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Abstract 
This thesis examines the emergence and evolution of government conservation 
initiatives within the fisheries sector. In particular, it discusses the incidental capture 
of marine wildlife species, including marine turtles, cetaceans and sea birds. The study 
focuses upon Australia and the United States, with the particular aim to trace the 
path of U.S. experience, in order to determine what lessons can be learn for Australia. 
In so doing, this thesis makes two significant contributions. Firstly, it considers the 
bycatch of charismatic species as a single study unit. It documents the development of 
policies towards such issues as driftnetting, tuna- dolphin purse -seine bycatch, the 
turtle- shrimp controversy and unilateral trade measures, and albatross longline 
bycatch. Secondly, it examines which factors have had the greatest influence on the 
creation of policies towards reducing the incidental capture of non- target species by 
commercial fishers, and the role each has played in different phases of the policy cycle. 
A chronological approach is taken: tracing bycatch policy in the United States, 
beginning with its emergence onto the public and political agendas in the 1970s, 
through to its current day status as central fisheries management issue. Three stages in 
this period can be isolated. These are: the raising of the issue onto the agenda and 
preliminary attempts to form policies therefor, such as early consideration of tuna - 
dolphin and turtle- shrimp bycatch; secondly, was a phase dominated by the creation 
of a new set of mechanisms, with an emphasis on their application in the international 
arena (for example the LaJolla Agreement and the dolphin -safe label); followed, in the 
1990s, by a period of consolidation and implementation of both new and existing 
policy items into actual actions, as seen internationally in the InterAmerican 
Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles and the Agreement on 
he International Dolphin Conservation Program, and domestically through the take 
reduction process and the rapid handling of seabird bycatch. 
As well as tracing the hitherto undocumented development of bycatch policy, the 
thesis contributes to the construction of a marine policy theory; adopting an 
environmental policy analysis framework, with legislative and related activity as the 
basic unit of analysis. Four factors believed to have influenced the evolution of bycatch 
policies are identified. As no broadly accepted theoretical foundation for marine 
policy exists, these factors are derived from an examination of the fields of public 
policy, environmental policy theory, and marine management analysis. These factors 
- the role of science, international influences, domestic events and priorities, and 
NGO activities - are traced through the case -studies. Areas of particular interest, that 
have to date been neglected in much of the Iiterature, such the influence of individuals 
and the impact that industry groups upon fisheries conservation policy formation, are 
highlighted. Increased understanding of the influence of the various factors at each of 
the phases in the policy cycle, as seen by an examination of the situation in the United 
States, has relevance for other jurisdictions that have had less experience with bycatch 
policy development, particularly, given the many similarities between the two nations, 
for Australia. 
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Introduction 
Marine mammals, including whales, porpoises, dolphins, seals, sea lions, sirenians, sea 
otters and polar bears, have had a sombre history. No other group of large mammals 
has had so many of its members driven to the brink of extinction.' Some of these 
species were also the first focus of international conservation agreements: witness the 
1911 Treaty for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, and the 1946 Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling! These agreements were a response to the threat of 
direct harvesting and, like most intergovernmental management efforts, protective 
status for cetaceans and pinnipedia was provided only after the species had been 
commercially depleted. Adding marine turtles and seabirds to the list, the survival of 
this group of marine wildlife species is now under threat. Although direct harvesting 
continues to cause significant mortality, attention has turned towards other impacts, 
one of which is capture incidental to commercial fishing operations (bycatch). 
This thesis traces the hitherto undocumented development of bycatch policy in the 
United States of America (U.S.), beginning with its emergence onto the public and 
political agendas in the 1970s, through to its current status as a central fisheries 
management issue. In Australia too, bycatch now commands significant policy 
attention. It does not, however, have the longevity of consideration that is witnessed in 
the U.S.. Australia's first foray into bycatch policy was its assertive 1986 ban on 
driftnetting in northern waters, subsequent to which, interest in the issue slumped. 
Notwithstanding this historic lack of attention, Australia now seems to have elevated 
bycatch to a central policy concern. The intent of this thesis is to provide an 
examination of the U.S. situation and handling of bycatch policy development to 
determine what can be learned for Australia. To so do, the thesis adopts an 
environmental policy analysis framework, with legislative and related activity as the 
basic unit of analysis. Four factors believed to have influenced the evolution of bycatch 
policies are identified. As no broadly accepted theoretical foundation for marine 
policy exists, these factors are derived from an examination of the fields of public 
policy, environmental policy theory, and marine management analysis. These factors 
- the role of science, international influences, domestic events and priorities, and 
environmental groups' activities - are traced through the two case studies. In the final 
1 Norris, K., "Marine Mammals and Man ", in Broker, H. (ed), Wildlife and America (Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1978) pp.49 -62. 
2 Convention for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, T.S. 504 (1911); and The International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (1948). 
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analysis, the role of each of these factors upon the development of bycatch policy is 
discussed, and their potential as the basis for a marine policy theory is contemplated. 
Bycatch was of little issue prior to the 1960s. Civilian marine efforts - with the 
exception of whaling - lacked technical expertise, and were restricted to relatively 
near shore waters. But with advances in marine science and technology, came 
improved fishing capabilities and increased access to the high seas.' This, coupled 
with an increased demand for ocean products, saw a dramatic rise in the number and 
scale of fishing operations, and with it, an increase in the incidental mortality of non- 
target species. Although this includes species other than those defined as marine 
wildlife, due to the difference in policy solutions, and the legislative and management 
tools adopted, this thesis considers only the bycatch of conservation significant marine 
wildlife species, at the expense of any attention to non -target fish species.' 
Kellert has identified nine characteristics responsible for the historic depletion of 
marine mammals.' These factors can be similarly applied to the other species 
identified under the heading of marine wildlife for the purposes of this thesis, 
notwithstanding that not all have been subject to large scale commercial harvesting. 
The factors are: the common property nature of most marine mammals; the migratory 
habits of many oceanic species; the vulnerability of many marine mammals as targets 
of exploitation; the presumed inexhaustibility of marine species; widespread biological 
ignorance; the large commercial benefits involved with harvesting many species or 
associated fish species; the difficulty of developing effective international marine 
mammal conservation agreements; adverse impacts of human activities upon marine 
habitats; and the historic lack of a sympathetic attitude towards marine mammals. 
Through the 1970s and 1980s several of these characteristics altered. The 1970s saw 
the enclosure of great expanses of ocean space that had been considered common 
property under the Grotian principle of the freedom of the high seas. This rising trend 
of ocean enclosure had considerable impact upon the use and management of ocean 
resources. Open access to common property resources and the resultant over - 
exploitation, a concept popularised by Hardin,' were reduced. Necessarily, the area of 
3 Laist, D. and Epting, J., "Marine Policy Evolution: A Reference Guide for Coastal Managers" (1980) 
7 Coastal Zone Management Journal 71. 
4 The separate consideration of marine wildlife to fish species derives from their different life cycles and 
the public image and commercial value they hold. Due to these differences, both the political response 
and available management and policy tools vary between these groups of marine species. For further 
discussion see Chapter One, footnotes 16 to 18 and accompanying text. 
5 Kellert, S., "Marine Mammals, Endangered Species, and Intergovernmental Relations ", in Silva, M. 
(ed), Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, 
1986) pp.131 -154. 
6 Hardin, G., "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 163 Science 1243. 
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ocean that fell under unilateral management increased. Coinciding with this, came an 
increased impetus to manage these areas sustainably.7 This was accompanied by 
increased international cooperation for those species in the ocean commons. Two other 
of Kellert's factors - the presumed inexhaustibility and the widespread biological 
ignorance - dissolved with the observed decline in and amongst marine mammal 
populations. Efforts to gain an increased understanding of the habits and fecundity of 
many marine species ensued. With this, both the finite nature of marine wildlife, and 
their vulnerability to over exploitation and habitat destruction, became apparent. 
In western nations, the emergence of sophisticated tactical lobbying and the increased 
provision of information to the community by environmentalists, combined to reduce 
the acceptability of the harvesting of marine mammals. As the direct exploitation of 
marine mammals became unpalatable to the public it was commonly either outlawed, 
or the market for the product declined such that operations were no longer 
commercially viable. Notwithstanding these developments, until recently little change 
has been discernible in commercial operations where marine wildlife is caught 
incidental to the target (fish) species. These operations have continued and the 
commercial incentive has remained high regardless of increased biological 
understanding, and altered community perceptions, with regard to marine wildlife. 
Indirect impacts on marine wildlife from commercial fishing operations may include 
reduced sources of food, alterations in predator -prey balances, habitat degradation, 
and bycatch. Bycatch policy development has only in the last few years progressed 
from a target species (e.g. tuna) and method (e.g. purse -seining) specific approach, to a 
policy area in its own right. In this period of rapid change in the way bycatch is 
viewed, it has been elevated to the status of one of the main marine environmental 
issues of the 1990s.5 Reflecting the newness of 'whole of bycatch' policy 
considerations, little academic work has been done in the bycatch issue area; this 
thesis rectifies this deficiency. 
Case -Study Selection 
The validity of selecting the United States of America as the case -study for an 
examination of the development of bycatch policy, as it relates to Australia, lies in the 
richness of U.S. experience and the essential similarities of these two countries and 
7 Kellert (1986) op. cit. n5. This relationship between ocean enclosure and greater littoral State 
responsibility is also discussed with respect to marine reserve declarations by Bohnsack. See Bohnsack, 
J., "Marine Reserves, Zoning, and the Future of Fisheries Management" (1996) 21 Fisheries 14. 
8 Tillman, M., "Bycatch: The Issue of the 90's ", in Proceedings of an International Conference on 
Shrimp Bycatch (Southeastern Fisheries Association, Tallahassee, Florida, 1992) pp.13 -18. 
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their approach to marine affairs. The federal government of each nation has played a 
key role in the evolution of international policy aimed at the reduction of incidental 
wildlife capture, and each has, in 1997, initiated the development of a bycatch policy 
aimed at comprehensively addressing the problem at a national level. Further, industry 
and government in both the U.S. and Australia have given considerable support to the 
research and development of bycatch reduction technology. 
Culturally similar in their affinity to marine wildlife species and cultural linkage with 
the ocean, throughout the writings of U.S. and Australian marine policy and law, 
authors have scattered references as to the importance of the coastal zone in the 
psyche of each nation.' Moreover, with regard to their marine environments the two 
nations are geographically and biologically similar: each has an expansive ocean 
territory, and high value fishery resources within their 200nm zones of jurisdiction.10 
Moreover, to govern their marine resources, both nations have established joint 
management structures involving their sub -national states and other key interests, be 
this on a regional or species specific basis." 
The similarities between Australia and the U.S. extend also to their federal system of 
governance. Federalism has been described as a "system of rules for the division of 
public policy responsibilities among a number of autonomous government agencies ".1z 
in both nations the authority to govern or make laws is divided between state and the 
federal governments, and enumerated under their constitutions. Although there are 
marked differences in the Australian and the U.S. styles of federalism, these nations 
share similar jurisdictional arrangements regarding the state /federal divisions of 
powers for fisheries off their coasts, and these have tended to be heavily dominated by 
the interests of commercial fishers. 
Born of the federal system are other likenesses. Such an arrangement offers 
opportunity for political participation by the citizenry, due to the existence of multiple 
arenas for public involvement. Democratic systems of elected government, and the high 
9 For example see Cicin -Sain, B., "A National Ocean Governance Strategy for the United States is 
Needed Now" (1994) 22 Coastal Management 171; and Davis, B., "Contemporary Ocean and Coastal 
Management Issues in Australia and New Zealand: An Overview" (1996) 33 Ocean and Coastal 
Management 5. 
10 The monetary value of Australia's fisheries is considerable, notwithstanding that its waters are 
comparatively poor in terms of production by weight. 
11 The term "states" is used to denote the internal units that comprise the federation of the U.S. or 
Australia. Unless otherwise stated throughout this thesis the term "states" in the Australian context refers 
to both the states and the Northern Territory, Use of upper -case " States" refers to nation States as 
recognised by international law. 
12 Anton, T., "Models of American Intergovernmental Relations" in Silva, M., (ed.) Ocean Resources 
and US. Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980.ç (Westview Press, Colorado, 1986) pp.1 -36 at 1. 
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degree of public access to elected representatives' further support this participatory 
basis of federalism in both the U.S. and Australia.13 Further, independent judicial 
redress is available to aggrieved parties. This option is more often pursued by groups 
or individuals in the U.S. though, as high costs and strict standing laws in Australia 
make access to the courts more prohibitive.14 
Finally, with respect to their international status, Australia and the U.S. are both 
prominent English -speaking, western nations. Although the U.S. is now the only 
recognised superpower, Australia has traditionally assumed a leadership role as a 
regional hegemon in the South Pacific, and wields considerable power in the Southern 
Ocean as a claimant nation under the Antarctic Treaty System.15 This position of 
Ieadership, shared by both nations at least on a regional level, allows them to propose 
and sustain various economic and diplomatic ideas outside of their own boundaries. 
Though sharing many similarities, this thesis restricts its conclusion to those lessons 
that can be learnt from the U.S. situation. The detailed attention paid to the U.S. vis- 
a -vis Australia is a reflection of the quantity of empirical evidence on the U.S. and the 
relatively scant data available in Australia, and the desire to utilise this U.S. data so 
as to develop a hitherto undocumented record of U.S. bycatch policy development. 
Thesis Structure 
Before embarking on the case studies, some background to the bycatch problem and a 
theoretical basis for the analysis is provided. Chapter One justifies the boundaries of 
the study in terms of the species considered under the heading of marine wildlife, and 
clarifies the concept of bycatch; both defining and explaining the term, and describing 
the main fishing methods that result in the bycatch of marine wildlife. Attention to 
Australian bycatch policy developments is also provided, and the nation's approach 
to bycatch policy creation for dolphin, albatross, sea turtles and dugong outlined. 
The second chapter discusses the theory and method. It examines the four factors that 
influence fisheries bycatch policy (the role of science, international influences, domestic 
actors, and environmental NGOs) and overviews the policy cycle as a framework for 
examining the role of each of these factors in policy development. 
13 Ibid. 
14 McDonald, J. and Münchenberg, S., "Public Interest Environmental Litigation - Chipping Away at 
Procedural Obstacles" (1995) 12 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 140; Münchenberg, S., 
"Judicial Review and the Commonwealth Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974" 
(1994) I I Environmental and Planning Law Journal 461; and Preston, B., "Lathes in Public Interest 
Litigation" (1986) 3 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 224. 
15 Bache, S. and Evans, N., "Dolphin, Albatross and Commercial Fishing: Australia's Responses to an 
Unpalatable Mix" (1999) 23 Marine Policy 259. 
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Chapters Three through Five comprise the U.S. case -study. They document the 
progression from the species and fishing method specific focus, to the development of 
the recent U.S. bycatch policy. Observations of the nature and evolution of policies are 
based upon the attention and national priority given to the issue, as indicated by the 
passage of legislation, and actions and statements of federal officials, members of 
Congress, academics, and other policy actors. Sources of information include: 
transcripts and statements issued with respect to the passage of legislation; 
executive branch and upper level bureaucracy responses to new legislation, as 
indicated by priorities for implementation, organisational changes made to 
accommodate such, and the calibre of leadership witnessed; 
major new initiatives by the government evidenced by the implementation of 
reviews, release of new policies, or executive orders by the president; and 
significant political studies, speeches and important reports." 
The three U.S. case -study chapters are arranged in broad but distinctive periods, 
unique to its ocean policy development phases. Several authors have attempted to 
classify the periods of marine activities as dominated and demarcated by phases in 
the nation's political landscape." The arrangement in this thesis draws upon these in 
determining three phases. These are: 1970 -1979 the formative era of marine and 
environmental policy; 1980 -1992 the Reagan/Bush years of government characterised 
by policy stagnation and judicial challenges; and 1993 forward, which has been a 
period dominated by the consolidation of marine bycatch policies. 
By adopting a chronological approach the analysis is able to consider not just the 
problems or solutions but the process undergone in reaching an endpoint policy 
position.18 Throughout, the descriptive case studies are reexamined in terms of the four 
factors identified in Chapter Two. In the concluding chapter, lessons of the 
16 Knecht, R., Cicin -Sain, B. and Archer, J., "National Oceans Policy: A Window of Opportunity" 
(1988) 19 Ocean Development and International law 113. 
17 A range of authors have used different boundaries and nomenclature to identify different phases of 
policy development in the oceans arena. Written mainly in the late 1980s towards the end of Reagan's 
term, they universally classified his phase of Presidency as negative for ocean's policy development. For 
example King delineates a formative decade (1959- 1969), a stewardship decade (1970- 1980), and a decade 
of decline (1980- 1990), with 1990 onwards being the decade to come. Curlin argues that the distinctive 
periods have been from a phase of innovative oceans policy (1969- 1976), through a cognition phase 
(1977 -1982) to a phase of degradation (1983- 1988). Finally Knecht, Cicin -Sain and Archer put forward a 
model of the phases of development of ocean policy commencing with ocean science (1960 - 1969), then a 
phase dominated by environmental concerns (1969 -1973), followed by an energy crisis (1973 -1980) and 
culminating with a period of retrenchments (1980s). See Curlin, J., "Federalism and Ocean Policy - a 
Commentary" (1988) 20 Marine Technology Society Journal 3; King, l,. and Jennings, F., "The 
Executive and the Oceans: Three Decades of United States Marine Policy" (1990) 22 Marine Technology 
Society Journal 17; and Knecht et al. (1988) op. cit. n16. 
18 Walker, K., The Political Economy of Environmental Policy: An Australian Introduction (New 
South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1994). 
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combination and recombination of various influences upon the promotion or 
retardation of bycatch policy development, since the issue first emerged into the 
decision making arena in the early 1970s, is assessed. In this way, an insight into the 
pitfalls or omissions regarding Australian policy development is provided. As stated, 
the utility of these factors as the basis for a marine policy theory, within a policy cycle 
model, is also contemplated. Finally, current trends and direction are considered. 
Theoretical and Analytical Orientation 
Policy analysis has been defined as the "description and explanation of the causes 
and consequences of government activity ".19 The policy area examined here is 
ultimately a government responsibility although other players are also involved. 
Providing incentives for, or compelling the use of, bycatch exclusion devices or, (where 
such are not available) prohibiting operations, is a regulatory duty commonly the 
responsibility of a national government. As such, this thesis focuses on the national 
perspectives and actions of the United States of America and Australian governments. 
The theoretical basis for the analytical component of this thesis is provided in Chapter 
Two. This is drawn from a range of environmental policy perspectives and public 
policy theories, as well as marine focused writings. Literature combining these fields of 
analysis - notwithstanding the longevity and multi- disciplinary objective of policy 
science20- is scarce, with much environmental policy having evolved quite separately 
to other public policy theories. This thesis's methodology chapter integrates aspects 
from all three disciplines to distil therefrom four factors likely to have repeatedly 
influenced the development of bycatch policies. It also draws attention to the 
differences inherent in the marine context, as opposed to the terrestrial environmental 
experience, upon which the bulk of environmental policy theory is based. 
The four factors that may be used to explain the nature and timing of various stages in 
the emergence of each nation's bycatch policy are, as previously mentioned, the role of 
science, the impact of non -governmental organisations, domestic political constraints 
and motivations, and the impact of international agreements and the range and level of 
interest in the issue (its internationality)." The purpose of this second chapter is not, 
however, to provide a critical analysis or to test the theories of each of the literatures 
that promote the importance of these factors in policy formation. Rather it is to 
19 Dye, T., Understanding Public Policy (5 Ed) (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984). 
20 Lasswell, H., The Policy Orientation ", in Lerner D. and Lasswell H., (ed), The Policy Sciences: 
Recent Developments in Scope and Method (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1951) pp.3 -15. 
2I Bache and Evans (1999) op. cit. n15. 
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identify those dimensions of each of these that may provide some insight into the 
process of marine policy creation, and to allow the application of their explanatory 
tools to the issue of bycatch in the U.S. and Australia.' 
The investigation of the four identified factors is conducted within a policy cycle 
model, which allows for consideration of a complex policy in a number of more 
accessible stages. These stages of the policy cycle progress from that of agenda raising, 
where the issue is first introduced for policy consideration; through to the second 
phase of policy formation where an issue is transformed in to an actual policy; and 
finally to the implementation stage of the cycle. An issue may be discarded at any 
stage throughout this cycle, resulting in no policy being formed though the rejection of 
an issue is a policy decision in itself. The actors and influences differ at each of these 
phases in policy development: NGOs and science often playing a significant role in the 
agenda raising phase; domestic players and events expected to have a dominant role 
in the second phase along with international influences; and finally NGOs and 
domestic players dominating in the third implementation stage. These roles have of 
course evolved over time, and the development and various influences of the four 
factors are traced through the U.S. case -study chapters. The use of the policy cycle 
model also "aids in theory building by allowing numerous case studies and 
comparative studies of different stages to be undertaken,"53 It is hence intended that, 
in concluding, the four factors will provide complementary hypotheses that form the 
basis of a (uniquely) marine policy theory, 
This thesis and its methodological framework provide several major contributions to 
the current state of knowledge on both bycatch and on marine policy. Nowhere 
previously has such an consistent and detailed review of the development of U.S. 
bycatch policy been undertaken. And hence the treatment given to this issue area in 
this thesis is itself a significant contribution to knowledge. This thesis makes a second 
contribution. The Second Chapter distills from a range of fields a framework of 
analysis. In combining public policy, environmental policy, and marine management 
disciplines, and applying this framework to the fisheries bycatch issue area, this thesis 
makes a significant advance towards the goal of creating of a marine policy theory. 
The framework of analysis is, through the detailed U.S. case study, proven to be valid. 
22 A similar approach is taken in Elliott, L., International Environmental Politics: Protecting the 
Antarctic (MacMillan Press, London, 1994). 
23 Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M., Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1995) at 12. 
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1.1 Defining the Problem - the incidental capture of marine wildlife 
Marine wildlife and fisheries interact in ways that can adversely affect both. Marine 
mammals, seabirds or turtles may become entangled in fishing gear and be killed or 
injured. Alternatively, marine wildlife may compete with fishers for the same resource 
or may cause damage to gear and catch. This thesis considers only the former of these 
two interactions, that is bycatch. 
The term bycatch is used to describe the unintended capture of both non -target fish 
and non -commercially viable species in fishing operations. That is, those species and 
individuals towards which there is no directed effort.' Most marine wildlife species are 
air -breathing, and consequently a large portion of the individuals that are caught as 
bycatch die from asphyxiation before being sighted and released. Considerable debate 
exists as to what percentage of live species that are released after incidental capture 
actually survive? Individuals caught and returned to the oceans have not traditionally 
been included in bycatch figures, although they may fall within the scope of some more 
recent definitions, which include phrases such as "unobserved mortalities"? 
These progressive and broader definitions are also likely to encompass ghost fishing as 
a form of bycatch. Ghost fishing refers to the entanglement and ultimate death of 
marine species in discarded or lost fishing gear including driftnets, trawlnets, gillnets, 
traps, ropes and monofilament fishing line.' This form of marine debris is particularly 
1 Alverson, D., Freeberg, M., Pope, J. and Murawski, S., A Global Assessment of Fisheries Bycatch 
and Discards (FAO, Rome, 1994). 
2 For example in regard to dolphins' purse -seine bycatch mortality rates see, Kubasek, N., Browne, 
N.M., Young, M. and Hiers, W., "Protecting Marine Mammals: Time for a New Approach" (1995) 13 
Journal of Environmental Law 1; and Curry, B., Stress in Mammals: The Potential Influence of 
Fishery -Induced Stress on Dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, NOAA Technical 
Memorandum No.260 (NMFS, Southwest Fisheries Science Center, LaJolla, March 1999). With regard 
to sea turtle longline mortality rates see Aguilar, R., Mas, J. and Pastor, X., "Impact of Spanish 
Swordfish Longline Fisheries on the Loggerhead Sea Turtle Caretta caretta Population in the Western 
Mediterranean", paper presented at Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Workshop on Sea Turtle Biology 
and Conservation (NMFS, Georgia, 1992) pp.1 -9; and Balaz, G. and Pooley, S., Research Plan to 
Assess Marine Turtle Hooking Mortality: Results of an Expert Workshop Held in Honolulu, Hawaii, 
November 16 -18, 1993 (Southwest Fisheries Science Center, NMFS, 1994). 
3 National Marine Fisheries Service, Managing the Nation's Bycatch: Priorities, Programs and 
Actions for the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, Washington DC, 1998); and Ministerial 
Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture, National Policy on Fisheries Bycatch (AFFA, Canberra, 
1999) (hereafter "National Bycatch Policy "). 
4 Ghost fishing occurs where lost and discarded marine fishing debris continues to fish, capturing 
both target and non -target marine species. Of most concern are the impacts from gill or driftnets and 
demersal trawl nets. One study has estimated that the amount of lost and discarded fishing gear amounts 
to 135,000 tonnes per annum. Merelle, T., "Accumulation of Plastic Litter on Beaches of Amchitlea 
continued over page 
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deadly due to its transparent nature, as well as longevity and buoyancy.' As an 
indication of the number of individuals believed to be taken in this manner, it is 
estimated that plastic pollution (from both fishing vessels and ships) causes the 
fatality of over 1,000,000 birds and over 100,000 marine mammals and sea turtles 
each year.' These figures, as well as those of the number of individuals that are eaten 
by predators before the equipment is hauled in, are difficult to quantify and are 
seldom incorporated into incidental mortality estimates.' Consequent of these 
uncertainties, bycatch figures have a significant margin of error, and are believed to be 
routinely underestimated.8 
The problem of uncontrolled and escalating bycatch, as with overfishing, emerged 
largely due to the rapid development of fishing technologies,' the escalation in 
commercial fisheries, and the lack of a parallel advance in regulation to prevent 
adverse environmental side- effects.10 While not the target of the nets, longlines and 
Island, Alaska" (1986) 3 Marine Environmental Research 171. See also Jones, M., Fishing Debris in the 
Australian Marine Environment (Bureau of Resource Sciences, Canberra, 1994); Lang, G., "Plastics, The 
Marine Menace: Causes and Cures" (1990) 5 Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 729; and 
Joyner, J. and Frew, S., "Plastic Pollution in the Marine Environment" (1991) 22 Ocean Development 
and International Law 33. 
5 The non -biodegradable nature and reduced weight of construction materials means that lost or 
discarded nets may continue to ghost fish for years, until they are washed ashore, or the weight of the 
species caught therein causes the nets to sink to the ocean floor. See Center for Environmental Education, 
Plastics in the Ocean: More than a Litter Problem (CEE, Washington DC, 1987); Fower, C., "Marine 
Debris and Northern Fur Seals: A Case Study" (1987) 18 Marine Pollution Bulletin 334; Laist, D., 
"Overview of the Biological Effects of Lost and Discarded Plastic Debris in the Marine Environment" 
(1987) 12 Marine Pollution Bulletin 319; Mackey, D., "To Help Hooked Sea Birds" (1982) May -June 
Oceans 24; and Shaughnessy, P., "Entanglement of Cape Fur Seals with Man-Made Objects" (1980) 11 
Marine Pollution Bulletin 326. 
6 Lang (1990) op. cit. n4. 
7 In Queensland, Australia, a study was undertaken comparing the utility and bycatch of shark -nets 
with that of baited lines for protecting beaches from sharks. On several occasions dugong and dolphin 
were found in the stomachs of sharks captured in nets. This led the author to conclude that a significant 
proportion of these sharks had been lured by previously meshed non -target species, and moreover, that 
the recorded level of bycatch of non -target species was an underestimation. Paterson, R., "Effects of Long - 
Term Anti -shark Measures on Target and Non -target Species in Queensland, Australia" (1990) 52 
Biological Conservation 147. 
8 Threat Abatement Planning Team, Plan for the Incidental Catch (or Bycatch) of Seabirds' During 
Oceanic Longlining Operations (Environment Australia, Canberra, 1998). 
9 Dayton, P., Thrush, S., Agardy, M. and Hofuran, R., "Environmental Effects of Fishing" (1995) 5 
Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 205. Traditionally fishers used nets 
constructed of natural materials - less durable, and more expensive. Retrieval was by hand, thus the size 
of the net was limited by its laden weight and the manual power needed to successfully reclaim it. This 
situation altered with the combined technological developments of the mechanised winch, and the 
replacement of natural fibers with nets made of synthetic fibers such as monofilament nylon. Moreover, 
these nets made of light translucent plastics are difficult both to see, and to detect with sonar. Once 
caught, large species, that may have once otherwise escaped from weaker and less durable materials, 
became permanently entangled and drown in fishing nets. 
10 Krock, H -J., "The Role of Technology in Ocean Resources Development ", in Mensch, T. (ed), 
Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century (Law of the Sea Institute, University 
of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1996) pp.150 -155. 
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trawls, marine reptiles, mammals, and seabirds were "hauled up, killed and thrown 
overboard in fisheries around the world in staggering quantities. "" 
Arguments as to why bycatch is an issue of concern can be broken down into three 
categories.° First, expanding on the principle of maintenance of ecosystem integrity 
and marine biodiversity, there are ecological arguments such as avoiding the extinction 
of species, rebuilding depleted populations, and retaining the basic structure and 
function of an ecosystem. In terms of the principle of integrated oceans planning and 
management for multiple ocean use, there are also sociological arguments which include 
reducing 'wastage' in fisheries, regardless of whether the species are charismatic or not. 
Finally, as part of encouraging the development of competitive industries, there are 
economic arguments based upon the desire to keep fisheries open. These include 
minimised negative publicity, and meeting operational and technical needs such as 
minimizing the inconvenience or danger associated with bycatch. In addition the 
redressing of the bycatch issue will result in the incorporation or amelioration of, in 
economic terms, an externality of fishing.13 
This thesis is concerned with the bycatch of marine wildlife, oft referred to as 
'conservation significant species'. This terminology is somewhat misleading. Although 
derived from the endangered status of some marine wildlife, this phrase is commonly 
also applied to species which are in abundance but have emotive significance to 
western nations. For example, although many seabirds, sea turtles and manatees 
afforded the title conservation significant species are critically endangered, also 
grouped hereunder are healthy populations of some dolphin, sea lion and seals. 
Conversely threatened fish species are rarely grouped under the heading of 
conservation significant, hence implying that they are not in need of preservation 
measures, though their populations may be depleted or even endangered in their 
natural habitat." Notwithstanding the apparent scientific illogic of this grouping, the 
II IudiceIlo, S. and Lytle, M., "Marine Biodiversity and International Law Instruments and 
Institutions that can be used to Conserve Marine Biological Diversity Internationally" (1994) 8 Tulane 
Environmental Law Journal 123 at 128. 
12 Hall, M., "On Bycatches" (1996) 6 Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 319; Harris, A. and 
Ward, P., Non - Target Species in Australia's Commonwealth Fisheries - A Critical Review (Bureau of 
Rural Sciences, Canberra, 1999); and Metzner, R., "Bycatch: Do We Care ?" paper presented at ABARE 
Outlook '99 (ABARE, Canberra, 1999) in press. 
13 Hoagland, P., Sin, D. and Lee, P., Market -Based Incentives to Reduce Fisheries Bycatch 
(NMFS /WHOI, Woods Hole, 1996). 
14 There is some evidence that this situation is changing. For example, in Australia the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna has been nominated for listing as threatened under Australia's primary endangered species 
legislation, and is being considered for nomination under CITES. Per comm. Dr Nathan Evans, Senior 
Policy Officer, Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch, Forestry, Fisheries and Agriculture - Australian, 
Canberra, 12 May 1999. 
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consideration of marine wildlife in bycatch policy formation and management has been 
handled differently to that of fish species. 
The reasons for the fish /non -fish classification system are several, and vary slightly 
depending upon whether the viewpoint is held by professionals or the public. The 
emotive connection the wider community has with marine wildlife is rarely extended to 
fish species.° This can be assumed to be, by and large, a reaction to the appearance 
and behaviour of fish and, to human conditioning to accept these species as a food - 
source.16 Another aspect contributing to the divided perception between fish and 
marine wildlife, is that ownership rights to fish are perceived to accrue to commercial 
fishers (largely through the allocation of catch quotas and access rights). Thus in the 
public psyche, fish are not afforded the same degree common property status as 
marine wildlife, and the same level of community interest and ownership of the 
problem that results from the overexploitation of marine wildlife, is seldom achieved in 
relation to fish species. Finally, is the influence of the different paradigms of 
conservation and resource agencies: the former tending to take a protective role, and 
the latter a sustainable use approach to fisheries and associated marine species. 
Species so grouped as marine wildlife do, however, have one notable, tenable scientific 
difference to most fish species." Their biological longevity and low fecundity,18 results 
in a particular susceptibility to bycatch.10 Seabirds and marine turtles and mammals 
suffer low levels of recruitment: all either bear young infrequently and in small 
numbers, or else have a high infant mortality rate. For example dugongs do not calve 
until at least ten years of age and only a single offspring is born, after which there is a 
15 Dayton et al. (1995) op. cit. n9. 
16 Several non -western societies consider marine wildlife (such as turtles and dugong) to be another 
source of food, and they view these species accordingly as wild, harvestable species, akin to fish. 
17 There are fish species which are an exception to this general rule. For example the Orange 
Roughy's life characteristics mimic that of a turtle more than reflecting its status as a fish. It is believed 
to have a life -span of well over one hundred years and does not begin breeding until an age of 20 -30. 
Fecundity is low, rarely exceeding 90,000 eggs per female. Tilzey, R. and Chesson, J., "South Fast 
Fishery - Quota Species ", in Caton, A., McLoughlin, K. and Staples, D. (ed.), Fishery Status Reports 
1997: Resource Assessments of Australian Commonwealth Fisheries (Bureau of Resource Sciences, 
Canberra, 1997) pp.41 -58. 
18 Most marine species are r- strategists. These are species with a short lifespan but which produce 
many offspring. Species characterised as large- bodied, long-lived, slow -breeding, and producing fewer 
offspring with greater parental investment are classified as K- strategists. Marine wildlife, including marine 
mammals, seabirds and turtles are K- strategists, and hence vulnerable to exploitation induced extinction 
(the other group of marine species to be K- strategists are elasmobranchs, and more recently these too have 
begun to receive considerable conservation attention). See Vermeij, G., "Saving the Sea: What We Know 
and What We Need to Know" (1989) 3 Conservation Biology 240. 
19 Crouse, D., "The Consequences of Delayed Maturity in a Human- Dominated World" (1999) 23 
American Fisheries Society Symposium (in press); and Dayton et al. (1995) op. cit. n9. 
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period of three to seven years before calving occurs again.20 Even if breeding at their 
maximum rate, a dugong population is unlikely to increase by more than five percent 
per annum.21 Similarly albatrosses, depending upon the species, do not reach maturity 
until between five and 12 years of age 22 Albatross produce only a single chick every 
one to two years and the chick may take up to 11 months to fledge. Marine turtles vary 
from this pattern in that, although long lived and only occasional breeders, they 
produce a large number eggs per clutch, up to 130 at once, again depending on the 
species. The recruitment rate remains low however, due to both natural and human 
predation of eggs, and the high natural mortality rate of marine turtle hatchlings.n 
Given the public and scientific popularity of these marine wildlife species, their 
incidental take in fishing operations worldwide remained out of the media for a 
surprisingly long time. It first gained widespread attention in respect to dolphin 
mortality caused by both long drift nets and purse -seine operations in the mid 1970s 
and 1980s. The continued usage of these fishing methods inspired two of the most 
heated, emotional, and public debates over fisheries since the whaling and sealing 
controversies of the previous decade ' 
Bycatch occurs for one of two reasons: either because the gear used is not selective 
enough, or else because fishers have insufficient incentive to operate the gear in a 
manner or location that will prevent non -target take. Technological investigation to 
increase the selectivity of gear is an ongoing process. Devices designed to reduce the 
amount of bycatch in a particular fishery or with a particular gear type are seldom 
accepted and adopted by fishers unless three preconditions are met: (1) that minimal 
loss of target species results, (2) that the use of the bycatch reduction device does not 
increase the operating costs, and (3) that the device is safe, simple and practicable to 
20 The considerable period between dugong calves is partially explained by the length of pregnancy 
the nursing period. Gestation lasts for 13 months, and dugong calves then suckle for a further 18 month 
period. 
21 Marsh, H., "An Ecological Basis for Dugong Conservation in Australia" in Angee, M. (ed), Marine 
Mammals of Australasia - Field Biology and Captive Management (The Royal Zoological Society of 
NSW, Sydney, 1988) pp.9 -21. 
22 Threat Abatement Planning Team (1998) op. cit. n8. 
23 Crouse, D., Crowder, L. and Caswell, H., "A Stage -based Population Model for Logerhead Sea 
Turtles and Implications for Conservation" (1987) 68 Ecology 1412; Crowder, L., Crouse, D., Heppell, 
S. and Martin, T., "Predicting the Impact of Turtle Exclusion Devices on Loggerhead Sea Turtle 
Populations" (1994) 4 Ecological Applications 437; and Heppell, S., Limpus, C., Crouse, D., Frazer, 
N. and Crowder, L., "Population Model Analysis for the Loggerhead Sea Turtle, Caretta caretta, in 
Queensland" (1996) 23 Wildlife Research 143. 
24 Joseph, J., "The Tuna -Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, 
and Political Impacts" (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 1. 
-13- 
Sali Jayne Bache 
usez To illuminate the nature and provide a better understanding of the problem, the 
main methods of fish harvest, their bycatches, and available exclusion devices, are 
outlined below. 
1.2 Methods of fishing, individual fisheries and their bycatch 
Bycatch occurs in almost all fisheries and no large -scale commercial fishing method fits 
the description of perfectly selective. Fishing gear and methods are designed so as to 
obtain the best results (i.e. highest catch) with the minimal time and financial outlay 
(i.e. lowest effort), as determined by the characteristics and behaviour of the target 
species of a particular fishery.' Characteristics and behaviours include fish feeding, 
spawning, shoaling and migratory activities, a species' ecology or relationships with 
their habitat and other species, and their herding ability.' Bycatch of high numbers of 
conservation significant species, however, is restricted to a small selection of available 
fishing methods. Logically though, these methods are those that also provide in the 
greatest target catch -per -unit- effort, and as such are those predominantly favoured in 
fisheries. 
Although no world standard for the categorisation of fishing gear exists, a benchmark 
is generally taken from the Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) 1987 gear 
classification 28 Fishing vessels, too, vary. Some are defined in terms of their gear such 
as longliners or trawlers, and others are multi- purpose and can be rigged with different 
gear to operate in several fisheries. Fisheries, as considered here, are grouped in terms 
of their gear under the four major categories of long pelagic driftnets and gillnets, 
purse -seiners, demersal trawls, and longliners 29 
The extent and nature of the bycatch taken in a fishery, and the most effective means 
for the reduction thereof, depends primarily upon the fishing method used. Bycatch 
reduction devices and mitigation methods range from relatively minor gear adaptations 
or changes in harvesting techniques, to seasonal or spatial closure of entire fisheries. 
25 Tucker, A., Robins, J. and McPhee, D., "Adopting Turtle Exclusion Devices in Australia and the 
United States: What are the Differences in Technology Transfer, Promotion, and Acceptance?" (1997) 25 
Coastal Management 405. 
26 This is commonly referred to as the catch -per- unit -effort (CPUF.), which is a measure of the number 
or weight of fish caught by a unit of fishing effort, frequently time. CPUE is often used as a measure of 
fish abundance. 
27 Chapman, L., "Fishing Gear ", in Bureau of Resource Sciences (ed), Australian Fisheries Resources 
(Department of Primary Industry and Energy, Canberra, 1993) pp.46 -63. 
28 Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO Catalogue of Small -scale Fishing Gear (2 Ed) (Fishing 
News Books, London, 1987). 
29 Other fisheries not considered in this chapter include dredging, lobster pots, squid jigging, and pole 
and line Fishing. Their lack of inclusion is due (with the exception of lobster pots and large cetacean take) 
to the lack of policy attention afforded any of these gear types to date. 
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In considering the benefits and costs of each of the fishing methods and bycatch 
mitigation options outlined below, it is useful to recognise the implications of the 
complexity of this issue in the following remarks made at a United States' 
Congressional Hearing on the issue of dolphin bycatch in tuna purse -seine fisheries. 
The U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans stated that 
[wie recognise that some people believe that there should be no setting of 
purse -seine nets around dolphins. However, this would increase the use of 
other fishing techniques, such as setting the nets around logs or schools of 
fish. Unfortunately, these other fishing techniques, if used widely, are much 
worse for the environment overall, because they yield significantly higher 
bycatch of other species, including sharks, billfish and endangered sea 
turtle. 
Long Pelagic Driftnets and Gillnets 
Gill and driftnets have been used for centuries. In modern times they have been 
employed chiefly to target squid and salmon on the high seas of the northern 
hemisphere, and to catch tuna and shark in southern waters, as well as a variety of 
coastal species. Drift and gillnets are a non -selective passive fishing device, the 
intention of which is to capture the fish when it attempts to pass through the net, 
becoming caught behind its gills.30 The nets are constructed from a series of panels of 
meshing, held vertically in the water column by floats at the top and weights at the 
bottom. Their position in the water column and the size of the mesh depends upon the 
target species and the particular regulations governing its catch. 
Gi inettíng has traditionally been practiced in both coastal waters and on the high seas, 
although is more common within nations' 200nm exclusive economic zones (EEZ). The 
three main types of gillnets are drifting gillnets, bottom set gillnets and coastal 
gillnets.' Drifting gillnets are termed positively buoyant if set with the headline on the 
sea's surface, and negatively buoyant if set part way down the water column and 
suspended below the surface from larger floats. Once set the net is generally allowed to 
fish for between one and six hours, with one end permanently attached to the vessel. 
The net is then hauled on board and cleared by hand. Bottom set gillnets are also 
referred to as sharknets, graball nets, or mesh nets. They are similar to drifting gill nets 
except they fish on the ocean floor and the boat does not usually remain attached to 
the gear. These nets may be left for up to several days to fish the waters before being 
hauled onboard and cleared 32 Because of the considerable time they are left 
30 Chapman (1993) op- cit. n27. 
31 Purse -seines may also be classified as a form of gilinet or under an alternate classification of 
encircling nets. For the purposes of their bycatch and appropriate mitigation tactics purse -seines are 
considered as a different gear type to gillnets. 
32 Chapman (1993) op. cit. n27. 
- 15 
- 
Sali Jayne Bache 
unattended, as well as their bottom dwelling nature, demersal" set gillnets are 
particularly dangerous to the herbivorous dugong in the southern hemisphere.' Coastal 
gillnets (or swinger nets, running nets, or offshore set gillnets) are set adjacent to the 
shoreline on coastal mud flats. They generally extend through the depth of the water 
column so as to ensure that they encounter all fish moving in the area and fish from 
when the tide begins to rise until it recedes?' 
Large scale driftnet operations are perhaps the method of fishing that has received the 
most negative publicity, and generated the most debate over the past two decades. 
This fishing method emerged with the technological advent of monofilament nylon, and 
the power winch. Long pelagic driftnets have been used by both distant water fishing 
nations (DWFNs) in the South and North Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and to a lesser 
extent by individual nations within their 200nm EEZ. Long driftnets are not, contrary 
to popular belief, constructed so as to form a single continuous 'wall' or 'curtain'. They 
are made up of alternating segments of mesh, joined together for up to 10 or 11 km, 
followed by a break ranging from several tens of meters to one kilometer. A single long 
driftnet may however span up to 50 kilometers in length. The nets are typically set at 
dusk, taking three to four hours to deploy, they are allowed to drift with the winds 
and currents near the surface overnight. The following morning, the crew uses a marine 
radio on an attached buoy to locate its net. The subsequent winching aboard may take 
eight or more hours to complete. Occasionally when a net becomes too heavy it will be 
cut loose and abandoned - left to ghost fish indefinitely. Alternatively a net may not 
be retrieved if its homing device becomes accidentally detached, or else if a vessel is 
fishing illegally it may abandon the net to avoid detection or capture. 
Because of the scale of long driftnet operations, and because they occur outside of 
national regulatory boundaries, little control over operations is possible?' Referred to 
as "one of the most deadly fishing methods ever developed"?' long pelagic driftnets 
33 The terminology, demersal, derives from the Latin `deme' which means down. Demersal refers to 
species living on or near the sea bottom. It is extended to fishing operations intended to capture these 
species. Pelagic or surface dwelling fish (similarly from the Latin 'pela' meaning up) refer to those 
species living or growing at or near the ocean's surface. 
34 Great Barrier Reef Ministerial Council, "Emergency Measures for Great Barrier Reef and Adjacent 
Area Dugong Recovery and Conservation" Record of Decisions, 22nd Meeting of the Great Barrier Reef 
Ministerial Council, 30 November 1996, Brisbane, cited in Preen, A., "Marine Protected Areas and 
Dugong Conservation Along Australia's Indian Ocean Coast" (1998) 22 Environmental Management 
173. 
35 Chapman (1993) op. cit. n27. 
36 Although many nation's apply their laws extra -territorially, problems with collection of evidence 
and the reflagging of vessels makes enforcement often problematic. 
37 Paul, L., High Seas Driftnetting: Plunder of the Global Commons (Earthtrust, Washington DC, 
1991). 
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have been nicknamed "curtains [or walls] of death ".38 And although intended to target 
specific species they are notorious for their indiscriminate take of non -target fish and 
conservation significant species. Cetaceans, marine turtles, sea birds, manatees and 
dugongs are routinely entangled and drowned in long pelagic driftnets.39 Although the 
ratio of target to incidental catch is believed to vary considerably between driftnet 
fisheries, monitoring and mitigation are difficult. The only tools that appear to be 
successful in the reduction of bycatch in large scale driftnetting operations are closures 
- seasonal, spatial or permanent. 
Though implicated in the near extinction of several species of porpoise worldwide,40 
small coastal gillnetting operations, in contrast to large scale driftnetting, "need not be 
any more destructive than other fishing techniques if they are used selectively and in 
moderation. "41 Notwithstanding this assertion, there has been considerable concern 
over the incidental capture of dugong, inshore dolphin, turtles and seabirds in 
gillnetting operations ' Restrictions on net drop and length, and compulsory regular 
monitoring are advocated as the primary tools with which to minimise gillnet bycatch. 
Limits on the mesh size also will reduce the number of the larger non -target species 
that are caught incidentally as, in general, the Iarger the mesh, the more likely that 
species such as dugongs and turtles will become entangled. 
The use of mitigation methods to adequately prevent marine wildlife bycatch in small 
gillnetting operations remains contentious. A range of acoustic deterrents have been 
tested, but information has been based upon trial and error and few controlled 
experiments have been undertaken. 43 The latest popular technological development is 
the use of pingers, acoustic sounding devices, to alert dolphins of a net's nearby 
presence and thus reduce dolphin bycatch.44 This has been successfully trialed with the 
38 Eisenbud, R., "Problems and Prospects for the Pelagic Driftnet" (1985) 12 Environmental Affairs 
473. 
39 For data on the estimated take of large -scale driftnet fishing operations refer to Chapter Four 
discussions on Sidney Review (section 4.3, text accompanying footnotes 99 -105). See also Northridge, 
S., Drfftnet Fisheries and Their Impact on Non- Target Species: A Worldwide Review (FAO, Rome, 
199í); and Northridge, S., Environmental Mismanagement on the High Seas: A Retrospective Analysis 
of the Squid and Tuna Drhnet Fisheries of the North Pacific (Marine Mammal Commission, 
Washington DC, 1995). 
40 Jefferson, T. and Curry, B., "Global Review of Porpoise (Cetacea: Phocoenídae) Mortality in 
Gillnets" (1994) 67 Biological Conservation 167. 
41 Eisenbud (1985) op. cit. n38 at 473. 
42 Marsh, H., Corkeron, P., Limpus, C., Shaughnessy, P. and Ward, T., "The Reptiles and 
Mammals in Australian Seas: their Status and Management ", in Zann, L. and Kailola, P. (ed), The State 
of the Marine Environment Report for Australia: Technical Annex 1 - the Marine Environment (AGPS, 
Canberra, I995) pp.151 -166; Brownell, R., Ralls, K. and Perrin, W., "The Plight of the Forgotten 
Whales: It's Mainly the Small Cetaceans that are Now in Peril" (1989) 32 Oceanus 5. 
43 Jefferson, T, and Curry, B., "Acoustic Methods of Reducing or Eliminating Marine Mammal - 
Fishery Interactions: Do They Work ?" (1996) 31 Ocean and Coastal Management 41. 
44 Ibid 
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harbor porpoise in the U.S. New Hampshire area, with a 92% bycatch reduction rate 
reported.45 It has yet to be repeated with the same degree of success in other studies or 
regions, though.46 Moreover it has been suggested that even if the effectiveness of 
pingers is confirmed that alone these may provide insufficient to satisfy marine 
wildlife protection laws." Further problems include the cost of gear modification, the 
impracticality of the use of pingers in their current early state of development, and the 
potential for pinnipeds learn to associate pingers' noises with gillnets from which they 
feed from fishers' catches prior to hauling.95 
Purse -Seiners 
Hook -and -line bait boats, of predominantly U.S. register, targeted yellowfin tuna in 
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) throughout the 1940s.49 By the mid 50s, 
however, profits had begun to decline due to the combined factors of low productivity 
and competition from cheap imported tuna 5° In 1957, the first conversion of a U.S. 
bait boat into a purse- seiner occurred. The occurrence of incidental capture of dolphins 
was first brought to public attention in 1968, when documented by a U.S. National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) scientist 51 
In the ETP yellowfin tuna tend to swim directly underneath pods of dolphins, and 
purse-seining was developed to utilise this unexplained relationship 52 The name of 
purse- seining arose out of the catch method which begins by the high speed pursuit of 
a school of dolphins by motor boats and the use of small explosives called seal bombs 
to tire and scare them, rounding the dolphins into a herd. This chase lasts somewhere 
between 20 minutes and an hour 53 The catcher vessel then encircles the herd with a net 
in a process known as 'setting on dolphins'. These "house- sizedi54 nets may be up to a 
45 Kraus, S., Read, A., Anderson, F.., Baldwin, K., Solow, A., Spradlin, T. and Williamson, J., 
"Acoustic Alarms Reduce Incidental Mortality of Porpoises in Gill Nets" (1997) 388 Nature 525. 
46 Dawson, S., Read, A. and Slooten, E., "Pingers, Porpoises and Power: Uncertainties with Using 
Pingers to Reduce Bycatch of Small Cetaceans" (1998) 84 Biological Conservation 141. 
47 Mid 
48 Ibid 
49 The Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean or ETP is an area of nutrient -rich waters extending from the 
U.S.- Mexico boarder down to the equator. Yellowfin tuna are plentiful in this region, and are particularly 
valuable to the canneries due to their size of up to 400 pounds. 
50 Joseph (1994) op. cit. n24. 
51 !hid 
52 Possible reasons for this connection between dolphin and tuna include the use of dolphin by tuna as 
a defense mechanism against predators, and the similar feeding habits of the species. 
53 Buck, E., Dolphin Protection and Tuna Seining, CRS:96011 (Congressional Research Service, 
Washington DC, 1997). 
54 Coulston, C., "Flipper Caught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorisation of the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act and its Effect on Dolphin" (1990) 11 Journal of Ecology, Natural Resources and 
Environment Law 97 at 102. 
-18- 
Chapter One Bycatch Explained 
kilometer in length, and using weights and floats they hang as deep as 200 -250 meters 
beneath the ocean surface 55 Once herded into the open upper part of the net, the 
bottom is then pulled closed - much like a purse - so as to capture the target 
yellowfin tuna.'6 Incidental in the process, dolphins also become caught. Dolphins are 
air- breathing mammals, and entanglement in these nets often results in drowning. This 
relationship between dolphins and tuna has not traditionally been thought to exist 
elsewhere, nor hence the dolphin bycatch problem extend outside the ETP.S' 
A number of events in the capture process outlined above may cause increased dolphin 
fatalities. The mortality rate of dolphins may escalate if strong currents cause the nets 
to collapse and entangle the cetaceans, or if for some reason the dolphins themselves 
panic and become entrapped. Nursing mothers may refuse to abandon their captured 
offspring. Estimates suggest that in the period prior to U.S. statutory restriction more 
than 100,000 dolphin mortalities occurred in purse -seining operations in the ETP each 
year.55 Further to these recorded mortalities, it is suggested that a considerable 
proportion of the dolphins that are released, or do manage to escape the nets, still die. 
Research suggests that the average dolphin in the ETP is captured four times each 
year.59 Exhausted by the rounding -up process, and being repeatedly captured, the 
dolphins become susceptible to attacks by predators such as sharks. The use of seal 
bombs disorientates the dolphins, and these herding explosives can also cause 
deafness or loss of sonar capabilities. Other physical disorders such as ulcers and 
stress related illness may occur.S° Disabilities and trauma may combine to cause the 
premature death of the animal. These conditions may also cause pregnant females to 
miscarry.' 
55 Buck (1997) op. cit. n53. 
56 Chapman (1993) op. cit. n27. 
57 Periodically claims have emerged to suggest that other Pacific purse -seining operations - which 
had hitherto been thought to be nearly free of dolphin bycatch - witness a similar relation between tuna 
and dolphin to that of the ETP. Most recently, questions of a similar relationship between tuna and 
dolphins also existing in other areas were raised in the context of the review of the U.S. tuna labeling 
laws. Per. comm. Dr Naomi Rose, Marine Mammal Scientist, Humane Society of the United States, 
Washington DC, 16 April 1999. 
58 This estimated mortality level covers the years 1960 to1972. By 1979 the U.S. rate had decreased 
to around 20,000 individuals per annum. The ETP dolphin mortlatiy rate rose again in the 1980s with 
the introduction of Latin and South American fleets into the fishery. National Research Council (NRC), 
Dolphins and the Tuna Industry (National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1992). 
59 Curry (1999) op. cit. n2. 
60 Buck (1997) op. cit. n53. IATTC scientist contend however that environmental groups' concern 
over what Congress has referred to as "cryptic kills" is overstated, and that such kills would be 
noticeable because dolphin carcasses float and hence are highly visible. Others contest this statement, 
drawing upon the suggestion that dolphin carcasses do not float if the lungs are full of water, and as such 
carcasses would only surface and be observed after decomposition gasses accumulate. 
61 Curry (1999) op. cit. n2. 
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MEDINA STRIP 
(5 X l20.fathoms) 
CORK LINE UNDER WATER 
Figure 1: A purse- seiner showing the backdown and release of dolphins 
Source National Marine Fisheries Service (U.S.) 
Considerable research into and development of mitigation measures has occurred. A 
process called ' backdown' has been selectively practiced in the ETP since purse -seining 
was introduced. Backdown, as it sounds, involves the lowering of nets so that dolphins 
can escape over the top while the deeper swimming tuna remain entrapped (see Figure 
1). The use of backdown, in theory, reduces the number of dolphins killed in a capture 
to mere dozens. These figures remain contentious however, and 'disaster sets' may 
occur where a large pod of dolphins - hundreds or even thousands - remains 
trapped due to either disorientation or human error. 
Gear alterations have helped further mitigate the extent of dolphin hycatch in the 
fishery, For example in 1971 a special panel that reduced dolphin entanglement was 
developed. The medina panel, named after its designer, is constructed if a finer mesh, 
thus not entangling dolphins and allowing them to escape. It is generally accepted that 
further improvements in the level of dolphin take in the ETP tuna fishery can be made, 
and the progress of designing and implementing a variety of mitigation measures is 
ongoing.62 
62 For details of more recent developments see Hall, M. and Campa, M., "Solving the Tuna -Dolphin 
Problem in the Eastern Pacific Purse -Seine Fishery" (1999) unpublished manuscript. 
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Demersal Trawls 
Trawls are less selective than most other fishing methods. Comprised of complex 
equipment made from a combination of specialised components, it is the codend or 
bag at the rear that collects and holds the catch, as the net is dragged. Trawls are used 
to target a variety of species, the most valuable of which are prawns and shrimp. 
Other species targeted in both demersal and mid -water trawls include orange roughy, 
gemfish, blue grenadier, and redfish as well as emperors, rockcod and squid.63 
Mechanised demersal trawling for prawns and shrimp has, to date, generated the most 
concern with respect to incidental catches. Australian prawn trawl studies found that 
the ratio of bycatch to target species catch ranges from between 6:1 to 15:1.64 The 
primary conservation significant bycatch to result from trawling is that of marine or 
sea turtles 65 concerns over the incidental take of which were first raised in the 1970s in 
the U.S..' It has been estimated that 50,000 adult turtles are captured in shrimp 
trawls in the southeast U.S. each year.67 The green, Olive Ridley, hawksbill, 
leatherback, flatback and loggerhead sea turtles are all listed variously throughout their 
ranges as endangered or threatened with extinction.68 It is believed there are only 1500 
nesting Kemp's Ridley turtles remaining in the wild.69 
Mortality of sea turtles in trawling operations may be due to drowning (or 
comatosation) in the trawl, deliberate kill of turtles by crew, or skull or cervical 
63 Mid -water or pelagic trawling by contrast is much less wide spread. It requires sophisticated (and 
hence expensive) technical equipment and expertise to locate and accurately target the fish. Problems of 
seal and sea lion bycatch in these operations have, however, begun to emerge. 
64 Dredge, M., Bycatch from the Central Queensland Prawn Fisheries. 1. The Prawn Fisheries and 
their Bycatch Composition in Terms of Species and Community Assemblages, Technical Report FRB 
88/4 (Queensland Department of Primary Industries, Fisheries Research Branch, Brisbane, 1988); and 
Harris, A. and Poíner, I., "Bycatch of the Prawn Fishery of Torres Strait: Composition and Partitioning 
of the Discards into Components that Float or Sink" (1990) 41 Australian Journal of Marine and 
Freshwater Research 37. 
65 It is estimated that over 125,000 turtles die each year as non -target catch in shrimp and tuna 
operations. Weber, M., Crouse, D., Irwin, R. and Iudicello, S., Delay and Denial: A Political History 
of Sea Turtles and Shrimp Fishing (Center for Marine Conservation, Washington DC, 1995). 
66 Hillestad, H., Richardson, J. and Williamson, G., 'Incidental Capture of Sea Turtles by Shrimp 
Trawlermen in Georgia" (1978) 32 Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Southeast Association 
of Fish and Wildlife Agencies 167; and Hillestad, H., Richardson, J., McVea, C. and Watson, J., 
"Worldwide Incidental Capture of Sea Turtles ", in Bjormdal, K. (ed), Biology and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles (Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington DC, 1981) pp.489 -495. 
67 Henwook, T. and Stunts, W., "Analysis of Sea Turtle Captures and Mortalities During 
Commercial Shrimp Trawling" (1987) 85 Fishery Bulletin 813. 
68 It is important to recognise that, in particular in the case of sea turtles and dugong bycatch, a 
considerable threat is also posed from direct harvesting for food, especially by indigenous communities. 
There is, however, no reliable source of data on the comparative take levels. 
69 Turtle Expert Working Group, Results of a Series of Deliberations held in Miami Florida, June 
1995 - June 1996 (2 July 1996), discussed in Kibel, P., "Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation 
and the Court of International Trade" (1996) 15 Journal of Environmental Law 57. 
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fractures resulting from being dropped onto the tray during hauling. Strangulation may 
occur if the rope used to drag the turtles out of the trays remains around the turtle's 
neck. Drowning may occur after the turtle has been returned to the sea due to 
disorientation or sustained injuries. Individuals may fall prey to sharks or other 
predators. 
One strategy employed to reduce the impact of bycatch upon sea turtle populations is 
through programs to lower the turtle infant mortality rate: for example, headstarting, 
captive breeding, and hatcheries.70 These have been critisised as "halfway 
technologies" though, due to their concentration on artificially increasing the survival 
rate of hatchlings in order to allow bycatch and other threatening practices to be 
maintained at extant levels without further endangering turtle populations. In the long 
term, it is suggested that such efforts will prove futile.71 Instead, it is argued that the 
threatening process itself needs to be remedied, and that concentrated efforts need to 
be applied to the development of technology that addresses and ameliorates the 
particular problems faced by the sea turtles without removing them from their natural 
environment.' 
One tactic to reduce the mortality of incidentally captured species in demersal shrimp 
trawls is to limit the time of the trawl so that captured animals will be raised, and 
freed, before drowning. The main management strategy employed to minimise turtle 
bycatch in demersal trawling, though, is that of gear modifications. Though marine 
turtle mortality can be reduced through the employment of manual rather than 
mechanised hauling devices, this is time and labor intensive, as well as being very 
difficult to enforce, and thus is not a favoured approach. Instead, the primary 
instruments used to combat marine turtle bycatch are turtle exclusion devices, or TEDs 
(see figure 2)." TEDs are trap doors placed in the nets, prior to the codend, and so 
designed to enable turtles, heavier than the target species, to escape. Such passive 
sorting devices are intended to operate without fishers needing any particular 
expertise, or incurring any substantial loss of shrimp catch." Feedback on the success 
of TEDs has been mixed, with observer programs reporting between two and ten 
percent loss of catch.75 It has been estimated, however, that TEDs can reduce the 
70 Frazer, N., "Sea Turtle Conservation and Halfway Technology" (1992) 6 Conservation Biology 
179- 
71 Ibid. 
72 lb id. 
73 TEDs are also referred to as trawl efficiency devices. 
74 Controversy over the success of these goals is discussed in Margavio, A., Laska, S., Mason, J. and 
Forsyth, C., "Captives of Conflict: The TEDs Case" (1993) 6 Society and Natural Resources 273. 
75 Renaud, M., Gitschlag, G., Klima, E., Shah, A., Nance, J., Cailouet, C., Zein -Eldin, Z., Koi, D. 
and Patella, F., Evaluation of the Impacts of Turtle Exclusion Devices (TEDs) on Shrimp Catch Rates in 
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marine turtle mortality from shrimp fishing operations by up to 97 %.76 The use of 
these devices has also been found to reduce damage to the nets that is often caused by 
a range of bycatches. The preferred exclusion device for any single shrimp trawl 
fishery varíes, depending upon the nature of both the target and bycatch species, as 
well as the seasonality, and no one modification works universally?7 
Turtles slide up the grating 
into the gate and escape 
Figure 2: A turtle excluder device fitted in a trawl net 
Source: Bureau of Resource Sciences (Ault.) 
Prawns pass through 
the grating into the 
codend 
Demersal trawl nets pose an additional problem to that of discarded fishing and ship 
debris, because they are particularly prone to catching on the sea floor. One study has 
found that greatest marine -debris -caused turtle mortalities were associated with trawl 
nets, and that, unsurprisingly, an expansion in trawling activities has coincided with 
reports of increased netting debris.78 No measures to address this impact have been 
the Gulf of Mexico and South Atlantic, March 1988 through July 1989, NOAA Technical Memorandum 
NMFS -SEFC -254 (NMFS, Washington DC, 1989). 
76 Kibel (1996) op. cit. n69. 
77 Kennelly, S., "The Issue of By -Catch in Australia's Trawl Fisheries ", in Zann. L. (ed), State of the 
Marine Environment Report for Australia: Technical Annex 3 (AGPS, Canberra, 1995) pp.12; Andrew, 
A. and Pepperell, J., "The Bycatch of Shrimp Trawl Fisheries" (1992) 30 Oceanography and Marine 
Biology Annual Review 527; and Robins- Troeger, J., Buckworth, R. and Dredge, M., "Development of a 
Trawl Efficency Device (TED) for Australian Prawn Fisheries. II. Field Evaluations of the AusTED" 
(1995) 22 Fisheries Research 107. 
78 Mounsey, R., Interim Draft Report on the Groote Eylandt Fishing Debris Project (Unpublished 
report to Northern Territory Fisheries, Darwin, 1997) ; and Jones (1990) op. cit. n4. 
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devised, though it is not unlikely that if the above results persist then the attention 
afforded to mitigating such impacts will increase. 
Longliners 
Longline fishing commenced on a large scale in the 1950s. Longline gear consists of the 
self explanatory long continuous mainline supported by float lines, and regularly 
spaced branch lines that end with baited hooks. Although of relatively simple design, 
the gear can be deployed in numerous configurations and methods so as to increase the 
catch of particular species and to avoid that of others. It is used to target both pelagic 
and demersal fish, and as such, the line can be set parallel to the surface (mid water 
set) or anchored vertically (bottom set).79 A pelagic or mid -set longline may be up to 
130km long and carry between 600 and 3500 barbed steel hooks on 40 metres long 
branchlines. Hooks are usually suspended between 50 and 150 metres below the 
surface.' These primarily target tuna, billfish and sharks. Bottom set methods of either 
droplines, demersal longlines or trotlines are used to catch toothfish, ling and sharks. 
Automated demersal longlines have up to 20,000 hooks on one meter branchlines 81 
Although many longline fisheries have no interactions with seabirds due to the method 
or location of their operation, this fishing method poses one of the greatest human 
threats to seabirds 82 Mortality most commonly occurs during line setting.' Seabirds 
dive for the bait, and become caught on the hooks or entangled in nearby lines, and 
drown. Seabird interactions with longlines during hauling has also been recorded in 
Southern Ocean fisheries, however seabirds more often escape or are freed when this 
occurs. The extent of subsequent mortality, due to injuries sustained, is once again 
unknown.8ó More widespread effects which have also been included under the 
"bycatch" umbrella in Australia, include the deaths due to the ingestion of hooks in 
discarded fish, and the mortality of chicks due to the death of parent birds.' Further 
bird mortalities have been recorded due to shootings by crew members who view 
seabirds as competition for bait intended to lure and catch their commercial target fish. 
79 Alexander, K., Robertson, G. and Gales, R., The Incidental Mortality of Albatross in Longline 
Fisheries (Australian Antarctic Division, Hobart, 1997). 
80 Threat Abatement Planning Team (1998) op. cit. n8. 
81 Chapman (1993) op. cit. n27. If not automated the number of hooks is usually between 500 and 
2000. 
82 Birdlife International "Global impacts of Fisheries on Seabirds ", paper presented at London 
Workshop on Environmental Science, Comprehensive and Consistency in Global Decision of Ocean 
Issues paper presented at Cambridge, 30 November -2 December 1995. 
83 Brothers, N., "Albatross Mortality and Associated Bait Loss in the Japanese Toongline Fishery in 
the Southern Ocean" (1991) 55 Biological Conservation 255. 
84 Gales, R., Brothers, N. and Reid, T., "Seabird Mortality in the Japanese Tuna Longline Fishery 
around Australia, 1988 -1995" (1998) 86 Biological Conservation 37. 
85 Threat Abatement Planning Team (1998) op cit. n8. 
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Figure 3: Longliner with streamers on 'tori' lines towed during setting to deter bird for 
diving for baits 
Source: Bureau of Resource Sciences (Aust.) 
A range of mitigation methods for seabird bycatch during line setting have been 
trialed in an attempt to reduce the number of seabirds caught in longline fisheries 86 
Perhaps the most successful mitigation method in reducing sea bird bycatch is that of 
night setting. Other tactics include modification of the time or area from which offal is 
discarded, and the reduction of seabird access to baits by increasing the sink rate of the 
bait by weighting of lines or using bait casting machines that allow for the bait to be 
tossed beyond the range of the propeller's turbulence which otherwise keeps the bait 
at the surface longer. Similarly the thawing of bait and puncturing of swim bladders 
(which make many baitfish highly buoyant) before their casting, allows for more rapid 
emersion. Tori poles or bird scaring lines have also become widely used as a method 
for discouraging birds from diving for bait. These consist of a line being suspended 
over the area where baits are being set, in combination with the use of streamer cords 
which hang in the water and move in unpredictable patterns to deter birds from 
foraging on the baits (see figure 3). Towed deterrents, such as buoys operate in a 
similar way, by disturbing birds as they land to feed on the hooked bait. Other 
measures are still in the developmental phases. These include underwater setting 
devices, and "smart hooks" which retract until at a safe depth, and reduce the 
likelihood of birds being snared should they take a bait. The use of a range of 
86 Bache, S. and Evans, N., "Dolphin, Albatross and Commercial Fishing: Australia's Responses to an 
Unpalatable Mix" (1999) 23 Marine Policy 259. 
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alternative baits less attractive to seabirds, such as squid baits or live bait, has also 
been mooted. 
Afforded much less attention to date, sea turtles are also captured incidental to 
longline operations, in particular in the warmer waters m The problem however, is 
potentially of the same scale of significance as sea turtle trawl bycatch.' First reported 
in the western Atlantic ocean in the early 1980s; ° sea turtle take occurs through 
hookings in front and hind flippers, head, mouth, neck and carapace, as well as 
through entanglement in the mainline around the head, neck, flippers and shel.91 
Recommended techniques for bycatch mitigation in longline operations include reducing 
the length of the line, the retrieving of gear in reverse order so as to reduce the 
maximum soak time, and the introduction of requirements to move to a new fishing 
location after a singe marine wildlife interaction has occurred ' 
1.3 Australian Bycatch Management 
Australia's experience with bycatch policy has been both brief and varied. By far the 
greatest governmental effort has been devoted to developing policy in relation to the 
bycatch of dolphins and albatrosses.93 The Commonwealth' has been visibly more 
active in protecting marine wildlife from bycatch over the last several years. The 
various impacts of trawling and gillnetting have recently been afforded policy attention 
as activities which threaten rare and endangered marine wildlife. In this regard, 
consideration has thus been extended to concerns of sea turtle and dugong capture 
incidental to fishing operations. In addition, the Commonwealth has also developed a 
broad policy document wherein the federal government is committed to developing 
fishery -specific action plans to reduce bycatch. Stemming from this, a national bycatch 
policy has been developed in consultation with the states. A brief outline of these 
actions is provided below. 
87 Threat Abatement Planning Team (1998) op. cit. n8. 
88 Crouse (1999) np. cit. n19. 
89 Ibid; and Crouse, D. "After TEDs: What Next ?" in Abreu- Grobois, A (ed), Proceedings of the 
18th Annual Symposium on Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation (Mazatlan, Sinola, Mexico, 1998). 
90 Witzell, W., "The Incidental Capture of Sea Turtles in the Atlantic U.S. Fishery Conservation 
Zone by the Japanese Tuna Longline Fleet, 1978-8I'' (1984) Marine Fish Review 56. 
91 Gerrior, P., "Incidental Take of Sea Turtles in Northeast U.S. Waters ", paper presented at Pelagic 
Longline Fishery -Sea Turtle Interactions: Proceedings of an Industry, Academic and Government 
Experts, and Stakeholders Workshop, 24 -25 May 1994, NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS -OPR -7 
(NMFS, Washington DC, 1996). 
92 Other strategies which have been mooted to effect the reduction of marine wildlife bycatch include 
the introduction of limited entry restrictions and increase of observers onboard. Atlantic Offshore Cetacean 
Take Reduction Team, Atlantic Take Reduction Draft Plan (NMFS, Washington DC, 1997). 
93 Bache and Evans (1999) op, cit. n86. 
94 The title "the Commonwealth government' refers to federal government of Australia. 
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Cetaceans and the Dríftnet Ban 
In 1986 the Australian federal government acted with leadership by banning fishing 
with long driftnets in the northern Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) due to the high 
incidental mortality of dolphins caused by Taiwanese fishing fleets 95 A joint 
experimental gear program concluded that mitigation of dolphin bycatch in the up to 
300 km long nets was not possible96 Meanwhile considerable attention had been 
afforded the issue by Greenpeace, through publicity and lobbying efforts!' Thus, in the 
absence of mitigation measures, and with considerable public pressure upon the 
government, Australia introduced stringent controls on the length of driftnets 
permitted in northern Australian waters. A fisheries notice restricted the use of 
driftnets in northern Australian waters to less than 2.5 km. Promulgated under the 
Fisheries Act,98 the result was the elimination of both the cetacean bycatch, and of 
Taiwanese driftnet fishing in Australian waters. 
Two years Iater, the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) member nations seized upon the 
issue of driftnet fishing in the South Pacific99 In November 1988 the first informal 
consultations between South Pacific nations, on the topic of driftnet fishing, 
occurred.10° Then, on 11 July 1989, the South Pacific Forum (SPF) registered its concern 
about "the damage driftnets were causing to the marine resources of the South Pacific" 
in the Tarawa Declaration.tU1 The Declaration called for a convention to ban 
95 Data was collected by Australian observers placed on Taiwanese driftnet vessels off northern 
Australia between 1981 and 1985. This revealed that an estimated 14000 cetaceans, the majority of which 
were bottlenosed dolphins, were taken during this period. Harwood, M. and Anderson, G., Incidental 
Catch of Small Cetaceans in an Offshore Gillnet Fishery in Northern Australia Waters 1981 -1984 
(Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, Canberra, 1985). 
96 Ibid. 
97 "Push for Ban on Driftnets" The Launceston Examiner, 17 October 1991. 
98 Fisheries Notice 182, Prohibition on Pelagic Gillnet Fishing off Northern Australia, Government 
Gazette S636, 11 December 1986. Created under s8, Fisheries Act 1952, In addition the government also 
denied foreign driftnet vessels access to Australian ports except in cases of emergency, and prevented the 
transshipment, within the AFZ, of harvests caught using the driftnet method. 
99 It is believed that the issue first raised attention when Taiwanese fishing industry representatives 
approached the Cook Islands in mid -1988, hoping to use the Islands as a locus of transshipment fa 
South Pacific albacore tuna. Anonmyous,The South Pacific Albacore Drifnet Issue: Developments Since 
November 1988 [Update, January 19901 and Second Consultation on Arrangements for South Pacific 
Albacore Fisheries Management, Internal Meeting, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 28 February -I March 
1990, FFA Report 90/6 (unpublished document, South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 1990). 
100 One of the conclusion from this meeting was that South Pacific albacore was currently being fished 
at its maximum sustainable level. At the second meeting, in March 1989, it was noted that the expected 
albacore harvest for that season would be four times greater than the estimated sustainable take level. 
Anon, Summary of Recent Developments Relating to Drifinet Fishing (Unpublished report, Department 
of Primary Industries and Energy, Canberra, undated). The maximum sustainable level of the South 
Pacific albacore harvest was estimated at 10,000 tonnes per annum. 
101 Tarawa Declaration of the meeting of the South Pacific Forum on 10 -11 July 1989, reprinted in 
Law of the Sea Bulletin, No. 14, December 1989. For discussion see Miller, B., "Combating Drift -Net 
Fishing in the Pacific ", in Crawford, J. and Rothwell, D. (ed), The Law of the Sea in the Asia Pacific 
Region (Martinus Nijhoff, Boston, 1995) pp.155 -170; Islam, M., "The Controversial Driftnet Fishing in 
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driftnetting in the EEZs of SPF states and revealed their intention to create a 
management regime for albacore tuna in the South Pacific.102 
Australia swiftly took legislative action to give effect to both the Declaration and to its 
broader policy of a world wide ban on large scale driftnetting.703 The [then] Minister 
for Primary Industries and Energy, John Kerin, passed a notice that revoked the 1986 
ban and emplaced a similar but expanded prohibition covering all Australian 
waters.104 The federal government also released a fisheries policy statement, further 
confirming Australia's commitment to the creation of a global ban on large -scale 
driftnet gear.105 Highlighted was the indiscriminant nature of this method of fishing and 
the resultant unacceptable levels of bycatch of marine mammals and other aquatic 
species. 
On 24 November 1989 the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Drift - 
nets in the South Pacific (The Wellington Convention), was entered into by South 
Pacific Island Nations, Australia and New Zealand.106 The Convention banned the use 
of driftnets longer than 2.5km within EEZs of the SPF States. It also prohibited the 
transport, landing or processing of catch, and harbor access to driftnet vessels.107 
Unsurprisingly, neither Japan nor Taiwan signed the agreement.108 Japan reiterated its 
position that there was no scientific reason to ban driftnetting, while Taiwan chose to 
leave the meeting in protest. 
the South Pacific and the Duty of Conservation and the Management of the Living Resources of the Sea" 
(1990) 6 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 137; and Islam, M., "The Proposed 
"driftnet -free zone" in the South Pacific and the Law of the Sea Convention" (1991) 40 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 184. 
102 Davis, L., "Northern Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untangling the High Seas Controversy" (1991) 64 
Southern Californian Law Review 1057. 
103 Australia had wanted to push for a worldwide ban, however the SPF decided to tackle the issue as a 
regional problem first. "Global Ban Sought on Driftnet Fishing" The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 July 
1989. 
104 Fisheries Notice AFZ01, Prohibition on Pelagic Gillnet and Driftnet Fishing, Government Gazette 
S255, 25 July 1989. Created under s8, Fisheries Act 1952. When in 1991 the existing Australian 
fisheries legislation was replaced by two new statutes the prohibition of driftnets greater than 2.5 km in 
length was then included in the legislation itself, s13 Fisheries Management Act 1991. 
105 Commonwealth of Australia, New Directions for Commonwealth Fisheries Management in the 
1990s -A Government Policy Statement (AGPS, Canberra, 1989). 
106 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Drift -nets in the South Pacific, 29 I.L.M. 
1449 (1990) (hereafter "Wellington Convention "). 
107 in addition the Wellington Convention provided that any state may choose to adopt more stringent 
measures "consistent with international law ". 
108 In appreciation of the difficulties associated with the convention only being open to FFA members 
nations, the Wellington Conference endorsed two draft protocols to the Convention which it 
subsequently adopted in New Caledonia in October 1990. Protocol I, prohibiting driftnetting, was open 
for any State fishing within the Convention area and Protocol II, prohibiting driftnetting and the 
transshipment of driftnet catches within nations 200nm EEZs, was open for signature to any nations on or 
within the Pacific Rim. 
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The Wellington Convention played a pivotal role and had considerable impact on the 
raising of global awareness of the problem.109 Also in November 1989 the South Pacific 
nations and Australia introduced the issue of driftnet fishing into the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA). "° 
Endangered Species Protection and Albatross Longline Take 
It was not until 1987 that marine wildlife was first offered protection under the 
Commonwealth's principal wildlife statute - the National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation Act.111 Although operating by protecting wildlife from deliberate 
interference, this same statute excused commercial fishing operators from any 
meaningful obligation to reduce bycatch."2 
The Endangered Species Protection Act (ESPA) was enacted in 1992, forming the 
cornerstone of the Commonwealth's biodiversity policy.13 Accordingly, jurisdiction 
over the Act was given to Environment Australia (EA), the federal governments 
environment agency. In simple terms, the ESPA provided a legislative strategy for 
recovering species and communities at risk of extinction, and proscribing activities 
which pose a threat thereto. The final enacted legislation required the Commonwealth 
to cooperate with states in protecting threatened species located outside 
Commonwealth areas, rather than empowering the Commonwealth to act unilaterally. 
114 
109 Davis (1991) op. cit. n102; and RothwelI, D., "The Law of the Sea in the Asian- Pacific Region: 
An Overview of Trends and Developments" (1995) 13 Chinese Yearbook of International Law Affairs 
81. 
110 On 2 November 1989 the driftnet resolution was introduced into the UNGA by Australia, Canada, 
Fiji, Mauritania, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, the United States of 
America and Zaire. UN Doc. A/C.2/44.L30, Rev. 1 (1989). For further discussion on see Chapter Four, 
section 4.3 "Catch and Bycatch in Long Pelagic Driftnets - An intemational issue ". 
I11 The protection of wildlife from deliberate take was achieved by listing seals and sea snakes in 
regulations prescribed under section 71 of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975. 
Subsequent to that time several other marine species have been similarly protected, including sea lions, 
crocodiles, dugong and turtles which were added to Schedule 1, National Parks and Wildlife 
Regulations 1992 in 1992. 
112 Regulation 55(7)(b), National Parks and Wildlife Regulations, provides that no offence is created if 
a person takes protected wildlife "while engaged in a licensed commercial fishing operation, being an act 
that is unavoidable in the course of carrying out that operation ". 
113 Christie, E., "The Eternal Triangle: The Biodiversity Convention, Endangered Species Legislation 
and the Precautionary Principle" (1993) 10 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 470; Dixon, N., 
"Protection of Endangered Species - How Will Australia Cope ?" (1994) 11 Environmental and Planning 
Law Journal 6. 
114 The precursor, the Threatened Species Bill, was introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament as a 
Private Member's Bill by the then Environment Minister The Hon. Ros Kelly, after the "Government 
failed to honour its own much- vaunted commitment to bring in such a national law." This had proposed 
a statutory regime that covered all Australian waters and lands, regardless of the federal /state jurisdictional 
arrangements (Transcript of Four Corners, Channel Two, 9 September 1991). Notwithstanding the 
reduced application of the present Act, the ESPA does apply offshore in Australian waters. Section 5(1) 
provides that - 
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The principal scheme of the ESPA involved listing species according to degrees of 
endangerment, and imposing upon decision makers an obligation to avoid further 
species loss and to assist with species recovery. The ESPA also allowed for the 
nomination and listing of activities which posed particular threat to endangered 
species as key threatening processes (KTPs), which would then invoke a legal 
requirement that action must be taken to remove or reduce the threat.'1s 
Comparatively scant attention has been given to the offshore operation of the ESPA: 
the exception to this is the incidental take of albatross in longline fishing, and the 
listing of the latter as a KTP.116 The issue of albatross bycatch received much less 
public attention than did that of small cetaceans. A paper by Brothers in 199111' 
prompted realisation of the potential implications of longline fishing bycatch on 
albatross species.118 
Based upon research from 1988 he [Brothers] brought the crisis facing 
albatross populations into the public sphere. His studies found that a 
"conservative calculation" of albatross take by Japanese longliners 
operating in the Southern Ocean was 44,000 birds annually, Breaking this 
figure down it was estimated that for ever 1000 hooks set, a minimum of .4 
birds become entangled and drown; given that an average of 107.9 million 
hooks are set in southern seas each year this translates to a threatening and 
unsustainable level of albatross take.119 
For the purposes of the act, any of the following areas, and any parts of the following areas, 
are Commonwealth areas: ... 
(d) the seabed of, and the waters above, the continental shelf of Australia; 
(e) the Australian fishing zone ... 
Evans, N. and Bache, S., "Fisheries and Endangered Species: Jurisdiction and the Management of 
Threatening Activities" (1997) 14 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 468. 
115 A key threatening process (or KTP) is a process that threatens, or may threaten the survival, 
abundance or evolutionary development of a native species or ecological community. For listing purposes 
the process must adversely affect two or more species or communities and a nationally coordinated plan 
must he feasible. A limitation to the efficacy of the threat abatement planning process is that - 
notwithstanding the prohibition of social or economic considerations in ESSS' considerations - in 
preparing a threat abatement plan regard must be had to social and economic impacts arising from the 
implementation of that plan (s34(2)(c)). Evans, N., "Australia Moves to Protect Albatross from Longline 
Bycatch" (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 387. 
116 Bergin, A., "Albatross and Longlining - Managing Seabird Bycatch" (1997) 21 Marine Policy 63. 
117 Brothers, N., "Albatross Mortality and Associated Bait Loss in the Japanese Longline Fishery in 
the Southern Ocean" (1991) 55 Biological Conservation 255. 
118 Per. comm. Andrew McNee, Director, Wildlife Management, Biodiversity Group, Environment 
Australia, Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Canberra, 9 September 1999. 
The first report of seabird bycatch was made in 1983 by Morant from band returns, and subsequently 
Weimerskirch and Jouventin documented a dramatic decline in wandering albatross numbers on the 
Crozet Islands and implicated trawl and longline fisheries in this. Morant, P., Brooke, R. and Abrams, 
R., "Recoveries in Southern Africa of Seabirds Breeding EIsewhere" (1983) 4 Ringing and Migration 
257; and Weimerskirch, H. and Jouvetin, P., "Population Dynamics of the Wandering Albatross, 
Diomediea exulans, of the Crozet Islands: Causes and Consequences of the Population Decline" (1987) 
49 Oikos 315. 
119 Hansard, House of Representatives, [Laurie Ferguson, Shadow Minister for Defence, Science and 
Personnel] 1 September 1997, p.7394. 
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Initial action occurred under the auspice of the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources.120 Between 1992 and 1994 seabird bycatch also 
received its first serious consideration at the Commonwealth level.121 
Of the estimated 44000 albatross, 8700 albatross were calculated to be caught in the 
AFZ each year.122 It was on the basis of this calculation, combined with the very low 
fecundity of albatrosses, that in mid 1995 the Wandering Albatross and longline 
fishing were nominated under the ESPA.1u Taken together, this statutory protection 
required measures to be actively pursued to recover the albatross from its perilously 
low levels. 124 
Longline fishing is a curiosity insofar as it displays the legal characteristics of a KTP 
while at the same time is also a major commercial activity.125 Indeed, some members of 
the fishing industry displayed considerable opposition to the ESPA listings and 
process.126 Although not unsurprising, this was nonetheless unfortunate, especially 
considering the willingness with which Australia halted driftnet fishing due to its 
adverse environmental impacts. 
120 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 19 I.L.M. 837 (1980) 
(hereafter "CCAMLR "). In 1992 CCAMLR introduced what was the first international measure to 
conserve seabirds from the impacts of longline fisheries. Reports of the incidental mortality of albatross 
both within and outside of the CCAMLR region led to the establishment of a working group on 
incidental mortality arising from longline fishing (IMALF) to study the problem. By 1994 it was 
apparent that not only albatross, but also petrel populations, were at risk from the longline fishery. Thus, 
since 1994, a series of evolving Conservation Measures, similar to those enunciated in the Australian 
threat abatement plan (created under the ESPA), have been adopted, aimed at mitigating the impacts of 
these fishing operations upon seabirds. For example, Conservation Measure 29 /XVI: Minimisation of the 
Incidental Mortality of Seabirds in the Course of Longline Fishing or Longline Fishing Research in the 
Convention Area restricted fishing to night time and required sea bird scaring and streamer lines. 
121 Albatross were not considered for the first set of listings under the ESPA, though there was some 
emergent interest in albatrosses' longline bycatch at the time. Per. comm. Andrew McNee. op. cit. n118. 
122 Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 3rd Report - Two International Agreements on Tuna (The 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Transcript of Evidence) 9 September 1996, p.19. 
123 On 24 July 1995 the Wandering Albatross was listed under Schedule 1 as a species that is 
endangered, and "incidental catch (or bycatch) of seabirds during oceanic longline fishing operations" as a 
KTP under Schedule 3 of the ESPA. Commonwealth of Australia, Declaration under s 18(1) of the 
Endangered Species Protection Act 1992, 24 July 1995, John Faulkner Minister for the Environment 
Sport and Territories. 
124 The ESPA listing of longline fishing as a KTP compelled the Commonwealth to prepare a threat 
abatement plan to direct the fishing industry's mitigation of seabird bycatch. The plan was legally 
binding on the Commonwealth and its agencies. Commonwealth of Australia, Government Gazette, 
GN31, 9 August 1995. 
125 Explanatory Statement, Declaration under s18(1) of the Endangered Species Protection Act 1992, 
Issued under the Authority of the Minister for the Environment, Sport and Territories, Canberra, July 
1995. Evans (1996) op. cit. n115. 
126 "Pledge to Save the Albatross" The Age, 8 August 1998; Madden, T., `Tuna Fishermen 
Condemn Threat Abatement Plan for Incidental Seabird Catches" (1998) August Professional Fisherman 
12. 
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The creation of a threat abatement plan (TAP) was begun by a series of focus groups 
and the formation of a team. In January 1998, the Minister for the Environment 
indicated that the government's ultimate goal was to achieve a "zero by -catch of 
seabirds, especially threatened albatross and giant petrel species, and bring to an end 
the horrible deaths suffered by these beautiful birds.i727 The final plan, published in 
August 1998, proposed the reduction of seabird bycatch to below 0.05 birds per 
thousand hooks by 2003. Given the current estimated rate of 0.4 birds per thousand 
hooks,128 this represented an approximately 90% reduction in take within the AFZ. 
Though acknowledging the inability of a zero bycatch goal to be achieved in the short 
term, the TAP enunciated this as an ultimate goal, in particular for threatened 
albatross and petrel species.129 The plan outlined the need for education and data 
collection and a series of mitigation measures including gear and method 
modifications. These included night setting; the use of thawed bait and hydraulic bait 
throwers; development of underwater setting capabilities; and the deployment of bird 
scaring devices i3° 
Because albatross range thousands of kilometers across EEZs and the high seas, 
collective action was recognised as a precondition for successful bycatch mitigation 
responses.131 Tn 1993 the Australian government, under the auspice of the Convention 
on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,132 funded a review into 
existing international mechanisms available for the conservation of albatross.133 
Subsequently, several regional initiatives involving Australia have been commenced. 
Australia has exported its domestic action regionally through the Conventions for the 
127 "Seabird By -Catch - Ending the Slaughter" Media Release, Minister for the Environment, 25 
January 1998, 06/98. 
128 Alexander et al. (1997) op. cit. n79. 
129 The singling out of specific species of bird, though logical in itself, stemmed also from deeper 
issues. Though not actually stymieing the process, opposition had arisen with regard to the wording of 
the original KTP listing. Industry had been concemed that the transition of the subject at issue to `birds' 
rather than albatross would lead to highly prohibitive restriction being placed on their operations. This 
was dealt with by indicating within the plan that, whilst the provision does apply to all seabirds, in 
assessing the extent to which the target has been met the species will be taken into account. Madden 
(1998) op. cit. n126. 
130 Threat Abatement Planning Team (1998) op. cit. n8. 
131 Southern Hemisphere albatross breed in the territory of eleven different States (Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, France, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, and the United States) and 
pass through the territory of may other nations. In addition, much of albatrosses life is spent over the 
high seas. 
132 The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 19 I.L.M. 15 (1983) 
(hereafter "Bonn Convention "). 
133 Gales, R., Co- operative Mechanisms for the Conservation of Albatross (ANCA/DFAT, Canberra, 
1993). This found that mortality in association with commercial fishing operations was the greatest threat 
that albatross faced, and that further testing and implementation of bycatch deterrent methods, in 
particular on longline vessels, was needed. Though some thought was given to the ESPA's extra- 
territorial application to fishing occurring on the high seas outside the AFZ, it was concluded that other 
remedies were needed to fill this gap in international protection. 
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Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)134 as well as supporting the FAO 
effort led by Japan and the U.S.?' Of most recent significance was Australia's 
nomination of albatross on the Bonn Convention.136 Australia is presently engaged in 
negotiations aimed at the creation of a protective agreement for albatross species 
under this Convention.137 
Sea Turtles, TEDs and Prawn Trawl Bycatch 
In Australia, management of prawn trawling in the tropics occurs under three 
regimes.136 The Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF) stretches between Cape Londonderry in 
Western Australia to the northern tip of Cape York, encompassing the waters of four 
jurisdictions - Western Australia, the Northern Territory, Queensland and the 
Commonwealth. Because of its multi- jurisdictional nature, the NPF is managed by the 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) as a Commonwealth fishery 
throughout this area, from low water mark or baselines out to the limit of the AFZ. The 
other tropical prawn fisheries operate on the Queensland east coast and the Western 
Australian Kimberlys region. Both are managed by the states pursuant to their fisheries 
legislation in both state and Commonwealth waters.139 
134 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefm Tuna, A.T.S. No. 16, (1994) (hereafter 
"CCSBT"). The CCSBT included in its ambit the consideration of the impact of fishing on ecologically 
related species. At the first meeting of the Commission, a working group on ecologically related species 
(ERSWG) was established, and at its inaugural meeting in December 1995 ERSWG earmarked albatross 
bycatch as a priority issue. 
I35 Per. comm. Jennifer Doust, Senior Policy Officer, Fisheries and Aquaculture Branch, Department of 
Primary Industries and Energy, 24 March 1999. 
136 In 1995, a decision was taken to nominate several albatrosses species under the Bonn Convention. 
This first attempt was unsuccessful. The process of nomination was faulted in that insufficient 
consultation outside conservation departments had occurred, especially in light of the significant 
implications a listing may have had for the fishing industry. Finally, on 11 November 1996, Australia's 
Environment Minister announced that Australia would propose the listing of the 11 albatross species 
which occur in the southern hemisphere. In April 1997, these were accepted onto the Bonn Convention. 
"Australia Leads Albatross Conservation" Media Release, Minister for the Environment, 16 April 1997, 
35/97. 
137 The use of the Bonn Convention for a regional albatross conservation was variously mooted in 
1997. Hansard, House of Representatives [The Prime Minister John Howard], 3 March 1997, pp.I698- 
1701; CCAMLR, Report of the Working Group on Fish Stock Assessment (Hobart, 13 -22 October 1997) 
paragraph 7.30. Currently, the support of a core group of regional nations (the Valdivia group) is being 
recruited. There is hope that an agreement will be endorsed by member nations in an out of round session 
in early 2000. Per. comm. Andrew McNee. op. cit. n118. 
138 Combined, the NPF and the east coast trawl fisheries account for about two thirds of Australian 
prawn catch by both weight and value and for a large portion of Australian trawl activity (Anonymous, 
Queensland Fisheries Production (Australian Fisheries Statistics, Canberra, 1992). 
139 As a result of ongoing dispute, a permenant arrangement between the state and federal governments 
to divide jurisdiction offshore was created in 1979. Under the Offshore Constitutional Settlement, title 
and legislative power over the first three miles of coastal waters is vested in the states, while jurisdiction 
seaward of state waters out to 200 miles accrues to the Commonwealth. With respect to fisheries policy, 
though, this convention is often abandoned in favour of a more useful arrangement that recognizes the 
artifice of separating management responsibilities three miles offshore. Management of commercial 
fisheries may occur under any of four regimes provided for by the Offshore Constitutional Settlement - 
Commonwealth management from the low water mark to the limit of the AFZ; 
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In the late 1980s, due to the indiscriminate nature of conventional otter trawls and, in 
part, responding to the high profile the issue had achieved in the U.S., a series of 
surveys of sea turtle bycatch in prawn trawlers were conducted.140 By the early 1990s 
sea turtle trawl bycatch had become an issue that needed to be addressed. Given the 
success of the albatross and longlining nominations, and the potential of the ESPA to 
improve the status of marine species,141 there was little doubt that the KIT mechanism 
would be invoked again in respect of commercial fishing activities.142 In ,'July 1995, the 
Humane Society International (HSI) nominated "Prawn Trawling" as a KIT affecting 
six species of threatened marine turtles.t43 The nomination was focused primarily on 
the impact of trawling on loggerhead turtles. 
Listing of endangered and threatened species and communities and KTPs are made to 
the Director or National Parks and Wildlife and forwarded to the Endangered Species 
Scientific Subcommittee (ESSS) for examination and recommendation. After 
considering this advice, the Minister for Environment then makes a decision on the 
management by states throughout this same area; 
Joint Authority management by both governments under either Commonwealth or state law; and 
status quo management, whereby the states manage fisheries within waters under their jurisdiction 
and the Commonwealth manages in its waters beyond. 
See, Evans and Bache (1997) op.cit. nl 14. 
140 Initial results showed that 4114 sea turtles were taken of which 247 died in the NPF in 1988. Error 
margins of ( ±1369) and ( ±90) respectively were assigned to these figures. From this data it was concluded 
that NPF sea turtle bycatch was at an insufficient level to warrant immediate action, but that further 
information was needed. Subsequently, observer data was obtained. This indicated that the take was 
relatively high with an estimated sea turtle capture rate of 5500 in 1989 and 5200 in 1990 in the NPF, 
with a mortality level of about 14 percent. These figures resulted in a mortality rate between 730 and 770 
individual each year in the NPF alone. In a separate study it was found that the eastern loggerhead 
population had seen a 50 to 80% decline in nesting, attributable largely to trawling activity. The decline 
documented herein was based upon data collected over a 17 year period. Trawling was also found to have 
had a significant impact on the southern Great Barrier Reef population of green turtles. Limpus, C. and 
Reimer, D., "The Loggerhead Turtle, Caretta caretta, in Queensland: a Population in Decline" in 
Proceedings of the Australian Marine Turtle Conservation Workshop (ANCA, Canberra, 1994); Poiner, 
I., Buckworth, R. and Harris, A., "Incidental Capture and Mortality of Sea Turtle in Australia's Northern 
Prawn Trawl" (1990) 41 Australian Journal of Marine and Freshwater Resources 97; Poiner, I. and 
Harris, A., "The Incidental Capture and Direct Mortality of Sea Turtles in Australia's Northern Prawn 
Fishery" (1996) 125 Marine Biology 813; Robins, J., "Estimated Catch and Mortality of Sea Turtles 
from the East Coast Otter Trawl Fishery of Queensland, Australia" (1995) 74 Biological Conservation 
157; and Ramm, D., Pender, P., Willing, R. and Buckworth, R., "Large -Scale Spatial Patterns of 
Abundance Within the Assemblage of Fish Caught by Prawn Trawlers in Northern Australian Waters" 
(1990) 41 Australian Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research 79. 
141 "Great Safety in Numbers for Endangered Species" Press Release, Minister for the Environment, 9 
July 1997, No. 79/97. 
142 Evans and Bache (1997) op. cit. n114. 
143 "Senator Faulkner Asked to List "Prawn Trawling" as a Threat to Marine Turtles Under 
Commonwealth Law" Press Release, Humane Society International, 20 July 1995. The basis of listing 
was on incidental catches of sea turtles, sea -snakes, and two species of fish (Paramonacanthzis species). 
Estimates reliably put the bycatch of turtles in the Gulf of Carpenteria at about 2000 annually; see, 
Marsh, H., Corkeron, P.J., Limpus, C.J., Shaughnessy, P.D. and Ward, T.M., "Conserving Marine 
Mammals and Reptiles in Australia and Oceania ", in Moritz, C. and Kikkawa, J. (ed), Conservation 
Biology in Australia and Oceania (Surrey Beatty & Sons, Chipping Norton, 1995) pp 225 -244. 
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nomination.' For administrative reasons the trawling KTP nomination was delayed, 
and an interim decision was not announced until late 1997.1m 
Not convinced by the information available to it, the ESSS remarked that evidence that 
trawling was adversely affecting the loggerhead turtles was equivocal. Furthermore, the 
affect upon other sea turtles was considered even less clear. Notwithstanding the 
dearth of information, it did however make an interim conclusion that prawn trawling 
adversely affects two species of sea turtle, and "could cause turtle species that are not 
endangered to become endangered ".16 Thus the ESSS advised the Minister that, though 
it was not willing to recommend the nominated KTP at this time, it believed that the 
potential of a nationally coordinated threat abatement plan was worth reviewing.147 
Additional data was to be gathered, and another assessment provided to the Minister 
in 1998. 
Unsurprisingly, the KTP nomination was rigorously opposed by both the fishing 
industry and by AFMA.146 Although seemingly sympathetic to fishery agency and 
industry views, the ESSS noted that 
[w]hile many trials have been carried out and evaluated over a number of 
years, and quite effective turtle exclusion technology has now been 
developed, no serious attempts have yet been made by fisheries agencies or 
industry to implement the widespread use of these devices!' 
The ESSS, while critical of industry's implementation record, offered an incentive for 
TED adoption. It noted that if an effective TED program is implemented in Australia 
under other legislation or by industry initiative, then it may be no longer necessary to 
consider the KTP application.'so 
144 ESPA, section 24. 
145 Interim Advice to the Minister for the Environment from the Endangered Species Scientific 
Subcommittee (ESSS) on a public nomination to Schedule 3 of the Endangered Species Protection Act 
1992 (unpublished, 1997) (Hereafter "ESSS Interim Prawn Trawling Advice "). In 1995, membership to 
the Endangered Species Scientific Subcommittee (ESSS) expired and the nomination assessment process 
was halted, pending the reconstitution of the ESSS by the Environment Minister. Jones, M. and Evans, 
N., "Fishing and the Environment ", in Caton, A., McLoughlin, K. and Staples, D. (ed), Fishery Status 
Reports 1997: Resource Assessments of Australian Commonwealth Fisheries (Bureau of Resource 
Sciences, Canberra, 1997) pp.103 -1 I I. 
146 ESSS Interim Prawn Trawling Advice (1997) op. cit. n145 at 4. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Armstrong, M., Maguire, K. and Robins, J., "Recovery Planning in Australia: Benefits of a 
Cooperative Approach ", paper presented at 2nd ASEAN Symposium and Workshop on Sea Turtle Biology 
and Conservation: Beyond the Beach, Kota Kinabalu, 15 -17 July 1999 (University of Malaysia, Sarawak, 
in press). 
149 ESSS Interim Prawn Trawling Advice (1997) op. cit. n145 at 3. 
150 Ibid. 
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The ESPA also provided for a second legislative mechanism through which sea turtle 
recovery could be facilitated - recovery planning.151 In theory all endangered and 
vulnerable species listed under the ESPA must have a recovery plan prepared and 
implemented. With regard to sea turtles, in late 1997, Senator Hill announced that a 
recovery plan, funded out of the national heritage trust, would be created in order to 
address the primary threats to long term sea turtle survival.152 As required, the plan 
contained the four critical elements of: an objective; criteria against which this was to 
be measured; outline actions to protect critical habitat; and a budget and timetable.15' 
Due to a lack of data, the recovery planning team found it difficult to be prescriptive 
about the actions needed to be taken, and this led them to take a threat -based 
approach to the recovery process.' A draft plan was completed in early 1999, and a 
final plan was due to be released in September.'55 Although not as yet released in its 
final form, Senator Hill has remarked that 
I expect that the Recovery Plan for Marine Turtles will look at increased 
use of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) in the prawn trawling industry,'5' 
Meanwhile, reacting to the threats of federal action, international trends, and a genuine 
concern about sea turtles, both the NPF and the Queensland trawl fishery developed 
management plans to mitigate and manage the impacts of otter -trawling upon sea 
turtles. The first move towards sea turtle bycatch mitigation occurred with the 
development and adoption of the Code of Fishing Conduct and Recovery Procedures 
for Turtle Captures 157 
With some federal persuasion,'5' Queensland fisheries managers firstly created 
compulsory TED requirements in seven designated areas,' which will become 
151 Armstrong et al. (1999) op. cit. n148. The other two mechanisms available under the ESPA for sea 
turtle recovery are conservation agreements and conservation orders. 
152 "Saving Our Marine Turtles" Media Release, Minister for the Environment, 25 November 1997; 
see also "Plan Aims to Rescue Turtles From Extinction" The Canberra Times, 13 April 1998. 
153 Male, B., "Recovery of Australian Threatened Species -A National Perspective ", in Stephens, S. 
and Maxwell, S. (ed), Back From the Brink: Refining the Threatened Species Recovery Process, (Surry 
Beatty and Sons, Chipping Norton, 1996) pp.23 -27. 
154 In addition to trawling, other threats came from marine debris, customary (indigenous) harvest, 
non -trawl fisheries and boating interactions, shark control activities, predation by feral animals on eggs, 
and loss of habitat. Anonymous, Draft Recovery Plan for Marine Turtles in Australia, (Marine Wildlife 
Management Section, Biodiversity Group, Environment Australia, Canberra, 1998). 
155 Armstrong et al. (1999) op. cit. nI48. 
156 "Hill Acts to Protect Marine Turtles" Media Release, Minister for the Environment, 12 August 
1999. 
157 The creation of a Code of Conduct occurred in 1995 in Queensland and the following year in the 
NPF. Anonymous, Turtle Recovery Procedures and Code of Fishing Ethics: The Capture of Sea Turtles 
(unpublished, Queensland Commercial Fisherman's Organisation and the Queensland Department of 
Primary Industries, Brisbane, 1995). Armstrong et al. (1999) op. cit. n148. 
158 The federal Minister for the Environment requested that TEDs be compulsory throughout the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park. In so doing he stated that if Queensland refused to comply with this request 
,. 
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compulsory throughout the Great Barrier Reef region by 1 January 2001.16° Meanwhile, 
in the federally managed NPF, in anticipation of the long -awaited and delayed 
Commonwealth bycatch policy, the fisheries advisory management committee began 
the preparation of a bycatch action plan in 1997. The plan was agreed to on 11 March 
1998 and implementation actions were approved by the AFMA board two weeks 
later.61 The main objective of this action was a reduction in the number of turtles 
captured annually in prawn trawls to about 5% of the estimated 1989/1990 figure - 
that is from 5370 to 268, with a total annual mortality of around 40 turtles.162 The 
related strategy in pursuit of this aim was that 
[t]he use of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) will be compulsory in the NPF 
by a date to be determined by NORMAC [Northern Prawn Trawl 
Management Advisory Committee] but no later than the commencement of 
the fishing season in the year 2000.163 
In 1999, the ESSS provided its final advice to the Minister for the Environment for 
consideration.164 This recommended that trawling be listed as a KTP. The Minister, in 
deciding not to list, accepted the Attorney -General's advice relating to potential 
Constitutional and jurisdictional problems with the application of the ESPA in state 
waters.l6s The federal government's legal advice has never actually been tried in a court 
then he would create the said requirement under the auspice of Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
(GBRMPA), from whom he had already received a pledge of support for such a move. Per. comm. Mark 
Armstrong, Policy Officer, Biodiversity Group, Environment Australia, Department of Environment 
Sport and Territories, 17 June 1999. 
159 Section 85 "Requirement to use a turtle exclusion device" Fisheries (East Coast Trawl Fishery) 
Management Plan 1999 created under the Fisheries Act 1994 (Q1á), active 1 May 1999. The only 
dilemma in the fishery seems to be the acceptance of the need for TEDs in deeper waters where the chance 
of sea turtle bycatch is very slight. 
160 Ministerial Council on Forestry Fisheries and Aquaculture, National Policy on Fisheries Bycatch 
(AFFA, Canberra, 1999) (Hereafter "National Bycatch Policy "). 
161 NORMAC, Northern Prawn Fishery: Bycatch Plan of Action (unpublished, AFMA, Canberra, 
1998). 
162 As well as through gear modifications, the realisation of this result will be assisted by the 38% 
reduction of the number of fishing days per year that has occurred since that data was collected. If the sea 
turtle catch rate has remained constant at 25 turtles per trawler per year, then catch rate for the present fleet 
would be around 3200. Anon. "Northern Prawn Fishery - Background Paper on Bycatch" in 
NORMAC, Northern Prawn Fishery: Bycatch Plan of Action (unpublished, AFMA, Canberra, 1998) 
pp.10 -21. 
163 and at 7. Another alternative mooted, should TEDs prove unsuccessful in achieving this bycatch 
reduction goal, were time area closures, to be determined in consultation with Environment Australia. 
164 Advice to the Minister for the Environment and Heritage from the Endangered Species Scientific 
Subcommittee (ESSS) on a public nomination to Schedule 3 of the Endangered Species Protection Act 
1992 (ESP Act), (unpublished, August 1999) (Hereafter "ESSS Prawn Trawling Advice "). 
165 Armstrong et al (1999) op. cit. n148. Advice from the Attorney- General's department indicates that 
the ESPA can not apply outside of Commonwealth areas without first receiving the agreement of all the 
states and territories. The ESPA's forcing provisions apply to Commonwealth areas and the decisions of 
Commonwealth agencies, a concession made to the states at the time of enactment. In relation to the 
waters above the continental shelf and the AFZ, the efficacy of the ESPA should therefore be assured, as 
these are defined as Commonwealth areas (s.5(1)). With regard to prawn trawling under the NPF federal 
regime, much activity occurs within state waters, and thus questions as to the extent to which fisheries' 
decisions made by the Commonwealth in respect of state waters are covered by the statute arise. The 
Commonwealth appears bound to seek state cooperation in preparing and implementing recovery and 
- 37 
- 
Sali Jayne Bache 
of law, and indeed, with the activation of replacement statute in 2000, these legal 
questions will become entirely academic.' Moreover, and with regards specifically to 
sea turtles, by 2001 TEDs will be in place in most Australian prawn trawling fisheries. 
Sea turtles - as with albatross - are highly migratory, and require multilateral 
protection to ensure their long term survival. In 1995, the year of the sea turtle in the 
South Pacific region, Australia first began to publicly contemplate the urgent need for 
regional attention.' Objectives of an upcoming Indian Ocean meeting to be held in 
Perth include to 
identify potential regional scale actions to reduce of threats to 
marine turtles; 
identify and consider regional mechanisms to manage marine turtles; 
and 
develop an indicative timetable for cooperative priority actions to 
progress regional management.18 
Although having no official position, both the Foreign Affairs and Environment 
Ministers favour the use of the Bonn Convention to create a regional agreement.169 
threat abatement plans that include activities occurring in state waters, because these are non- 
Commonwealth areas (ss.31(2), 33(2)). To this end, the success or otherwise of the Commonwealth's 
plan depends upon the goodwill and assistance of state governments. Hence, and although the 
Commonwealth is required to prepare and implement threat abatement plans under the ESPA regardless 
of the fisheries management regime in place (ss.31(1), 33(1)), the question of listing of a process and the 
ability of a plan to mitigate the threat posed by the process in state waters, may deem a KTP nomination 
inappropriate. 
Notwithstanding this advice, the FMA expressly provides that the three miles of state waters are taken to 
be part of the AFZ with respect to fisheries managed by the Commonwealth pursuant to an OCS 
arrangement (s76). An argument could therefore be mounted that the Commonwealth can prepare and 
implement plans unfettered by the need to cooperate with states because a clear and enforceable exclusive 
Commonwealth mandate has been created within state waters. This curious situation is quite 
unanticipated within the ESPA, and is possibly antithetical to the enacted accordist policy of the 
legislation. Evans and Bache (1997) op. cit. n114. 
166 Becoming active in mid 2000 is a new statute, created to replace and combine five existing Acts, 
including the ESPA, as well as creating new policies and regulations. The Environmental Protection 
Biodiversity Conservation Bill and subsequent Act (EPBC Act) has maintained most of the extant 
aspects of the ESPA. The difference, though, is in its application. In 1997 and recently renewed with the 
passage of the EPBC legislation, was an agreement within the Council of Australian Governemnt 
(COAG) that the protection of threatened species and migratory species were issuea of national 
environmental significance. Thus under the new federal legislation the Commonwealth Environment 
Minister is in a much more prominent position to that which has historically been the case. Thus, it may 
he pondered whether the trawling KTP nomination will be revitalised after the activation of this new 
legislation in July 2000. See Ashe, J., "Recent Developments: Commonwealth Environmental 
Protection and Biodiversity Protection Act 1999" (1999) 3 Australian Environmental Taw News 6. 
167 "Guide to Help Save Marine Turtles" Media Release, ANCA (Australian Nature Conservation 
Agency), 14 September 1995. 
168 Letter of Invitation, Perth Indian Ocean Sea Turtle Conservation Workshop, 19 -22 October 1999, 
to the IUCN Marine Turtle Specialist Group, from Andrew McNee, Director, Wildlife Management, 
Biodiversity Group, Environment Australia, 22 September 1999. 
169 The Australian government's preferential selection of the Bonn Convention as the instrument to 
create a multilateral regional sea turtle protection under is based upon a two- pronged rationale. Firstly, 
current Australian government policy is to not subscribe to new instruments, if there are existing ones 
adequate to the task. Secondly, as a member nation of the Bonn Convention, there is an obligation 
carried, in essence, to promote this instrument. 
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Dugong Protection and the Regulation of Gillnetting 
Dugongs' range in Australia extends through tropical and sub tropical waters 
concentrating between Moreton Bay on the east coast to Shark Bay on the west. It is 
generally believed that, due to the level of threatening activities elsewhere, Australia is 
the dugong's last stronghold.10 By 1996, the Commonwealth government was under 
considerable public pressure to take action to remedy the dugong's decline, particularly 
due to incidental capture in protective shark nets and gillnet fisheries.l'r 
Industry groups in Queensland strongly deny that the bycatch of dugong in gi nnets is a 
problem, and vociferously opposed regulatory action. ' Z A concerted campaign to 
discredit not only data, but also the scientists involved, was launched.' Leading this 
action was the Queensland Commercial Fishermen's Organisation (QCFO). " 
Notwithstanding intense industry opposition, by 1997 dugong mortalities in 
Shoalwater Bay had resulted in the creation of a Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority (GBRMPA) consultative management plan which prohibited all driftnetting 
in Shoalwater Bay " 5 The intent was to mitigate the dangers posed to dugongs in that 
area, by banning the carriage of all nets in that area and making it an offence to 
interfere with dugongs. 
170 Marsh et al. (1993) op. cit. n143. 
171 Dugongs' survival is perhaps more precarious than any of the previously considered bycatch 
species. This is due both to the fragility of their population status and their susceptibility to threats: 
fecundity is particularly low, with a l -2% loss of mature females thought to be greater than a population 
can withstand; furthermore, dugongs can not survive longer than 8 minutes underwater without surfacing 
to breathe, and are thought to suffer cardiac failure from capture stress. Indeed, the dugong has been listed 
as vulnerable to extinction by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) since 1982. 
Marsh (1988) op. cit. n21; and Marsh, H. and Anderson, P., 'Probable Susceptibility of Dugongs to 
Capture Stress" (1983) 25 Biological Conservation I. 
172 "Safety zones to protect dugongs on Reef' Sydney Morning Herald, 15 August 1997. 
The Northern Territory industry is not as actively opposed to dugong protection as are Queensland 
groups. Indeed the government and fishers in the Northern Territory are progressively taking actions 
aimed at the reduction of dugong bycatch. Per. comm. Dr Nick Rayns, Director, Northern Territories 
Fisheries, Darwin, 14 September 1999. 
173 Among the tactics employed was a letter sent to the Director -General of the IUCN with claims of 
"misconduct by falsely asserting a decline in the dugong population and disseminating misleading 
information.... [and] wilfully engineering an artificial emergency to milk the public purse ". Cited in 
Marsh, H., `Bulletproofing Science Against Extremists: Advice for Sirenian Researchers" (1999) 31 
Sirenews 1. 
174 Per. comm. confidential source. 
175 In 1996, Shoalwater Bay had been listed under the Convention of Wetlands of International 
Importance 1971 (Ramsar Convention), and thus protection to the habitat of this region was required. 
The Shoalwater Bay (Dugong) Plan of Management was gazetted on 9 April and came into force in May 
1997. See Slater Slater, J., "The Legal and Policy Issues Involved in Protecting a Population of 
Dugongs (Dugong Dugon) from Gill Netting in Shoalwater Bay, of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage 
Area" (1997) 2 Australian Environmental Law News 14. 
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Meanwhile, in 1995, in response to a nomination under the ESPA,16 a report had been 
commissioned that found that though dugong populations were in general healthy in 
Australia, off the Queensland coast they had fallen by between 50 and 80% from 1986 
to 1994.' Thus, despite evidence that the dugong was not in danger Australia -wide, 
they had suffered a "catastrophic decline" in numbers along the Queensland coast!' 
Towards the end of 1996, the federal Minister for the Environment, Robert Hill, 
announced the federal government's intention, with the support of the Queensland 
government, to establish a chain of dugong sanctuaries ° Thus, once again, area 
declarations were used as an attempt to combat the impact of gillnetting activities 
upon dugong populations!' 
A series of dugong protection areas (DPAs) along the Queensland coast were created 
based upon an independent review of scientific information.'s' Sixteen DPAs, at 
approximately 200km intervals, were to be established along the Queensland east 
coast, in which gillnetting was either prohibited,'' or safeguards were put in place to 
minimise the impacts of fishing upon dugongs.'' An endangered species awareness 
course was also made compulsory for all Queensland commercial fishers. The closure 
and compensation of 38 fishing operations resulted in the consequential loss of jobs.'" 
176 Advice to the Minister for the Environment from the Endangered Species Scientific Subcommittee 
(ESSS) on a Public Nomination to Schedule 3 of the Endangered Species Protection Act 1992 
(unpublished, 1995). 
177 In 1998, the ESSS had advised the Minister to deny an earlier KTP nomination, though it reserved 
a final decision on the conservation status of dugongs, this nomination to be reviewed in five years. 
178 Marsh, H., Corkeron, P., Lawler, I., Lanyon, J. and Preen, A., The Status of the Dugong in the 
Southern Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, Townsville, 1995). 
179 "Urgent Action Taken on Dugong Decline" Media Release, Minister for the Environment, 4 
December 1996, No. 172/96. See also Bache, S., "Federal Marine Wildlife Initiatives" (1997) 4 
Australian Environmental Law News 6. 
180 Hansard, Senate [Senator Robert Hill, Minister for the Environment', 19 June 1997, p.4643. 
181 The restriction on mesh netting were implemented on 12 January 1998 under the Queensland 
Fisheries Act, "Hill Welcomes World's First Dugong Sanctuaries" Media Release, Minister for the 
Environment, 11 January 1998, 03/98. 
182 In zone A sanctuaries, the use of offshore set nets, foreshore set and drift nets was prohibited, with 
the exception of the Sandy Bay area, and the Great Sandy strait sanctuary where specialised practices were 
permitted with modification. River set nets were also prohibited in all bar two zones: those of 
Ilinchinbrook and Shoalwater Bay. See url: 
http: / /www.gbnapa. government .au /information/dugong /modificati ons.html 
183 In zone B, restrictions and gear modifications included a limit on the length of offshore nets to 600 
metres, fishing only in water at least two meters deep, and with the fisher within 100 meters of the net. 
Foreshore set nets were restricted to 200 meters length, with the nets no more than 800 meters apart and 
the distance between the first and last net no greater than 1 kilometer. Ibid. 
184 Compensation, in the form of ex gratia payments to those fishers affected by the creation of zone A 
sanctuaries, was made- available for the surrender of fishing licenses or redundancy as a crew member. 
Ibid. 
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A New Agenda - Bycatch Policy 
As seen by the increased attention in the mid -1990s and increasingly as 2000 
approaches, discarded bycatch is becoming an issue of policy concern in Australia. 
Most recently elevated to the status of an issue requiring policy action, and to date 
escaping significant public attention, was the bycatch of seals in mid water trawling 
operations off the west coast of Tasmania.' 
Though the bycatch of seals is traditionally of a very low order, in 1999 an 
uncharacteristically high number of seals were taken in this fishery.` In response, in 
September 1999, AFMA acted to temporarily prohibit the entrance of three New 
Zealand factory trawlers to Australian waters, citing the inability of seal to escape 
given the speed of the trawling as the reason for this high take.187 
This cases reflect a trend (evidenced in the U.S. case studies which follow) whereby, as 
fisheries' interactions continue to occur and previously low numbers of marine wildlife 
increase due to greater protection, the bycatch of these species also increases. As the 
incidental take of unthreatened populations of marine wildlife which command 
significant public interest escelates, bycatch will become an issue that is increasingly 
fought out over philosophical and ethical grounds, rather than those of population 
viability. 
Intended, in part, as a framework within which to address these emergent problems 
are the federal government's Commonwealth and national bycatch policies. The 
introduction of a process to create a bycatch policy within the federal government was 
not a surprising development. Both the 1996 and 1997 annual Commonwealth fisheries 
status review considered, as a key environmental issue, "bycatch, especially of high 
profile, threatened marine species - seabirds, dugongs and turtles ".188 In 1998 a 
185 The South East Trawl Fishery is a complex mulit- species fishery, managed under AFMA's 
jurisdiction using a regime of individual transferable quotas (ITQs). The gear is configured such that it 
`flys' off the bottom, an arrangement that reportedly has considerable potential to incidentally capture 
seals. Indeed, the Action Plan for Australian Seals identifies nine threatening processes, included in 
which are interactions with fisheries. Shaughnessy, P., The Action Plan for Australian Seals 
(Environment Australia, Canberra, 1999). 
186 Between 1993 and 1995, in a total of 1886 trawl shots, a total of 46 fur seals were recorded as taken 
(Harris, A. and Ward, P., Non -Target Species in Australia's Commonwealth Fisheries - A Critical 
Review (Bureau. of Rural Sciences, 1999)). Records from 1998 indicate that only three seals were taken in 
that season. In the 1999 winter season, 89 seals were taken, of which only six were returned to the water 
alive. Per. comm., confidential source. 
187 "NZ Trawlers Banned" The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1999; `Animal Activists Fear Seal 
Net Deaths" The Hobart Mercury, 28 September 1999; "Seals Killed" The Canberra Tunes, 28 
September 1999. 
188 Wallner, B., Ward, P., Jones, M., Hamdorf, I. and Harris, A., "Fishing and the Environment ", in 
McLoughlin, K., Wallner, B. and Staples, D. (ed), Fishery Status Reports 1996: Resource Assessments 
of Australian Commonwealth Fisheries (Bureau of Resource Sciences, Canberra, 1996) pp_I 19 -131; and 
Jones and Evans (1997) op. cit. n145. 
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separate chapter on fishing and non -target species appeared.189 This was a result of a 
nearly two year review undertaken to provide data on the effects of fishing in 
Commonwealth waters.190 These developments reflected a marked increase in federal 
commitment to the consideration of the bycatch of non target non -fish species. Though 
yet to be publicly released, the review itself is highly critical of the lack of information 
and data collection efforts with respect to non -target catch in Australian fisheries, 
commenting on the absence of even baseline data for many fisheries.191 
In June 1997, the AFMA- convened Commonwealth bycatch taskforce released its draft 
bycatch policy for comment 192 Herein was recognised that bycatch is a problem in 
need of redress, and the creation of bycatch action plans for all Commonwealth 
fisheries was foreshadowed.193 As such, the policy provided a framework for the 
coordination of efforts, and supplemented rather than replaced other initiatives such 
as that of threat abatement plans prepared pursuant to the ESPA. The plan also 
highlighted the dearth of adequate data and the need for its collection in order to deal 
with bycatch in a systematic and equitable manner. 
Lacking, however, was any enunciation of the expected outcomes, time frames, or the 
performance indictors.'94 Also criticised was the lack of an explicit goal to actually 
reduce bycatch.19s 
If we try to develop strategies without a framework outlining the explicit 
objectives that we want to achieve, we are likely to find ourselves setting 
precedents and developing rules which may be overlapping or even 
conflicting, or - perhaps even worse - which merely displace problems 
from one fishery or region to another without actually resolving them.196 
189 Harris, A., "Fishing and Non - Target Species ", in Caton, A., McLoughlin, K. and Staples, D. (ed), 
Fishery Status Reports 1998: Resource Assessments of Australian Commonwealth Fisheries (Bureau of 
Resource Sciences, Canberra, 1998) pp.149 -161. 
190 Harris and Ward (1999) op. cit. n186. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Commonwealth Bycatch Policy - A Draft for Public Comment. Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority, Canberra, 1997 (hereafter "draft Commonwealth Bycatch Policy "). 
193 Open letter accompanying the draft Commonwealth Bycatch Policy, from Richard Stevens, 
Managing Director AFMA, 2 June 1997. 
194 Comments on the draft Commonwealth Bycatch Policy, Submission No. 17, Alison Russel - 
French, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Portfolio Marine Group, EA. 
195 Comments on the draft Commonwealth Bycatch Policy, Submission No. 7, David Nicholls, 
Peninsula College of TAPE; Submission No. 13, Gordon Anderson, Assistant Director, Marine and 
Policy Integration Section, Biodiversity group EA and Great Australian Bight MAC member; 
Submission No. 17, Alison Russel- French, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Portfolio Marine Group, 
EA. 
196 Metzner (1999) op. cit. n12. 
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Notwithstanding these broad criticisms, there was wide ranging acclaim for the policy. 
Although NGO support had been expected, encouragingly, the fishing industry were 
also very much in favour of its creation, stating in its submission that 
the seafood industry is concerned about the fisheries bycatch problem and 
considers it a major issue in terms of sustainable fisheries management, 
industry economics, and the environmental credentials of the industry. The 
bycatch problem is more than one of perception.197 
Moreover, support for the intention and process of the development of a 
Commonwealth bycatch policy stretched across typically partisan political lines. 
In response to scientific information, developments are now occurring 
where a range of interest groups are working together, to combat both 
species specific impacts and more broadly in the formation of a 
Commonwealth bycatch policy. This is an unprecedented alliance of 
government, industry, and conservation bodies, wherein no party sees any 
benefit stemming from the bycatch of conservation significant species 198 
The revised document incorporated a wide range of views from public, industry, 
government and non -government stakeholders. The strength of the policy remained its 
creation of fisheries -specific action plans. The plan then stalled however. A 
multiplicity of reasons for this have been suggested, among them being that subsequent 
alterations made to the plan by Enironment Australia were so significant that the plan 
no longer belonged to the taskforce.199 
In late July 1997, the Ministerial Council on Forestry, Fisheries and Aquaculture agreed 
to develop a nationally coordinated bycatch policy 200 This commitment has elevated 
the inter- governmental priority being afforded bycatch problems.201 It represented a 
commitment by all Australian states to contribute and abide by a national bycatch 
policy. Once again, specifically mentioned were albatross, dugongs and turtles.202 
As an initial step, a discussion paper was released by the Council for public 
consultation at the end of the year. In its final form the federal plan recognised the 
increasing international attention being paid to bycatch, and the need to develop a 
more strategic approach towards bycatch in Australian waters. 
197 Comments on the draft Commonwealth Bycatch Policy, Submission No. 18, Bill Nagel, CEO, 
Australian Seafood Industry Council. 
198 Hansard, House of Representatives, [Laurie Ferguson, Shadow Minister for Defence, Science and 
Personnel] 1 September 1997, p.7394. 
199 Per. comm. Richard Stevens, Managing Director, AFMA, Wednesday 26 November 1997. 
200 "Fisheries Ministers Agree to Tackle Bycatch" Joint Media Statement, Ministerial Council on 
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In the event, the national plan overtook the Commonwealth's, and was released in 
October 1999 with the agreement of, and contributions from, all state governments. 
The national bycatch policy highlighted the need to address bycatch in a coordinated 
manner, and to achieve a common understanding by stakeholders of the need for 
action. The objective was to "ensure that bycatch species and populations are 
maintained at sustainable levels." Three policy sub -objectives were to 
reduce bycatch; 
improve protection for vulnerable /threatened species; and 
minimise adverse impacts of fishing on the aquatic environment. 
The range of strategies outlined for achieving these included issue prioritisation, 
development of codes of practice, compensation adjustment measures, regulatory 
action and the use of economic incentives, education and training, encouragement of 
research funding, and enhancement of data quality.zo3 
Subsequent to the completion of the national policy, concerns over the fate of the 
Commonwealth policy have emerged. These concern the preferred manner of handling 
the presence of, not one, but two bycatch plans involving the federal government. Both 
EA and AFMA were insistent that the Commonwealth plan still be released under 
their combined bailiwick.' Indeed although still not finalised there is certainly some 
merit in maintaining the Commonwealth plan in that it contains specific actions for the 
implementation of the goals espoused in the overarching national document: that is 
bycatch action plans to be created for every federally managed fishery. 
Notwithstanding recent developments, Australia remains in the formative stages of its 
efforts to address bycatch through policy responses. Data is scant, and procedural 
responses to new issues as they arise, remains ad hoc. The U.S. by comparison has 
much more experience and explored in greater detail the various options regarding 
bycatch policy. It is the influences on this policy that this thesis is concerned with. The 
next chapter outlines existing literature from public and environmental policy and 
marine management fields, to provide a marine policy framework with which U.S. 
experience can be examined. 
From this study, and supported by published literature, four factors of particular 
interest can be seen as having a reoccurring role in raising the agenda, and promoting 
the formation and implementation of marine wildlife bycatch policy. In the case of 
driftnets, NGOs were instrumental in raising the profile of the issue and having it 
attended to. In addition, domestic political forces had a significant influence in 
203 National Bycatch Policy (1999) op cit. n3. 
204 Draft Commonwealth Bycatch Policy (1997) op. cit. nI92. 
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Australia's actions in the South Pacific; and conversely domestic action was driven by 
Australia's international goals. In comparison, attention to albatrosses has been driven 
primarily through science, both in the raising of the issue and in the formation of a 
responsive policy.205 Most recently, in the cases of sea turtle take and dugong bycatch 
domestic players, such as industry and state /federal interactions, have had 
considerable influence over the policy process, though science has continued to play a 
part in the polycy process too. Regarding sea turtles the actions of other nations have 
been also influenced Austrlalia's behaviour, domestically and regionally. 
The following chapter considers these four factors - the role of science, international 
influences, environmental NGO involvement, and the impact of domestic actions and 
actors - and examines the existing analytical treatment of these elements. As no 
specific marine policy analysis framework exists, discussions are drawn from related 
fields of public policy, marine management and environmental policy literature. 
205 Bache and Evans (1999) op. cit. n86. 

Chapter Two 
Framework of Analysis: Science, 
Stakeholders and the Law 
2.1 Introduction 
Concern over the harvesting of seals and whales, on both sustainabilit_y and 
humanitarian grounds, and later the bycatch of dolphins, triggered widespread public 
interest and international involvement in the management of marine wildlife. 
Notwithstanding that all parties agree that the elimination of the bycatch of marine 
wildlife is a desirable goal, the issue has strained relationships between otherwise 
friendly nations, changed fishing patterns and trade relations, and divided interest 
groups.' To be sure, the issue of incidental take of marine wildlife is complex, and the 
surrounding policy formation process reflects these complexities. 
Few studies concerning the formation of marine policy have contemplated the bycatch 
issue. Those that have so done, considered a particular fishing practice in isolation, 
and tended to focus upon a single factor as the predominant causal element in related 
policy action. For example Joseph, in his discussion on dolphin bycatch in purse - 
seining operations in the ETP, concludes that the differences of opinion regarding the 
preferred management of the fishery stein largely from unresolved questions as to the 
nature and behaviours of the target species.' In so doing he highlights the scientific 
unknowns: why do dolphins and tuna swim in association, what are tuna's early life 
behaviours prior to association with dolphins, and how do both species interact with 
their surrounding ecosystem? Burke et al. also consider science as the main influence 
upon policy formation, here however with respect to bycatch in long pelagic driftnets 3 
He examines the role science was afforded in the policy formation process, and 
questions why it was not the dominant influence and why political and national 
concerns were allowed to capture the process and dictate the outcomes. 
Several papers in the broader environmental policy field have analysed the reasons 
behind a nation's behaviour with regard to a particular issue, in terms of several policy 
1 Joseph, J., The Tuna -Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, 
and Political Impacts" (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Burke, W., Freeburg, M. and Miles, E., "United Nations Resolutions on Dríftnet Fishing: An 
Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management" (1994) 25 Ocean 
Development and International Law 127. 
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factors. In an analysis of Canadian and Australian environmental policy Boardman 
identifies a number of influences.' These include the financial and natural resources of 
a nation; the bureaucratic actors within national governments; government structures, 
in particular the division of power among levels of government in federal States; and 
pressures from domestic interest groups. Bergin, in his analysis of Australia's role in 
the Antarctic minerals convention, considers the impact of a variety of actors on the 
debate. In addition to public influence he holds that 
[ buureaucratic conflicts were much in evidence and environmental groups 
stimulated public and political interest. The prime minister ... was to prove 
a decisive actor in the final decision.' 
More recently, Friedheim analysed japans behaviour at the International Whaling 
Commission in terms of rational choice, cultural conditioning, and domestic 
constraints.' 
This thesis borrows from the above approach, by distilling from the public policy and 
environmental policy literature four variables with which to better explain Australia 
and the U.S.'s behaviour towards the mitigation of bycatch of marine wildlife. 
Published as the theoretical basis for an article entitled "Dolphin, Albatross and 
Commercial Fishing: Explaining Australia's Responses to an Unpalatable Mix" by 
Bache and Evans, these variables are: 
international influences and the internationality of the issues; 
the profile and role of non -governmental organisations; 
the use of science in decision making; and 
domestic political influences on foreign and domestic policies and positions.' 
These four factors are not mutually exclusive and, when phrased as hypotheses, are 
complementary rather than rival.' For example, and as illustrated by Burke et al.,' the 
role that science is afforded in decision -making may be impacted upon by the type and 
strength of interests at stake.10 The influence of science in an international forum may 
4 Boardman, R., "Approaching Regimes: Australia, Canada and Environmental Policy" (1991) 26 
Australian Journal of Political Science 446. 
5 Bergin, A., "The Politics of Antarctic Minerals: The Greening of White Australia" (1991) 26 
Australian Journal of Political Science 216 at 216. 
6 Friedheim, R., "Moderation in the Pursuit of Justice: Explaining Japan's Failure in the 
International Whaling Negotiations" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and International Law 349. 
7 Bache, S. and Evans, N., "Dolphin, Albatross and Commercial Fishing: Australia's Responses to 
an Unpalatable Mix" (1999) 23 Marine Policy 259. 
8 Yin, R., Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 1994). 
9 Burke et al. (1994) op. cit. n3. 
10 Andresen, S., "Increased Public Attention: Communication and Polarization" in Andresen, S. and 
Ostreng, W. (ed), International Resource Management: The Role of Science and Politics (Belhaven 
Press, London, 1989a) pp.25 -45; Miles, E., "Scientific and Technological Knowledge and International 
Cooperation in Resource Management" in Andresen, S. and Ostreng, W. (ed), International Resource 
Management: The Role of Science and Politics (Belhaven Press, London, 1989) pp.46 -87; and Ostreng, 
continued over page 
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be reduced if it is perceived to be harmful for short -term economic or broader 
domestic /national interests. Alternatively science may play an elevated role through 
its use by non -governmental organisations to arouse public interest, and persuade 
policy makers towards a particular - scientifically supported - viewpoint. In this 
way these four factors outlined below are interwoven as the key elements contributing 
to the issue emergence and policy consideration of marine bycatch. Combination and 
recombination of these factors is sought throughout the case study component of this 
thesis, in an attempt to determine which, if any, has been dominant in encouraging or 
retarding the formation of marine bycatch policies. 
2.2 The role of science as knowledge 
Science both provides the means to produce technological solutions to physical 
problems, and is a way of acquiring and conveying information." In its first role, as the 
principle developer of technology, science serves a dual- purpose as the cause of many 
management problems, and not infrequently also as the supplier of the technology 
required to solve these problems!' Consideration of science in this thesis however is 
restricted to the role that scientific findings play in the formation of marine 
conservation policy; that is, its role as supplier of information. 
Insofar as the influence of science on marine policy applies, there has developed an 
increasingly intelligent discourse on the subject.13 This literature attempts to explain 
how scientific research is used in the raising of an issue and the formation of an 
appropriate policy response in both domestic and international fora. It recognises that 
science is not the only, nor necessarily the predominant, contributor to the information 
base.14 Essentially, this material has evolved out of realisation that decision making 
and policy setting is ultimately a political imperative, and that recommendations from 
scientists are not necessarily impartial, nor do decisions always reflect the findings of 
W., "Polar Science and Politics: Close Twins or Opposite Poles in International Cooperation ", in 
Andresen, S. and Ostreng, W. (ed), International Resource Management: The Role of Science and 
Politics (Belhaven Press, London, 1989) pp.88-114. 
11 Ottesen, P. and Woodley, S., "Great Barrier Reef Marine Park - Research for Better Management ", 
paper presented to Science and the Management of Protected Areas (Elsevier, Acadia, Nova Scotia, 1991) 
pp.37-45. 
12 Underdal, A., "The Politics of Science in International Resource Management: A Summary ", in 
Andresen, S. and Ostreng, W. (ed), International Resource Management: The Role of Science and 
Politics (Belhaven Press, London, 1989) pp.253 -268. 
13 See generally, Constable, A., "The Role of Science in Environmental Protection" (1991) 42 
Australian Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research 527; and Ottesen and Woodley (1991) op. cit. 
n I. 
14 Ottesen and Woodley (1991) op. cit. n11. Elizinga, A., "From Arrehius to Megascience: Interplay 
between Science and Public Decision Makin" (1997) 26 Ambio 72 provides four models outlining 
various degrees of scientific and politicallsocial influence over the closure of a scientific controversy. 
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the research.15 The extent to which science impacts upon a final policy, is tempered by 
a variety of political and systematic constraints.' Even where ideal conditions for the 
successful translation of scientific advice into a policy position are met, policy makers 
may still prefer instead to satisfy other more pressing demands. The scientific message 
may still be ignored. By way of example, the following is a statement issued by the 
chairman of the Scientific Committee of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) 
on his resignation: 
the matter of substance is, what is the point of having a Scientific 
Committee if its unanimous recommendations on a matter of primary 
importance are treated with such contempt." 
There is no doubt that science does provide a crucial contribution to the formation of 
policies on natural resource conservation and management. Indeed Walker observes 
that 
environmental problems cannot (unlike some political issues such as 
taxation) be resolved by political debate alone. Scientific knowledge must 
be procured and brought to bear; without ìt, no policy can be evolved." 
As earlier suggested, science has two key avenues by which it may influence natural 
resources policy. Referred to by Underdal as the diagnostic and therapy roles,19 these 
are the first two phases in the three tiered policy cycle, the final phase being that of 
implementation (for discussion on the policy cycle refer to section 2.5).2° 
The revelation of new scientific evidence - and diagnosis of a problem - may trigger 
the initiation of the political process with regard to a particular issue. Young notes that 
science regularly plays an important role in agenda setting by identifying 
and highlighting previously unknown and often cumulative problems 
15 See Andresen (1989) op. cit. nl0. See also Miller, A., "The Role of Analytical Science in Natural 
Resource Decision Making" (1993) 17 Environmental Management 563 for a discussion on science as the 
predominant source of knowledge, and the view that technical rationality and its objective scientific 
information should claim the primary role in all decision formation. Miller too rebukes this claim and 
argues that science should not be provided the predominant role in policy formation because it is not 
itself impartial and hence can not rightly be elevated to such status. 
16 Walker, K., The Political Economy of Environmental Policy: An Australian Introduction (New 
South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1994). 
17 Phillip Hammond, letter of resignation, 26 May 1993, cited in Friedheim (1996) op. cit. n6. 
18 Walker (1994) op. cit. n16 at 31. 
19 Underdal (1989) op. cit. nI2. See also generally Miller, M., "Regional Fishery Management 
Councils and the Display of Scientific Authority" (1987) 15 Coastal Management 309; and Andresen, S. 
and Ostreng, W., "Introduction", in Andresen, S. and Ostreng, W. (ed), International Resource 
Management: The Role of, Science and Politics (Belhaven Press, London, 1989) pp.1 -6. 
20 See also Jenkins, W., Policy Analysis: A Political and Organisational Perspective (Martin 
Robertson, Oxford, 1978); Hogwood, B. and Peters, B., Policy Dynamics (Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 
1983); and Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M., Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995). 
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arising from the human use of natural resources and environmental 
services ' 
Secondly science may be a key influence on the content and form of the policy 
generated in response to environmental management needs; that is the therapy. It is in 
this role, at the policy interface, that science is most varied and controversial, and it is 
thus important to understand the relationship between scientific and political levels of 
problem solving. Hildreth observes that 
although the goal of making marine policymaking more scientific deserves 
support, there are limits to how scientific marine policymaking can become 
because the roles of scientists and marine policymakers are different.' 
This difference in roles is explained in terms of science being a method designed to 
provide an answer to what is right or true or correct, but being unable to determine 
what is better. Better requires a value judgement, it involves non -science considerations 
such as personal values and belief systems. Hence 'better' falls into the decision 
making realm of the policy maker.' This recognises that even though an environmental 
problem may have a scientific answer, the ultimate solution for human society is 
political and expressed as policy.' 
Wettestad and Andresen extend this concept from an observation of a difference in 
the abilities of science and politics, to a contention that the influence of science in the 
decision making process tends to be marginal when strong national and economic 
interests are involved." As discussed policy makers must weigh scientific information 
against that of, say, industry and financial bodies. Young points out that when the 
arrangements proposed by the scientific community do not impinge on the concerns of 
powerful interest groups, then the implementation of advice is unlikely to be a 
problem.' Godard similarly observes that 
21 Young, O., "Science and Social Institutions: Lessons for International Resource Regimes ", in 
Andresen, S. and Ostreng, W. (ed), International Resource Management: The Role of Science and 
Politics (Belhaven Press, London, 1989) pp.7 -24 at 10. 
22 Hildreth, R., "The Roles of Science in U.S. Marine Policy: Some Regional Applications" (1994) 
22 Coastal Management 163 at 169. 
23 Huffman, J., "Truth, Purpose, and Public Policy: Science and Democracy in the Search for Safety" 
(1991) 21 Environmental Law 1091. 
24 Caldwell, L., "Analysis- Assessment -Decision: The Anatomy of Rational Policymaking" (1991) 9 
Impact Assessment Bulletin 8I. 
25 Wettestad, J. and Andresen, S., "Science and North Sea Policy -Making: Organization and 
Communication ", in Freestone, D. and Ijlstra, T. (ed), The North Sea: Perspectives on Regional 
Environmental Co- operation (Graham and Trotman, London, 1990) pp.111 -122. 
26 Young (1989) op. cit. n21. 
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leaders and laypeople are all to willing to believe statements that are made 
by scientists, not because such statements are scientifically verifiable, but 
because they lend credence to lay attitudes or leadership positions.' 
Where, however, groups possessing considerable political influence oppose the 
scientific community the situation becomes more complex. 
In polarised settings, gaps in scientific knowledge have been traditionally used to 
justify inaction, and scientific information used to promote factional purposes. 
Selective use of scientific information acts to legitimise a particular position, 
irrespective of the merits of that science, based on the belief that the emergent policy 
derives its authority from scientific rationality 28 'Truth' becomes a secondary or 
auxiliary criterion.' Indeed science is not infrequently used post ipso facto as a 
justification for a policy position reached on other grounds 3° As Andresen noted with 
respect to the partisan pressures within the IWC 
there is little room for independent and open- minded scientific discussions 
... the line often does not go between scientists and decision -makers but 
between an alliance of scientists and diplomats from whaling and non- 
whaling nations respectively. ... This has nothing to do with the ability or 
skills of the scientists involved, as there are excellent scientists on both 
sides 31 
Ottesen and Woodley have identified three factors (in addition to the influence of 
alternate non -science sources of knowledge discussed above) which may act to limit 
the contribution of science to the formation of any natural resources policy. These are: 
1. a lack of comprehensive results; 
2. limited consensus within the scientific community; and 
3. a high degree of complexity and large number of qualifications made in the 
results.32 
In terns of the marine environment, the first and third of these, in particular, are 
exacerbated. The immense size and the fluid nature of the environment, and the 
consequentially high biological and physical variability, and logistical and financial 
difficulties of researching a fluid environment, as well as the comparative youth of the 
academic disciplines engaged in marine research, create an unusually high number of 
scientific unknowns, and often complex and qualified results. 
27 Godard, O., "Social Decision- Making in the Context of Scientific Controversies: The Interplay of 
Environmental Issues, Technological Conventions and Economic Stakes" (1992) 2 Global 
Environmental Change 239 at 242. 
28 Andresen and Ostreng (1989) op. cit. n19. 
29 Underdal (1989) op_ cit. n12. 
30 Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
31 Andresen (1989a) op. cit. n10 at 38. 
32 Ottesen and Woodley (1991) op. cit. n11. 
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The potential implications of a lack of comprehensive results are discussed in much of 
the environmental policy literature under the broader umbrella of 'uncertainty'. It is 
however necessary to first limit the meaning of 'uncertainty' as it relates to discussions 
on science. Uncertainty is an aspect of all science. According to Wynne "ignorance is 
endemic to scientific knowledge, which has to reduce the framework of the known to 
that which is amenable to its own parochial methods and models"?' The term 
uncertainty as it is used in the proceeding discussion refers to that which is unknown 
over and beyond that of routine scientific practice. 
Uncertainty has the effect, in polarised settings, of allowing science to simultaneously 
validate several opposing arguments. 
Scientific uncertainties are resources that can be used to manipulate - or 
paralyse - policy decisions. The purpose of such interventions may be to 
obtain premature (often favourable) closure of a controversy, or to sustain 
continued controversy and uncertainty. Interventions can occur in many 
different ways. New research may be financed for the purpose of raising 
doubts about widely accepted 'facts'. Alternatively, lobbying and public 
relations campaigns may be undertaken to diffuse doubts about insecure 
scientific findings, or to call for postponement of action by underlining 
uncertainties and controversies.' 
Herein is illustrated the danger that scientific analyses of environmental problems may 
be accepted as more factual than is actually warranted tm According to Andresen, if 
uncertainty is pronounced and it cannot be proven who is right and who is wrong then 
each player is able to select from the existing often diverging scientific reports or 
opinions available 36 Dovers takes this further and suggests that some decision makers 
may not actually want improved information, as uncertainly can be useful in clouding 
understanding and allowing for greater control over public debate 37 
Recognition of the problem and extent of uncertainty has led to a search for new ways 
of handling scientific uncertainty 3E One approach has seen attempts to categorise 
uncertainty and define it in order to allow a "more structured and comparable means 
33 Wynne, B., "Uncertainty and Environmental Learning-Reconceiving Science and Policy in the 
Preventive Paradigm" (1992) 2 Global Environmental Change 111 at 115. 
34 Godard (1992) op. cit. n27 at 242. 
35 Lemons, J., "Introduction ", in Lemons, J. (ed), Scientific Uncertainty and Environmental Problem 
Solving (Blackwell Science, Oxford, 1996) pp.1 -11. 
36 Andresen, S., "Science and Politics in the International Management of Whales" (1989) 2 Marine 
Policy 99. 
37 Dovers, S., "Information, Sustainahility and Policy" (1995) 2 Australian Journal of 
Environmental Management 142. 
38 Dovers, S. and Handmer, J., "Ignorance, Sustainability and the Precautionary Principle: Towards 
an Analytical Framework ", in Harding, R. and Fisher, E. (ed), Perspectives on the Precautionary 
Principle (The Federation Press, Sydney, 1999) pp.I67 -189. 
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of approaching problem definition" 'An alternate approach has been to repackage the 
concept of uncertainty as a science in itself: that is the science of risk analysis. Risk, as 
distinct from uncertainly, is a defined structural element representing the likelihood of 
failure.'° 
Another approach has been through the creation of the concept of precaution. The 
introduction of precaution into scientific decision making has altered the balance 
between the scientific and the political influences on policy formation: "traditional 
reliance on waiting for scientific 'proof' is no longer viable ". "' The precautionary 
principle holds that uncertainly is not an adequate reason for postponing 
environmental protection measures» It recognises that adequate information to 
support decisions will rarely if ever be achieved, and hence the validation of the 
precautionary approach to decision and policy making implies an acceptance of the 
inherent limitations of anticipatory lmowledge.' While there are problems with the 
subjective and qualitative descriptors used in most definitions of the precautionary 
principle, with the adoption of a precautionary approach 'scientific certainty' is now 
no longer required to prove that a particular change has occurred." Rather, even where 
there is no scientific evidence proving that a causal link exists, the principle of 
safeguarding the environment by the use of best available technology and other 
appropriate measures is the accepted norm. With the advent of near universal 
39 Dovers, S., "Risk, Uncertainty and Ignorance: Policy Process and Institutional Issues ", paper 
presented at Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental Management: Proceedings of the 1995 Australian 
Academy of Science Fenner Conference of the Environment Canberra, 13 -16 November, in Norton, T., 
Beer, T, and Dovers, S. (ed) (The ANU, Canberra, 1996) pp.14 -32; and Funtowicz, S. and Ravetz, J., 
"A New Scientific Methodology for Global Environmental Issues ", in Costanza, R. (ed), Ecological 
Communities: The Science and Management of Sustainability (Columbia University Press, New York, 
1991) pp.137 -152. 
40 McDonell, G., "Risk Management, Reality and the Precautionary Principle: Coping with 
Decisions ", in Harding, R. and Fisher, E. (ed), Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (The 
Federation Press, Sydney, 1999) pp.190 -208. 
41 Dovers, S., Norton, T. and Handmer, J., "Uncertainty, Ecology, Sustainability and Policy" (1996) 
5 Biodiversity and Conservation 1143 at 1144. 
42 The precautionary principle is enunciated in, inter alia, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (1992) Principle 15, the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (1992) Article 3.3, 
and the United Nations Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995) Article 6. 
43 Wynne (1992) op. cit. n33. 
44 By way of example of the qualitative nature of the definition of precaution see the underlined terms 
in the Council of Australian Government's 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment. 
Clause 3.5.1 reads: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used, as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. in the 
application of the precautionary principle, public and private decisions should be guided by: 
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible damage to the environment; 
and 
(ii) an assessment of the risk -weighted consequences of various options. 
See, Dovers et al. (1996) op. cit. n41. 
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acceptance of this approach to environmental management, the utility of gaps in 
scientific data as a stalling mechanism is likely to be reduced. As Grey notes, the 
precautionary principle shifts the element of doubt to the environment rather than the 
exploiter as previously, and moves the burden of proof onto development 
proponents.' 
Ottesen and Woodley's second factor is derived from the influence that the behaviour 
of the scientific community has upon the role afforded science in policy creation. A 
lack of scientific consensus - like an absence of comprehensive results - allows for 
the politicization of science and its use to support particular, rather than universal, 
interests. Young places the blame for the failure of scientific knowledge to be applied 
accurately to policy formation largely upon the shoulders of the scientific community 
itself. 
In my judgement, the key to the effectiveness of the scientific community in 
this context lies less in the state of scientific knowledge about specific 
issues than in the ability of those scientists working on a given issue to 
reach consensus among themselves and to overcome the natural tendency 
of members of the scientific community to exhibit extreme caution in the 
interest of avoiding any appearance of overstating the inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence available ' 
Other complications for scientists arise where politicization has been active from the 
outset of issue emergence. In such a scenario, members of the scientific community will 
not have had the chance to devise their terms of reference in an apolitical setting. 
Hence scientists must choose between remaining aloof from the process on the basis 
that science and politics do not mix, or entering the political process to attempt to 
effect a beneficial outcome." Andresen considers the disbenefits of both options as 
active participation endangers the scientific credibility of findings, and the retention of 
a traditional elitist position may result in the omission of scientific considerations from 
the public debate altogether.' Scott et al suggest an alternate view that scientists who 
seek the truth will invariably become partisan to any dispute and therefore can not 
escape becoming captive to the controversy.49 
In the end however - and regardless of the extent of issue polarisation and of 
scientists' active participation in or withdrawal from political aspects of policy 
45 Gray, J., "Statistics and the Precautionary Principle" (1990) 41 Marine Pollution Bulletin 174. 
46 Young (1989) op. cit. n21 at 10. 
47 /bid. 
48 Andersen (1989) op. cit. n10. 
49 Scott, P., Richards, E. and Martin, B., "Captives of Controversy: The Myth of the Neutral Social 
Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies" (1990) 15 Science. Technology and Human Values 
474. 
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formation - the science delivered to the policy makers will have been politicised to the 
extent that it is informed by the scientists' world -views. That is, although science is 
often promoted as an absolute and pure form of knowledge, the beliefs, perspectives 
and philosophies of the source of this knowledge (that is the scientists) changes the 
knowledge itself. 
Concepts pertaining to natural resource views of nature, and scientific 
knowledge are not concepts found in nature waiting to be discovered but 
instead are matters of social construction and human creation.' 
At odds with the positivist view of knowledge, the shortcomings of which have been 
widely debated for many years," this position acknowledges that the process of 
generating scientific knowledge is engaged, value -bound and context determined, and 
recognises interpretation, translation and representation as essentially social acts.52 
Consequently, achieving a consensus depends not only upon the data generated, but 
also the world view of those responsible for its analysis and communication. 
When polarised political settings develop, demands for a particular sort of 
information is called for by the various parties. This typically includes depictions of 
social or physical processes, their interaction with other processes, and the likely 
consequences of particular actions: all of which require the application of considerable 
scientific and /or technological expertise.53 Epistemic communities are possible 
providers of such advice. 
An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.54 
Haas further clarifies this notion and considers an epistemic community to hold not 
only a shared set of normative, principled and causal beliefs, and notions of validity, 
but also to be a community with a common policy enterprise the basis of which is 
aimed at the realisation of an endpoint dictated by a shared set of values 55 The 
inclusion of this final criterion - a shared set of values - explicitly recognises the 
impact of scientists, upon their science. 
50 Lemons (1996) op. cit. n35 at 7. 
51 Habermas, J., On the Logic of the Social Sciences (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1988); and 
Wynne (1992) op. cit. n33. 
52 Drinkwater, M., 'Knowledge, Consciousness and Prejudice: Adaptive Agricultural Research in 
Zambia ", in Scannes, I. and Thompson, J. (ed), Beyond Farmer First (Intermediate Technology 
Publications, London, 1994) pp.32 -41; Scoones, I. and Thompson, J., "Knowledge, Power and 
Agriculture - Towards a Theoretical Understanding ", in Scoones, I. and Thompson, J. (ed), Beyond 
Farmer First (Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1994) pp.1 6-32. 
53 Haas, P., "Introduction: Fpistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination" (1992) 46 
International Organization 1. 
54 /bid at 3. 
55 Ibid. 
- 56 - 
Chapter Two- Framework of Analysis 
Control over scientific knowledge is an important dimension of the policy forming 
process: even more so, perhaps, in a marine context, where data is both difficult and 
costly to acquire, and independant verification of results seldom available. When 
uncertainty and demands from policy makers for information proliferate, the members 
of the prevailing community become strong actors, and their data, as informed through 
their own worldview, becomes the predominant scientific knowledge. As such, it is 
important to recognise that even before an overt tempering of scientific advice with 
other forms of advice has occurred, the information has been subject to value 
judgements 
The potential skewing of scientific information, and the consequential development of 
irrational policies, led Wettestad and Andresen to suggest that there is a need to keep 
these tasks of science and politics functionally separates' Graham warns that if 
respective roles of fact and value are obscured, then decision makers cannot be held 
responsible for either their scientific errors or their policy judgements 58 Others have 
criticised this separation however. Glantz brings to attention the possibility of 
conflicting views within interest groups, as well as between them, and highlights that 
this internal conflict is 
an aspect seldom addressed at meetings on fisheries management, because 
in many countries these is a separation of science and politics. The marine 
science community is often unable to openly challenge policy decisions once 
they are taken.59 
Ottesen and Woodley consider as their third impediment to the translation of scientific 
advice into policy, the complexity of many scientific solutions that are offered to 
questions of policy.60 Although perhaps more accurate, highly detailed information is 
incompatible with the task of decision making. This incompatibility is representative of 
the integral differences that exist between the two fields in terms of time horizons, 
language, fundamental loyalties and peer groups 61 
Andresen and Ostreng suggest that the extent of scientific influence is highly 
dependant upon the "organisation of the relationship between science and politics," 
and agree that a primary reason for failing to adequately consider scientific 
56 Scoones and Thompson (1994) op. cit. n52. 
57 Wettestad and Andresen (1990) op. cit. n25. 
58 Graham, D., Green, L. and Roberts, M., In Search of Safety: Chemicals and Cancer Risk, 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1988). 
59 Glantz, M., "Man, State, and Fisheries: An Inquiry into some Societal Constraints that Affect 
Fisheries Management" (1986) 17 Ocean Development and International Law 191 at 238. 
60 Ottesen and Woodley (1991) op. cit. n11. 
61 Bernstein, B., Thompson, B. and Smith, R., "A Combined Science and Management Framework 
for Developing Regional Monitoring Objectives" (1993) 21 Coastal Management 185. 
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information is the malfunctioning of the communications process between the policy 
makers and the scientific community.62The problem of communication between ecology 
and policy is considered by Dovers et al.. They suggest that it is not only the fault of 
the scientists, but that the policy makers must bear equal blame.' While ecologists may 
have a poor understanding of the policy process and the policy makers' requirements, 
the policy makers often fail to comprehend the scientific method and often hence, 
misinterpret or dismiss the conclusions reached. 
Hildreth extends this idea of the determinative influence of communication, so as to 
include consideration of the role of the particular institutions involved. Most 
international and domestic bodies have procedures and personnel designed to ensure 
the integration of science into their decisions, thus providing the necessary means for 
science to influence the political process.` In this regard Haas found that nations with 
structured scientific communities were more likely to have institutional channels for the 
incorporation of scientists and their ideas into policy making, and that these countries 
were consequently more responsive to scientific advice and alarm.65 This arrangement 
does not necessarily translate into logical public policy formation though. In this regard 
Ostreng suggests that the successful use of science depends upon the actual role the 
scientists are afforded by their government or agency.66 That is, if scientists are given a 
lead role, then the science will be well used and cooperation at a political level 
achieved. If, however, scientists are allowed only a secondary role, then the science will 
be only disparate or poorly used. 
Underdal too recognises that the method of translation between science and politics 
has a determinative influence on the role that science is afforded within various 
resource management systems 6' He offers what could be viewed as a compromise 
position in his claims that what is required to remedy the communications impasse, is 
a two way link between basic knowledge and political decision. Wettestad and 
Andresen refer to this link as cooptation and go further in their suggestion that it is 
essential for the translation of scientific advice into policy formation.66 Cooptation is 
62 Andresen, S. and Ostreng, W., "Introduction ", in Andresen, S. and Ostreng, W. (ed), International 
Resource Management: The Role of Science and Politics (Belhaven Press, London, 1989) pp.1 -6. 
63 Dovers et al. (1996) np. cit. n41. 
64 Hildreth (1994) op. cit. n22. 
65 Haas, P., "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control" 
(19926) 46 International Organisation 187. 
66 Ostreng (1989) op. cit. n10. 
67 Underdal (1989) op. cit. n12. 
68 Wettestad and Andresen (1990) op. cit. n25. 
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the use of mediation for the political translation of research findings,69 as may be 
fulfilled by an intermediatory 'policy analyst' situated between the scientist and the 
policy maker.' It has been suggested that the most appropriate actors to provide 
cooptation are the NGOs, the downside of which is that NGOs often have their own 
agendas, and thus themselves do not always provide a neutral and factual 
presentation of the science. 
2.3 Environmental NGO and community group involvement 
Environmentalism first emerged as a popular movement in the 1960s in North 
America,' and gained political and international legitimacy at the 1972 UN 
Conference on the Human Environment or Stockholm Convention! The involvement of 
nonprofit non -government organizations has since become a distinctive characteristic 
of environmental politics 3 In terms of the ocean, mounting public evidence of severe 
environmental degradation, and a growing perception that traditional national 'self - 
interest' within the State dominated system is overly restrictive, and that governments 
are hence either unable or unwilling to deal with these problems, have confirmed a role 
for environmental NGOs." 
NGOs differ dramatically in their size, composition, capabilities, history, tactics, and 
policy position on a range of issues. They impact upon the formation of policy both 
69 For discussion on the negative aspects of co- option see section 2.3 "Environmental NGOs and 
Community Group Involvement ", this Chapter. 
70 Caldwell (1991) op. cit. n24; Floistad, B., "Scientific Knowledge in the Management of Fish and 
Whale: Global or Regional Organizations, Single and Multi- Species Approach ", in Andresen, S. and 
Ostreng, W. (ed), International Resource Management: The Role of Science and Politics (Belhaven 
Press, London, 1989) pp.232 -250. 
71 Dunlap and Mertig identify several factors that led to the emergence of the environmental 
movement. These are the activist culture of the 1960s, an increased scientific knowledge and media 
coverage, the rise in outdoor recreation and heightened connection with the environment, the widespread 
economic boom of post WWII and consequential reduced concern with materialism and increased 
consideration of quality of life issues, and the broadening of the focus of many extant NGOs to include a 
wider (and more publicly appealing) range of environmental issues. Dunlap, R. and Mertig, A., "The 
Evolution of the U.S. Environmental Movement from 1970 to 1990: An Overview" (1991) 4 Society and 
Natura! Resources 209. 
72 Due to the large number of NGOs in attendance at the Stockholm convention an Environment 
Forum was convened with the assistance of the Swedish government. This was intended to provide an 
outlet for their complaints and agendas. It also served as the first step in conventionalising NGO 
involvement in official intergovernmental environmental policy making. Caldwell, L., "Globalizing 
Environmentalism: Threshold of a New Phase in International Relations" (1991) 4 Society and Natural 
Resources 259. 
73 Throughout this thesis the term NGO is used to refer to citizen organisations that are advancing 
conservation concerns rather than the wider use of the term that includes resource user or industry groups. 
The influence of this latter category on policy formation is considered under the heading of domestic 
political influences. 
74 Hewison, G., "The Role of Environmental Non -Governmental Organisations ", in Mensah, T. (ed), 
Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century (The Law of the Sea Institute, 
Honolulu, 1996) pp.115 -137. 
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through direct interactions with States, and also by their influence over the behaviour 
of collectives and shaping of public opinion.' While some believe it is imperative to 
establish dialogue with industry groups, others maintain that their modus operandi 
should be restricted to consumer boycotts.76 Names such as Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth, WWF, and the TUCN are unfamiliar to few in western nations, as are those of 
grass roots movements in specific regions both North and South. 
Hewison identifies five types of environmental NGOs." These are: 
international organisations such as those listed above. Unique within this group is 
the IUCN whose membership structure includes other NGOs, governments and 
agencies; 
national organisations with large memberships but a focus on domestic 
environmental issues. Examples of these include the Sierra Club in the U.S., and the 
Australian Conservation Foundation; 
expertise based organisations, with small memberships and funded largely through 
private donations. These include policy think tanks (e.g. World Resources 
Institute), scientific and technical investigative bodies (e.g. Cousteau Society); 
direct action groups, such as the Sea Shepherd, who use tactics such as passive 
resistance and civil disobedience, with an underlying philosophy which considers 
all life forms to be of equal status; and 
grassroots organisations concerned with local matters. These are usually reliant 
upon the commitment of a small number of individuals, and although poorly 
funded these groups may exert considerable influence over their local /state 
government or federal member. 
Due to their established role as representatives of the public interest and their large 
community memberships, as well as their longevity, and policy makers' familiarity 
with the organisations and individual players, it is the larger NGOs that have the 
greatest impact on the formation of national and foreign policy. This is even more 
pronounced in regard to oceanic issues where the mobilisation of small core community 
groups is unusual due to the lack of a not- in -my- backyard (NIMBY) reaction, and 
because of the considerable financial resources and physical equipment needed to 
75 Wapner, P,, Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics (State University of New York 
Press, New York, 1996). NGOs also play an important role in encouraging social learning. Social 
learning for its own sake and benefit, although laudable, is outside of the scope of this discussion as it 
only has an indirect effects on policy development in that it may moblise public concern on an issue. For 
discussion on NGOs as facilitators of social learning see Princen, T., Finger, M. and Manno, J., 
"Translational Linkages ", in Princen, T. and Finger, M. (ed), Environmental NGOs in World Politics: 
Linking the Local and the Global (Routledge, London, 1994) pp.217 -236. 
76 Hewison (1996) op. cit. n74. 
77 Ihid. 
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actually reach the threatened environment. Thus the larger NGOs are better equipped 
to handle non -coastal marine conservation. These organisations are characterised by 
mass financial membership of individuals (with only modest commitment to the 
specific body and issue), and a comparatively small core of committed employees 
and /or volunteers. In the 1990s they command multi- million -dollar budgets, operate 
on local, national and global scales, and have in their employ a corps of full-time 
lobbyists, lawyers and scientists. 
Borrowing from social movement literature7e the generation of support for community 
problems is mapped through the following process: proponents of problems coalesce 
into organization(s) that attempt to motivate others to work to ameliorate an 
identified problem. To achieve this they must gain the support of the media, funding 
sources, the public, and ultimately policy makers.79 Solutions generally take the form of 
new government regulations and /or agencies, which signify the institutionalisation of 
the movement. It is at this point that environmentalism diverges from the previously 
observed social movement cycle. The natural history theory holds that the process 
continues on a downward spiral where those instrumental in the movement become 
absorbed into the newly created bureaucracy, in- fighting develops within the activist 
organisation, and the issue looses its momentum and disappears from the agenda!' 
The role and significance of environmental NGOs has, contrary to the above theory, 
increased markedly in recent years, and there are now over 12,000 environmental 
NGOs worldwide .' This perpetuity of environmental NGOs may be attributed largely 
to their public and political legitimacy.' Evidence of political legitimacy is to be found 
internationally in statements of diplomats regarding the support of NGOs as a means 
by which to validate their particular policy position, and the inclusion of NGO 
members in official delegations - neither of which occur with, for example, security or 
78 For a discussion on the applicability of social movement theory to NGOs see Finger, M., "NGOs 
and Transformation: Beyond Social Movement Theory", in Princen, T. and Finger, M. (ed), 
Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (Routledge, London, 1994) 
pp.48-68. 
79 Dunlap and Mertig (1991) op. cit. n71. 
80 This is one of several social movement theories which originates from theories of collective 
behaviours and action out of the Chicago school of sociology. Cyclical theories such as this are typically 
modeled after the labour movement, the most detailed of which is the work of Alain Touraine. See 
Touraine, A., The Self -Production of Society (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981); Touraine, 
A., An Analysis of Social Movements (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Touraine, 
A., "An introduction to the Study of Social Movements" (1985) 52 Social Research 749. 
81 From 1983 to 1991 WWF increased its membership from, 94,000 to over one million and 
Greenpeace from 1985 to 1990 moved from having 1.4 million to 6.75 million members. Hewison 
(1996) op. cit. n74. 
82 For a discussion on legitimacy, and the qualities of transparency and transnationalism see, Princen, 
T., "NGOs: Creating a Niche in Environmental Diplomacy ", in Princen, T. and Finger, M. (ed), 
Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (Routledge, London, 1994) 
pp29 -17. 
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trade agreements. The publicly perceived legitimacy of NGOs is derived largely from 
the single -issue focus of these organisations ' Unlike nation States they are not 
required to accommodate a wide range of interests, and as such are able to maintain a 
no- compromise position. With respect to issues of health or quality of life, the 
community applauds such a position. The transnational character of many NGOs 
furthers this legitimacy, in that they are not bound to promoting State interests, nor be 
falsely confined within sovereign boundaries, when considering ecological problems. 
NGOs are hence able to demonstrate an interest greater than that of their national 
representatives, and reinforce the position that their allegiance is foremost to the 
ecosystem. In this way, environmental actors are able to fill a niche that other actors 
are ill equipped to do.' 
As with science and knowledge, NGOs play a significant role in both the raising of an 
issue, and may be influential in determining the form or nature of the policy response. 
They are also frequently instrumental in the third major phase of the policy cycle, that 
of the implementation of policy." 
The successful placing of an issue on the agenda, as is often facilitated by NGOs, is 
particularly important given Caldwell's assertion that 
governments (and private corporate organisation as well) seldom act in the 
absence of organized public demand. Uncoordinated individual 
discontent, however widespread, has little effect on politicians and 
bureaucrats. Governments did not concede the political legitimacy of 
environmental quality concerns until citizen organizations with political 
muscle and sophistication emerged during the 1960s and grew in strength 
and numbers during the 1970s and 1980s. 
This statement alludes to the dual strategies of NGOs in bring pressure to bear on 
institutions once the issue has been successfully raised: firstly through the generation of 
public support and hence political pressure; and secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, by gaining direct access to negotiations. 
Non -governmental organisations are able to gain direct access to the policy process 
due to their status as independant actors, and their possession of their own, often 
unique, bargaining assets. Work on the means by which NGOs influence environmental 
policy formation and outcomes, shows their bargaining assets to be fourfold. They 
have access to considerable funds; they are able to command media attention and 
generally involve the public; they lobby political decision makers and provide 
83 Ih id 
84 lb id 
85 Hewison (1996) op. cit. n74. 
86 Caldwell (1991) op. cit. n72, at 262. 
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alternative forums for communication; and finally NGOs are providers of information 
and 'earth- centred perspectives' to decision choices.° Moreover, flexible alliances 
among NGOs endow them with greater persuasive ability so as to convince policy 
makers of their legitimate role as representatives of a diverse range of peoples and 
nations.' 
Although not wielding traditional power through the possession of land or military 
strength, NGOs are, as suggested, often endowed with considerable economic leverage. 
For example, in the decade from the early 1980s to 1990s the WWF contributed 
$US62.5 million to grassroots projects worldwide. And this economic leverage is 
increasing, from 1983 to 1991 WWF's revenue grew from $US9 million to $US33 
million, and Greenpeace's rose from $ÚS24 million in 1985 to $US100 million by 
1990.90 The resources of these organizations means that it is often difficult for States to 
ignore or dismiss them. Furthermore, multilateral agencies are increasingly channeling 
development assistance funds through major NGOs. This economic linkage, and 
financial command, provides NGOs with significant influence.' 
Media coverage of issues is of primary importance to NGOs. A public profile, and 
hence an assumed command of some influence over public opinions, gives NGOs a 
powerful bargaining asset with which to negotiate with policy makers. The media 
themselves and NGOs have a symbiotic relationship, wherein a regular exchange of 
information in turn for publicity, occurs. Environmental organizations rely heavily 
upon mass media to help bring environmental concerns to the public agenda, and, in 
turn, the media benefits from a (generally) continuous, reliable and legitimate source of 
'newsworthy' information.' 
Although the media is recognised as a predominant influence on public opinion, an 
extreme constructionist view, whereby the global ensemble of problems is a creation of 
the media, has very shaky foundations 93 Although there is no doubt that the media 
affects public opinion, the links are complex and often difficult to demonstrate. The 
most widely accepted media impact is thought to be on agenda setting and issue 
87 Princen (1994) op. cit. n82. 
88 Hewison (1996) op. cit. n74. 
89 World Wide Fund for Nature, WWF Annual Report 1991 (World Wide Fund for Nature, Gland, 
1991). 
90 Flewison (1996) op. cit. n74. 
91 Princen (1994) op. cit. n82. 
92 Underdal (1989) op. cit. n12. 
93 Mazur, A. and Lee, J., "Sounding the Global Alarm: Environmental Issues in the US National 
News" (1993) 23 Social Studies of Science 681. 
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framing.' That is, the press is effective at directing public attention towards specific 
policy concerns, although not so effective in determining the nature of opinion with 
regard to those issues 95 Having raised an issue to salience, the continued prominence 
of the issue in the public mind depends less upon the substance of reports than upon 
the quantity of coverage the issue subsequently receives 96 Indeed, many problems that 
do receive heavy news coverage, often do so not by virtue of the severity of the 
problem, but rather, through the purposeful manipulation of reporters by activists: 
news requires fuel to sustain coverage, and with respect to environmental issues this 
fuel comes often from NGOs serving as either sources or intermediatories. 
The third of NGOs' assets allowing them influence over environmental policy making is 
their ability to network and lobby, and their provision of alternative forums for 
informal communications. The breadth of NGO liaisons has been characterised by one 
author as follows. 
[Environmental groups] do not trust governments, or governments alone to 
do the right thing and thus take direct action with their own governments, 
non -governmental organisations, other governments, corporations, and 
individual citizens of other states. They operate on a transnational basis." 
Internationally NGOs have had an unofficial, but organised, presence at every United 
Nations environment related conference since Stockholm in 1972. Although the links 
between these unofficial convenings and the actions of official national representatives 
may not be visible during these occasions, its potential power is captured in the 
following example. 
With no major pro -whaling interest groups or pressure groups ... the foreign 
officials of the major developed states have no incentive to try to resist the 
ardent push of the antiwhaling forces ... whatever analytical or scientific 
understanding of the whaling issue a developed states' government official 
might have personally, he or she can throw it away and concede to the 
antiwhaling animal rights segment of the strong environmental forces that 
have arisen in recent years. The official will not lose political capital, nor 
does he or she have to worry about enormous financial capital outlays to 
do something about the problem98 
94 Shelley, P., The Role of Citizen Groups in Environmental Issues" (1993) 36 Oceanus 77. 
95 Mazur and Lee (1993) op. cit. n93. 
96 Note that it is the Quantity rather than the content of coverage that is deemed to be the determining 
factor in the public response to an issue. Mazur and Lee explain this in that "the typical reader or viewer 
does not give undivided attention to news reports, especially on technical matters, and rarely absorbs 
them in their entirety.... Impressions of a news report may be formed from scanning its headlines, an 
accompanying picture and its caption .... We therefore distinguish between the substantiative content of a 
story, which should be intelligible to a careful reader or viewer, an the simple image that most readers or 
listeners actually absorb from the story." Mazur and Lee (1993) op. cit. n93 at 683. 
97 Friedheim (1996) op. cit. n6 at 358. 
98 Ibid at 358. 
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Further legitimising this presence, the role of NGOs has increasingly been formally 
recognised and incorporated into the institutional structures of a number of 
international organisations 99 
Domestically, environmental NGOs pressure their governments to comply with or take 
a particular positions on certain resolutions, utilising both official communications and 
more non -conventional means of conveying their messages. Electoral systems of 
proportional representation enable small parties to elect representatives to state /Iocal 
and national legislative bodies. The result has been the emergence of multi-party 
politics, in which relatively minor parties may hold a balance of power, or form a 
coalition government with one of the more established political parties.10° A strict two 
party system precludes such a development, and in such situations environmental 
bodies have favoured or fought individual politicians on their environmental records, 
regardless of party affiliation. 
The last of the four factors providing NGOs with increased legitimacy and influence is 
their role as providers of information. Underdal discusses the impact of NGOs on the 
conveyance and role of scientific research and muses that: 
some [non -governmental] organizations have contributed substantially to 
translating findings and hypotheses from scientific research into premises 
or even demands for new policy proposals. Complaints have been voiced 
about some of these translations. And, admittedly, the game of public 
campaigns played by several of the main non -governmental organizations 
is one where the fine print of scientific reports is unlikely to be preserved. 
None the less, some of these organisations today serve as important 
elements of an early- warning system, amplifying whatever cause for 
environmental concern that can be found in publications from scientific 
research.1°' 
Some NGOs have broadened their science based activities from the translation of 
information, to the conduct of scientific research themselves. Princen suggests that this 
gives some NGOs a distinct advantage over other organisations and States, as those 
with prepared position papers and carefully worded proposals for 
agreement will have influence beyond their structural position in the 
negotiations. In this regard, an NGO representative can sit comparably - if 
not equally - with a representative of a superpower or multinational 
corporation. Moreover, if they have additional assets to offer - expertise, 
grass -roots support, a transnational base or network ... - they carry even 
more weight; they can actually bargain.'02 
99 These include the International Whaling Commission, the International Maritime Organisation and 
the CITES Secretariat. Hewison (1996) op. cit. n74. 
100 Caldwell (1991) op. cit. n72. 
101 Underdal (1989) op. cit. n12 at 264. 
102 Princen (1994) op. cit. n82 at 37. 
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Although publicity, political pressure and negotiations have been the principle 
strategies of NGOs, an ultimate goal of NGOs in Western nations has been to 
institutionalise their objectives into laws.103 Similarly in the international arena, and 
although the introduction of NGO conferences operating parallel to those of nation 
states has been an important development in the legitimation of NGOs, possibly more 
significant are those NGO activities aimed directly at shaping international 
arrangements and institutions.'° Conversion of soft agreements into hard law provides 
these organisations with the tool of litigation as a means by which to force the 
implementation of environmental policies 
Following the social movement issue cycle theory, however, the creation of new 
bureaucracies to administer these laws may result in the co -option of NGO members 
into the newly formed regimes and authorities. Co -option or incorporation, occurs 
when an interest group is included in the administrative framework (often in the form 
of an advisory committee) of the authority responsible for the policy formation or 
implementation. This not only provides NGOs close proximity to decision- makers, but 
is likely also to result in a more broadly accepted policy outcome. While often 
beneficial to all interest and sought after by NGOs, co- option may actually be used by 
agencies or governments to reduce the level of interest group involvement in the policy 
process.705 Co -option may be intended to remove an interest group from the public 
arena, hereby reducing the public opposition to a particular policy, or to placate a 
vocal NGO with token involvement in an effort to reduce the level of conflict'o6 
Alternatively a committee may be constructed not to provide advice, but rather, in 
order to delay the process, or to educate appointed members of the difficulties the 
decision -making authority faces. 
The co -option of members from one NGO but not another may also serve decision - 
makers by generating conflict between previously allied organisations, and hence 
weakening their common stance. Conflicts between NGOs are however more commonly 
a result of their differing ideological bases: conservationist or preservationist, realist or 
fundamentalist. The preservationist view focuses on individual members of a species 
and their right to live without human interference. On the other hand, conservationists 
are said to look at aggregates of organisms as resources which should be sustainably 
managed. This age old division on occasion hampers the operation of environmental 
103 Caldwell (1991) op. cit. n72. 
104 Princen, T. and Finger, M., "Introduction ", in Princen, T. and Finger, M. (ed), Environmental 
NGOs in World Politics (Routledge, London, 1994). 
105 Haward, M., Institutions. Interest Groups and Marine Resources Policy (unpublished, Masters of 
Arts dissertation, University of Tasmania, 1986). 
106 Ibid. 
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based NGOs. The open airing of these discordant views in policy discussions can 
potentially limit the effectiveness of those striving to safeguard the environment from 
unnecessary harm. In public debates where such divisions become apparent, each side 
may level accusations at the other of, for example, distorting facts, failing to recognise 
economic or political reality, or imperilling public safety.107 And where both succeed to 
a limited extent and a single statute contains both perspectives, there is the potential 
for a conflicting mandate with regard to the management policy contained therein.108 
2.4 Internationality and the international influence 
International regimes vary considerably according to their scope, and form, the level of 
adherence, and the instruments through which they are given effect, as well as their 
administrative arrangements, budgets and resources. They range from short term 
bilateral accords to multilateral treaties. Examples of international regimes concerning 
high seas fishing operations include the Rio Earth Summit (1992), the FAO Fisheries 
Code of Conduct (1995); Ó9 and the United Nations Agreement Relating to the 
Conservation. and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks (1995) (UNIA or the Implementing Agreement).10 
Within this framework of international governance arrangements nation States are 
unable to function as independent, fully autonomous actors. The international system 
exercises a variety of restraints upon the behaviour of nation States, and conversely 
regimes are able to be directed or exploited by governments or interest groups to 
further their own agendas.' 
Countries differ considerably in their approaches to regimes. These 
arrangements likewise have a diversity of effects on the politics, 
governmental structures, policy processes, and public policy outcomes, of 
nations.' 
Ordinary principles of international law limit the prescriptive authority of nation 
States to the jurisdiction of their own territory and the activities of their own nationals, 
thus providing countries a certain freedom of manoveour. The basic theory behind this 
107 Príncen and Finger (1994) op. cit. n104. 
108 Kubasek, N., Browne, N.M., Young, M. and Hiers, W., "Protecting Marine Mammals: Time for a 
New Approach" (1995) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 1. 
109 It is worth noting that, though this is a voluntary compliance agreement, it is being widely 
included at a national policy level. For example Canada is preparing legislation in which is included 
ideas enunciated in the Code. 
110 UNIA requires 30 ratifications to become active. As of November 1999, it has 26 ratifications and is 
expected to receive its 30th ratification early 2000. 
111 Boardman (1991) op. cit. n4. 
112 Ibid at 448. 
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is that it subjects most people to an exclusive jurisdiction, and hence clarifies legal 
obligations, and limits the potential for conflicts over sovereign authority that can lead 
to the disruption of world order. Problems arise with respect to common heritage 
precisely because no such clear jurisdiction exists.13 
Given this situation nation States may perceive a clear deficiency in some aspect of the 
international governance of a global common. It is, however, well recognised that "in 
the field of international environmental diplomacy, progressive policies of individual 
nations can serve as a catalyst to global awareness and consensus.i114 Thus 
mobilisation of change does not necessarily require direct action by one State against 
another. Rather, it has been shown that historically 
[ennvironmental progress in one jurisdiction has often created a 'follow -the- 
leader' dynamic in which others are pressured to conform to the higher 
standard. This higher standard also serves very often to provide 
policymakers with palpable evidence of what is possible and practical.' 
Where such a domino effect does not occur, there are two options by which a nation 
State may actively work towards the internationalisation of a domestic goal. A 
country can attempt to negotiate a settlement or treaty with other States so as to 
create an acceptable international benchmark, or else they can try to impose their will 
upon other nations through unilateral action, commonly either by military force or 
trade sanctions."' 
Negotiated multilateral arrangements have many supporters who contend that 
effective and enforceable conservation will be better served by cooperation than 
confrontation. ' Where States refuse to relinquish authority to an international 
institution, a position termed by Finlayson and Zacher as sovereignty norms, 
governments will seek to maintain as much control as possible over the decision 
making process within the issue area.' This does not preclude the creation of a regime, 
although such is likely to rely more upon institutional bargaining that long -term 
common interests, and its utility as a measure for ensuring environmental security is of 
113 See O'Connell, D., International Law (2 Ed) (Stevens and Sons, London, 1970) at 455 -460 for 
debate over high seas fisheries in this context. 
114 Kibel, P., "Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of International Trade" 
(1996) 15 Journal of Environmental Law 57 at 61. 
115 Shrybman, S., "Trading Away the Environment" (1991 -92) Winter World Policy Journal 93 at 
105. 
116 Discussed by Elliott as either imposed or negotiated regimes. Elliott, L., International 
Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic (MacMillan Press, London, 1994). 
117 Spracker, S. and i.undsgaard, D., "Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of Free 
Trade and Protection of the Environment" (1993) 18 Colombia Journal of Environmental Law 385. 
118 Finlayson, J. and Zacher, M., "The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime 
Dynamics and Functions" (1981) 35 International Organisation 561. 
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considerable doubt.19 The extent to which a State will be able to maintain its 
sovereignty will depend upon the innate features of the State, the severity of 
international pressures, and the nature of the issue.120 
Recognition of the interdependence of nations inclines States to maximise their 
interests through collaboration.'Z' Cooperation as is witnessed in negotiated regimes 
does not, however, imply a harmony of interests.' Payoffs, incentives and moral 
suasion may have been instrumental, rather than any commonality of goals, in reaching 
a closure. It is in this area that the contrast between imposed and negotiated regimes 
becomes somewhat blurred. An imposed regime occurs in the presence of a hegemonic 
power intent on furthering either their own (coercive) or global (benign) interests, 
through the creation of an international regime. Where a hegemonic actor is 
participating in a bargaining process however, it may be difficult to ascertain whether 
they engaged in hegemonic behaviour, or constrained to act only as a bargaining 
power.' 
Considerable attention must also be paid to middle power Ieadership, and its role in 
the creation of international regimes. Middle powers emphasise the politics of 
persuasion and negotiation rather than coercion, they seek to employ networks of 
influence and to build coalitions of support, they are likely to engage in niche 
diplomacy.124 
New goals and principles, which emerge from interactions at the international level, 
can influence national ocean governance systems, as domestic regimes are modified to 
comply therewith. Knecht posits that the influence of internationally agreed goals on 
nations' domestic frameworks is likely only to increase in the future.1Z5 
Moreover, even if not signatory to a particular treaty, a littoral State's exploitation of 
its marine resources may also be influenced somewhat by such agreements. In his study 
of Canadian federalism and fisheries management Fairley comments that 
[i]n this [domestic] domain the international public law of the ocean also 
governs; it demands both understanding and an adequate appreciation 
119 Elliott (1994) op. cit. n116. 
120 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
121 Finlayson and Zacher (1981) op. cit. n118. 
122 Elliott (1994) op. cit. n116. 
123 Ibid 
124 Evans, G. and Grant, B., Australia's Foreign Policy in the World of the 1990s (Melbourne 
University Press, Melbourne, 1991). 
125 Knecht, R., "Essay: Emerging International Goals and Principles and Their Influences on National 
Ocean Governance" (1994) 22 Coastal Management 177. 
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before the domestic constitutional issues can be properly analysed and 
decided. More simply, the domestic issue is not merely domestic!' 
Furthermore, a fishery will most certainly be affected by a range of factors that 
originate in other nations.127 For example, the demand for the fish product abroad (as 
effected by market demands, competition from other fisheries, and international 
commodity prices for fish products) will unavoidably effect a nation's fishing effort. 
Boardman identifies several factors that may form a framework for the investigation of 
State -regime relations. These factors include the physical attributes of the milieu of a 
country;128 the maturity of a regime as determined by the international familiarity with 
an issue; the attitude of the State towards the utility of intergovernmental 
organisations; and the budgetary, personnel and information resources available to a 
State.'" 
Regardless of the preferability of a negotiated settlement there are a number of 
problems which may arise in multilateral negotiations, and which may act to impede or 
even halt the process. If one or more parties dissents outright, it leaves only the options 
of either negotiating around a new set of boundaries, or else excluding the dissenting 
parties. Where compromise is required to keep the issue and all parties at the table, 
individual nations must undertake domestic re- evaluation and re- formation of their 
policy stance. This may not be possible to the extent required, and moreover, by 
negotiating down to the limit of the dissenting nation the desired outcome may not be 
achieved. Alternatively, by excluding a nation the harmful practice which is being 
sought to be curtailed may continue unabated. This option of exclusion also creates the 
problem of the free rider nation."° This is both an economic and environmental hazard, 
where one nation who refused to participate reaps the benefits of the other nations' 
efforts without contributing to the solution. Not only does the free rider nation not 
126 Fairley, H., "Canadian Federalism, Fisheries and the Constitution: External Constraints on 
Internal Ordering" (1980) 12 Ottawa Law Review 257 at 290. 
127 Other such factors include: 
the readiness of other nations to engage in the transfer of technology, and the need for foreign 
exchange, and loans from international development agencies; and 
side -issues that is, those aspects which do not appear to directly relate to fisheries management, 
for example the reaction of the international community to the seizure of foreign fishing vessels, and to 
the expropriation of foreign investment to sectors other than fishing. 
Glantz (1986) op. cit. n59, 
128 Physical attributes according to Boardman (1991) include not only the geography and natural 
resources, but also factors such as the spatial distribution of economic sectors and the transport networks. 
Boardman (1991) op. cit. n4. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Walker discusses this scenario in terms of `n' (greater than 2) participants. He surmises that in 
such a situation the benefits of participation to all n parties are less obvious, and concludes that 
consequently n- person negotiations rapidly generate free riders. Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
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have to contribute directly to the preservation of the resource, but as it has less 
controls on the related industry, the free rider nation is able to manufacture at a lower 
cost, and thus charge less for the end product, gaining a competitive advantage over 
the remaining - compliant - nations. In such situations multilateral sanctions or 
unilateral embargos may result. 
The use of unilateral arrangements is criticised as being a scenario wherein powerful 
nations provide prescriptive authority over other nations, or else as a system of 
piecemeal multilateral regulations. More broadly the issue can be considered in terms 
of a trade -environment trade -off. Opinions with regard hereto generally fall into one of 
two categories. 
Free trade advocates feel that allowing the market to set prices through the 
opening of national economies and unhindered trade will help strengthen 
the economies of developing countries. They argue that environmental 
degradation is linked to poverty; thus, as developing countries get richer 
through free trade, the world environment will improve. On the other side 
of the debate, environmentalists advocate the use of trade restrictions to 
induce enforcement of environmental protection laws.' 
A position that economic growth is good for the environment relies upon the 
proposition that an empirical relationship exists between per capita income and 
environmental quality.132 This is often conceptually represented as an environment 
kuznets curve, an inverted U- shaped relation between environmental degradation and 
per capita income. There are however several problems with this model. Firstly a 
single- equation reduced form model does not allow for the identification of structural 
equations or the consideration of different influences.133 Secondly, in terms of 
expanding this model to justify free global trade, the historical experiences of some 
economies can not necessarily be extrapolated to the future of the global economy.' 
When poorer nations attempt to employ the same levels of environmental regulation as 
developed nations have, they will face a more difficult task due to the absence of other 
nations to deploy the environmentally deleterious tasks to. Indeed, highlighted in the 
1992 World Development Report, is that economic growth alone is not sufficient to 
131 Hurwitz, D., "Fishing for Compromises through NAFTA and Environmental Dispute- Settlement: 
The Tuna -Dolphin Controversy" (1995) 35 Natural Resources Journal 501 at 502. 
132 Arrow, K., Bolin, B., Costanza, R., Dasgupta, P., Folke, C., Honing, S., Jansson, B. -O., Levin, 
S., Maler, K. -G., Perrings, C. and Pimental, D., "Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the 
Environment" (1995) 268 Science 520. 
133 Stern, D., Common, M. and Barbier, E., "Economic Growth and Environmental Degredation: The 
Environmental Kuznets Curve and Sustainable Development" (1996) 24 World Development 1151. 
134 Ibid. 
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reverse environmental degradation, and that, although not a panacea in itself, direct 
regulation via protective policies is also needed.135 
Brack outlines the positive and negative effects of trade liberalisation upon the 
environment.136 The disbenefits include the potential undermining of environmental 
laws by free trade agreements, the competitive advantage provided to nations with 
more lax environmental laws in an open market situation, and the link between high 
economic growth (as encouraged by trade liberalisation) and unsustainable 
consumption of natural resources. In favour of free trade as an environmental tool are 
the arguments which hold that it supports specialisation and hence maximum output 
in relation to the resources consumed, and encourages the spread of new and 
(presumably) environmentally friendly technology. Perhaps the most persuasive 
argument though, is one offered in favour of unilateral actions. It holds that (much as 
the 'follow -the -leader' dynamic between individual nations) trade embargos and 
sanctions by one nation upon another often have a catalytic effect upon the 
development of multilateral management regimes.13' 
2.5 Domestic political influences 
The domestic political influences within a State have an obvious role to play in the 
formation of national policies. A variety of players may be involved: Allison highlights 
the involvement of bureaucrats, politicians, and industry interests: and Miller and 
Broches refer to the role of agencies, legislators and interest groups.' Boardman too 
refers to the importance of the bureaucratic actors within the national government 
especially in relation to scientific and technological issues. He adds to the list state 
and territory government actors, and highlights the role of government structures, in 
particular the division of power between levels of government in federal polities.19 All 
these players have a direct influence upon both internal and domestic foreign policies, 
although the impact of some actors or influences upon the process of international 
negotiations is not readily apparent. 
Game theory and bargaining provide important insight into the influence of politics at 
both the domestic and international levels. They attempt to explain the structure of 
135 1RRD, World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1992). 
136 Brack, D., "Balancing Trade and the Environment" (1995) 71 International Affairs 497. 
137 Spracker and Lundsgaard (1993) op. cit. n117. 
138 Allison, G., Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Little, Brown and 
Company, Roston, 1971); and Miller, M.L. and Broches, C., "Congress, Issue Networks and Marine 
Affairs" (1989) 17 Coastal Management 263. 
139 Boardman (1991) op. cit. n4. 
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interactions among political actors where choices are limited by the anticipated 
payoffs for certain courses of action.' Bargaining analysis is based on an assumption 
that parties see some advantage in entering into negotiations. It allows for the 
consideration of the interplay between actors, and the effect of external forces on 
altering the scope of the bargain. The development of intergovernmental agreements, 
accommodating sundry interests, can also be seen as taking the form of moves within a 
game, where each set of actors attempts to maximise their return from the bargaining 
table.147 
Two theories contributing towards the understanding of a nation State's behaviour at 
the bargaining table build upon the earlier model of rational choice.12 The rational 
choice theory denotes the belief that States will act in a manner that will optimise the 
benefits they accrue, and if, despite their best tactical efforts, they can not arrange a 
better outcome, then they will withdraw from the negotiations and maintain the status 
quo. The first of Freidheim's theories is that of cultural moulding, which accepts the 
rational choice model but adds to it the variables of cultural and individual behaviour 
or personality.193 In regard to the influences of the individual upon policy development, 
Joyner notes the need for a sense of fairmindedness, integrity and competence of 
leaders in negotiating consensus agreements.144 Leadership is not restricted to state 
actors, and may take a variety of forms. Structural leadership is commonly evidenced 
in bargaining activities, entrepreneurial leadership in the proposal of options and in 
brokering the interest of other actors, and intellectual leadership in the use of ideas.145 
The second theory considers the impact of domestic constraints upon the negotiator, 
and emphasises the importance of the structure of the domestic system. Domestic 
constraints may be conceptualised as a two level game, where the negotiator bargains 
at both the domestic and the international levels.146 Domestic level negotiations are 
I40 Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
141 Peterson, M., "Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management of 
Whaling" (1992) 46 International Organization 147. 
142 Freidheim (1996) op. cit. n6. 
143 See also Haggard, S. and Simmons, B., "Theories of International Regimes" (1987) 41 
International Organization 491. 
l44 Joyner, C., "The United States and the New Law of the Sea" (1996) 27 Ocean Development and 
International Law 41. 
145 Young, O., "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the 
Environment" (1989) 43 International Organisation 349; and Young, O., "Political Leadership and 
Regime Formation: The Emergence of International Institutions in International Society" (1991) 45 
International Organisation 281. 
146 See also Putnam, R., "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two -Level Games" (1988) 
42 International Organization 426; Iida, K., "When and How do Domestic Constraints Matter ?" (1993) 
37 Journal of Conflict Resolution 403; and Mo, J., "The Logic of Two -Level Games with Endogenous 
Domestic Coalitions" (1994) 38 Journal of Conflict Resolution 402. 
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concerned with arriving at a conclusion which will be acceptable to all stakeholders, 
and thus able to be implemented domestically. To recall, the domestic actors are 
federal politicians and bureaucrats, industry representatives, and decentralised state 
and territory governments. Community and non -governmental organisations are 
another actor that contributes to domestic politics. In the environmental and resource 
arena, these however (as earlier outlined) have influence beyond that of a domestic 
player, and as such have been considered as a separate, significant influence upon 
policy formation. 
Political and bureaucratic agendas are a major factor in explaining the emergence of, 
and support provided for, particular policies. Tn spite of often being overlooked in 
earlier analyses of both multi-nation agreements and unilateral conservation actions, 
the domestic political situation and agenda has increasingly been acknowledged as an 
influence on international, as well as domestic, behaviour.14' 
Moreover, in particular in pluralist political systems, where a range of interests and 
pressures are continually impacting upon the government, additional factors that do 
not obviously relate to the issue area may also impact upon the decisions of political 
actors. Significant events, such as elections, worker strikes, public sector downsizing, 
policies towards exchange rates, or government nationalisation of foreign investment, 
are of potential relevance. For example, as politicians seek re- election, they will be 
acutely sensitive to the demands of the electorate and select those policies most 
congruent with public opinion.148 Brokerage politics (the purchasing of political support 
by investment in marginal electorates) is not uncommon around election times and may 
elevate a particular issue to a position above that it would otherwise assume. A desire 
to capitalise on potential electoral support also provides a strong stimuli to resort to 
symbolic politics, where a strong popular reaction to symbols (as is often readily 
available in the environmental issue area) can provide substantial political gain from 
only a minimal outlay of resources.14' 
In addition to these significant events, there are political pressures with which leaders 
must contend that may also have an impact upon the shape of a policy. For example, 
a lack of media support, or opposition from colleagues or other political factions or 
parties, or upper house or legislature rejection of a Bill, may retard or generally alter 
policy positions. Bargaining may occur between the cabinet or the executive branch and 
Congressional members or minor senate parties, thus changing the nature or focus of 
147 Bergin (1991) op. cit. n5. 
148 [I? id 
149 Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
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the original policy. Acknowledgment of these factors takes into consideration that a 
particular focus sector is only one small part of a larger political system, and that the 
broader context must be realised.'so It also means that a government's ability to 
coordinate policy, or its capacity to govern, depends upon its relative power. In weak 
States the leader is often reactive and quick solutions without overall policy directions 
are frequently sought; as compared to stronger states where a more anticipatory 
approach allows for the strategic formation of policies, and the preempting of crisis 
events 15' 
In both the U.S. and Australian systems of governance - where the legal system 
provides broad discretion in the administration of laws and delegates a significant role 
to subsidiary Iegislation - it is not only the elected politicians that have considerable 
control over the direction and goals of any specific policy field, but also appointed 
individuals such as key bureaucratic actors.152 In this regard, agencies and senior 
government executives have a duty not only to implement the policies of the 
government, but also to represent their constituents and to fend off jurisdictional 
encroachment from other sectors 153 Bureaucratic influence is likely to be particularly 
pronounced where agency or departmental perceptions of a situation, and its 
appropriate remedy, are significantly different from government policy. In such a 
scenario both the letter and the spirit of a policy may be frustrated, most commonly 
through the subversion of a government's regulatory capacity.' On the other hand, a 
commonality of interest between bureaucracy and government is likely to lead to 
enhanced attention to an issue area. Once again, and as with political players, 
bureaucratic decisions or actions may also be influenced by individual beliefs and 
situational constraints such as ethical rules, organisational patriotism or rivalry, a need 
to generate revenue or a shortage of resources, pressures towards proper social 
behaviours, and personal promotion criteria.'ss 
The structure of the bureaucracy, and diffusion or concentration of power, is also 
significant, especially at the sectoral level.'s° In the marine context deciphering an 
150 Ross, S., "Organizing for Marine Policy: Some Views from Organization Theory ", in Hool, F., 
Friedheim, R. and Hennessey, T. (ed), Making Ocean Policy - The Politics of Government Organisation 
and Management (Westview Press, Boulder, 1981) pp.91 -111. 
151 Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
152 Knecht (1994)) op. cit. nI25. 
153 O'Leary, R. and Wise, C., "Public Managers, Judges, and Legislators: Redefining the "New 
Partnership "" (1991) 51 Public Administration Review 316. 
154 Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
155 [bid; and Ross (1981) op. cit. n150. 
156 Atkinson, M. and Coleman, W., "Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in 
Advanced Capitalist Economies" (1989) 19 British Journal of Political Science 47. 
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overarching bureaucratic position is often a difficult exercise given the potentially large 
set of different agencies and departments with vastly different philosophies, and a 
mixed record of interagency cooperation - that are entrusted with various aspects of 
policy formation.157Interagency differences are, at times, so pronounced that arrival at 
a single policy position is simply not possible. In relation to fisheries the claim of an 
arrangement whereby the 'fox is guarding the henhouse' has been leveled at both the 
U.S. and Australian lead agencies.158 In this regard, the capture thesis holds that as 
bureaucrats form close relationships and identify with the industry they purport to 
regulate, so they come to see the issue in the same way and to adopt the same policy 
solution position. 
Often omitted, by and large due to its uncertain and controversial role within the 
policy making arena, is the third arm of government - the judiciary. Claims of an 
expanded role of judges in some jurisdictions, has led to considerable public 
discussion regarding the trend towards a more activist judiciary.159 Judges are however, 
increasingly being recognised as having a valid role to play in formation of marine and 
other policy.' Although cases, when they come to court for resolution, are decided on 
legal grounds, they are by no means apolitical. Rather they reflect the use of legal 
methods by the courts for political purpose - the judiciary acts as a possible veto 
point which constrains what legislatures and bureaucrats can do in policy matters. 161 
Grounds of review differ considerably across nations but tend to involve questions of 
constitutionality, principles of natural justice, and errors of laws or executive acts that 
exceed legal limits. Repeated court intervention in a policy area can lead to one of two 
scenarios: the implementation by the bureaucracy of a previous eschewed policy or, at 
the other end of the scale, a complete rejection of administrative responsibility in an 
157 Miller and Broches (1989) op. cit. n138. 
158 For example, and while not necessarily espousing these views, the scenario was discussed in 
Young, P. and Wallace, J., "An Evaluation of the Balance of Power between Government, Industry and 
Science in Managing Australia's Federal Fisheries (Setting the Fox to Guard the Henhouse) ", paper 
presented at ICES Annual Science Conference, St John's, Canada (International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea, Copenhagen, 1994). 
159 "Courting a proper, mature relationship ", The Australian, 3 September 1997; and "The jury is 
out ", The Weekend Australian, 24 January 1998. 
Kirby discusses this trend in four countries: India, the United Kingdom, the United States of America 
and Australia. Kirby, M., "Judicial Activism" (1997) 27 Western Australian Law Review 1. 
160 Broches, C. and Miller, M.1.. "Public Law Litigation and Marine Affairs: The Boldt Decision" 
(1985) 13 Coastal Zone Management Journal 99. 
161 Galligan, B., Politics of the High Court: A Study of the Judicial Branch of Government in 
Australia (University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1987). 
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issue area.162 Regardless of the ultimate outcome however, the courts' outputs or 
decisions form a significant part of the political process.1h' 
In nations ruled under a system of federal governance the sub -national states also have 
a significant influence over the development of policies. The influence of these sub - 
national governments over federal policy formation depends upon a range of factors 
included in which are: the issue area and the constitutional division of powers in 
respect thereto; the degree of state and federal interest in a particular issue; the ruling 
party's federalist philosophy; how strong a coalition exists between the states; and the 
individual personalities involved. Consequently patterns of state /federal relations at 
any one phase - contrary to popular theories which align distinctive trends with 
particular periods - do not conform across sectors to a single dominant model.164 In 
relation specifically to the marine policy sub sector, very different patterns have 
tended to prevail across coastal zone management, fisheries governance, marine 
mammal and endangered species protection, and offshore oil development.165 
In both the U.S. and Australia a limited number of specific powers are enumerated for 
the federal levels of government and a remainder are to be exercised concurrently, 
while unspecified residual powers remain with the states. Notwithstanding the 
provision that, should conflict between state and federal laws arise, the federal 
legislature's laws prevaiI,' this arrangement has resulted in considerable 
constitutional ambiguity in both Australia and the U.S.. One consequence of this is the 
constant need for renegotiation of the rules that make up the division of powers 
between federal /state governments. 
The substance of the split of powers in the two nations is remarkably similar. In the 
U.S., Congressional powers are enumerated in Article I, Section 8 and herein is 
provided an unlimited ability to levy and collect taxes for the general welfare of the 
nation. Similar provisions exist in Australia, where there is an allowance for the 
162 Diver, C., "The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public 
Institutions" (1979) 65 Virginia Law Review 43. 
163 Galligan (1987) op. cit. n161. 
I64 Wright is a key proponent of the intergovernmental relations as being homogenous across particular 
periods of time, wherein political issues, participants perceptions, and intergovernmental relations 
mechanisms set it apart from surrounding phases. See Wright, D., Understanding Intergovernmental 
Relations (Brooks /Cole Publishing Co., Monuterey, 1982). The counter- argument, that state /federal 
relations differ depending on the issue area, is convincingly argued in Cicin -Sain, B., 'Ocean Resources 
and Intergovernmental Relations: An Analysis of the Patterns ", in M. Silva (ed), Ocean Resources and 
US Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, 1986) pp.241 -26I. See also 
Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
165 Cicin -Sain (1986) op. cit. n164. 
166 The Constitution of the United States of America, Art VI; The Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, section 109. 
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Commonwealth parliament to make laws with respect to external affairs, corporations 
and trade and commerce.1fi7 In effect these controls provide the federal governments 
with the ability to undertake any actions they deem worthy of national attention, a 
position supported by the historically broad interpretation of federal powers by the 
courts.16a 
This open ended interpretation of federal responsibilities, born from the reserve to the 
states of all powers not assigned to the federal level of government (rather than 
specific enumeration thereof), has led (instead of a clear definition of policy 
responsibilities and rights) to a merging of boundaries and, at times, active conflict 
between the two levels of jurisdiction.169 It is largely due to this division of powers that 
the states in both the U.S. and Australia have gained political leverage, and are able 
contribute domestically to the formation of federal marine policy. 
Because of the inherently dynamic nature of the political process, federal /state 
renegotiations widely reflect changing social philosophies. For example, in neither the 
U.S. nor Australia is the federal level of government granted, under the relevant 
Constitution, the right legislate with regard to the environment. Indeed the environment 
does not even rate a mention, a reflection of its historic irrelevance at the time of 
inception of both constitutions, and the preoccupation with property rights of the new 
settlers. Both governments have tackled the problem similarly, through the 
manipulation or application other powers so as to give effect to environmental 
imperatives -- for example the external affairs power,°° or the commerce clause.'71 
Perhaps surprisingly, the process of redistributing powers between the various levels of 
government is not always an adversarial one based on federal encroachment into areas 
of previous state competence. Each nation at particular stages has also chosen to 
devolve considerable powers back to the states during phases of influence by 'new 
federalist' political thinkers. This form of cooperative rule has been termed accordism 
167 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, section 51(i, xx, and xxix). 
168 In the U.S. see for example Yodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, Inc 
452 U.S. 264 (1981); in Australia see for example Murphyores Incorporated Ply Ltd v. The 
Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1. 
169 For discussion of the Austrlaìn situation see Davis, B., "Federal -State Tensions in Australian 
Environmental Management: The World Heritage issue" (1989) 6 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 66; and Tsamenyi, B.M. and Bedding, J., "The World Heritage Convention in the High Court: 
A Commentary on the Tasmanian Forests Case" (1988) 5 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 
232. 
170 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, section 51 (xxix). 
171 The Constitution of the United States of American, Article 1. 
- 78 - 
Chapter Two- Framework of Analysis 
by one author, and is characterised by federal engagement with all spheres of 
government, NGOs and industry lobby groups.'n 
Even in the absence of a governmental policy of inclusion, dominant industry lobby 
groups are able to exert considerable influence over the form of domestic policy 
formation. The primary function of industry lobby groups is to engage in political 
activities to shape government policies on behalf of their member.' Howlett and 
Ramesh contend that the most influential factor in an industry's capacity to influence 
change is their internal organisation, in particular the level of worker membership, as 
collective action is the only influence such bodies have.14 
The industrial fishing sector underwent a major shift in the 1980s, since which time it 
has become much more like that of other occupations. Three aspects that characterise 
this change are that: 
fishing has become highly politicised with a range of actors and greater dependence 
upon the shifting distribution of power and authority; 
economic dimensions are more closely intertwined with public policy than before, 
such as is evidenced in the common property debates surrounding the marine 
environment; and 
fishing has become an unsettled moral issue based upon questions of the 'right' to 
fish.'s 
Miller and VanMaanen observe that because of this linkage between the political, the 
economic and the moral, the fishing community has become a network of operational 
groups, interlinked by the three sectors of harvesting, processing and management - 
with each of these sectors contributing to the development of fisheries policies.16 
Haward supports this in his statement that 
[tjhe relationship between industry groups and different tiers of 
government in a federal system provides an important, yet neglected, 
aspect of intergovernmental interaction. The linkages between industry 
groups and government departments provide reinforcement of that tier of 
the government's interest in the particular policy area. ... The presence of 
these groups adds a third party dimension to intergovernmental 
arrangements whose influence is generally understated in the literature. 
172 Economou, N., "Accordism and the Environment: The Resource Assessment Commission and 
National Environmental Policy -Making" (1993) 28 Australian Journal of Political Science 399. 
173 Taylor, A., Trade Unions and Politics (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989). 
174 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
175 Miller, M.L. and VanMaanen, J. "The Emerging Organisation of Fisheries in the United States" 
(1983) 10 Coastal Zone Management Journal 369. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Haward, M., Federalism and the Australian Offshore Constitutional Settlement (unpublished, 
Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University of Tasmania, 1992) at 92. 
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2.6 The policy cycle 
The discussion thus far has focused upon the influence of four interrelated factors 
upon the promotion and resolution of an issue. Although there is no doubt that all four 
factors offer a general contribution to bycatch policy formation, there remains conflict 
over the details of the influence each has upon the specific nature of a policy output. 
Complicating the situation is that the factor of greatest influence may vary throughout 
the formation of any single policy. Hence, to help in an analysis of policy formation, it 
is instructive to consider the model of a policy cycle or process. 
The most important advantage of the policy cycle model ... is that it 
facilitates the understanding of public policy -making by breaking the 
complexity of the process into a limited number of stages and sub- stages, 
each of which can be investigated alone, or in terms of its relationship to 
any or all the other stages of the cycle.17' 
Thus the policy cycle provides a useful framework within which to examine the 
interaction of influential factors, and to determine their individual impact upon the 
endpoint policy. 
The earliest models of the policy process utilised decision theory. An alternate body of 
writing that later emerged applied a systems perspective, where outputs arise out of 
processed demands. From discussions on the influence of power distribution among 
actors, evolved a third stream, that of interest group theory. In his discussion on these 
alternate policy models and their sub -models, Dye highlights that none are incorrect, 
and that each model has its own merits and hence these simply provide different 
perspectives on the focus of policy development.' 
In terms of analysing a range of influences upon the development of a policy, the 
strength of the system theorists' model lies in it's conceptualisation as a series of 
stages. Jenkins' policy process, and Hogwood and Peters' policy cycle models, each 
alienated several stages in policy development, which can be isolated into three major 
phases.' They are: 
1. the emergence of the issue onto the agenda; 
2. the processing of the issue to develop a policy; and 
3. the implementation of the policy. 
In more recent work on the policy cycle by Howlett and Ramesh, the processing phase 
is split into that of policy formation and policy decision -making. Herein policy 
178 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20 at 12. 
179 Dye, T., Understanding Public Policy (5 Ed) (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1984). 
180 Jenkins (1978) op. cit. n20; Hogwood and Peters (1983) op. cit. n20; and Howlett and Ramesh 
(1995) op. cit. n20. 
- 80 - 
Chapter Two- Framework of Analysis 
formation involves the elimination of policy options until only a few are left from 
which the final policy selection is made, and this final selection then constitutes the 
decision -making phase.181 Policy formation does not necessarily undergo two such 
distinctive phases and it is perhaps more instructive to view these as potential stages 
within the earlier identified second processing phase of the policy cycle. 
Early work on the first phase of the policy cycle was done by Richardson and 
Jordan 1m They identified a tripartite influence, that of the "issue community ", 
comprised of the government, the civil service and interests groups, upon the building 
and setting of an agenda. Similarly Baumgartner and Jones' work (based on the 
premise that agenda setting is a process of discussion, debate and persuasion) 
developed a model focused around the actors involved in the policy setting process. 
Herein the idea of policy monopolies emerged, where key or principle actors are able to 
direct the interpretation of a problem, and thus the manner in which it is consídered.l 
This idea of process led to the generation of three models by Cobb, Ross and Ross:" 
an outsider model where issues originate in non -governmental groups and are then 
propelled into the public arena and onto the institutional agenda; an insider model 
where placement of an issue on the agenda is initiated by key actors with special 
access to decision- makers and is often characterised by a desire to keep the issue out 
of the public sphere so as to limit participation to specialised knowledge or interest 
groups; and a mobilisation model wherein issues are placed on the formal agenda by 
the government and potentially may involve neither a public grievance, nor public 
involvement in the subsequent policy formation process. 
The public raising of an issue does not, however, guarantee that policy formation or 
even debate will follow.' To explain this Downs suggested that there is an issue - 
attention cycle that many agenda items fall into, and which prevents their evolution 
into actual policies. This cycle follows the path of (1) pre problem stage where experts 
or those with a particular interest identify a problem, followed by (2) a public 
declaration and education phase, commonly evidenced by an "alarmed discovery" 
181 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
182 Richardson, J. and Jordan, A., Governing Under Pressure: The Policy Process in a Post - 
Parliamentary Democracy (Partin Robertson, Oxford, 1979). 
183 Baumgartner F. and Jones B., "Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems" (1991) 53 Journal of 
Politics 1044. 
184 Cobb, R., Ross, J. and Ross, M., "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process" (1976) 
70 American Political Science Review 127. Howlett and Ramesh (1995) criticise Cobb, Ross and Ross's 
linkage of particular agenda raising processes with certain types of political regimes, instead claiming that 
each of the proposed agenda raising schemes could apply to in range of political governance models and 
that "no firm generalisation of agenda -setting by regime type is possible" (at 114). 
185 Downs, A., "Up and Down with Ecology - The Issue Attention Cycle" (1972) 28 The Public 
Interest 38. 
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and "euphoric enthusiasm ". As (3) a realisation of the impediments to, and costs of, 
solving the problem emerges, there is (4) a decline in the public interest and 
displacement of the issue by another. Finally the issue enters the (5) the post -problem 
phase, where it exists in a prolonged issue limbo, albeit with a higher profile than pre 
problem, but where no policy to address the issue has emerged.' Notwithstanding the 
lack of an actual change, such events are still significant -a policy to do nothing, as 
occurs in Downs' model when the post -problem phase is reached, is still, in itself, a 
significant decision. 
An alternate stream of literature on agenda setting looked to capture the relationships 
between interests, institutions and ideas.' Early commentators identified influential 
factors in agenda setting as including the socio- economic and physical environment, 
the distribution of power, prevailing ideas and ideologies, bureaucratic structures, and 
process of governmental decision making. From this position, Kingdon offers an 
alternative explanation for the failure of an issue to develop into a policy. He suggests 
that a combination of factors are need to be present for the 'window of opportunity' to 
open.'R8 According to this theory, in order for an issue to be successfully placed on the 
agenda, the realisation of the existence of a problem, the accumulation of sufficient 
knowledge and perspectives so as to be able to react quickly with a solution policy, 
and finally a political atmosphere conducive to the particular changes, all need to be 
present. Where these three factors of problem, policy and politics converge, then the 
window opens, and an issue is able to reach the policy agenda. Without such 
convergence, issue limbo occurs. 
If an issue does progress into phase two of the policy cycle, two features from the 
agenda forming stage will influence its subsequent development. These features are the 
how and the why of the issue's progression onto the agenda. And the answers may 
influence the not only the ultimate policy itself, but also the role and influence afforded 
to various factors and players in the development of that policy. To recall, the 
influence of science may be considerably different if the issue is highly politicised from 
the start, as opposed to had it emerged as a scientific dilemma; or, the role of an NGO 
which was influential in the raising of an issue, may in the next phase be that of an 
"insider ", rather than an independent lobbying body. 
Regardless of its route through, an issue's arrival at the processing phase of the policy 
cycle is characterised by the drawing of actors into a network, leading to closer 
186 Ibid. 
187 Hofferbert, R., The Study of Public Policy (Hobbs -Merrill, Indianapolis, 1974); and R. Simeon, 
"Studying Public Policy" (1976) 9 Canadian Journal of Political Science 548. 
188 Kingdon, J., Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Harper Collins, Michigan, 1984). 
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problem definition, and eventually a proposed policy action. Decisions derived out of 
this process are not necessarily based upon facts, but alternatively, a negative 
perception of a particular option by a key policy actor may be sufficient to preclude its 
further consideration. 189 
Several models to assist in understanding the policy formation and decision -making 
phase of the policy cycle have been proposed. The best known three are the rational, 
the incremental and the garbage can models. The first of these assumes that procedures 
that will lead to the most efficient means for attaining policy goals will be followed, 
through the gathering of all relevant information, and the selection of the best 
alternative. What this fails to realise is that policy making is not a technical exercise 
but rather an inherently political process.19° The incremental model conversely argues 
that decision making is a process of bargaining and compromise between decision 
makers, where only a few appropriate alternatives are considered, and selection 
herefrom occurs through a series of 'successive limited comparisons' with previous 
decisions.191 As suggested by the name, the process results only in incremental changes 
from the status quo. It is criticised, among other things, for its inherent conservatism 
and suspicion of large scale change and innovation, its confinement of participation to 
senior officials, and its limited application to that of a relatively stable environment.142 
The final model that of the garbage can, views decision making as a highly ambiguous 
and unpredictable process 193 This model sought to highlight many of the criticisms of 
the earlier two models, in that not only are causal relationships often unknown to 
policy makers, but that frequently the goals are also unclear. This model is itself 
however, criticised as being an unnecessarily exaggerated version of policy processing. 
189 Howlett and Ramseh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
190 Howlett and Ramesh (1995). Simon argued a range of reasons that prevented rational decision 
making including the cognitive limits of decision -makers, their political and ideological biases, the 
inability to know all the consequences of all options, and the difficulties inherent in comparing 
alternatives with a selection of favourable and adverse outcomes. Simon, H., "A Behavioral Model of 
Rational Choice" (1955) 69 Quarterly Journal of Economics 99. 
191 Lindblom, C., "The Science of Muddling Through" (1959) 19 Public Administration Review 79. 
Walker (1994) names this process of taking the first acceptable solution as `satísficing', and is critical of 
such an approach due to the inherent danger that a eminently more desirable policy may, as a 
consequence, be overlooked. 
192 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
193 March, J. and Olsen, J., Ambiguity and Choice in Organisations (Universitetsforlaget, Bergen, 
1976). So named because decision opportunities were: 
a garbage can into which various problems and solutions are dumped by participants. The 
mix of garbage in a single can depends partly on the labels attached to the alternative 
cans; but it also depends on what garbage is being produced at the moment, on the mix 
of cans available, and on the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the 
scene (at 26). 
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As implied in the models discussed above, and unlike agenda -setting, the policy 
processing phase is dominated by members of the policy subsystem. That is, 
participation is by those who have some minimal level of knowledge of the subject and 
hence are able to comment on the feasibility of various moot options.194 Indeed where 
there are two distinctive phases as proposed by Howlett and Ramesh's model, 
participation in the decision -making phase normally excludes virtually all non -state 
actors, and only those officials empowered to make authoritative decisions in the issue 
area participate.195 
Unsurprisingly, preferential relationships between players have considerable influence 
at this stage of the policy process. In this regard, Richardson and Jordan highlight the 
importance of the presence of machinery, not only to facilitate the processing of an 
issue, but also as a means of dictating the involvement of various interests.196 
Commonly institutions will attempt to retain control over other groups and over the 
processing of the issue. Control however may be circumscribed by a host of rules 
constraining the actions of decision -makers, and the institutional or political 
acceptability of potential participants. For example an official may be required to 
surrender some of their control to other policy actors where federal /state or 
national /international issue agendas overlap, and incompatible machinery would 
otherwise disable an issue's processing. Alternatively, particular actors, who were 
either not invited to participate, or who feel it is otherwise beneficial, may operate 
outside of the institution's machinery. An NGO not included in a closed forum may 
still contribute by facilitating the processing of a complex issue; or a scientific 
community may prefer to provide unsolicited evidence and independent advice so as 
to better assist in rational decision -making. 
Relationships within the policy processing phase are not static. An actor involved in 
the formation of a policy may withdraw from the process, or at the closure of this 
phase, may register their displeasure with the end product. If the outcome is highly 
unsatisfactory, then they may actively resist its implementation. Although "once a 
decision is reached, once a policy is announced. ... there is a tendency for the issue 
concerned to leave the agenda ", the selection in phase two of a particular policy does 
not necessitate the closure of the issue.197 Even if a policy appears to have been agreed 
upon, the successful translation of plans into practice is not assured. 
194 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
195 Ibid. 
196 Richardson and Jordan (1979) op. cit. n182. 
197 !bid at 143. 
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Limitations to achieving the prescribed objectives may stem from the nature of the 
problem itself, such as intractable technical difficulties, the size and diversity of the 
target group and consequential difficulties in altering its operation, or the extent of 
behavioural change the policy requires. In addition, externalities (which may change at 
any time) affect the successful implementation of a policy decision. These externalities 
may include the development of new technology, or changes in economic conditions, 
political circumstances, or administrative apparatus.198 Finally, the policy choice itself 
and presentation thereof may affect its implementation. The clarity of the goals, the 
utility of procedures for implementation, the availability of a causal theory as to why 
the prescribed measure should achieve the said goals, the allocation of sufficient 
support funds and resources, and the selection of an appropriate lead agency to 
enforce and oversee policy implementation, are all significant in the final outcome. 
Further to these, direct resistance may come from a party who was either not given 
active involvement in the second phase of the cycle, or who was dissatisfied with the 
outcome. Another common reason for policy failure at this stage is institutional 
impairment. Bureaucracies, hostile to politically driven changes, may attempt to ignore 
or reinterpret the policy in their preferred manner.199 In this situation, interest groups 
may act as the public guardian, playing a 'watchdog' role in seeking to reinforce state 
accountability and compliance and where necessary reverting to the use of judicial 
redress to force policy implementation.'°° 
As demonstrated, the progression from agenda issue to policy implementation is 
neither instantaneous, nor necessarily smooth. And the public policy process is not 
nearly as tightly sequential as the model makes it appear.20' For example, preferred 
solutions may be mooted in the agenda -setting phase. Moreover, 
while disaggregation permits the detailed examination of the policy 
process, it begs the question of what the process looks like when all its 
constitutive pieces are reassembled'°' 
Within the cycle outlined above, a range of relevant factors and related actors may 
retard or promote the development of policy at any one or more of the three identified 
stages. Howlett and Ramesh describe these as the actors, institutions and ideas. The 
first encompassing the executive, bureaucracy and legislature as well as societal actors 
such as interest groups, research organisations and mass media. The institutions 
similarly are both internal and external to government, and it is both the structuring of 
198 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
199 Walker (1994) op. cit. n16. 
200 Elliott (1994) op. cit. n116. 
201 Howlett and Ramesh (1995) op. cit. n20. 
202 Ibid at I84. 
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these and the relationship between society and state that determines their ability to 
effect the policy process. Finally, ideas are instrumental in the shaping of policy 
discourse by conditioning actors' views of what is both desirable and practicable 203 h 
the case -studies below, these elements of actor, institution and idea are considered 
under the headings of the role of science, the influence of NGOs, international factors, 
and the domestic imperatives at work. These parameters, as discussed, are critical in 
understanding the development of bycatch policy. To be sure, combination and 
recombination of these four factors are the main determinants in the development of 
Australia's and the U.S.'s bycatch policies. 
The following three chapters contain description and analysis of the successes and 
failed attempts at creating marine wildlife bycatch policies in the U.S.. The intent of 
this examination is not only to document a hitherto academically neglected area of 
marine conservation and fisheries policy, but also to aid in the elaboration of the 
evolution and various influences of the four factors discussed above. The intent in so 
doing is not to describe an ideal bycatch policy, but rather, to enunciate those elements 
that retarded and promoted bycatch policy development and where in the policy cycle 
these can be of greatest benefit. Thus, this thesis provides not only a record of U.S. 
action on marine wildlife policy, but moreover, a significant contribution towards the 
creation of a marine bycatch (and more broadly marine fisheries conservation) policy 
theory is made. 
203 Ibid. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The United States' efforts to curb the capture of marine wildlife incidental to 
commercial fishing operations have been varied and, until recently, ad hoc in nature. 
The period examined in this Chapter, from the early -1970s to 1980, was one of 
transition to be sure; when the U.S. government accommodated itself to the 
replacement of the Grotian doctrine with a new regime of extended coastal state 
jurisdiction.' The seaward movement of national boundaries was, in part, motivated 
by a desire to control and exploit the natural resources in the oceans adjoining States' 
coastlines, and was facilitated internationally through the third reconvention of 
negotiations for a Law of the Sea Convention.' Domestically, the early 1970s 
witnessed a flurry of federal legislative assertiveness in the field of marine policy. 
Spearheaded by an active Congress (rather than the Presidency) the oceans' program 
movement was lent force by substantive leadership in both the House and Senate.' 
This spate of marine oriented enactments was driven largely by the emergent public 
interest in the environment, and caution towards the 'dark side of technology'.' The 
first landing on the moon in 1969, and photos of the earth from outer space, raised the 
profile of the concept of the earth's environment as a closed system, and the metaphor 
'spaceship earth' was popularised.' In 1970 Life Magazine declared "Ecology: a cause 
becomes a mass movement" and public support was formalised in the national 
celebration by a reported 20 million people of Earth Day 1970.5 This emergent 
environmental awareness was supported by the popular media, and characterised by 
I The Grotian doctrine of freedom of the high seas holds that nations have a right to freedom of 
navigation for civil and military purposes, and freedom to take the oceans' resources, with the caveat of 
the exclusive right of a sovereign State to exercise jurisdiction over a narrow territorial sea, subject to the 
right of innocent passage for vessels of other states. This concept was outlined in the early 1600s by 
Hugo Grotius' in his treatise "Mare Liberum ", where he claims that the sea can not be owned. See 
Aceves, W., "The Freedom of Navigation Program: A Study of the Relationship Between Law and 
Politics" (1996) 19 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 259. 
2 Miles, E. and Fluharty, D., "U.S. Interests in the North Pacific" (1991) 22 Ocean Development and 
International Law 315. 
3 These include Representative Pelly, Representative Dingell, Representative Studds, Senator 
Magnuson, Senator Stevens. 
4 See Caldwell, L., "Globalizing Environmentalism: Threshold of a New Phase in International 
Relations" (1991) 4 Society and Natural Resources 259. 
5 Boulding, K., "The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth ", in Jarrett, H. (ed), Environmental 
Quality in a Growing Economy (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966) pp.3 -14. 
6 Earth Day was held on 22 April 1970. See Dunlap, R. and Mertig, A., "The Evolution of the U.S. 
Environmental Movement from 1970 to 1990: An Overview" (1991) 4 Society and Natural Resources 
209. 
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an escalation in public membership of environmental NGOs.7 In the early 1970s these 
organisations concentrated their efforts not only on agenda raising via the media, but 
also on policy formation through the lobbying of Congress, and they affected desired 
changes through influencing legislative enactments and amendments. Litigative action, 
in response to administrative branch inaction or legislative misinterpretation, did not 
emerge as a serious option until several years of statutory operation of each Act, and 
was not routinely practiced by NGOs as a means of redress until the 1980s.' 
Amidst this flurry of community concern, a general environmental protection statute 
was enacted in 1970.9 This was followed shortly thereafter by marine mammal and 
endangered species protection legislation, and several years later a new system for the 
governance of U.S. fisheries. Two recurring themes can be traced through these 
enactments: the expansion of federal control into areas of previous state jurisdiction, 
and an increase in the U.S.'s international assertiveness facilitated through both 
negotiation, and the threat of trade sanctions. 
In relation to the bycatch of marine wildlife, the issue which received the greatest 
attention in the 1970s was the take of dolphins in tuna purse -seining operations. The 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was enacted, in part, due to public and 
Congressional concern generated in response thereto. It placed a moratorium on the 
take of marine mammals and then laid a permit system over the top, so as to provide 
for commercial exemptions from this broad prohibition. In its enduring attempts to 
both conserve marine mammals and protect U.S. fishing interests, Congress has tended 
to increase restrictions on marine mammal take simultaneous to the provision of 
greater industry concessions: hence the MMPA's actual effectiveness as a tool to 
discourage the incidental capture of marine species has been limited. 
The MMPA did not purport to offer protection to marine reptiles or seabirds. Where 
the survival of these marine wildlife was threatened or endangered they were, instead, 
to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Though enacted 
in partial response to the successful negotiation of the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and aimed at 
preventing the extinction of species due to unrestricted international trade, the ESA 
7 In the period between 1960 and 1969 U.S. NGO membership increased sevenfold from 123,000 to 
819,000, and in the subsequent three years increased by another 300,000 members. Mitchell, P., Mertig, 
A. and Dunlap, R., "Twenty Years of Environmental Mobilization: Trends Among National 
Environmental Organisations" (1991) 4 Society and Natural Resources 219. 
8 The increase in litigation witnessed in the 1980s was also a reflection of, and reaction to, the less 
open system of govemment, and a reduction in the avenues of access that were available to interest groups 
under the Reagan administration between 1980 and 1988. 
9 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91 -190, 83 Stat. 852 (hereafter "NEPA "). 
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had a broader mandate and implemented a similar protective scheme to the MIMPA. It 
was under this scheme that turtle bycatch in shrimp trawling was first addressed. 
Notwithstanding that declining populations of sea turtles was raised as a concern at 
the beginning of the 1970s, little had been done to remedy the situation by the end of 
the decade. The reason for this inaction can by and large be attributed to interagency 
conflict stemming from disagreement over who had primary jurisdiction for sea turtles 
under the ESA. 
Concern over the bycatch of marine wildlife was not restricted to the domestic arena. 
With increasing ocean enclosure, and growth in the size of foreign fishing fleets, the 
U.S. administration was directed through Congressional enactments to initiate the 
formation of a variety of bi- and multi- lateral fisheries arrangements. Motivated by the 
rapid growth in tuna and salmon fisheries in the North Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, 
the U.S. also took a lead role in ensuring the expansion of extant regimes from tools for 
the allocation of fishing rights, to include environmental considerations such as 
bycatch. This move was not entirely altruistic, it was also an attempt by the U.S. to 
prevent the loss of income due to the reflagging of its vessels to flags of convenience, 
and to minimise opposition to its own domestic arrangements by ensuring that foreign 
imports did not have a price disadvantage over the U.S. catch. Resistance to this new 
paradigm in international offshore management, from both littoral States and the 
DWFNs, led to the U.S.'s development of a range of trade mechanisms with which to 
persuade or coerce participation or adherence by reluctant nation States. 
3.2 Trade as a tool: the PelIy Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act 
The first of several domestic instruments that provided the U.S. with the means to 
impose unilateral sanctions, as a supplementary procedural mechanism in an attempt 
to control the actions of foreign fishing nations, was enacted in 1971, The Pelly 
Amendment10 added section 8 to the Fishermen's Protective Act, whereunder the U.S. 
could place trade restrictions upon foreign nations so as to encourage them to become 
part to or comply with international fishery conservation programs to which the U.S. 
was signatory 11 Although initially intended as a tool with which to halt overfishing, 
10 Fishermen's Protective Act Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No, 92 -219, 85 Stat. 786 (hereafter the 
"Pelly Amendment "). 
11 The Pelly Amendment included no requirement that the foreign nation certified thereunder be 
themselves a signatory to the triggering agreement. An "international fishery conservation program" was 
defined (at enactment) to mean 
any ban, restriction, regulation, or other measure in force pursuant to a multilateral 
agreement to which the United States is a signatory party, the purpose of which is 
to conserve or protect the living resources of the sea. (The Pelly Amendment of 197I, 
§1978h(3), [s8h(3)] (emphasis added)). 
continued over page 
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the Pelly Amendment was potentially amenable to the control of marine wildlife 
bycatch. Indeed, since amendments were passed in 1978 that extended the Act's 
application to wildlife conservation, the legitimacy of Pelly Amendment's use in 
bycatch reduction has been established beyond doubt. 
Historically very little fishing occurred in international waters.12 Freedom of fishing on 
the high seas, subject to treaty obligations, had nonetheless been protected under 
consecutive United Nations' Conventions.' Fishing fleets on the high seas fell under 
the control of only the flag State of the vessel; and littoral States were unable to exert 
direct control over fishing operations occurring in the ocean commons adjoining their 
coastlines. They instead had to convince the flag State to whom the vessel was 
registered to impose regulations to control the particular fishing operations." 
Agreement of this nature often came in the form of an international treaty, negotiated 
so the flag State would gain some other beneficial concession from the initiating nation. 
Where such agreement was not forthcoming, alternative options included extended 
jurisdictional claims to assert proprietary rights over the area in question, or coercion 
through the imposition or threat of trade sanctions. Both these techniques have been 
used by the U.S. in its attempts to gain control over DWFNs' operations, the latter of 
which first gained notoriety through the enactment of the Pelly Amendment to the 
Fishermen's Protective Act. 
The Fishermen's Protective Act was initially enacted in 1954.15 The Pelly Amendment to 
this Act, was crafted with the intent of conserving and protecting atlantic salmon of 
North American origin. This was primarily in response to a perceived need to provide 
for action against Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Norway, all of who 
As such, in addition to encouraging compliance, it was possible that the Pelly Amendment be used to 
encourage international participation in new negotiations. 
12 This was particularly significant given that, in 1971, coastal State jurisdiction extended only 3nm 
seaward from low water mark under international law. Fishing beyond this 3nm mark did however, occur 
off the coast of Alaska. See Buck, E., National Patterns and Trends of Fishery Development in the 
North Pacific (Arctic Environmental Information and Data Center, University of Alaska, Anchorage, 
1975). 
13 See Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 599 
U.N.T.S. 285 (1958), Article 2(11); most recently see United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), Article 87. 
14 The recent Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stock Agreement changes the situation 
somewhat. See Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the I,aw of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (hereafter "UNTA" or the 
"Implementing Agreement "). 
15 Enacted in 1954, the original Act was amended in 1967 by the Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 
(Pub. L. No. 90 -482, 82 Stat. 729) such that 
"the Act of August 2, 1954" (68 Stat. 883; 22 U.S.C. 1971 -1976), as amended by this 
Act may be cited as the 'Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967'. 
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had filed objections to, and were refusing to comply with, a ban on high seas salmon 
fishing established in response to a decline in stocks 16 
The mode of operation proposed by Representative Pelly in H.R. 3304 was initially 
opposed by the Departments of State and Commerce. While hearings in the House 
were being conducted the member parties to the International Convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) met, and it became apparent that a ban on the 
high seas fishing of salmon would not be agreed to by all of the 15 member States. 
Subsequently the Departments endorsed the Pelly Amendment, albeit with several 
changes to its original proposed form.17 Suggested alterations extended the scope of 
the Pelly Amendment's application. The first of these increased the section's 
jurisdiction from exclusively governing salmon species, to encompass all fish and 
marine mammals. The Pelly Amendment's inclusion of marine mammals was with 
mind only to the direct harvesting thereof though, rather than being also intended as a 
remedy to incidental captures. A second alteration to H.R. 3304 saw a shift from the 
authorisation of embargos upon nations whose actions result in the diminishment of 
domestic programs, instead, to the triggering of such action in response to violations 
of, or refusals to comply with, international programs. Both changes to the original Bill 
were adopted by Congress and integrated into the enacted text. 
In its final form, the Pelly Amendment functioned via the invocation of a requirement 
that the Secretary of Commerce certify to the President when the Secretary determined 
that nationals of a foreign State were conducting fishing operations that diminished the 
effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program.18 In response to 
certification, the Pelly Amendment allowed for the President to direct the Secretary of 
Treasury to prohibit the importation of all fish products from offending nations. 
Within 60 days of certification the President was required to notify Congress of any 
action taken, and the reasons behind action(s) which did not fully prohibit the 
16 The background against which the Pelly Amendment was proposed and enacted, began with the 
changed fishing patterns from an essentially inshore activity in the 1950s, to rapidly assume high seas 
capabilities in the 1960s. Late in that decade Denmark, Norway, and Sweden began catching large 
quantities of salmon from the waters of the Davis Straits, where the fish were found to congregate in the 
winter months. A rapid decline in stock occurred, and under the auspice of the International Convention 
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) -to which all four nations (including the U.S.) were party 
- a ban on the high seas taking of Atlantic salmon was instigated. Denmark, the FRG and Norway 
subsequently issued objections, and under the ICNAF were hence free to ignore the ban. The remaining 
ICNAF nations were concerned, in particular, about Denmark's operations, which amounted to 900 ton 
of the combined 1180 ton catch of the Scandinavian nations. Given the considerable portion of the total 
catch that was taken by Danish vessels, their objection effectively nullified the ban, and in its place the 
ICNAF nations agreed to the setting of an annual quota. By the early 1970s the issue had still not been 
settled. House of Representatives Report (Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee) No. 92 -468, [To 
accompany H.R. 3304] 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2409 (Hereafter 
"H.R. Rep. 92- 468 "). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Pelly Amendment, §1978(a), [s8(a)]. 
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importation of all fish products from the offending nation.79 Hence, and although 
reportage requirements were mandatory, the Presidential power was discretionary and 
there was no compulsion for the application of sanctions. 
One caveat to the Pelly Amendment was that actions taken pursuant thereto had to be 
consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT or General 
Agreement).20 This exercise in caution was an attempt to avoid charges of violation of 
the GAIT by the Pelly Amendment, and explains many of the procedural aspects of 
the Amendment. The 1947 GATT had been intended as a post WWII multilateral 
agreement on tariff reduction, and companion to the International Trade Organisation 
whose charter was negotiated at the same time. In the event the U.S. Congress failed to 
approve the ITO charter and the General Agreement filled this vacuum.21 The GATT 
was intended to limit the Pelly Amendment only to the extent that it prohibited 
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or a "disguised restriction on international 
trade ". Indeed, the Department of State in its submission to the House Committee 
remarked that 
while the use of trade sanction is generally inconsistent with our 
obligations and policies, it is recognised as appropriate to apply limited 
restrictions to trade to achieve comparability between the treatment 
afforded domestic and foreign interests in carrying out such conservation 
regulations." 
The two measures were thus believed to be in accord, so long as controls relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources were "made effective in conjunction with 
restriction on domestic production or consumption. "23 
Notwithstanding this apparent confidence in the legal validity of the Pelly Amendment 
as per the GATT, the Act afforded the President considerable flexibility with regard to 
the details of embargoed species, due largely to residual uncertainty regarding the 
legality of imposing sanctions on all fish products, rather than the less appealing 
option of an import ban upon only those species directly considered in the particular 
international convention ' So as to allow for continued trade action should a possible 
19 dad, 11978(b), [s8(b)I, 
20 Ibid, §I978(a)(4), [s8(a)(4)]. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1947) 
(hereafter the "GATT" or the "General Agreement "). 
21 Although the GATT is not technically a treaty, it received a Congressional executive order and was 
approved by the President under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act of 1945. 
22 Department of State, Report on Legislation, cited in H.R. Rep. 92 -468 op. cit. n16 at 2413. 
23 Ibid at 2413; see also GATT, Articles XX(g). 
24 The reason for wanting to apply the embargos to all fish products was the potentially large 
economic impact that such action would have upon an offending nation. For example, Danish salmon 
exports to the U.S. were said to be worth $U563,844 in 1970, as compared with the $tJS10,543,298 
value of all Danish fish products imported into the U.S.. The difference in impact of an embargo of 
$63,000, as compared to that of ten and a half million dollars worth of goods is obvious. Department of 
State, Report on Legislation. cited in H.R. Rep. 92 -468 op. cit. n16. 
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challenge under the GATT be upheld, the mandatory scheme proposed in H.R. 3304 
was slightly revised such that it allowed for the discretionary application of embargos 
by the President on certification of a nation.' Introduced concomitant to this 
allowance of Presidential discretion, was the statutory requirement to report and 
explain any partial implementation of the Pelly Amendment to Congress. Such 
reportage was viewed by the Committee as "essential to [their] oversight 
responsibilities"." 
The Congressional caution demonstrated with respecf to the international legal validity 
of the Pelly Amendment may have been well founded. Commentators have argued that 
the relating of trade restrictions to international instruments does not diminish the 
unilateral character of the sanctions imposed, and thus places them in violation of the 
GATT." The basis of these claims relates, in particular, to the targeting of non- 
signatory nations, and thus the expansion of the agreement to additional and 
involuntary parties. Also, problematic is the use of sanctions to enforce international 
recommendations before formal agreements have come into effect. Moreover, some 
commentators have suggested that, as the authority under the Pelly Amendment to 
determine a nation's compliance lies with members of the U.S. executive, and not with 
an international tribunal, it is (regardless of the validity of the agreement or treaty 
under international law) essentially a unilateral trade embargo imposed unlawfully 
upon a foreign nation.' 
In the years following the enactment of the Pelly Amendment, its primary utility 
appeared to be in passive discouragement of nations considering taking actions 
disfavored by the U.S. with regard to the conservation of marine living resources. The 
only active use of the provision, as enacted in 1971, was in 1973 when the Secretary of 
Commerce certified Japan and Russia to President Ford for their failure to abide by 
provision of the IWC. Subsequently both nations, notwithstanding the strengthening of 
IWC whaling restrictions, agreed to comply with the Commission, in order that the 
U.S. President did not embargo these offending nations. The Pelly Amendment also 
25 In contrast to the enacted scheme, H.R. 3304 had initially proposed that the Secretary of Commerce 
certify nations directly to the Secretary of Treasury, who was then compelled to act on that information 
and enforce an embargo on the offending nation. 
26 H.R. Rep. 92 -468, op. cit. n16 at 2414. 
27 Black, D., "International Trade v. Environmental Protection: The Case of The U.S. Embargo on 
Mexican Tuna" (1992) 24 Law and Policy International Business 123. 
28 Joseph, J., "The Tuna -Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, 
and Political Impacts" (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 1. 
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provided another very important function: it led the way for the use of similar 
mechanisms in other major marine enactments of the 1970s and 1980s.29 
In 1978 Congress considered the reauthorisation of the provision that allowed 
voluntary insurance for the reimbursement for certain losses incurred as a result of 
vessel seizures by foreign countries on the basis of claims of jurisdiction not recognised 
by the U.S.. ° 
Testifying on behalf of a number of environmental NGOs Mr Garret raised an issue 
peripheral to the section 7 reauthorisation. He proposed an amendment to section 8 of 
the Act, and based on his suggestions section 8a(2) was added to the Pelly 
Amendment, such that the scope of the Amendment was considerably expanded. The 
intent was to "provide additional protection to endangered and threatened species of 
fish and wildlife" 31 The Act's jurisdiction was broadened to include action that may 
endanger an international program for threatened or endangered species, as a trigger 
for sanctions.32 In accordance with the use of "take" in the MMPA and ESA, the 1978 
amendment added this broadly defined term and made it an offence to take 
applicable endangered or threatened animals to which an international program 
applied. To this end, Congress provided the Secretary of the Interior with powers 
comparable to those of the Secretary of Commerce's for those species under his [sic. J 
jurisdiction.33 Finally the application of the Pelly amendment to countries, whether the 
actions were sanctioned under the laws of the offending nation or not, was statutorily 
confirmed.34 
The U.S.'s propensity towards extending the use of access restrictions to its waters as 
a disincentive for undesirable, yet unrelated, activities was clearly demonstrated in 
January 1980. Though under a different legislative tool, President Carter almost 
29 For example the Packwood- Magnuson Amendment to the FCMA (Authorisation Appropriations 
- Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 of 1979 (Pub. L. No. 96 -61, 93 Stat. 407, 
section 3)) and Section 609, Conservation of Sea Turtles: Importation of Shrimp (Pub. L. No. 101 -162, 
103 Stat. 1988 (1989)). 
30 The provision was initially created in 1954 following the declaration of a series of zones of extended 
jurisdiction by foreign nations. Reauthorisation was in light of the 1976 expansion of U.S. territory 
seaward to 200nm, Fishermen's Protective Act of 1967 (Pub. L. No. 90 -482, 82 Stat. 729). 
31 Pelly Amendment of 1971, amended 1978, Pub L. No. 95 -376, 92 Stat. 714; House Report 
(Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee) No. 95 -1029 [To accompany H.R. 10878], 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1769. 
32 Pelly Amendment, 1978a(2), [s8(a)(2)]. 
33 Ibid, §1978a(2), [s8(a)(2)]. 
34 Ibid, §1978g(7)B, [s8g(7)B]. 
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immediately after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, closed U.S. waters to 
the Soviet fishing fleet, an action was described by one author as a "food weapon" 35 
3.3 Environmental Awakening in the U.S. 
Beginning in the 1960s the U.S. public underwent a much reported environmental 
awakening. Increased public attention towards the degraded state of the nation's 
natural environment, and the shift in legislative focus from concerns about the 
utilisation of specific resources, to the issue of environmental quality, were the result of 
a variety of influences 36 Initially interest and concern in the environment was triggered 
by the emergence of several controversial books including works such as Rachel 
Carson's Silent Spring,37 and Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb.38 Compounding this 
were the Torrey Canyon tanker spill in 1968, and the 1969 Santa Barbara Channel oil 
blowout off the Californian coast, events which acted to focus public attention 
worldwide on the fragility of the marine ecosystem. The environmental movement of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s nurtured the growth in public environmental interest. 
Emergent environmental groups offered a different focus to the previously 'wilderness' 
dominated orientation: more accessible to the lay person, these NGOs formed a 
political movement and embraced concepts such aesthetic and ethical values. And, 
realising the potential of mass public support to influence the nature and form of 
governmental policies, NGOs launched a program aimed at public education and 
political persuasion. 
This increased role afforded to environmental interest groups can not be entirely 
attributed to their increased membership, profile and activism. The situation on the 
domestic political front also contributed by providing conditions amenable to 
increased NGO involvement in policy formation 39 The early 1970s was a period of 
considerable Congressional resurgence as was evidenced by: 
1. the proliferation of subcommittees; 
2. a particularly active Congress with a number of members in each chamber with 
interest in marine issues; and 
35 Warner, L., "Conservation Aspects of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act and the 
Protection of Critical Marine Habitats" (1983) 23 Natural Resources Journal 97 at 127. This was 
undertaken under the Packwood -Magnuson Amendment to the Fisheries Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94 -265, 90 Stat. 331) (hereafter "FCMA "). 
36 Bradley, D. and Ingram, H., "How Federalism Matters in Natural Resources Policy ", in Silva, M. 
(ed), Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, 
1986) pp.37-74. 
37 Carson, R., Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1962). 
38 Ehrlich, P., The Population Bomb (Ballentine Books, New York, 1968). 
39 Knecht, R., Cicin -Sain, B. and Archer, J., "National Oceans Policy: A Window of Opportunity" 
(1988) 19 Ocean Development and International Law 113. 
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3. a growth in the number and competence of Congressional staff and expanded 
Congressional Research Service.44 
These changes acted to decentralise and expand Congress. They provided a 
"proliferation of access points" for these new, and increasingly politically astute, 
environmental groups.41 Further encouraging the burst of federal legislative creativity 
evidenced in the early 1970s was Congress's strong distrust of the Executive branch. 
The heads of the administrative agencies in 1969 had been appointed by a President 
from a different political party to that which held power in Congress; and the 
democratic Congress was reputedly skeptical about the validity of President Nixon's 
interest in environmental issues.42 
The presence of this combination of factors in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to the 
enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).43 The NEPA created a 
broad national policy to "promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to 
the environment," with the aim of creating and maintaining conditions under which 
man [sic.] and nature could live together in "productive harmony" 44 Accordingly, it 
incorporated into the statute a public trust language - later to be repeated in other 
conservation statutes - through the use of terms such as "trustee of the 
environment "." This implied obligation to govern on behalf of the people was of little 
surprise, given the prevalent political tensions between Congress and the Executive 
branch. To ensure such philosophy was successfully translated into action, the NEPA 
compelled the consideration of environmental factors in federal decision- making.46 It 
required that all agencies consider the environmental effects of their intended actions, 
as well as the likely impacts of non -government proposals involving federal funding or 
approval. Surprisingly though, given Congress's attitude, the NEPA suffered from a 
similar shortcoming to its predecessor, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.47 Both 
statutes mandated that all federal agencies contemplating actions that may impact 
upon fish or wildlife consult with the agency assigned jurisdiction over such species: 
40 The Legislative Reorganisation Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91 -570, 84 Stat. 1140). Cicin -Sain, B., 
"Managing the Ocean Commons: U.S. Marine Programs in the Seventies and Eighties" (1982) 16 
Marine Technology Society Journal 4. 
41 Kitsos, T. "U.S. Ocean Policy and the Uncertainty of Implementation in the 80s: A Legislative 
Perspective" (1981) 15 Marine Technology Society Journal 3. 
42 Blumm, M. "The Origin, Evolution and Direction of the United States National Environmental 
Policy Act" (1988) 5 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 179. 
43 NEPA, op. cit. n9. 
44 Ibid, §4232, [s2]. 
45 Ibid, §4331, [s101]. For discussion the use of trustee of the environment language in U.S. 
legislation see Warner (1983) 112 op. cit. n35. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 401. 
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both statutes, however, also required that only procedural considerations be fulfilled, 
and once these were satisfied, a proposal could continue unhindered, regardless of its 
impact.48 
The policy attention and fiscal support given to scientific advancement in the 1960s, 
largely a by- product of cold war competition, flowed over into the environmental 
legislation of the early 1970s.49 To implement the NEPA the Council on Environmental 
Quality -a newly created federal watchdog of environmental policy - developed a 
series of procedural rules, governing the application of the Act.50 These rules 
established within the NEPA a recommendation -making process based solidly upon 
scientific findings. As with the trade provisions contained in the Pelly Amendment, 
this procedural emphasis on scientific rigor but with few substantive benchmarks for 
guidance, was to be mirrored in much of the legislation of the 1970s. 
The range of statutes that surrounded the enactment of the NEPA acted also to 
enhance the federal role in environmental issues. For example, the passage of the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act in 1972 abruptly shifted the control over marine 
mammals from an almost entirely state dominated activity, to provide federal 
government preeminence 51 
3.4 Marine mammal protection and tuna- dolphin bycatch 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act 1972 
Over a four day period in October 1971, Congress passed a suite of conservation 
legislation.° These laws, in conjunction with the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 
significantly increased the scope of U.S. activity vis -a -vis the oceans, reflected a use- 
48 The strength of NEPA requirements however, were revealed as early as 1971 in Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (401 U.S. 402 (1971)) where the requirement that a "hard look ", or due 
consideration, was given by the agency to environmental factors was introduced. For example of the 
application of this precedent see, Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc v. Bergland (428 F. Supp. 908, 922 
(D. Orr. 1977)). 
49 Knecht et al. (1988) op. cit. n39. 
50 Kennedy, H., "The 1986 Habitat Amendments to the Magnuson Act: A New Procedural Regime 
for Activities Affecting Fisheries Habitat" (1988) 18 Environmental Law 339. 
51 Silva, M. and King, L., "Ocean Resources and Intergovernmental Relations: The Record to 1980 ", 
in Silva, M. (ed), Ocean Resources and U.S. Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s (Westview Press, 
Boulder, 1986) pp.75 -104. 
52 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92 -522, 86 Stat. 1027 (16 U.S.C.1361) 
(hereafter "MMPA "); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 95 -532, 86 
Stat. 1052; Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92 -583, 86 Stat. 1280; and the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No 92 -500, 86 Stat. 816 (now the Clean Water Act). 
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by -use management approach, and encouraged centralised authority at the national 
levela3 
The Marine Mammal Protection Act prohibited the take of all marine mammals other 
than in situations where an exemption applied or permit had been granted. The 
rationale behind affording a high level of statutory protection to one particular group 
of fauna was the imminent threat of extinction that human activities posed to marine 
mammals." The following opening statement to the House Report well captured this 
sentiment. 
Recent history indicates that man's impact upon marine mammals has 
ranged from what might be termed malign neglect to virtual genocide. 
These animals, including whales, porpoises, seals, sea otters, polar bears, 
manatees and others, have only rarely benefited from our interests: they 
have been shot, blown up, clubbed to death, run down by boats, 
poisoned, and exposed to a multitude of other indignities, all in the 
interest of profit or recreation, with little or no consideration of the 
potential impact of these activities on the animal populations involved." 
The successful passage of the MMPA was, by and large, a result of the momentum 
generated through the efforts of NGOs.56 Environmentalists had successfully harnessed 
the public outrage over the slaughter of harp seal pups in Canada, and the fear that 
some whale species were becoming extinct. Relying upon the popularity of 'flagship' 
species, high profile campaigns were launched to draw attention to the plight of marine 
mammals 57 These campaigns successfully raised the community's awareness of the 
practice of setting on dolphins in purse -seining operations, and the consequently high 
level of dolphin mortality suffered in the eastern Pacific tuna fishery.58 
53 Cicin -Sain (1982) op. cit. n40; Cicin -Sain, B. and Knecht, R., "The Problem of Governance cf 
U.S. Ocean Resources and the New Exclusive Economic Zone" (1985) 15 Ocean Development and 
International Law 289. 
54 MMPA, §1361(1), [s2(1)]. 
55 House of Representatives Report (Merchant and Marine Fisheries Committee) No. 92 -707, [To 
accompany H.R. 104201 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144 at 4145 
(hereafter "HR. Rep. 92- 707 "). 
56 The House report remarked that 
Interest in the welfare of marine mammals is manifest through -out the world. Recent 
investigations into the intelligence of animals such as whales, porpoise and seals have 
spurred protests in Ottawa, New York, London, and Paris against their wanton killing. 
Groups have been formed with the express purpose of advocating stronger protective 
measures, and their memberships have mushroomed. 
Ibid at 4145. 
57 The term flagship species refers to those animals, normally charismatic large vertebrates, which are 
used to anchor conservation campaigns due to the public sympathy and interest they arouse. Simberloff, 
f)., "Flagships, [Umbrellas, and Keystones: is Single- Species Management Passe in the Landscape Era ?" 
(1998) 83 Biological Conservation 247. 
58 Perrin, W., "The Porpoise and the Tuna" (1968) 14 Sea Frontiers 166; Perrin, W., "Using 
Porpoise to Catch Tuna" (1969) 18 World Fishing 42. 
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Highlighting the bycatch problem in combination with other threats to marine 
mammals, and in particular small cetaceans, environmentalists also addressed 
Congress directly. Members were encouraged to protect, over and above economic 
interests, the aesthetic and recreational significance of marine mammals.59 To this end 
the Harris -Pryor Bill (H.R. 6554), cosponsored by some 90 members of Congress and 
supported by a body of concerned citizens, was brought before the Committee.` The 
intent of this bill was to give statutory backing to the belief that all marine mammals 
should be declared off limits to human exploitation. Although not modeled on this Bill, 
the MMPA did capture its sentiment, and supported a conservationist bias resemblant 
to a precautionary approach.' Protection was offered to all marine mammals 
regardless of their state of endangerment. 
The MMPA placed an indefinite moratorium on the taking of marine mammals in U.S. 
waters, or by U.S. citizens on the high seas, and on the importation or selling of marine 
mammals, or of products obtained by methods involving the taking of marine 
mammals.` It did so through the creation of a protective system for marine mammals, 
via the prohibition of actions collectively referred to as 'taking' 53 Defined as "to 
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill"7 the 
inclusion of this term both here and in the Endangered Species Act of 1973 generated 
considerable controversy due to the potential broad interpretation of activities that 
constitute 'take'.` It was observed that 
'taking' is so broadly defined that virtually any interaction that disturbs 
the natural behaviour patterns of a marine mammal is in violation of the 
statute or of regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority. 
59 Alker, S., "The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the Approach to Conservation" (1996) 
44 UCLA Law Review 527. 
60 H.R. 6554, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); reprinted in Marine Mammal: Hearings on the 
Legislation for the Preservation and Protection of .Marine Mammals before the Subcommittee on 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) at 4 -7 (hereafter "Marine Mammal Hearings (1971) "). 
61 In the teeth of this lack of knowledge of specific causes, and of the certain knowledge that 
these animals are almost all threatened in some way, it seems elementary common 
sense to the Committee that legislation should be adopted to require that we act 
conservatively that no steps should be taken regarding these animals that might 
prove to be adverse or even irreversible in their effects until more is known. 
H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit n55 at 4148. 
62 MMPA, § 1371(a), [s 102(a)]. 
63 Ibid, §1362(13), [s3(13)]. 
64 !bid, §1370(a), [s101(a)]. 
65 For example it has been suggested that whales may be "harassed" by the noise created by large 
ships, however these Acts had no intention of banning such operations. See Alker (1996) at 535 op. cit. 
n59. 
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Virtually any interaction with marine mammals requires prior 
authorisation.66 
The Department of Commerce strongly criticised the inclusion of the term take, 
categorising it as overly broad.' It argued that such a definition precluded any capture 
of marine mammals incidental to fishing operations. Indeed, when eventually trialled 
this view was affirmed by the courts who held that if a marine mammal became 
entangled in a fishing net, even if it was released, a 'taking' had been committed.68 The 
fact that the Committee had intended the Act to be broadly applicable to a range of 
situations is seldom acknowledged in commentaries though. By way of example, the 
Committee had cited as a possible ground for prosecution for taking the "excessive" or 
"wanton" use of herbicides in areas that drain into manatee habitat and breeding 
grounds.' Hence, notwithstanding considerable opposition to the term, the definition 
of take was intended by Congress to be wide ranging and thus was not amended in the 
text of the final enactment. 
Congress did however hold some reservations about imposing a blanket moratorium 
upon marine mammal capture. Political pressure for an alternate scheme, sourced 
primarily in the Anderson -Pelly Bill (H.R. 10420)70 came from three directions. The 
executive branch viewed the Harris -Pryor Bill as unworkably narrow and restrictive, 
and maintained a position opposing the enactment of H.R. 6554.' Secondly scientists, 
not representing any particular interest, presented a case based on the view that 
man[sic.] had already interfered with, and disrupted, nature's balance.'2 They pushed 
for statutory acknowledgment that animal populations may consequently need active 
management in order to prevent them from exceeding the "carrying capacity of their 
66 Smith, E., "Legal Perspectives on the Sea Otter Conflict ", paper presented at Social Science 
Perspectives on Managing Conflicts Between Marine Mammals and Fisheries, Conference on 
Management of Sea Otters and Shellfish Fisheries, California, 9 -11 January 1981. 
67 Letter to Hon. Edward A. Garmatz, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
House of Representatives from Karl E. Bakke, Acting General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, 
10 September 1971. Reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4166 -9. 
68 Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries Coop. Ass 'n v. Baldridge, 679 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.D.C. 
1987), áff'd sub nom. Kokechik Fisherman's Ass 'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F. 2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 
1988), cert. denied sub nom. Verity v. Center for Environmental Education, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989). 
69 H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55. 
70 H.R. 10420, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); reprinted in Marine Mammal Hearings (1971) op. cit. 
n60 at 13 -19. 
71 H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55. Other similar bills also rejected by the Executive included H.R 
6558, H.R. 7463, H.R. 8183, and S.1315. 
72 See testimony of Thomas 1. Kimball, Executive Director of the National Wildlife Federation 
(Marine Mammal Hearings (1971) op. cit. n60 at 65 -77). 
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environment and thus destroying it and themselves in the process"?' Finally, 
commercial stakeholders, with public -display and fishing interests, sought several 
major concessions in the Act. These included a more flexible permit system than 
outlined in the proposed Harris -Pryor moratorium Bill." 
A scheme to allow regulated take was legislated for. Permits could be obtained from 
the Secretary of the relevant department of Commerce and Interior. Safeguards 
included requirements for the review of permit applications by the Marine Mammal 
Commission (MMC) and the Commission of Scientific Advisers established 
thereunder, as well as a public comment period.75 The MMPA further directed the 
responsible Secretary to prescribe regulations to which permits governing the taking of 
marine mammals were subject, as were "necessary and appropriate to ensure that such 
taking will not be to the disadvantage of those species and populations stocks 
consistent with the purposes and policies [of the MMPA] ".76 
In essence, the bill [gave] to the Secretaries of Interior and Commerce the 
authority and direction to establish general limitations upon the taking of 
all marine mammals, and within those limitations, to issue permits for 
their taking.' 
The MMPA mandated several non -negotiable scenarios where marine mammal take 
was prohibited. These included where the species was taken in an inhumane manner. 
Species under eight months of age, pregnant or nursing were also outside the scope of 
the bycatch exemption and take permits.'$ Moreover, extra protection was afforded to 
certain species and population stocks of marine mammals [that] are, or 
may be, in danger of extinction or depletion as a result of man's 
activities." 
73 H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55 at 4152. In the event the Act recognised marine mammals as part of 
the broader ecosystem, and noted the need to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem, 
but failed to mandate remedial action with respect to degradation thereof (MMPA of 1972, §1361(2),(6), 
[s2(2),2(6)]). Moreover, in concentrating on specific species, activities and, actors, the MMPA failed to 
provide facilitating mechanisms to achieve habitat protection (AIker (1996) op. cit. n59). 
74 H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55. 
75 MMPA, §1374, [s105]. 
76 Ibid, §1373(a), [s104(a)]. This has been termed the 'disadvantage' test which must be met before 
takings can be permitted (see Erdheim, F. "The Immediate Goal Test of the Marine Mammal Protection 
Act and the Tuna/Dolphin Controversy" (1979) 9 Environmental Law 283). An act of unauthorised 
taking, regardless of intent, faced penalties of $US 10,000 (H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55). "[T]he act of 
taking need not be intentional ". Further, forfeiture of both vessel and cargo was allowed, and, in the case 
of knowing take, fiscal penalties increased twofold with an additional threat of one year jail, per violation 
(MMPA, §1375, [s106]). 
77 Sauer, M., "Balancing Marine Mammal Protection Against Commercial Fishing: The Zero 
Mortality Goal, Quotas, and the Gulf of Maine Harbor Porpoise" (1993) 45 Maine Law Review 419 at 
426. 
78 MMPA, §1372(a)(3)(B) [s103(a)(3)(B)]. 
79 Ibid, §1361(1), [s2(1)]. 
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The MMPA defined depleted as a species or population stock that was below its 
optimum carrying capacity within its environment 80 If a species was found to be 
depleted, then the requirement that all take be consistent with the overall goals of the 
Act and any regulations promulgated thereunder logically precluded the granting of a 
permit or invocation of an exemption. 
Other than these specific scenarios, Congress articulated its general marine mammal 
protection policy in terms of the optimum sustainable population (OSP). It mandated 
that marine mammals should be managed at such a level and the authorised take of a 
marine mammal must include in it a statement of the impact on the OSP. The MMPA 
thus required that when a population falls below the OSP, immediate action to remedy 
the situation must be taken. The OSP was defined as "the number of animals which 
will result in the maximum productivity of the population or the species" 81 The term 
was a Congressional invention however, and hence did not come with an established 
scientific understanding from which its requirements could be implemented. 
Congress's attempt to give voice to both industry and environmentalists, and to 
simultaneously provide for the interests of their conflicting views, as well as scientists, 
led to a compromise solution with a two track strategy: a management program with a 
partial moratorium.82 In so doing, Congress has been accused of enacting a statute with 
two incompatible, and hence unattainable, goals - critics claim that the MMPA is 
unable to achieve its protectionist mandate due to the existence of the conflicting goal 
of resource management, which hence prohibits true marine mammal protection.' 
A Special Case: commercial fishing and the tuna -dolphin bycatch 
exemption 
At the time of enactment of the MMPA, the direct harvest of some animals had been 
addressed in international agreements. Indirect impacts on marine mammals had been 
poorly considered though. This changed significantly with the passage of the MMPA. 
In the late 1960s a government scientist, aboard a boat, observed and reported the 
practice of setting on dolphin, and in so doing, brought the issue of bycatch to the 
80 ¡hid, §1362(1)(h)(2)(B), [s3(1)(h)(2)(B)]. 
81 ¡hid, §1361(6),1362(8), [s2(6),3(8)]. 
82 Littell, R., Endangered and Other Protected Species: Federal Law and Regulation (The Bureau of 
National Affairs, Washington DC, 1992). 
83 Coniston, C., "Flipper Caught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorisation of the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act and its Effect on Dolphin" (1990) 11 Journal of Environment, Natural Resources and 
Energy Law 97. 
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public's attention.' Congress and the community were presented with evidence that 
up to 400,000 dolphins were being killed each year incidental to tuna purse -seining 
operations in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP).° Even without public 
condemnation of such activities it is likely that the Democratic Congress would have 
found this an unacceptable high mortality rate. The community did reject the practice 
of setting on dolphins though. The media had portrayed tuna purse -seining as a 
needless mass slaughter of animals considered to be both intelligent and personable. 
This scenario was unpalatable to the U.S. public and thus once informed the public 
refused to condone these fishing activities. Adding to Congressional pressure to 
remedy this situation was the fact that almost all fishing for tuna in association with 
dolphins in the early 1970s was conducted by vessels of U.S. registry. Indeed the 
influence of public opinion upon Congress is evidenced in the inclusion in the Senate 
daily record of the New York Times editorial entitled "Dolphin Slaughter ". 
Congress was also aware of the potential impact that an immediate prohibition on the 
taking of dolphins may have on the tuna industry.' Congress believed that the 
technology available in 1972 was inadequate to provide for the long term goal of zero 
mortality. Members were concerned about job losses for crew, dock workers and 
cannery employees that would necessarily follow. Moreover Congress was aware that 
tuna provided a comparatively low cost food source and were keen to avoid any 
shortage in supplies thereof.' The Act's intention was not to "shut down or 
significantly curtail the activities of the tuna fleet"." 
Thus the need to balance commercial fishing and environmental interests was at the 
forefront of MNJPA discussions in both the Senate and the House. Representative 
Goodling summarised this prevailing sentiment in his statement that 
there must be an appropriate balancing of equities between the two 
extremes of a zero mortality rate and elimination of a commercial fishing 
interest.89 
84 Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall, InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission/Scripps Oceanographic 
Institute, San Diego (CA), 26 April 1999. 
85 H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55. 
86 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Conference Committee Report 92 -1488, [To accompany 
H.R. 10420] submitted by Mr Garmatz, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4188. 
87 See Sauer (1993) op. cit. n77; and Slade, D., "Back to the Drawing Board: Forth Amendment 
Rights and the Marine Mammal Protection Act" (1986) 16 Ocean Development and International Law 
91. 
88 H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. 055. 
89 118 Cong. Rec. 34,643 (1972). 
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The trade -offs between these two interests is well demonstrated in the evolution of 
H.R.10420 into the MMPA. The bill as introduced did not contain a 'zero mortality 
rate goal' (ZMRG). Several floor amendments changed this situation. Representative 
Udall amended H.R. 10420 to include a five year moratorium on the taking of marine 
mammals. Later H.R. 10420 was amended in Senate. During a floor debate Senator 
Harris proposed that instead of a five year ban, an indefinite moratorium be placed 
upon the take of marine mammals9° His ongoing concern about the level of dolphin 
mortality caused by tuna fishers led to the introduction of a requirement that marine 
mammal bycatch "be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and 
serious injury rate" 91 
To combat the potential impact this may have had upon commercial fishers a two year 
'breaking in' period - effectively an exemption to the moratorium - was provided 92 
This was aimed at specifically at protecting ETP purse- seiners.93 Compliance with the 
two year exemption scheme's provisos regarding certain species, populations and 
individuals was ensured via a same duration provision placing observers onboard all 
fishing vessels.' 
Congress was aware of not only the lack of appropriate bycatch reduction technology 
but also the inadequacy of scientific knowledge with regard to the general status of the 
species and the impact of individual activities thereon. They saw the MMPA as a 
vehicle by which to remedy the low level of general scientific knowledge on marine 
90 S.287I, reported in Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Committee on Commerce [To 
accompany S.2871] No. 92 -863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972) (hereafter "S. Rep No. 92- 863 "); 118 
Cong. Rec. 25,271 (1972). 
91 118 Cong. Rec. 25,271 (1972). MMPA, §1371(a)(2), [s102(a)(2)]. 
92 MMPA, §1370(a)(2), [s101(a)(2)]. 
"During the twenty -four calendar months initially following the date of enactment of this Act, the taking 
of marine mammals incidental to the course of commercial fishing operations shall be permitted, and 
shall not be subject to ... this title .... Subsequently to such twenty -four months, marine mammals may 
be taken incidentally in the course of commercial fishing operations and permits may be issued thereof 
93 The House Report stated that the "Committee took pains in its consideration of this bill to see that 
the legitimate needs of the tuna industry were not ignored." H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55. 
Other exception granted in the Act included takings for scientific research, and takings for public display 
and for Indians, Aleuts and Eskimos for subsistence take, for the selling of handicrafts, with the proviso 
that the take not be wasteful in nature (MMPA, §1371(b), [s 102(b)]). 
94 So as to ensure both the safety of observers, and accuracy of their data, the MMPA prohibited 
fishers from interfering with the observers. Notwithstanding this provision, such "interference" did 
occasionally occur, although the frequency is unknown as instances were rarely reported. Methods of 
harassment included direct intimidation, and more `subtle' persuasion such as the setting of seal bombs 
to explode nearby observers (Kubasek, N., Browne, N., Young, M. and Hiers, W., "Protecting Marine 
Mammals: Time for a New Approach" (1995) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 1 at 6). In sum, the 
aspects of the Act that governed observers onboard U.S. vessels did little to assist in discouraging their 
interference with, and in some cases, may have actually antagonised the situation. The most problematic 
of the observer provisions was the granting of access, by the vessel's captain, to observer reports. 
MMPA, §1381(d), [s202(d)]. 
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mammals 95 The gulf in information is illustrated by the lack of data collected between 
1959 and 1972. Information on dolphin mortality associated with fishing for ETP 
yellowfin tuna is available for only nine out of the 4250 fishing trips conducted by U.S. 
vessels in that period.9ó Thus the observer program was seen as not only useful to 
ensure compliance with the Act's requirements but also as a data gathering device. 
Notwithstanding their inclusion of the exemption provision, Congress's intent to lower, 
as far a practicable, the take of marine mammals in commercial fishing operations was 
resolute 97 In this regard it required that the best available bycatch reduction equipment 
be used.98 Thus the U.S. tuna purse -seining fleet's exemption was conditional to the 
maintenance of a high technological standard. The overall effect of the Senate and 
House amendments was to require the U.S. domestic tuna industry to employ the best 
available technology with a view to reaching the ZMRG within two years. 
The logic of a two year exemption was twofold. Firstly, as already discussed, it was 
intended to prevent the potential damage that sudden regulation may have had upon 
the fishing industry after years of little or no control. But it was also a reflection of 
Congress's confidence that scientific research would soon generate a technological 
solution to the problem of dolphin bycatch. This belief was nurtured by the fishing 
industry, representatives of which asserted that the basic techniques for bycatch 
reduction already existed, and that time to allow refinement and the implementation 
of this equipment by the fleet was all that was needed 99 Demonstrating both their 
belief that a solution was at hand and their commitment to dolphin bycatch reduction, 
Congress allocated $US2,000,000 over a two year period to research into bycatch 
exclusion technology. 
95 MMPA, §1377(b), [s108(ó)]. 
96 Smith, T. and Lo, N., Some Data on Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Tuna 
Purse Seine Fishery Prior to 1970. NOAA Technical Memoranda NMFS -SWFC -34 (Department of 
Commerce, Washington DC, 1983), cited in Lo, N. and Smith, T. "Incidental Mortality of Dolphins in 
the Eastern Tropical Pacific, 1959 -72" (1986) 84 Fishery Bulletin 27. 
97 For example see comments by Representative Pelly that "T and every member of the committee 
also feel that the Department of Commerce and the commercial fishing industry should do everything 
which is technologically feasible to reduce the level of incidental taking to the lowest possible extent" 
and of Representative Dingell that "it is our purpose to minimise to the greatest degree possible the 
porpoise kill" at 1I8 Cong. Rec. 7707 -09 (1972). See also H.R. Rep 92 -707, op. cit. n55. For similar 
comments from the Senate with respect to their complementary legislation S. 2971 see, S. Rep No. 92- 
863 op. cit. n90. See also Erdheim (1979) op. cit. n76; Sauer (1993) op. cit. n77. 
98 118 Cong. Rec. 7700 -09 (1972). 
99 For example see the testimony of Captain Joe Medina discussing the future of the tuna purse -seine 
industry in light of the results of tests of a 'medina panel' dolphin exclusion device. 
I feel in a year the whole fleet will convert over and everybody will have the new net... 
it is the difference between day and night. It has been a real help. We have the problem 
licked. 
Hearings on H.R. 10420 Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) at 348. 
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Thus Congress, firm in its belief that a technological solution was on the brink of 
discovery, but aware for the need for a phase of gradual implementation, provided a 
licensing system for the take of marine mammals, intended to be implemented at the 
expiration of the two year bycatch exemption. As it applied to commercial fishing 
operations this licensing system took the form of a regulatory system of bycatch 
permits with conditions imposed thereon. The Secretary of Commerce was directed, 
under the NLMPA, to assign quotas and promulgate regulations to govern the takings of 
marine mammals.'00 Fishers who violated either the Act's provisions, regulations, or 
appended permit requirements were subject to civil and criminal penalties 101 
In accordance with the general scheme of the MMPA, the burden of proof required to 
obtain a bycatch permit was that takings would not be detrimental to the species as a 
whole, and that "techniques and equipment" that produce the least practicable hazard 
to marine mammals would be utilised.102 
In every case, the burden is placed upon those seeking permits to show 
that the taking should be allowed and will not work to the disadvantage 
of the species or stock of animals involved. If that burden is not carried - 
and it is by no means a light burden - the permit may not be issued.10' 
Agency implementation of the tuna -dolphin scheme 
Notwithstanding Congress's high intended burden of proof, the practice of obtaining a 
bycatch permit proved to be much less onerous. At the end of the two year breaking in 
period afforded commercial fishers, the general permit and regulation procedures 
promulgated under the MMPA became applicable to American tuna fishing operators. 
The American Tunaboat Association (ATA)104 applied on behalf of its members and 
was granted a permit with no demonstration of the statutory requirements outlined 
above.'05 
100 MMPA, §1370(a), [s 101(a)]. 
101 ¡bid, §1375 -6, [s106 -7]. Fines were not to exceed $US10,000 per violation, nor imprisonment for 
one year and forfeiture of the violators' cargo per violation. 
102 ¡bid, §1371(a)(2), [sl02(a)(2)]. 
103 H.R. Rep. 92 -707, op. cit. n55 at 4151. 
104 The ATA was formed in 1923 as a non profit fisheries cooperative with the purpose of representing 
the tuna fleet in their fee negotiations with the Mexican government. Only after the 1945 Truman 
Fisheries Proclamation did the U.S. government, mainly through the State Department, become involved 
in an effort to protect fishers' interests. It was largely to this end that the Fishermen's' Protective Act was 
enacted in 1954 as a means by which to reimburse fishers who had incurred fines or had vessels seized as 
a result of fishing in waters declared by the littoral State to be within their jurisdiction but not 
acknowledged by the U.S. government. 
105 Alker (1996) op cit. n59 at 536. See Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc v. Richardson, 540 
F.2d 1146 -1147 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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In the period between enactment of the legislation and this 1974 expiration of the 
commercial fishing exemption, the community's attitude to the offshore had altered 
significantly. The 1973 -74 Arabian oil embargo had served to refocus the public and 
political outlook on the environment. Concentration was directed towards issues such 
as recycling, and the use of renewable energy resources. Less favourably however, the 
crisis also encouraged a perception that laws to protect marine mammals and 
endangered species were obstructionist, and various efforts were made to soften or 
repeal this legislation.'ob For example, the Endangered Species Act (discussed below) was 
amended to create a council to allow for exemptions from the requirements of the Act 
under circumstances typically found in proposals for new energy facilities.' 
Against this background, the Department of Commerce's National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) was required to take action to establish and enforce a quota limiting 
the take of dolphins in tuna fishing operations. The allocation of responsibility for the 
MMPA had placed the conservation of marine mammals under the two departments. 
NMFS, a subsidiary branch of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA),' was designated as the responsible agency to manage pinnipeds (other than 
walruses), and cetaceans,109 and the Department of Interior through the Fish and 
Wildlife Services (FWS) was assigned jurisdiction over sea and marine otters, polar 
bears, walruses and sirenians or manatees.10 This split was a result of the division of 
authority at the time of enactment, and was never intended to be a permanent 
arrangement. ' 
106 Knecht et al. (1988) op. cit. n39. 
107 Ibid. 
108 The NOAA was been created on 9 July 1970, under President Nixon's Governmental 
Reorganisation Plan No. 4 and Executive Order 11564 (Reorganisation Plan No. 4 of 1970, 84 Stat. 
2090). 
109 MMPA, §1362(11)(A), [s3(12)(A)]. 
110 Ibid, §1362(11)(B), {s3(12)(B)]. 
111 Buck, E., Marine Mammal Issues (Congressional Research Services, Library of Congress, 
Washington DC, 1992) at 1; H.R. Rep. 92 -707, op. cit, n55. 
Several prominent committees recommended the merging of the various agencies with marine authority 
into a single civilian ocean agency (for example see Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and 
Resources, Our Nation and the Sea, A Plan for National Action, (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C., 1969)). During the passage of the MMPA both responsible departments also offered 
their support for the move towards a single civilian agency (See: Letter to Hon. Edward A. Garmatz, 
Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives from W.T. Pecora, 
linder Secretary of the Interior, Department of the Interior, September 8, 1971. Reprinted in 1971 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4175; and Letter to Hon. Edward A. Garmatz, Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, House of Representatives from Karl E. Bakke, Acting General Counsel of the Department 
of Commerce, September 10, 1971. Reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4166.). The administrative 
structure which led to the split jurisdictional arrangement was originally a result of feuding within 
Nixon's cabinet, wherein no Secretary would accede to the creation of an ocean agency outside of their 
own department. Thus a deliberate compromise was made, where the duty to protect marine mammals 
was divided between the Departments of Commerce and Interior (see Laist, D, and Epting, J., "Marine 
Policy Evolution: A Reference Guide for Coastal Managers" (1980) 7 Coastal Zone Management Journal 
71, for a chronological outline of marine administrative structuring developments). 
continued over page 
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Indeed the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries was critical of the 
administrative structure, stating: 
the committee is not satisfied that the jurisdictional split between 
agencies is helpful or useful; it retained the status quo largely upon the 
hope and expectations that a Department of Natural Resources would be 
shortly forthcoming, at which point the two programs would be merged 
into one 12 
In the absence of this expected reorganisation, NOAA and NMFS have faced regular 
criticism. This stems from a perception that NMFS has been unable to give effect to all 
the requirements of the MMPA due to conflicting responsibilities for protecting marine 
mammals and for promoting commercial fisheries. It has been suggested that in 
attempting to balance these often incompatible duties, economic considerations have 
more often than not overridden marine mammal conservation - leaving this 
environmental aspect most neglected.' 
From 1972 to 1974 information gathered by observers led to new figures which 
suggested that in excess of 337,000 dolphins were being killed annually in the U.S. 
yellowfin tuna fishery. A report released early in October 1974 by the Southwest 
Fisheries Science Center of NMFS, examined the impact of purse -seine fishing on 
dolphins. ' It estimated that current population levels of spotted porpoises could be 
up to 80 percent less than the carrying capacity of the ecosystem; a figure well below 
the OSP. Moreover it concluded that this decrease could be attributed to the impact of 
purse- seining operations. Notwithstanding this assessment, in 1974 NMFS listed the 
status of dolphins as "unknown ".15 
In March 1973, NMFS published a notice of intent to prescribe a series of regulations. 
On 30 September 1974 the Secretary of Commerce issued a general permit for an 
unlimited number of dolphin bycatches to the ATA.116 The permit was granted without 
complying to the prescribed requirements of the MMPA in that no total allowable take 
based on current stocks nor was an OSP provided, although a goal of 50% reduction in 
Congressional discussions with regard to an independent ocean agency or cabinet level department 
persisted, though none of these came to fruition. Knecht et al. have suggested that the reason behind the 
failure of these proposed changes was, in this later instance, largely to do with the U.S. committee 
system and the issue of Congressional jurisdiction. "No sub- committee chair will willingly see his or 
her jurisdiction shrink as a result of reorganisation" (Knecht et al. (1988) op. cit n39 at 120). 
112 H.R. Rep. 92 -707, op. cit. n55 at 4146. 
113 Kubasek et al. (1996) op. cit. n94. See ESA jurisdictional problems section for an outline of 
problems and conflicts that have arisen from this split jurisdictional arrangement 
114 National Marine Fisheries Service, Draft Report on Porpoise Mortality Incidental to Tuna Purse - 
Seine Fishing for Fiscal Year 1975 (NMFS, LaJolla, 1974). 
115 39 Fed. Reg. 9685 (1974). 
116 39 Fed. Reg. 32117 (1974) (as amended 40 Fed. Reg. 764 (1975)). 
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the mortality rate was established.. ' Individual fishers were then able to apply to the 
ATA for certificates of inclusion in this permit I'$ In this way, the U.S. tuna fleet's 
continued fishing for tuna associated with dolphins was sanctioned by the U.S. 
executive. 
In lieu of creating a dolphin bycatch quota, the regulations introduced gear restrictions, 
so as to ensure that the best available technology was being used so as to prevent 
dolphin bycatch. Research had revealed that equipment modifications would allow for 
significant bycatch reduction. Even before the expiration of the exemption, NMFS 
drafted an interim regulation to be effective 1 March 1974 requiring the installation of a 
safety panel in all purse -seine nets and a variety of other alterations.19 These however 
were delayed until April to allow fishers to find and install the panels, and then again 
due to a petroleum shortage and consequential limited supply of nylon netting.120 
As of the issuance of the general bycatch permit, fishers were authorised to take 
porpoise incidental to their fishing operations so long as they complied with the 
requirements for modified gear and techniques. Such modifications were required as of 
the date the permit was effected - 21 October 1974 - and included the use of 
backdown, of speedboats to guide the nets, and the medina panel.' All holders of 
certificates of inclusion in the ATA's permit were also required to attend NMFS 
training sessions on legal obligations under the teÍMPA and techniques to reduce the 
serious injury and mortality of dolphin.'22 
In response to NMFS's lack of specification of permissible of dolphin bycatch limits, 
the Marine Mammal Commission issued a general warning that the current level of 
117 40 Fed. Reg. 764, 765 (1975). 
118 See Application of American Tuna Association for a General Permit Under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972, to Allow the Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing (18 
September 1974) (Admin. Rec. 24 January 1975); General Permit Under the Category: Encircling Gear, 
Yellowfm Tuna Purse Seining (NMFS, 21 October 1974) (Admin. Rec. 24 July 1975), (announced 39 
Fed. Reg. 38403 (1974)). 
119 38 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 2481 (1974). 
120 39 Fed. Reg. 2481, 20,406- 20,407 (1974). 
121 40 Fed. Reg. 56899 (1975). 
For example 50 CFR §216.24(d)(2)(iv)(A)(1976) describes the specifications of the medina panel as 
follows: 
The porpoise safety panel shall be installed so as to protect the entire perimeter of the 
backdown area [sic] from the cutboard end of the number tree cork bunching line to the 
tiedown point. This panel must be a minimum of 100 fathoms in length, except that 
the minimum length of the panel in nets deeper than 10 strips shall be determined by a 
ratio of 10 fathoms in length for each strip that the net is deep ... The porpoise safety 
panel shall consist of small mesh webbing not to exceed 2 [inch] stretch mesh, 
extending from the corkline downward to a minimum depth equivalent to one strip of 
100 meshes of 4 1/2 [inch] stretch mesh webbing.... 
122 41 Fed. Reg. 30,152- 30,155 (1976). 
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take was unacceptably high.' It did, however, support NMFS's approach of 
prescribing no quota until more information on current dolphin levels and the OSP 
were obtained.124 The MMC was formed to facilitate reviews of the operation of the 
program, and hence (notwithstanding the NMFS's argument for a less independent 
body125) the MMC's role was that of an independent statutory authority.'26 It was also 
an attempt by Congress to prevent biases toward either commercial or conservation 
interests and the independent structure was intended to ensure the process would not 
be captured by any one particular stakeholder. This arrangement was also though, a 
manifestation of Congress's ongoing lack of trust in the executive.127 
Abuses by the federal managers, if any, will be highly visible, to both the 
public in general and to the Commission. They will also be visible to this 
Committee, which proposes to maintain vigilant oversight on the program 
to see that it fulfils the high expectations of the Congress in bringing this 
program into existence.12' 
In August the following year the ATA applied for a renewal of its general permit which 
was due to expire on 31 December 1975.129 Initially NMFS proposed a quota of 
between 50,000 and 100,000 dolphins. Unsurprising, given the 1974 Southwest 
Center's assessment of dolphin population status, conservationists objected to this 
take level. Conversely, the ATA complained that this level of dolphin bycatch was 
unrealistically restrictive. NMFS decided to postpone the publication of its regulations 
and to hold negotiations between conservationists and fishing representatives in an 
attempt to resolve their conflicts.135 At a conference convened in September it became 
clear that the two stakeholder groups held mutually exclusive positions with respect to 
observer coverage and to the proposed quota. Tn December that year NMFS published 
compromise regulations. In so doing it pleased neither side. 
123 Report from John R. Twiss Jr., Executive Director, Marine Mammal Commission, to Robert W. 
Schoning, Director, NMFS (30 July 1974); (Admin. Rec. 24 January 1975). 
124 Hyde, L., "Dolphin Conservation in the Tuna Industry: The United States' Role in an International 
Problem" (1979) 16 San Diego Law Review 665. 
125 H.R. Rep. 92 -707 op. cit. n55. 
126 Ibid. The Commission has no regulatory authority what -so -ever, it is tasked with overviewing 
everything that the federal government does that may effect marine mammals and to make 
recommendation to the appropriate regulatory authority. This includes the NMFS, the FWS, the Dept of 
State, Minerals Management Service, the Coast Guard, the Navy. Per. comm. Dr Robert Hofman, 
Scientific Program Director, Marine Mammal Commission, Washington DC,15 April 1999. 
127 Although the MMC is part of the Executive Branch of the government, it reports to Congress not 
the President. Ibid. 
128 H.R. Rep. 92 -707, op. cit. n55 at 4152. 
129 See Application of American Tuna Association for a General Permit Under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act of 1972, to Allow the Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing (6 
August 1975) (Admin. Rec. 9 December 1975). 
130 Andersen, S., Anderson, R. and Searles, B., "The Tuna -Porpoise Dilemma: Is Conflict Resolution 
Attainable ?" (1978) 18 Natural Resources Journal 505. 
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NMFS once again failed to specify a bycatch quota, although the renewal permit 
included a caveat to the effect that NMFS could set an upper limit on dolphin take if it 
appeared that dolphin kills for 1976 would exceed 70 per cent of the 1975 bycatch 
levels.131 This perhaps stemmed from the 1975 take of dolphins having increased 37% 
over what it had been in 1974. NMFS also required a ten percent observer coverage. It 
issued statements with respect to the two most frequently captured species of dolphin, 
the offshore spotted and eastern spinner dolphin. The tenet of this was that neither of 
these species' populations were suffering greatly due to their incidental capture, nor 
would they benefit significantly from any change to the tuna permit.132 Importantly, 
though, NMFS was unable to comment on other populations of dolphin, nor on the 
effect of taking on their OSP levels.'33 
NGO Action through Judicial Challenge 
Inconsistencies between NMFS's actions and the scheme of the MMPA did not go 
unnoticed by environmentalists. In response to the ATA's receipt of the 1975 permit, 
14 NGOs united as plaintiffs and plaintiff- interveners to challenge the legality of 
NMFS's interpretation of the Act.13' Environmental groups sought a court declaration 
that the permit and regulations allowing unlimited killing were contrary to the MMPA 
and hence invalid.'35 
A determination was not handed down until May 1976. In the event, NMFS offered no 
dispute to the assertion that it had not fully complied with the letter of MMPA 
procedures. The central argument of the NGOs was the Iack of adherence to the 
MMPA with regard to the allocation of a specific quota for the incidental take of 
marine mammals; for NMFS, whether a lack of scientific evidence may be considered 
to be an extenuating circumstance, and thus excuse its failure to there comply.136 
The ATA, as interveners on the side of the defendant (the Department of Commerce) 
drew upon Representative Goodling's statement regarding balancing of equities. They 
claimed that in light of this statement the regulations in question - and hence ATA 
permit - were in fact consistent with, and sought to give effect to, the legislative intent 
of the MMPA. The District Court of Colombia held that this was in fact a 
131 40 Fed. Reg. 56899 (1975). 
132 40 Fed. Reg. 41536 (1975). 
133 Ibid. 
134 Committee for Humane Legislation v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976) at 308 
(hereafter "Committee for Humane Legislation "). 
135 The plaintiffs were the Committee for Humane Legislation Inc and the Fund for the Animals. 
Among plaintiff interveners was the Environmental Defense Fund. 
136 Rich, B., "The Tuna -Porpoise Controversy" (1976) I Harvard Environmental Law Review 142. 
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misinterpretation because Representative Goodling's statement had been made in the 
context of the ZMRG, and was aimed at dispelling fears that this goal would be used 
to prohibit or restrict actions that would clearly not be to the disadvantage of the 
species.137 
The tuna industry also contended that consistent with NMFS regulations, its use of the 
best feasible technology to prevent harm to marine mammals justified their continued 
operation under the MMPA irrespective of the level of bycatch. The court again 
disputed their claim, and held that the use of best technology alone cannot justify 
actions that are inconsistent with the purpose of the MMPA, and hence, non 
compliance would not be excused!' In so doing the court in Committee for Humane 
Legislation Inc zy, Richardson found that the primary of the goal of the Act, was the 
protection of marine mammals, and that the commercial fishing industry may operate 
only where its activities are not incompatible with this goal.'39 Through an examination 
of Congressional intent judge Richey reached the conclusion that 
[tjhe MIMIPA does not direct the defendants to afford porpoise only that 
amount of protection which is consistent with the maintenance of a 
healthy tuna industry. The interests of the marine mammals come first 
under the statutory scheme, and the interests of the industry, important 
as they are, must be served only after protection of the animals is 
assured.'4o 
In finding for the plaintiff the court held that following the procedures of the MMPA 
was a necessary step in fulfilling the purpose of protecting marine mammals. The ATA 
permit had violated requirements of the MYIPA, in particular in relation to the 
'disadvantage' test'' and thus had distorted the general spirit of the Act.14' Hence the 
permit was declared "void as contrary to law ".14' 
Moreover the court held that NMFS's failure to determine the OSP before allocating a 
take permit, constituted a violation of the Act. The announcement that existing 
populations of two species of dolphin were stable was ruled insufficient and the 
defense on inadequate information as irrelevant. Thus the court ordered that NMFS 
publish reasonable estimates of existing populations levels of all porpoise species 
effected by proposed regulations, the OSP of each species, and the number and type of 
137 Committee for Humane Legislation. 
138 Ibid. See also Sauer (1993) op. cit. n77. 
139 Committee for llumane Legislation. 
140 Ibid at 309. 
141 MMPA, §1373(a) [s104(a)]. 
142 Committee for Humane legislation. 
143 Ibid at 313. 
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marine species authorised to be taken in each permit.144 In light of these findings the 
court awarded the declaratory relief the plaintiff had sought, and ordered that the 
incidental killing of dolphins stop, unless and until NMPS was able to determine that 
such killing was not to the disadvantage of the species and as was otherwise 
consistent with the requirements of the MMPA.15 This opinion however was stayed 
pending an appeal.14' 
Bureaucratic Response, Industry Pressure & the Need for Better 
Science 
Unsatisfied with the outcome in Committee for Humane Legislation Inc v. Richardson, the 
Department of Commerce as defendant took their case to the United States Court of 
Appeal for the District of Colombia Circuit. The previous determination was affirmed 
- the court of appeal concurred that the MMPA was to be administered for the 
benefit of marine mammals over and above all other interests.147 The court did make 
one concession though. Recognising the potential dire impacts that the revocation of 
the permit may have had for commercial fishers, the court granted a several month 
stay on the invalidation of the ATA permit.145 The expiry date was rescheduled for the 
first of January 1977, and thus the need for a new permit was deferred. 
One opinion holds that dolphins may have also benefited from the stay placed upon 
the District Court of Appeal's decision.t49 The suggestion stems from subsequent 
discussions in Congress regarding the need for amendments to the MMPA due to its 
narrow judicial interpretation.150 The court itself had directed the ATA that its 
concerns with regard to the impacts that direct compliance may have upon the 
industry, should be more appropriately directed to Congress for consideration, rather 
than the courts 151 The ATA complied, redirecting much of its attention to lobbying 
Congress. Thus, given the mood of the time and the Congressional stirrings that arose 
from the court's decision, the stay of the enforcement of the Committee for Humane 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Committee for Humane Legislation v Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976) at 1151 
(hereafter "Committee for Humane Legislation [I "). 
147 Ibid. 
148 bid. 
149 Rich (1976) op. cit. n136. 
150 Hearings on Oversight of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 and on H.R. 13865, A Bill 
to Amend the Marine Mammals Protection Act of 1972, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). There was 
however no question as to the accuracy of the court decision, and its interpretation of Congresses intent in 
the enactment of the statute. 
151 Committee for Humane Legislation II. 
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Legislation decision, may have averted a Congressional overreaction in the form of 
extensive reductions in the regulatory protection extended to dolphins. 
A more tenable benefit to dolphins was that, in order to gain the stay for the ATA, the 
NMFS was required to amend its regulations - in effect conceding that fixed bycatch 
quotas were required under the Act.152 This led to what Robert Hofman of the MMC 
described as one of the "most important things that has happened under the 
MMPA ".153 NMFS hosted a workshop in which the OSP was interpreted as a 
population level between 60% of the initial or maximum stock size and the total 
carrying capacity of the ecosystem.'' That is, the upper limit is the largest supportable 
population,15i and the bottom of the range is the population level which will result in 
the greatest net increase in population numbers or biomass!' This means that the 
maximum permissible take of a species is the amount that lies in between the current 
population and the minimum of the OSP range. 
Quantitative information collected between 1972 and 1976 from the NMFS's observer 
program on ETP purse -seine vessels, was analysed and this confirmed that previous 
estimates of dolphin mortality had been inflated.157 Revised estimates were that less 
than 100,000 individuals were taken each year: approximately one third of previous 
figures.158 Thus the ATA's 1976 permit placed a limit of 78,000 permissible dolphin 
mortalities upon the U.S. fleet (of 106 vesseLs).m 
Unexpectedly, this quota was reached by late October 1976160 and certificates of 
inclusion in the permit were to be rendered invalid as of 22 October 1976.161 Before the 
Secretary was able to declare a halt to tuna fishing operations for the remainder of the 
year the district court of San Diego issued a temporary restraining order that 
152 Ihid. 
153 Per. comm. Dr Robert Hofman, op. cit. n126. 
154 42 Fed Reg. 12,016 (1977). See also Gerrodette, T & DeMaster, D., "Quantitative Determination 
of Optimum Sustainable Population Level" (1990) 6 Marine Mammal Science 1. 
155 41 Fed. Reg. 55536 (1976). 
156 This is the maximum sustainable yield. For the purposes of the OSP though this term has been 
replace by the phrase maximum net population (MNP). 
157 NMFS' population surveys were used as estimates and from these populations sizes were 
calculated. "They then took the dolphin catch data and back calculated to what the historical population 
size would likely have been for each effected porpoise stock - thus giving them and indication of the 
status of the stocks." This information was then used to provide take levels. Per. comm. Robert Hofman, 
op. cit. 0126. 
158 Joseph (1994) op. cit. 28. 
159 41 Fed. Reg. 23,680 (1976). 
160 The filling of the quota was "due to unusually high heavy porpoise fishing" in September, see 41 
Fed. Reg. 45,569 (1976). 
161 Ibid. 
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precluded revocation of the general permit until the [then] ongoing litigation was 
resolved.' 
In an attempt to meet the statutory requirements of the Act and to estimate the 
populations of various species and the impact of yellowfin purse -seining operations on 
them, NMFS convened a workshop of scientists in late July 1976.1a These were to 
provide the basis for the 1977 NMFS dolphin bycatch regulations and a proposed 
dolphin quota of 29,920 individuals was released. At the time, given the available 
technology, this would have made fishing for tuna in association with dolphins 
virtually impossible for much of the season. The industry instead recommended a 
quota of 96,100 and the Environment Defense Fund (EDF) and MMC of 53,120 and 
50,158 respectively. 
Final regulations for 1977 were not ready by 1 January 1977, and the ATA sought a 
preliminary injunction on NMFS's halt of fishing order. This was granted, and fishing 
operations were recommenced. 
Meanwhile NMFS promulgated an interim regulation extending the existing permit so 
as to allow the bycatch of 10,000 dolphins over the first four months of 1977.1` This 
was one third of the NMFS proposed total quota for 1977. Following considerable 
procedural confusion the interim regulations were held invalid in a scathing decision by 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit.165 The court was critical of 
the lack of proper administrative arrangements. 
During the first few months of 1977, while this dispute was being contemplated in 
Washington, DC, and U.S. vessels were prohibited from fishing on dolphins, and 
though fishing on logs and schools was still permitted, a reported sum of $US64 
million dollars was lost from the U.S. economy.166 
The eventual assignment in March 1977 of a NMFS dolphin bycatch quota was a 
compromise between NMFS's original figure and the ATA's requested quota. It saw a 
reduction in the permissible dolphin take from the 1976 figure of 78,000 to 59,050 for 
the year of 1977.16' This figure allowed for the take of 43,000 offshore spotted dolphin 
and small numbers of other species. There was however no quota allocated for the 
162 41 Fed, Reg. 47,254 (1976). The final estimated dolphin bycatch for 1976 was 104,000. 
163 Reported in Andersen et al. (1978) op. cit. n130. 
164 42 Fed. Reg. 1034 (1977). 
165 Court of Appeals for the district of Colombia Circuit No. 76 -2168, (D.C. Cir. 3 February 1977). 
166 This figure is a combination of $US50 miIIion in direct revenue lost from U.S. vessels, and SUS 14 
million in expenditure of U.S. canneries to purchase foreign fleet catches. See San Diego Union, 22 May 
1977. 
167 42 Fed. Reg. 12015 (1977). The district court later approved the 59,000 dolphin bycatch quota. 
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eastern spinner dolphin nor five other species, and thus the setting of nets around 
these species was prohibited. This was of particular issue to fishers due to the 
difficulty they faced in identifying dolphin species and the degree of error involved in 
such identification. 
Responding in particular to NMFS's proposed zero quota for some species, the tuna 
fleet refused to sail. This action was motivated by the court's earlier advice to address 
its concerns directly to Congress, and aimed at raising both public and Congressional 
awareness of its plight. The ATA applied pressure to Members and Senators to amend 
the MMPA so as to set a permanent quota of allowable dolphin take at nearly 80,000. 
Its tactics were only partially successful: 
the American tuna fleet remained in port protesting the regulatory actions 
and attempting to pressure Congress into amending the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act. The House of Representative yielded to the pressure, 
passing a bill in June that would have legislatively fixed an annual quota 
of nearly 79,000 for 1977 and 1978. The Senate, however, refused to 
budge, and the industry's boycott of the fishery ended." 
Notwithstanding difficulty fishers still faced with regard to the zero quota species they 
recommenced their operations after receiving assurance by the Department of 
Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps that the agency would only take action against 
fishers who intentionally set their nets around zero quota species. Accidental takings 
of small numbers would not be penalised.169 In May NMFS officially adopted a 
"reasonable enforcement" policy to allow for the prohibited but unintentional take of 
some species. This policy provided that fishers must identify if there are prohibited 
species in a set by a certain point, and that if after this point in time these species are 
noted, then the set may continue regardless of their presence and the danger to them. 
The policy recognised not only the difficulties fishers faced in identifying species but 
also that once the net is deployed and the process of encircling dolphins and tuna is 
begun, that retrieval of the net in compliance with the set procedures (eg backdown 
etc) is less dangerous to dolphins than an attempt to retrieve an uncontrolled net part 
way through a set.170 This approach was thus condoned by the both the EDF and the 
MMC.'n 
168 Bean, M., The Evolution of National Wildlife Law (Praeger Scientific, New York, 1983) at 310. 
169 Reported in the San Diego Union, 28 April 1977. 
170 42 Fed. Reg. 64,548, 64,551 (1977). 
171 These organisations agreed that an annual take of 6500 eastern spinner dolphins, the first to have 
this policy applied to it, would still allow populations to increase (42 Fed. Reg. 22,575 (1977)). This 
policy was later also applied to rough toothed and Fraser's dolphins when the quota of these species was 
reached (42 Fed. Reg. 42,370, 58,195 (1977), 43 Fed. Reg. 9632 (1978)). 
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In response to fishers' actions NMFS also revised its gross quota. In August 1977 this 
was increased to a figure of 62,429. Although representing a reassessment of one of the 
species' population status,' it was also a reflection of the ATA's petitioning for an 
extended quota to 80,707.' Once again although not entirely successful the ATA 
gained some leeway and modification of the regulations. 
In the event only 24,143 dolphins were taken by U.S. vessels of register in the ETP in 
1977. Whether this was a result of the late commencement of the U.S. fleet and a 
general good fortune that tuna were not found in association with dolphin that season, 
or a substantial achievement by the industry motivated to find a solution to the 
problem of dolphin bycatch and thus reduce the pressure upon it, is a moot point.14 
NMFS, in an attempt to bring closure to the dispute and provide legally valid and 
stable quotas, staged an administrative hearing on proposed regulations for dolphin 
bycatch in tuna purse -seining operations from 1978 through 1980.15 Presiding Judge 
Vanderheyden interpreted the Act as calling for: 
1. urgency in the reduction of dolphin mortality, 
2. quotas based upon technical feasibility, and 
3. mandated use of the "most efficient fishing equipment and procedures. " "b 
Accordingly the Judge rejected the proposed ATA quota of between 78,000 and 81,000 
individuals, because the zero mortality test required a higher level of bycatch 
reduction, as was achievable through the use of superior equipment. In its subsequent 
decision regarding the ATA's ETP bycatch quota NMFS adopted the administrative 
law Judges recommendations, and similarly rejected the ATA's proposed quota 177 At 
the end of 1977, NNIFS allocated dolphin mortality quotas of 51,945, 41,610 and 
31,150 to the ATA for the years 1978 through 1980 respectively.18 In 1980 NMFS 
issued a new ATA permit and associated regulations, which allowed for the take of 
172 The white -belly spinner dolphin quota was increased form 7,840 to 11,219 a reflection of updated 
population estimates (42 Fed. Reg. 40,230 (1977)). 
173 This petition was based on increased estimates of the white -belly spinner as well as two other 
dolphin species (the eastern spinner and offshore spotted). The NMFS found the increase in estimates of 
these other two species to be insignificant. 
174 Hyde (1979) op. cit. n 124, argues that this drop was due to a concerted attempt by fishers to reduce 
the level of bycatch. 
175 Proposed Amendments to Regulations to Govern the Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to 
Commercial Fishing Operations for the Years 1978 through 1980, Recommended Decision, MMPAH 
No. 1 -1977 (NMFS, Department of Commerce, 4 November 1977) (Vanderheyden, F.W., 
Administrative Law Judge) (hereafter `Recommended Decision'). 
176 Ibid at 27. 
177 42 Fed. Reg. 64,548 (1977) (summarising Judge Vanderheyden's Recommended Decision). 
178 Ibid. 
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20,500 dolphins per annum between 1981 and 1985.1' This, like the 1977 quotas, was 
based on economic and technological feasibility, while ensuring that the permissible 
take would not be to the disadvantage of the population.1A0 By 1983 the annual 
dolphin bycatch was down to only 12,000 individuals per year.181 
Concluding Comments 
After nine years of dispute, a resolution to what has become known as the tuna - 
dolphin controversy seemed to have been found. Research soon demonstrated that 
adopting certain technologies could dramatically reduce dolphin bycatches. Thus 
NMFS's solution to the controversy was manifest in a policy position based upon a 
heavy reliance on technological innovation to make possible a viable tuna industry as 
well as achieving the mandated requirement of bycatch minimisation. To this end early 
regulations relied upon gear adaptations. 
The entry of the issue of dolphin bycatch onto the agenda was achieved through a 
series of events. It was initially catalysed by the raising of the issue onto the public and 
political agenda by a coalition of NGOs aided by a cooperative media. The public's 
staunch refusal to condone the bycatch of dolphins in tuna purse -seining operations in 
the ETP was instrumental in the passage of the MMPA of 1972. The strong public 
focus on individual species, in particular dolphins and seals, perhaps also explains 
why the Act was structured primarily at the species and population level, rather than 
focusing on habitat considerations as had been advocated by several leading scientists. 
Once on the agenda, policy formation was dominated by Congress, with all other 
players relegated to the position of stakeholder and external to the decision- making 
itself. Even before the hearings commenced and notwithstanding that a total of 40 bills 
stood before the committee on the matter of marine mammal protection, the chair of 
the House Subcommittee Mr Dingell had defined the debate in terms of two options, 
the Harris -Pryor Bill (H.R. 5664) and the Pelly -Anderson Bill (H.R. 10420).182 In the 
event, the latter prevailed and was passed in an amended version into law as the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. 
179 45 Fed. Reg. 72,178 (1980). 
180 45 Fed. Reg. 72,179 -180, 72,185 (1980). 
181 Edwards, E. and Perkins, P., 'Estimated Tuna Discards from Dolphin, School, and Log Sets in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, 1989- 1992" (1998) 96 Fishery Bulletin 210. 
182 Mr Dingell Chair of the House of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Sub -- Committee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation. Opening Speech at the Marine Mammal 
Hearings (1971) op nit n60. 
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As in several other cases the legislature provided only a policy goal, without the means 
with which to achieve this. Other than providing a two year exemption to the fishing 
industry Congress abrogated any policy direction on how to achieve the zero mortality 
goal it had championed. Even in this regard though the message was mixed. Although 
the MMPA called for the elimination of marine mammal bycatch, it has been said to 
ostensibly provide a means by which to regulate these incidental captures - that in 
effect, rather than limiting the amount of bycatch, a system which promoted permits 
for takings and provided for exemption from prosecution was established.me Indeed 
the scheme implemented by NMFS differed somewhat to that conceived and intended 
by Congress. 
NMFS's regulatory approach of sharply decreasing annual quotas has been analysed 
as a response to a combination of factors: 
1. a limited budget for the protection of marine mammals, 
2. pressure from the tuna industry to find technologically based solutions, and 
3. continuing pressure from NGOs for the imposition of lower take limits.' 
These multivariate influences affected the form of instrument NMFS selected, and the 
instrument selected perpetuated ongoing reassessment of the details of its application. 
The history of the implementation of the MMPA and of its regulations 
regarding the tuna industry reflects a periodic oscillation between strict 
regulation and an enforcement policy characterised by stays, 
postponements, and compromises. This oscillation has resulted from the 
battle between conservationists, advocating strict adherence to the 
MMPA, and the tuna industry, armed with economic policy arguments 
supported by the industry's money and influence.' 
Thus the long term impact of this was a continual process of policy re- formulation and 
re- implementation. It was in this process that the stakeholders once again assumed a 
central position. NGOs, agencies, industry - often action through the judiciary - 
featured prominently. Congress's only real input was to refuse to accede to the tuna 
industry's demands. It is however important to recall both that a refusal to act is a 
significant policy stance, and that this phase of reassessment provided only 
incremental changes to Congress's original policy. 
In response to the bureaucracy's attempts to alter the policy on tuna- purse -seining 
bycatch via its powers of enforcement and implementation, environmental NGOs 
assumed a role of watchdog. In this role they attempted to ensure that the enacted 
policy, that they had worked so hard to achieve, be implemented. And in the absence 
183 Alker (1996) op- cit. n59 at 536. 
184 Andersen et al. (1978) op. cit. n130. 
185 Hyde (1979) op. cit. n124 at 679-680. 
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of a clear indication to the contrary Congress's actions were legally interpreted as a 
prioritisation of bycatch minimisation over and above the industry's welfare. Thus 
legal opinion largely concurred with environmentalists' position; the court repeatedly 
found that the agency's implementation of the MMPA was inadequate. One author has 
suggested that the opinion of the court failed to take into account that Congress was 
convinced of the proximate development of a technological fix and hence did not 
anticipate an absolute choice between dolphin and the tuna fishery when the 
exemption expired.186 Progressing this thought there is an inherent implication that the 
courts have thus taken on a significant law and policy making role through their strict 
interpretation of the MMPA. 
With neither Congress nor the judiciary sufficiently sympathetic to their cause the 
industry lobby failed to achieve its aim of unaltered fishing practices. Though having 
no consistent allies, the ATA was not altogether unsuccessful. Significant concessions 
were gained by the industry in the Congressionally dominated policy formation stage, 
and from the regulatory agency during implementation. Indeed, the ATA managed for 
several years to stall the introduction of dolphin bycatch limits, buying the industry 
time for the development of dolphin bycatch reduction technology and techniques. 
Several high profile protests did little to further the industry's cause. Perhaps aware of 
the level of public concern, Congress refused to amend the Act. In combination with the 
courts' a strict interpretation of the MMPA, opponents to the zero mortality goal were 
left with scant avenues of protest. NMFS, tired of the conflict resolved to affect a 
solution. A combination of legal advice, scientific assessments and technological 
advances provided NMFS with the tools needed to lower the dolphin quota to a figure 
acceptable to NGO while still allowing for a viable U.S. tuna harvesting industry. 
3.5 The Internationalisation of the Tuna -Dolphin Controversy 
Foreign Fisheries Management under U.S. law 
The need for revised federal fisheries conservation and management legislation arose, 
in part, out of inadequate control over foreign fishing operations.'g' The combined 
186 Rich (1976) op. cit. n136. 
187 Miller, M.M., Hooker, P, and Fricke, P., "Impressions of Ocean Fisheries Management Under the 
Magnuson Act" (1990) 21 Ocean Development and International Law 263. In their sixth annual report 
the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) (established through the 
National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere Act 1971) expressed concerns over increasing 
international efforts to use and develop ocean resources, including those off the U.S. coast. Released just 
prior to the passage of the new legislation, found that the U.S. was 
continued over page 
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effects of growing product demand, advanced technology, and the decline of fish 
stocks in other parts of the world, had triggered an unprecedented catch effort in the 
waters adjoining the U.S.. By the mid 1970s it had become apparent that the 
patchwork of international treaties, voluntary agreements, and individual State laws 
governing fisheries was unable to prevent rampant overfishing. As a consequence, from 
1967 the catch rate of many target fish species began to plunge.188 
Following this trend, the participation of foreign fleets began to increase in the ETP 
tuna purse -seining fishery in the 1970s, and thus the problem of dolphin bycatch 
became an international one.189 NMFS estimated that, in 1975, more than one quarter 
of dolphins killed in the ETP were as a result of foreign fishing operations, and 
moreover that a substantial increase in foreign fleet involvement could be expected.190 
This expansion was not only an increase in participant nations, but also a geographical 
expansion in the area fished. Increasingly the main catch came from high seas waters, 
and as the market for the product began to expand, European and Latin American 
canneries emerged.191 
General concerns over the impact of foreign fleets on the catch productivity of U.S. 
interests led to moves to reduce foreign operations through the declaration of a 200nm 
Fisheries Conservation Zone (FCZ).192 Notwithstanding the presumed benefits of 
extended jurisdiction, the Congressionally driven creation of a 200nm FCZ came under 
strong criticism from both President Ford and the Department of State.193 Moreover, 
ill- prepared to address this challenge not because of a lack of appropriate ocean programs 
and authorities, but rather because the existing elements are sometimes in conflict with 
each other or are vague and because of a lack of mechanisms to integrate these authorities 
into an overall marine strategy (cited in Miller et al. (1990)). 
188 Reauthorisation of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976: Hearing 
on H.R. 2061 before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of 
the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) at 69. 
189 Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall, op, cit. n84. 
190 Hyde (1979) op. cit. n124. 
191 Hall, M., "Strategic Issues in Managing Fishery Bycatches ", in Solving Sycatch: Considerations 
for Today and Tomorrow, Alaska Sea Grant College Report No.96 -03 (University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 
1996) pp.29 -32. 
192 Regionally both Canada and the U.S. had expressed concern over stock decreases and ghost fishing 
in the Northwest Atlantic. Hanna, S., "Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act: 
Retrospect and Prospect" (1996) 9 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 211 at 21I. 
193 Senate Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the Fisheries 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, (Comm. Print 196) at 1094 -95, cited in Warner (1983) op. 
cit. n35 at 102. 
Internationally, negotiations for UNCLOS III had begun to consider the issue of extended coastal State 
jurisdiction. The instigation of a regime of 200nm Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) over which littoral 
nations exercised sovereign control was being pursued as a potential remedy to the inadequate 
management of the vast high seas living resources, and in this regard compromise solution was reached 
between the U.S.S.R. and the NATO countries including the U.S.. Combined, the U.S.'s acceptance of 
this trade -off, and the plethora of unilateral extensions of zones of exclusive jurisdiction made Congress's 
move to create a FCZ possible. Miles and Fluharty (1991) op. cit. n2 at 317. 
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there was considerable disagreement within the fishing industry with regard to the 
merit of extended U.S. jurisdiction. Although by expanding its territory many U.S. 
fishers benefited, there was also a real fear that current high seas operations would be 
severely curtailed. The U.S. distant water fleet faced the loss of a substantial amount 
of its fishing grounds if other nations were encouraged to follow suit with mirror 
declarations. Thus in hearings for the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act 
(FCMA), the ATA opposed the extension of jurisdiction on the ground that the U.S. 
would then not be able to protest similar action by other nations as it had done in the 
past.194 Although not achieving its desired result, the tuna lobby, and in particular 
those with distant water fishing interests, did manage to secure the protection of their 
interests.195 
Congress resolved the matter by denoting highly migratory species as exempt from 
federal fisheries provisions that applied to the more sentient species.196 This was done 
so as to ensure continued international management of tuna species, in particular in the 
coastal waters of foreign States where U.S. distant water fishers operated. The FCMA 
further reserved the right to not recognise the fishing zones of other nations where these 
coastal States fail to recognise that tuna species are to be managed by international 
fisheries agreements.19' 
Intended to avoid catch restriction on U.S. fishing rights this management structure 
stemmed from the 1940s Truman Fisheries Proclamation. This was not, as it has oft 
been portrayed, derived from a philosophical belief in the freedom of the high seas, but 
rather ensured that the rights of U.S. distant water fishers to harvest tuna off the coast 
of South America would not be impinged upon should these nations make similar 
declarations. As commented by Hollick, the situation on the South America continent 
was considerably different to that of the U.S.. 
The requisites of the fishing industries in other countries of the Western 
Hemisphere did not coincide with that of the United States. While U.S. 
tuna fishermen had operated off South American shores since the 1930's 
... most Latin American nations fished only off their own coasts. Thus 
they were not attracted to a declaration of national jurisdiction that 
194 August Felando, General Manager ATA expressed their opposition to the extension of U.S. 
jurisdiction before the appropriate House and Senate Committees in 1974. See Wolff, T., In Pursuit of 
Tuna (Arizona State University, Arizona, 1980) at 129. 
195 Wade, S., "A Proposal to Include Tunas in U.S. Fisheries Jurisdiction" (1986) 16 Ocean 
Development and International Law 255. 
196 Section 103 reads "The exclusive fishery management authority of the United states shall not 
include, nor shall it be constructed to extend to, highly migratory species of fish ". This unique definition 
of highly migratory species as tunas ignores other species such as billfish, so that these remain under 
unilateral management. Joseph, J. and Greenough, J. International Management of Tuna, Porpoise, and 
Billfish (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1979) at 178. 
197 FCMA, §1822, [s202]_ 
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provided for reciprocity in recognising the rights of established foreign 
fishermen off their shores.' 
Indeed in later years a similar sentiment was expressed in Congress itself. 
Congressman McCluskey before the House of Representatives remarked on the 
counterproductive nature of a tuna embargo and on its 
incredibly deleterious and dangerous impact upon our relationship with 
friendly nations who understandably resent what appears to them to be 
an arrogant and imperialistic policy, to wit: what is within our 200 -mile 
zone is ours but what is within your 200 -mile zone is ours, too, if it is 
tuna.' 
Broader issues than the total annual catch also required consideration though. These 
included concerns whether other nations were likely to establish exploitative and 
unsustainable management systems within their FCZs, and the broader ecological 
implications of such a move. In this way the exclusion of tuna from national 
jurisdiction represented a prioritising of catch maximisation over and above the 
reduction of bycatch which, had the U.S. claimed exclusive rights over all resources 
within its FCZ, could have been more effectively regulated as an issue of U.S. 
jurisdiction. 
In the event this was not of particular issue as the phasing out of foreign fishing in the 
U.S. FCZ was rapid and with regard to domestic vessels the MMPA largely filled these 
gaps. With mind to the issues of conservation Congress maintained the arrangement 
whereby domestic standards imposed under the MMPA applied to all U.S. harvesters 
on the high seas and all vessels operating in U.S. waters. 
Attempts to extend these provisions to foreign nations operating on the high seas were 
affected through two mechanisms. Firstly the MMPA required that negotiations be 
undertaken to encourage the development of an international convention. 
Congress has recognised that marine mammals are essentially an 
international resource, and thus require the protection of countries other 
than the United States. United States fishermen are primarily responsible 
for the porpoise mortality level; however the percentage of porpoise killed 
by United States fishermen is decreasing steadily as other countries 
increase their fishing activities in the eastern Pacific. Perceiving this 
situation, Congress included international cooperation as an essential 
element of its overall plan for the protection of marine mammals.206 
198 Rollick, A., "The Roots of U.S. Fisheries Policy" (1978) 5 Ocean Development and International 
Law 61 at 67. 
199 Cong. Rec. H839128 (11 March 1982). 
200 Gordon, M., "International Aspects of the Tuna -Porpoise Association Phenomenon: How Much 
Protection for Poseidon's Sacred Messengers ?" (1977) 7 California Western International Law Journal 
639 at 652. 
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Congress was convinced that rapid technological advancement would soon lead to the 
development of equipment that would allow for the elimination of dolphin bycatch in 
the ETP. It was hence keen that international arrangements be established to ensure the 
widespread implementation of this equipment. Moreover, as stated, Congress wished 
to ensure that the U.S. fleet would not be disadvantaged by having a higher 
technological burden placed upon it than upon its international competitors. Thus 
Congress directed the Department of State to negotiate with the aim of effecting 
voluntary international compliance with domestic U.S- bycatch reduction measures 201 
In case negotiations did not achieve the desired result, Congress also enacted section 
101(c). Hereunder the Secretary of Commerce was directed to 
prohibit the importing of fish caught outside the United States where fish 
were caught by techniques which the Secretary concludes are injurious to 
marine mammals. Fleets of tuna fishermen already catch tuna fish by 
catching porpoises in the process.... If foreign fleets elect to continue to 
catch tuna fish by these methods, this section will close the United States 
market to the tuna fish caught in this fashion." 
In July 1975 the U.S. sent inquiries to governments whose nationals fished for yellowfin 
tuna in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans 203 Based on the lack of information available 
the NMFS required that, as a condition of certified under the MMPA, nations provide 
detailed data on their incidental take to the U.S..' This information was to be 
collated so as to provide an indication of the impact of purse- seining fleets on dolphin 
populations. 
These provisions applied also to operation in the waters of the country in question. 
Thus before a foreign nation's tuna could be imported, the government of the exporting 
nation was required to certify that the tuna was not caught by methods prohibited in 
the U.S..' As of January 1975 NMFS had certified both Canada and Denmark as 
being in compliance with U.S. standards in regard to the take of marine mammals26 
201 MMPA, §1361(4), 1378, 1381(c), 1383 [s2(4), 109, 111(c), 113]. 
202 H.R. Rep. 92 -707, op. cit. n55 at 4156. 
203 41 Fed. Reg. 30,152, 30,160 (1976). Only five nations responded. Canada and Mexico both 
indicated that they used safety panels and backdown procedures, but that no research programs were 
underway. And the other three states (the Ivory Coast, Nicaragua and South Korea) responded that their 
vessels did not fish on dolphins. 
204 42 Fed. Reg. 12,015, 12,020 (1977). 
The only other studies that had been undertaken were (I) a 1974 IWC Subcommittee on Small Cetaceans 
review of the biological geographical and fisheries status of each of the smaller cetaceans; and (2) a FAO 
Advisory Committee on Marine Resource Research ad hoc group on small cetaceans and sirenians 1976 
Report entitled Mammals in the Sea which categorised four ETP dolphin species as in urgent need of 
population assessment. 
205 MMPA §1372 (c), [s101 (e)]- 
206 40 Fed. Reg. 819 (1975). 
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In 1976, when the U.S. district court invalidated NMFS's regulations, the importation 
of tuna caught in association with dolphins was, by implication, also prohibited 207 
Subsequently foreign vessels were subject to the same series of stays and allowances as 
were imposed on the U.S. fleet. When NMFS promulgated the 1977 regulations foreign 
fleets were provided with a three month period of grace so as to allow them to obtain 
the correct gear and for their governments to obtain certification. The effective date of 
these regulations, initially the first of June, was extended four times, and eventually 
became active more than six months later, on December 31.208 
This delay was justified as an attempt to prevent the interruption of the flow of tuna 
products into the U.S., and emphasized that in all States the modifications necessary 
to achieve certification were underway.209 Also of consideration in granting these 
postponements was the impact that banning tuna imports may have upon negotiations 
underway at the Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), where an 
international resolution for the bycatch of dolphins in ETP fisheries was being sought 
(discussed below) 210 It was anticipated that a resolution in this forum and compliance 
by participating nations would make them eligible for certification under U.S. law. 
By October 1978 more than a dozen nations had been certified under the MMPA 211 
When they [embargoes] were emplaced there was a lot of bitterness, and 
many of the nations believed the embargos to be protectionist actions. The 
perception of these nations was that they were not for dolphins, they 
were for the advantage of the U.S. vessels and industry.212 
The Inter -American Tropical Tuna Commission 
The subject matter of the MMPA clearly overlapped with the responsibilities of the 
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC).213 To recall, the U.S. had 
specifically excluded tunas from the management jurisdiction of the FCMA and hence 
under U.S. domestic laws it was considered a legitimate topic for international 
governance. Acknowledging IATTC (of which the majority of ETP States were at the 
207 41 Fed. Reg. 21,782 -21,783 (1976). 
208 42 Fed. Reg. 12, 015, 24,742, 39,394, 54,294 (1977). 
209 Canada, Ecuador, Mexico and the Netherlands Antilles were by and large in compliance with U.S. 
standards. Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Panama had indicated intent to comply and undertaken efforts to 
achieve conformance. Bermuda, Peru, Senegal, Spain and Venezuela's positions were still unclear (42 
Fed. Reg. 54, 294 (1977)). 
210 Hyde (1979) op. cit. n124. 
211 42 Fed. Reg. 56,617, 64,121 (1977), 43 Fed. Reg. 1093, 3566, 5521, 31,144, 36,263, 40,025 
(1978). 
212 Per. comm. Dr. Martin Hall op. cit. n84. 
213 The Inter -American Tropical Tuna Commission Convention, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (1949) (hereafter 
"IATTC"). 
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time members) as the appropriate forum for the multilateral consideration of issues 
concerning tuna, the MMPA directed the U.S. government to 
seek, through negotiations within the IATTC, the cooperation of other 
governments in reducing porpoise mortality to the maximum extent feasible.' 
The IATTC treaty had been entered into in 1949 between the Republic of Costa Rica 
and the United States. It was concluded around the same time as a U.S.- Mexican 
bilateral treaty.X15 Both agreements reflected the problems the U.S. was encountering 
with reduced access to distant water fisheries and vessel seizures off the South 
American coast.21' The ETP conventions were designed to manage expanding U.S. 
interests in tuna harvests. IATTC was specifically established to study tuna and tuna 
like species of the eastern Pacific and to provide advice and recommendations for the 
responsible exploitation of the resource. Whilst the Mexican treaty was never 
activated, the agreement with Costa Rica grew in regional influence and membership, 
and resulted in the establishment of IATTC." Subsequent to Mexico joining IATTC in 
1964 the Commission was designated as having jurisdiction over approximately 8 
million square miles of "Yellowfin Regulatory Area" where the bulk of purse -seining in 
the ETP occurred. 
Although the purpose of IATTC was to conduct studies on tuna and to make 
recommendations to member nations based upon these studies, by association the 
Commission had the scope to consider the incidental take of dolphins 218 Thus the U.S. 
sought to engage IATTC members in the goal of dolphin bycatch reduction. 
The U.S. Commissioners to the IATTC have sought such cooperation and 
have requested that the Commission initiate its own program aimed at 
reducing porpoise mortality. In response to these U.S. efforts, the 
Commission at its 1975 meeting in Washington D.C., instructed the 
Director of Investigations to prepare a report dealing with Ethel porpoise 
214 The Tuna -Porpoise Relationship and the Inter -American Tropical Tuna Commission (unpublished 
background paper, IATTC c/o Scripps Institute of Oceanography, La Jolla California, Prepared for the 
annual IATTC meeting in Managua, Nicaragua, 1976). 
215 Convention for the Establishment of an International Commission for the Scientific Investigation of 
Tuna, 99 TINTS 3 (1948). 
216 For example in September 1946 the Mexican coast guard ceased seized two U.S. vessels reported 
fishing illegally in Mexican waters. Further seizures of U.S. vessels occurred in the January and April of 
1947, and for several years following Mexico periodically seized U.S. fishing vessels which it claimed 
were illegally fishing in its waters. The impact of this upon the U.S. fishing industry is perhaps best 
reflected in the U.S. government's enactment of provisions whereby U.S. fishers would be compensated 
for any fines they faced under Mexican laws. Hollick (1978) op. cit. n198 at 62. 
217 Although the Mexican -U.S. bilateral agreement was not officially terminated until 1965. 
218 IATTC, Article lI, para 5. 
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mortality problem to be presented at its 1976 meeting in Managua, 
Nicaragua. 19 
At the 1976 IATTC meeting the Commission decided to adopt responsibility for the 
goal of minimising dolphin bycatch in addition to its extant and potentially conflicting 
responsibility for the maximising of tuna harvest. The Commission agreed on three 
objectives: 
maintaining a high level of tuna production; 
conserving dolphin stocks at levels that would assure the survival of each species; 
and 
avoiding needless or careless killing of dolphins!' 
At a special meeting in June 1977 IATTC reviewed this proposal and unanimously 
resolved to begin studying the tuna- dolphin association and its effects on the MSY of 
the target yellowfin tuna ' Subsequently, a program aimed at establishing the extent 
of dolphin bycatch, the impact of purse -seining operations on dolphin populations, 
and ways to reduce dolphin mortality, was formulated. The plan intended to: 
1. address the problem of dolphin mortality through the establishment of a dolphin 
management and protection program, and 
2. facilitate better decision -making via the collection of scientific data. 
To assist in the collection of data an observer program was initiated. Funds to 
implement this program did not become available until 1979 though, and consequently 
no non -U.S. vessel data exists prior to this date. 
The dolphin management and protection program was somewhat more contentious. It 
took ten years from 1976 for the initiative to gain the support of all IATTC countries. 
Conflict arose primarily due to unreconcilable stances of the South American nations 
who refused to recognise the U.S. position on tunas, and the U.S.'s domestic 
invalidation of their declarations of jurisdiction over all living resources in their waters. 
In 1977 Mexico and Costa Rica called a plenipotentiary conference to discuss the 
creation of a new regime over tuna management which recognised the preferential right 
of littoral states over all living resources including highly migratory species of tuna. The 
allocation of such rights, and the fee structure to be established were the two essential 
issues on which IATTC nations could not agree. The U.S tactic to amend rather than 
219 The Tuna -Porpoise Relationship and the Inter - American Tropical Tuna Commission (unpublished 
background paper, IATTC c/o Scripps Institute of Oceanography, La Jolla California, Prepared for the 
annual IATTC meeting in Managua, Nicaragua, 1976). 
220 See Summary Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the Inter - American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
Managua, Nicaragua, October 11 -14, 1976 ( IATTC, La Jolla, 1976). 
221 See Minutes for the 34th Meeting of the Inter - American Tropical Tuna Commission, La Jolla 
California, June 27 -29, 1977 (IATTC, La Jolla, 1977), Resolution at V app. Ref: 8274 -154 -160. 
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completely renegotiate the IATTC drew threats from the two initiating nations to 
withdraw entirely. Resignation becomes effective one year after it is tendered. In 1978 
Mexico withdrew and the following year Costa Rica followed suite, subsequent to 
which U.S. vessels fishing in the waters of these nations without permits were 
repeatedly seized by authorities 222 Tn response to Mexico's seizure of six of their tuna 
vessel the U.S. invoked the FCMA embargo provision. 
Tuna harvesting rights and quotas hence caused an apparently insurmountable 
impediment to the multilateral management of dolphin bycatch in the ETP. With 
import sanctions already in place the U.S. had little persuasive leverage available. 
Closure of the international issue of dolphin bycatch at this stage appeared to be 
reached. And without Mexican involvement the creation of a protective regime under 
the auspice of IATTC provided only a partial remedy. 
Concluding Comments 
A coupling of broad concerns over foreign overfishing, with a desire to re- establish 
conservation as a basic goal of U.S.'s fisheries management led to the enactment of a 
new federal fisheries statute. 
As well as providing for improved fisheries management the FCMA extended U.S. 
jurisdiction over living resources out to 200nm. This expansion although providing for 
an increased domestic fishing range, also had a very real potential to negatively impact 
upon U.S. distant water fleets. Thus tuna species were excluded - on the basis of 
their highly migratory nature - -- from the territorial claim. There is no doubt that this 
exclusion was aimed primarily at softening some of the effects of extended jurisdiction 
on U.S. distant water fishers. 
Still displaying a genuine recognition of the need for better controlled fisheries 
exploitation the U.S. also assumed increased influence over high seas fisheries. This 
was to be effected by a requirement to negotiate, and the imposition of trade sanctions 
on nations who did not conform with U.S. conservation standards. With dolphin 
bycatch firmly on the domestic agenda, moves towards the global cessation of such 
activities were seen as a necessary political and moral move. Moreover the U.S. had 
little choice but to try and appease their own fishers by leveling the playing field 
between them and their foreign competitors. Whilst unilateral responses to the 
international problem of dolphin bycatch in the ETP were never considered adequate 
to resolve the problem, the U.S.'s control of a large percentage of the yellowfin market 
222 Wade (1986) op. cit. n195. 
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did play a major role in encouraging other States to implement dolphin conservation 
programs. 
A preferred means by which to extend U.S. tuna purse -seine policy was through the 
creation of international standards. Negotiations with respect to the issue of tuna - 
dolphin bycatch were handled through an extant body - IATTC. IATTC accepted 
responsibility for the international management of dolphin bycatch in ETP tuna purse - 
seining operations. It did not however indicate any intention to impose quotas upon 
dolphin bycatch. And, although having made some headway, two issues plagued the 
development of effective bycatch policy within the IATTC framework. The first of 
these was the problem of insufficient information, and the second the influence of a 
controversial side issue. 
3.6 Endangered Species Legislation and Sea Turtle Protection 
The ESA and Bureaucratic Delays in Sea Turtle Listings 
A decline in sea turtle populations and increase in strandings along the Atlantic coast, 
was first widely recognised as a problem requiring policy attention in the early 
19708,223 Soon hereafter the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted and it became 
recognised as the "only protection against a complete loss of sea turtle in the United 
States ".224 Unlike many other species listed under the ESA, sea turtles however were 
part of a valuable commercial fishery 225 Thought the take was not thought to be high, 
even as recent as the early 1970s sea turtles were legally harvested in U.S. waters for 
their highly valued meat, shell and skins.n6 One method of capture was as bycatch to 
shrimp trawling operations. Once captured in a trawl net sea turtles are unable to 
surface. If the length of the tow time exceeds the turtle's 90 minute diving capacity then 
it will drown.'" While sea turtle populations were healthy and the shrimpers few and 
fishing effort low, the incidental capture of sea turtles and their commercial sale 
223 In addition in a to a decline in the population of sited turtles, there was an observed reduction in 
nesting populations and large numbers of dead, stranded sea turtles. Per. comm. Dr Jack Frazier, 
Research Associate, Conservation and Research Centre, Smithsonian. Institute, Virginia, e-mail 
communication 22 August 1999. 
224 Weber, M., Crouse, D., Irwin, R. and Iudicello, S., Delay and Denial: a Political History of Sea 
Turtles and Shrimp Fishing (Center for Marine Conservation, Washington DC, 1995) at 2. 
225 Ibid 
226 Witzell, W., "The Origin, Evolution, and Demise of the U.S. Sea Turtle Fisheries" (1994) 56 
Marine Fisheries Review 8. 
227 The figure of 90 minutes is a broad generalisation, dependent upon the species as well as the 
individual sea turtle. Per. comm. Dr Jack Frazier op. cit. n223. 
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caused little apparent concern.' However with the expansion and intensification of 
the industry and the decline of sea turtle populations along with a dramatic increase in 
strandings, the catch and bycatch of turtles in shrimp trawling operations became an 
issue of policy and political concern.' The issue, as in previous cases, was not only 
the reduction of turtle bycatch, but also how to do so while sustaining a viable shrimp 
fishery. 
The shrimp fishery has the highest product value of any U.S. fishery.ns There are about 
30,000 shrimpers nationwide most of whom are from the Gulf states from Texas to 
western Florida, and many times that number are employed in product processing and 
marketing.ns The industry is composed of a complex of fisheries extending from Cape 
Hatteras in North Carolina, to the Mexican boarder in the Gulf.2n2 Profiles indicate that 
the distribution is such that approximately 92 percent of the total effort occurs in the 
Gulf of Mexico.2 About one third of operations are nearshore, and two thirds 
offshore. Seaward distance of primary catch from the coastline is not uniform between 
states however. In Texas, Georgia and Florida more than 75 percent of shrimp landings 
come from waters more than 3 miles offshore?' The opposite situation prevails in 
Louisiana, North and South Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi (states that have 
extensive lagoons and shallow water areas) where 60 or so percent of the shrimp catch 
is in the 3 mile waters. 
During the 1970s it became clear that in order to achieve economic success in the 
shrimp fishery a drastic reduction in the effort, and the number of active vessels, was 
needed.su Moreover, increased fuel costs had resulted in a rise in the production costs. 
The exclusion of U.S. shrimpers from rich Mexican waters, virtually unused by the 
228 The depletion of sea turtle populations had been raised in some circles up to one hundred years 
earlier in regard to the over -exploitation of sea turtles in (for example) the Texas turtle fishery. See 
Witzell (1994) op. cit. n226. 
229 Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. n224. 
230 In 1986 a nationwide catch of more than 400 million pounds was valued at $ÚS663 million. More 
than three quarters of this came from the Gulf of Mexico and two thirds landed in Louisiana or Texas. 
Conner, D., "Turtles, Trawlers, and TEDs: What Happens when the Endangered Species Act Conflicts 
with Fishermen's Interests" (1987) 7 Water Log 3 at 4. 
231 Seven species of shrimp are harvested in the U.S.: brown shrimp, white shrimp, pink shrimp, 
seahobs, royal red shrimp, rock shrimp, and trachs. Each shrimp is taken by a distinct fishery , and 
several fisheries are differentiated according to fishing depth, seasonal landings, vessels and gear, fishing 
localities, fishing techniques, and other characteristics. (National Academy of Science (NA S), Decline of 
the Sea Turtle: Causes and Prevention (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1990). 
232 Before Mexico closed its EEZ to U.S. fishers, shrimpers from Florida and Texas regularly trawled 
in Mexican waters. 
233 NAS (1990) op. cit. n231. 
234 Conner (1987) op. cit. n230. 
235 Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Fishery Management Plan for the Shrimp Fishery of 
the Gulf of Mexico, United States Waters (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council, Tampa, 1981). 
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industrialised Mexican fleet, greatly reduced the resource base available to the U.S. 
fleet. And a decline in the demand for the U.S. product due to increased competition 
from cheap foreign imports had led to depressed prices 6 Around this time an influx 
of Vietnamese migrants into both the U.S. and the shrimp industry occurred. Instead of 
effort reduction, this resulted in increased effort in the fishery industry and greater 
pressure on shrimp resources.' By 1980 the situation had deteriorated such that the 
Secretary of Commerce declared the shrimp fishery to be in a critical situation.' 
It was through this period that the problem of shrimp -turtle bycatch was first raised 
and required redress. Government agencies - prodded by environmental NGOs - 
had identified the declining number of sea turtles and the link between this phenomena 
and the activity of shrimp trawls in the late 1960s. On 2 June 1970 the hawksbill and 
leatherback sea turtles were listed as endangered throughout their ranges, and in 
December the Kemp's Ridley sea turtle was similarly listed.' Listing occurred under 
the 1969 the Endangered Species Conservation Act,240 an amendment to the Endangered 
Species Preservation Act of 1966 241 This earlier Act had cleared the way for federal 
endangered species protection by legislating for Washington's involvement in 
conservation, a task previously considered to be a state function.242 In 1969 the 
Endangered Species Conservation Act recognised the global nature of the problem and 
amended the earlier Act so as to allow the listing of, and restriction of trade in, fauna 
species in danger of worldwide extinction.243 Neither Act provided for the 
comprehensive protection of listed species though. For example, the 1966 Act's policy 
236 Figures vary but all reports agree that there has been an escalation in the importation of foreign 
shrimp from the 1970s through the 1980s. One author reports that 48% of shrimp consumed in The US 
was imported in 1977 and by 1989 this had increased to 72% (Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. n224). An 
alternate source states that in 1980 31% of fresh shrimp sold in the US was imported. By 1989 this figure 
had risen to 72 %. Roberts, K., "Shrimp Imports ... Out of Control ?" (1990) 1 Commercial Fisherman 
9. 
237 Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. n224. From 8074 in 1970 to 13042 in 1986. 
238 Durrenberger, P., "Shrimpers and Turtles on the Gulf Coast: The Formation of Fisheries Policy in 
the United States" (1988) 1 Maritime Anthropological Studies 196. 
239 Green Turtle as listed on 13 October 1970 under 35 Fed. Reg. 16047 (1970); Hawksbill and 
Leatherback turtles listed on 2 June 1970 under 35 Fed. Red. 8495 (1970), The Kemp's ridley listed on 
2 December 1970 under 35 Fed. Reg. 18320 (1970). 
240 Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969 (Pub. L. No. 91 -135, 83 Stat, 275). 
241 Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966 (Pub. L. No. 89 -669, 80 Stat. 926). 
242 The limited nature of federal involvement had been confirmed in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 
(437 U.S. 153, n20 (1978)), predicated upon a 1896 Supreme Court decision, Geer v. Connecticut (161 
U.S. 519 (1896)). This had confirmed that a proprietary interest in wildlife was held by the states, and 
hence sanctified states' interests and relegated the federal government to a secondary role. The 1912 
Abbey Dodge decision (223 U.S. 166 (1912)) further restricted federal involvement, effectively outlawing 
it within state boundaries. In 1979, amidst the continual expansion in federal jurisdiction over a range of 
legal arenas, the Geer decision was finally overturned (Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979)). See 
Rosenberg, R., "Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened 
Species" (1980) 58 North Carolina Law Review 491). 
243 Little (1992) op. cit. n82. 
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to protect species threatened with extinction was hobbled by limitations such as the 
restriction of taking prohibitions to endangered species on federal lands. These 
statutes were however each an incremental step towards more comprehensive 
endangered species laws. 
Due to these short -comings a replacement statute, the Endangered Species Act, was 
formulated. It was intended to combine the domestic and international elements of 
enhanced endangered species protection under a single statute.244 The ESA was one of 
the last of the series of 1970s environmental legislation, having been set in motion just 
prior to the 1973 Arab Oil Crisis. It was enacted within a year of the MMPA, and 
prior to the escalation of the tuna- dolphin controversy. 
In enacting the ESA, Congress's ultimate purpose was the conservation of the nation's 
natural heritage for the enjoyment and benefit of current and future generations245. In a 
similar vein, on signing the Act, President Nixon declared that "nothing is more 
priceless and more worthy of preservation than the rich array of animal life with which 
our country has been blessed" 246 
The ESA 
reflects the findings that human activities are responsible for causing the 
extinction of many species of animals and plants, and are bringing many 
more to the brink of extinction. The Act was enacted to prevent or retard 
the number of extinctions from man-made causes 247 
When the 1973 Act was passed there was already a list of 392 species that had been 
compiled since its predecessor's 1966 enactment. Transitional provisions allowed that 
any species listed under the earlier Act would be designated as endangered under the 
ESA, pending republication of the list to conform with the two categories of 
endangered and threatened 24s Endangered, that is in danger of extinction through all or 
a significant portion of its range; and threatened which refers to those species that 
without protection are likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future. The listing 
of species as endangered under the ESA effectively outlawed their capture 249 Thus the 
take of those species of sea turtle that had been listed in 1970 was prohibited. 
244 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93 -205, 87 Stat. 884 (16 U.S.C. 1531). Such 
shortcomings included narrow eligibility for listings, the ESA broadened these so as to include plants 
and invertebrates. 
245 ESA, §1531(a) -(c), [s2(a) -(c)]. Aitchison, D., "Lucas and Endangered Species Protection" (1993) 27 
University of California 185. 
246 Presidential Statement on Signing S.1983 into Law, 10 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2 (28 December 
1973). 
247 Conner (1987) op. cit. n230 at 7. 
248 ESA, §1535(c)(3), [s6(c)(3)]. 
249 This occurred through their inclusion on the lists of threatened and endangered species. 
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A 90 day period was allowed for the lodging of responses to an initial nomination. If 
the nomination was successful then an internal agency review was to be undertaken, 
the results of which were published in the National Register within one year of the 
study's commencement. Final determination of whether a species was to be listed fell 
to either the Secretary of Commerce or Interior, and the decision was to be based upon 
the best available scientific information.' 
The MMPA was itself amended at the time of the ESA's enactment so as to provide 
that a population listed as threatened under the ESA, would automatically be 
considered "depleted" under the MMPA.u1 This had two effects. Firstly, as the 
threshold for classifying a population as depleted is usually considerably more than 
the threshold for classifying a population as threatened, it provided a mechanism 
whereby the depleted population provision of the MMPA could be invoked with a 
considerably lower burden than initially intended. Secondly, this linkage provided an 
indirect public means of nominating a species as depleted under the MMPA where 
none statutorily existed. 
The main difference between the two Acts however was that the MMPA offered 
immediate protection to all marine mammals, whereas those species found to require 
protection under the ESA had first to pass through a complex nomination and listing 
process. It was during this process that lengthy delays in turtle protection arose. For a 
species to warrant protection under the ESA a four stage procedure had to be 
completed. A proposed regulation had to be developed, then published in the Federal 
Register and following which it was subject to a period of public comment. A final 
regulation was required to be promulgated within one year of the initial proposed 
regulation, or else the regulation be withdrawn and evidence warranting its withdrawal 
published. If substantial disagreement on the accuracy or sufficiency of scientific data 
existed then an extension of up to six months was permitted. Thus, under the scheme 
of the ESA it should have taken a maximum of two years and nine months from 
nomination to the publishing of a final regulation for any species - in the cases of the 
green and the loggerhead sea turtles however, it took almost double this time. This 
delay can not be entirely attributed to the complexity of the process, but rather must 
also be explained by the interagency conflict that arose over, in particular, issues of 
jurisdiction. 
By the mid 1970s a number of environmental groups had joined together in a strong 
call to the government to address the dangers facing marine turtles." 2 This mobilisation 
250 The list of endangered and threatened species is published at 50 CFR §17.11. 
251 MMPA, §1362(1)(c), [s3(1)(c)], amended by Pub. L. 93 -205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973). 
252 Particularly activist was Milton Kaufman of the environmental group Fund for Animals. 
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and organisation had a significantly different impact to the previous segmented 
bemoaning of turtles' declining status. Heightened societal awareness assisted in the 
progression of the sea turtle issue onto the agenda. Resulting from this pressure, on 26 
December 1973 two additional species of sea turtle - the green and the loggerhead - 
were proposed for listing by the Department of the Interior.' Initially listing was to 
occur under the Endangered Species Protection Act.25s The ESA however was 
subsequently enacted and the proposed listing withdrawn, to be progressed through 
the new Act's provisions. Environmentalists cited the 1973 passage of the ESA as the 
perfect instrument with which to give effect to sea turtle protection. Accordingly, the 
Department of the Interior was petitioned in April 1974 to list the Green turtle as 
endangered and the loggerhead and Olive Ridley as threatened us What ensued was "a 
tale of interagency jurisdictional conflict, delay, negotiation and scientific debate."' 
It was not until four and a half years later, in 1978, that these species of sea turtles 
would be eventually listed for protection under the ESA. As has been suggested earlier, 
the delay was by and large due to a interagency conflict. The ESA had introduced a 
role for NMFS in endangered species protection.' This led to feuding between NMFS 
and the Fish and Wildlife Service. Discrepancies in preferred responses to the listing of 
species have been attributed to an outgrowth of the conflict between the agencies' 
organisational goals. Described simply, 
NMFS favoured exemptions from the taking prohibition for commercial 
mariculture and for incidental catch by commercial fishermen; FWS did 
not.u8 
In this regard, it has been suggested that the jurisdictional disputes were merely a 
"smoke screen" and that "the real dispute was over perceived economic impacts 
versus biological interests" u9 
In August 1974, less than a year after the enactment of the ESA, NMFS and FWS 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) outlining jurisdictional 
253 38 Fed. Reg. 35485 (1973). 
254 Ibid. 
255 Letter from F. Wayne King, New York Zoological Society, to Rogers Morton, Secretary of Interior, 
23 April 1974. 
256 Yaffee, S., Prohibitive Policy: Implementing the Federal Endangered Species Act (MIT Press, 
Cambridge, 1982) at 164. 
257 Perhaps a result of the perceived conflict of interest between the NMFS' s management of fisheries 
and their duty to conserve endangered species, Congress afforded the Secretary of Commerce only limited 
powers. The Secretary of Commerce was able to act unilaterally to increase the protective status of a 
species under the NMFS's jurisdiction, however to reduce a species' status from endangered to threatened 
or to delist a species the concurrence of the Secretary of Interior was required. 
258 Yaffee (1982) op. cit. n256 at 115. 
259 Per. comm. Dr Ken Dodd, Fish and Wildlife Service, e -mail communication 20 May 1999. 
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responsibilities under the new Act' The allocation of turtles was not stipulated, but 
marine /coastal resources were to be jointly managed by both NMFS and FWS. The 
lack of data was apparent, and two agencies jointly prepared a comprehensive 
biological study on the status of the nominated species of sea turtles 261 As a result of 
this study, in May 1975 a joint NMFS /FWS proposal for the listing of all three species 
of sea turtle was published.' 
NMFS was subsequently petitioned by the Sea Life Park in Hawaii to hold a public 
hearing on the proposed listings. Without consulting the FWS, NMFS decided to grant 
the request. Moreover and notwithstanding the joint biological study that had been 
undertaken, NMFS also decided to prepare a draft EIS. This was the first time NMFS 
had taken such a course of action and it was widely speculated that these were merely 
stalling tactics. 
Supporting such suggestions is the admission by the director of the office of NMFS's 
endangered species program, to difficulties caused by the agency's dual role. As well 
as the protection of sea turtles, NMFS was entrusted with the economic development 
of the shrimp trawl industry under the FCMA." He commented on NMFS's primary 
involvement with commercial fisheries, and conceded that the ESA was very difficult 
for it to implement264 In this regard the NMFS openly admitted a preference for the 
listing of species as threatened rather than endangered, based on the belief that they 
ought to be managed, not protected. 
The unilateral action of NMFS constituted a violation of the MOU, which included an 
agreement that all marine based actions would be collaborative. In response the 
director of FWS, Lynn Greenwalt, wrote to NMFS expressing its strong disagreement to 
any delay in the listing of sea turtle species. Moreover FWS considered the report to be 
a needless repetition as a comprehensive assessment had already been prepared.265 
NMFS went ahead and scheduled the hearing for December 3, some three months later. 
In the November NMFS postponed the hearing until February 25, 1976. Meanwhile 
260 "Regarding Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Listing Procedures under the Endangered Species 
Act of 1973" signed by FWS Director Lynn Greenwalt and NMFS Director Robert Schoning, 24 August 
1974. 
261 Per. comm. Chuck Oravetz, National Marine Fisheries Service, e -mail communication 10 June 
1999. 
262 40 Fed Reg. 21.974 (1975). 
263 Tucker, A., Robins, J. and McPhee. D., "Adopting Turtle Exclusion Devices in Australia and the 
United States: What are the Differences ín Technology Transfer, Promotion, and Acceptance?" (1997) 25 
Coastal Management 405. 
264 Yaffee (1982) op. cit. n256. 
265 Letter from by FWS Director Lynn Greenwalt to NMFS Director Robert Schoning, 18 August 
1975. 
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FINS sought legal advice on what action was available to it with respect to NMFS's 
breach of the MOU. As no dispute resolution provision had been included the agency 
was advised that any grievance would have to be resolved by a higher level authority. 
In February FNS received a copy of the draft EIS. The document stated that listing 
would have very little economic impact and that the species proposed were indeed 
threatened. This document was also presented to NMFS's public hearing, and 
participants were informed that a final action would occur by the first of June.'E6 
In the event, the draft regulations were not ready until the fall of 1976. These allocated 
most of the responsibility for sea turtle recovery to NMFS. Approved by FWS they 
were never to progress beyond draft stage however, as they were vetoed by the 
Depas intent of Interior. A lengthy negotiation period ensued and finally in July 1977 an 
MOU between the two departments regarding sea turtle protection was signed.267 This 
created a new regime whereby responsibility for sea turtle protection was distributed 
at the low water mark: NMFS having marine responsibilities and FWS terrestrial 
control. 
As mentioned briefly, shrimp trawling was not the only issue to create contention with 
regard to the listing of sea turtles under the ESA. NMFS was concerned to secure an 
exemption for Mariculture Ltd in the Cayman Islands so as to allow the importation 
and sale of 'farmed' turtles. FWS did not want the exemption. Though ultimately 
unsuccessful, Mariculture Ltd's efforts were moreover bolstered by considerable 
Congressional support.268 
Subsequent to this final MOU, the listing of sea turtles ought to have been a simple 
procedure. The question of the extent to which the turtles were under threat of 
extinction had yet to be resolved however. Similarly to the MMPA, the ESA had made 
it a crime to "take" any plant or animal listed as endangered.269 Threatened species 
were not subject to no -take provisions and thus a strict liability did not here apply. 
The ESA did authorise the Secretary to extend to threatened species the same 
protection offered to those listed as endangered though. As a consequence of NMFS 
266 Statement made he Paul Kiefer, attorney for NOAA Washington Office, as transcribed in "Sea 
Turtle Hearing Minutes" unpublished, 11 Febniary 1976 p82, cited in Yaffee (1982) at 116. 
267 "Memorandum of Understanding Defining the Roles of the U.S. Fisheries and Wildlife Service and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service in Joint Administration of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 as 
to Marine Turtles" signed by FWS Director Lynn Greenwalt and NMFS Director Robert Schoning, 18 
July 1977. 
268 Per. comm. Dr Ken Dodd op. cit. n259. Interestingly Missouri Senator Danforth who was strongly 
in favour of Mariculture's exemption was heir to the `Purina fortune'. Purina supplied the feed for 
Mariculture's operations. 
269 ESA, §1532(12), [s3(12)]. 
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concerns over the impact on mariculture and commercial trawling interests of assigning 
sea turtles the status of endangered, listing was once again delayed. In February 1978 
the EDF petitioned FWS and NMFS to list all three species as endangered." In the end 
the two populations of green turtles were listed as endangered and the Pacific Ridley 
and Loggerhead both as threatened.' 
By listing sea turtle species as threatened rather than endangered, the 
NMFS and FWS avoided the problem of incidental catch by commercial 
fishers. If the species had been listed as endangered (as petitioned), 
incidental catch would have been prohibited and serious problems would 
have arisen from enforcement and commercial fishing. The threatened 
classification for commercial fishermen out of the blanket prohibition. 
Further, while making a concession to the fishing industry, the 
classification allowed the agencies to prescribe _procedures to follow if a 
turtle was accidentally caught by the fishermen. 
A second protective provision operated regardless of the category assigned to the 
species. Section 7 of the Act placed a duty to conserve upon all federal agencies. 
Although not applying to non -federal actors, this provision ensured that any actions 
financed, authorised, or undertaken by the federal government would not jeopardise 
the continued existence of an endangered or threatened species. Agencies were required 
to consult with FWS /NMFS with who the primary responsibility for protecting 
threatened and endangered species lay. A "biological opinion' from the responsible 
agency that such a jeopardy was likely to exist would lead to the prohibition of the 
proposed activity. The courts have subsequently found that this "jeopardy" provision 
extended to an affirmative duty to recover endangered and threatened species by all 
possible methods' 
The weight of evidence 
By and Iarge due to the controversy over turtle exclusion devices, more than 20 years 
elapsed between the listing of turtle species and the full implementation of TED 
requirements. Initially it was unclear what degree of influence the various human 
impacts had upon sea turtle populations. Potential factors contributing to their 
declining numbers were: 
the loss of nesting sites to coastal development, 
activities associated with offshore energy projects, 
changes in climatic conditions, 
270 Letter form Michael Bean EDF to Junita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce and Cecil Andrus Secretary 
for the Interior, 28 February 1978. 
271 43 Fed. Reg. 32808 (1978) 
272 Yaffee (1982) op. cit. n256 at 89 -90. 
273 Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1976) at 170. 
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pollution and ingestion of marine debris, 
predation of eggs and hatchlings on nesting beaches, 
capture for human consumption, and 
incidental capture in fishing gear. 
In 1973 the shrimp fishing industry was identified in a study by Prichard and Marquez 
as the principal threat to the continued existence of Kemp's Ridley sea turtle 27 
Evidence of the negative impact of trawling upon sea turtles included: 
the rise in the proportion of dead and comatosed turtles hauled aboard in shrimp 
trawls when the tow time increased. This ranged from very few at 40 minutes, to 
where about 70% of sea turtles were unable to be revived at tow times of about 90 
minutes; 
witnessing of an increase in the number of stranded carcasses on the beaches when 
shrimp fisheries open in south Carolina and Texas, and a similar decrease at the 
close of seasons 275 Data suggests that 70 -80% of turtles stranded during these 
periods were caught and killed in shrimp trawls; and 
a decline in loggerhead turtle populations in areas of heavy trawling but 
maintenance of their numbers in other regions where trawling is rare or absent.276 
Shrimpers complained that evidence such as the relatively large numbers of sea turtles 
washed ashore from North Carolina to Texas during shrimping season was purely 
circumstantial, and this could be a result of a range of other factors such as water 
temperatures or increases in other seasonal Gulf activities. Research conducted in the 
1970s and early 1980s generated a impressive record of studies. These demonstrated a 
linkage between shrimp fishing and the depletion sea turtle species, and went so far as 
to attempt to quantify sea turtle bycatch.m Between 1979 and 1981, NMFS conducted 
its own studies into sea turtle bycatch and mortality. Trained fishery observers were 
placed onboard vessels in the Gulf of Mexico and Southern Atlantic region. A total of 
274 Pritchard P. and Marquez, M., Kemp's Ridley Turtle or Atlantic Ridley, Lepidochelys kempi, IUCN 
Monograph No. 2 Marine Turtle Series (IUCN, Washington DC, 1973). 
275 Sea turtle strandings increased stepwise by factors of 3.9 to 5. during closed and open season. 
276 NAS (1990) op. cit. n23I. 
277 Anonymous, Incidental Capture of Sea Turtles by Shrimp Fishermen in Florida (Preliminary 
Report of the Florida West Coast Survey, University of Florida Marine Advisory Program, 1976); 
Anonymous, Alabama Shrimp Fishermen Interviews for 1977 -1978 (Marine Resources Office, Alabama 
Cooperative Extension Service, 1977); Hillestad, H., Richardson, J. and Williamson, G., "Incidental 
Capture of Sea Turtles by Shrimp Trawlmen in Georgia" (1978) 32 Proceedings of the Annual 
Conference of the Southeast Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies 167; Rothmayr, C. and 
Henwood, T., Incidental Catch and Mortality Report: (Final Report to Southeast Fisheries Center, 
NMFS, Miami, 1982); and Urlich, G., Incidental Capture of Loggerhead Turtles by South Carolina 
Commercial Fisheries: (Report of the National Marine Fisheries Service, 1978). 
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26734 observer hours led to results of 16 to 1 chance of turtles being captured in the 
Southern Atlantic as compared to the Gulf of Mexico .m 
Precise quantification of trawling induced turtle mortality is difficult. Using observer 
data NMFS estimated that 47,973 sea turtles were captured annually in offshore 
shrimp trawling operations, and more than 11,179 died as a consequence of their 
capture ' Shrimpers dispute these figures. They claim that little over 12,000 turtles are 
captured each year and that of these only 572 die. Fishers continue to contend that 
American shrimpers, especially in the Gulf of Mexico, are only 
insignificant players in the demise of sea turtle populations. Sea turtles 
are only very rarely or incidentally caught by shrimp trawling efforts, and 
those few that do get caught are normally returned to the water alive. 28' 
Recovery Planning and TEDs: implementation requirements and 
industry defiance 
In 1978 - the same year as the remaining unlisted sea turtle species were officially 
recognised as needing protection - the ESA was amended. It provided that federal 
agencies may obtain an exemption for actions that jeopardised listed species, from an 
executive -level Endangered Species Committee tm The amendments were by and large a 
reflection of Congress's search for a compromise position between developers and 
conservationists. Exemption was based on a determination of whether the benefits of 
an action "clearly outweighed the benefits of alternative courses of action, consistent 
with conserving the species ", and whether "the action is of national or regional 
significance" tm These section 7 amendments were uniformly condemned by 
environmental NGOs. President Carter too was hesitant about the benefits of these 
provisions, and warned the Committee members to be "exceedingly cautious in 
considering exemptions" tm 
278 During 9943 observer hours in the south Atlantic 482 turtles were caught, compared with 16771 
observer hours in the Gulf of Mexico which resulted in the capture of only 52 turtles. 
279 Henwood, T. and Stuntz, W., "Analysis of Sea Turtle Captures and Mortalities During 
Commercial Shrimp Trawling" (1987) 85 Fishery Bulletin 813. 
280 National Fisherman (June 1987) at 15, cited in Durrenberger (1988) op. cit. n238. 
281 Mialjevich, T., "Sea Turtles and TEDs: A Misdirected and Counterproductive Effort to Save 
Turtles" (1987) 7 Water Log 28 at 29. 
282 These changes were largely motivated by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the ESA in Hill v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 549 F.2d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Herein 
the construction of a $100 million reservoir, today the Tellico Dam, was halted 80% complete when a 
previously unknown fish species, the snail darter, was discovered in the Little Tennessee River. The 
snail darter was included in the list of endangered species soon after passage of the ESA in 1973, and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority was consequently subject to the provision requiring federal agencies to avoid 
actions that jeopardise the continued existence of the species. In the 1978 a Supreme Court decision 
affirmed the 1977 injunction against Tellico. 
283 ESA, §1536(e)/(h), [s7(e) /(h)1_ 
284 Presidential Statement on Signing S.2899 into Law, L4 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2002 (10 
November 1978). 
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At the same time, and applauded by NGOs, was the introduction of recovery plans 
and the requirement that the Secretary designate critical habitats.' The concept of 
recovery planning had emerged and already become established as an agency process. 
At the 1978 Congressional hearings, prior to the amendments, Lynn Greenwalt of FWS 
gave evidence that 59 recovery teams had been established with responsibility for 
developing recovery plans for 73 priority species 286 At the urging of environmental 
groups, and with the support of FWS, this practice was changed from a discretionary 
arrangement to a mandated statutory process in what was essentially a Congressional 
ratification of an existing activity2' The amendment was significant not only because 
it provided the process greater legitimacy, but also because it facilitated the 
assignment of funding therefor. Moreover it required NMFS to also engage in this 
process. 
The original provision for recovery planning, as enacted in 1978, directed the Secretary 
to develop and implement plans for the conservation and survival of endangered and 
threatened species unless it was found that such action would not promote the 
conservation thereof.288 Recovery plans were intended essentially as a fallback 
measure; to be used when the existing section 7 and 9 provisions were insufficient to 
recover a species 289 In this regard they were intended to be used as tools by which 
conservation measures could be identified and initiated so as to improve a species' 
status 29° Considering they were designed to recover the more imperiled species, the 
plans suffered a serious shortcoming: they were implementation schedules rather than 
regulatory documents and, as such, were unenforceable291 
Regardless of this new action- forcing mechanism., when it came to confronting the 
problem of sea turtle bycatch, government agencies stalled292 They have been 
condemned by environmentalists for fostering short term thinking and actions in their 
prioritising of the maintenance of what was an overcapitalised and subsidised 
industry under threat from cheap imported shrimp, over and above the goal of turtle 
285 ESA, §1534, [s5]. 
286 Endangered Species Act Authorisation: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. (1978) (hereafter "ESA hearings (1978) "), statement of Lynn A. Greenwalt, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. 
287 Cheever, F., "The Road to Recovery: A New Way of Thinking About the Endangered Species Act" 
(1996) 23 Ecology Law Quarterly 1 at 35. 
288 F.SA, §1533(f)(1), [s4(í)(1)]. 
289 ESA hearings (1978) op. cit. n286, statement of Lynn A. Greenwalt, Fish and Wildlife Service, 
U.S. Department of the Interior. 
290 ESA, §1533(f)(1)(B)(i), [s4(f)(1)(B)(i)]. 
291 Cheever (1996) op. cit. n287. 
292 Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. n224, at 2. 
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bycatch reduction. Shrimpers on the other hand accused the government of "simple 
bureaucratic intransigence, inability to admit mistakes, and faulty TEL) testing 
techniques." 93 
It is a common observation that every party affected by a government 
regulation tends to think that the responsible agency unduly favours 
parties with opposing interests. On the TED issue, shrimpers predictably 
thought that the NMFS was overly sympathetic to the cause of the 
environmentalists. On the other hand, environmentalists thought that 
political pressure had inclined the agency to be too lenient with the 
shrimp industry. In circumstances like this where livelihoods compete 
with regulations protecting endangered species, a government regulation 
will be entirely satisfactory to no one, and the situation can become 
politically volatile ' 
The one issue that industry and environmental representatives united on was with 
respect to imported shrimp products. Both groups complained that the imposition of 
these regulations on the domestic fleet without a mirror arrangement in other shrimp 
harvesting nations was unacceptable. Environmentalists highlighted the inadequacy of 
protecting turtles in one jurisdiction when they were subject to incidental capture in 
another. Fishers were also concerned about a further reduction in their price 
competitiveness on the market given the extra production costs they were incurring. 
Irrespective of the protests of their main client group, the responsibility for remedying 
the decline in turtle populations fell largely to NMFS. As per the 1978 amendments it 
was required to construct a recovery plan for each listed species unless such would not 
further that species' protection. The preparation of a sea turtle recovery plan was 
assigned to a Marine Turtle Recovery Team. 
Various options for the reduction of turtle bycatch were available. These included the 
limiting of fishing effort during particular seasons or in certain areas, the closing of 
some fisheries, the modification of gear, or reduction of tow times, the establishment of 
a quota system such as exists in the ETP for dolphin bycatch, or to do nothing except 
require that fishers release and if possible revive captured turtles. The closing of the 
fishery clearly would have been a politically unpopular and hence unacceptable 
decision. The logistics and cost of establishing a quota arrangement resemblant to that 
of dolphin purse -seining bycatch prohibited that option. Thus the agency initially 
chose the latter option. The agency issued a Final EIS on sea turtle bycatch in 1978 and 
at this same time it distributed guidelines for the resuscitation and release of captured 
turtles' " 
293 Mialjevich (1987) op. cit. n281 at 30. 
294 Conner (1987) op. cit. n230 at 12. 
295 43 Fed. Reg. 32811 (1978). 
- 141 - 
Sali Jayne Bache 
The State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Shrimpers Association had argued against 
the closing of areas to avoid sea turtle bycatch, and urged that ESA funds instead be 
used for alternate gear research. In 1978 . NMFS in conjunction with the Sea Grant 
Extension Service (SGES) and the shrimping industry, launched a gear research 
program. The initial 3 year excluder trawl program was an attempt by NMFS to meet 
the requirements of the ESA with minimal negative impact on fishers 2 The intention 
was to design an apparatus for turtle exclusion that could be used in conjunction with 
existing trawl gear. In the event there was scant industry involvement in the process of 
designing and refining the TED. Funding for research came from the government and 
NMFS drove the process. 
Thus the incidental capture of sea turtles in trawl fisheries was initially attended by 
the search for a barrier device to prevent turtles from entering fishing gear.297 These 
barriers excluded approximately 75% of turtles, however catch loss was also high, 
averaging between 15 and 30 percent 298 As a consequence a second strategy was 
engaged: the modification of gear to allow turtles to escape through a release device. 
This proved to be a technical success.299 In 1980 experiments with the device were 
initiated based upon an adaptation of the 'cannonball shooter' a device which had 
been long used to prevent the collection of cannonball jellyfish and trash in trawl nets. 
These achieved a 97% turtle exclusion rate.300 Unlike some other conflicts between 
short term economic need and long term ecological health, a technological solution did 
present itself soon after the emergence of the problem. 
At a meeting in Charleston, South Carolina in 1980, NMFS unveiled a primitive version 
of the TED. The original TED was heavy and unwieldy, and in response to comments 
and complaints from a handful of shrimpers who volunteered to test the devices, 
changes were made. The device however held considerable promise. NGOs thus 
contained their push for immediate conservation measures, based upon assurances by 
NMFS that regulations to require the use of TEDs would soon be forthcoming. No 
regulations were promulgated though, and meanwhile NMFS officials theorised about 
the potential for voluntary adoption of the devices, if these were able to he made 
attractive enough to industry. 
296 Tucker et al. (1997) op. cit. n263. 
297 Several hundred thousands of dollars were spent in 1978 by the NMFS. The catch loss was 
however 15 -30 %. Margavio, A., Laska, S., Mason, J. and Forsyth, C., "Captives of Conflict: The TEDs 
Case" (1993) 6 Society and Natural Resources 273 -290. 
298 Ibid 
299 !hid at 1R0. 
300 43 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (1978). 
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Concluding Comments 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Congress, spurred on by the rising popularity of the 
environmental movement, enacted a series of endangered species statutes culminating 
with the ESA in 1973. In comparison to the MMPA's broad -ranging protection of all 
marine mammals, the ESA suffered criticism for its protection of species only once 
threatened with endangerment, and its complex listing process, known as a species 
approach. 
NGOs who first ignited the process were sure to have had no idea how long it would 
take to get three species of sea turtles listed. Continual postponements of the listing of 
sea turtles was due predominantly - though not exclusively - to NMFS action. 
Requirements to minimise turtle bycatch were thus also delayed. In this way the action 
of the bureaucracy entrusted with sea turtle protection in the water, was ultimately 
responsible for the retardation of this very process. Such a delay was naturally to the 
delight of much of its main stakeholder group, commercial fishers. This is not to say 
that the dispute between NMFS and FWS was manufactured in order to stall the 
process, the jurisdictional conflict itself was very real. 
Having played a significant role in the delay that occurred in offering turtles 
protection, once assured a leadership role NMFS demonstrated considerable initiative 
in formulating a workable solution to the conflicting goals of minimising sea turtle 
bycatch and maximising shrimp catches. This path was not to prove smooth though. 
Problems arose firstly out of the lack of certainty with regard to which human 
activities were to blame for the sea turtles' population demise. By the mid 1970s 
scientific opinion seemed to coalesce that the main cause of declining turtle 
populations was their incidental capture in shrimp nets. Fishers however refused to 
accept this, and instead maintained a position that they did not catch many turtles in 
their operations. 
In an attempt to find a balance between its duty to protect turtles and its commitment 
to the shrimping industry, NMFS took a research approach to its endangered species 
program. Having invested considerable time, money and energy into perfecting a turtle 
exclusion device NMFS presumed that the implementation would be simple, and 
instigated a voluntary scheme. The agency fully anticipated that TEDs would be seen 
to offer a range of benefits to shrimpers and thus be adopted in Gulf and Atlantic post 
haste - they believed that the controversial phase of turtle bycatch reduction had 
passed and that, having generated a workable compromise, the responsibility for the 
program's implementation would be none too onerous. 
- 143 - 
Sali Jayne Bache 
3.7 Concluding Comments for Chapter Three 
Much of the material discussed in this chapter lays the foundation for future action 
with respect to the development of U.S. bycatch reduction policies. Indeed in the 
1970s the broad issue of bycatch was not itself recognised as a conservation 
imperative: perhaps as is best evidenced in its absence from the National Standards 
for fisheries conservation promulgated under the FCMA. 
Nonetheless, several potential tools for the management of bycatch emerged in the 
early 1970s - in particular the MMPA and ESA, and the use of unilateral trade 
sanctions. These functioned on a fisheries and species specific basis; through them the 
incidental capture of dolphin and sea turtles in commercial fisheries operations was 
recognised as a problem and tackled accordingly. The cases are outlined below in 
terms of their influences with regard to the four factors outlined in Chapter Two, that 
is: the international influences, the impact of NGOs, the role of science, and domestic 
factors. 
International Influences 
The internationalisation of high seas fisheries management had not emerged as a 
widely accepted paradigm in the 1970s, and globalisation had yet to become a 
household phrase. The 1972 Stockholm Convention had powerfully endorsed the 
sovereign rights of nations, and distant water fishing fleets were as a rule subject only 
to the law of their flag State. Recognition had however occurred that the exploitation 
of resources on the high seas required some form of multilateral regime to ensure the 
sustainable use and equitable distribution thereof. 
The U.S.'s attempts to remedy the bycatch of marine turtles and dolphins although not 
driven by international pressure, were affected by the extent and location of fishing 
activities outside its jurisdiction - be that high seas or national waters. That is, the 
internationality of the issue influenced the domestic implementation of the goal of 
bycatch reduction within the U.S.. 
Both tuna purse -seiners and shrimp trawlers quickly perceived there to be an injustice 
in their being required to compete against foreign fishers who were not subject to the 
same rigorous controls as they were. In this way the domestic creation of a bycatch 
minimisation policy was hampered by the legitimate complaints of the industry. The 
purse -seining tuna fishery was largely a high seas activity though and thus the need for 
a remedy had been anticipated. At the inception of the MMPA Congress had . 
perceived dolphin bycatch as an international problem, and accordingly had included 
sanction provisions in the Act. At that time neither the FCMA nor the Polly 
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amendment were amenable to providing similar controls over shrimp imports, and the 
ESA had no embargo powers. 
Thus in relation to the need for equitable arrangements for the sale of the U.S. fleet's 
product, the tuna- dolphin issue was able to find a solution due to the internationality 
of the issue. This ultimately allowed U.S. tuna fishers to accept the dolphin bycatch 
provisions without the same perceived unfair disadvantage as shrimpers held due to 
cheap imported products. 
A related issue is the extension of U.S. provisions to those foreign fishers who also 
caused high levels of marine wildlife bycatch. Although the lack of parallel bycatch 
minimisation requirements in shrimp trawling nations would later emerge as a 
prominent issue, this was given scant regard to begin with. 
The international impact of turtle bycatch in shrimping operations was perceived to be 
more subtle than that of the dolphin issue due to the lack of co- location with U.S. and 
foreign fishers. The harvesting of shrimp was conducted almost exclusively in State 
waters. No international management or quota allocation arrangement preexisted. 
Thus the translation of sea turtle bycatch from a domestic issue to an international 
concern - notwithstanding turtle's highly migratory nature - was impeded by the 
issue's newness. 
In comparison, and once again due to its high seas nature, the need for international 
support to resolve the bycatch problem in the international purse -seining tuna fishery 
was immediately recognised. The issue area of multilateral tuna management was not 
restricted by the originality of the issue. Both the IWC and the FAO had raised the 
issue of small cetacean bycatch. Moreover there was no need for the creation of a new 
regime, but instead a multilateral forum for tuna related concerns already existed. 
What was needed however was the translation of this from a purely resource oriented 
allocation regime, to one that prescribed conservation measures also. Due to the link 
between dolphin bycatch and the practice of tuna fishing, these concerns were able to 
be tied closely to international fishing efforts and the IATTC regime. The issue linkage 
and the U.S. position as a hegemon was however insufficient to see the progression of 
this issue to conclusion. The failure was by and large due to the presence of a virulent 
side issue that of national marine jurisdiction and the allocation of natural resources. 
Dolphin bycatch was however better able to be minimised across the board, 
domestically and internationally, whereas sea turtle bycatch was tackled only on a 
domestic level and but a tentative conclusion was reached. It is worthwhile to note 
that, rather than providing an impetus to policy formation, the internationality of the 
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tuna -dolphin issue removed what would have otherwise been a barrier to the 
successful development of such policy. 
The Impact of NGOs 
NGOs were significant actors in the early phases of issue emergence in both dolphin 
and sea turtle protection. The two areas were however tackled quite differently. The 
main success of NGOs came in the creation of the legislation for dolphin bycatch, and 
instead for the listing of the species in relation to sea turtles. In both cases NGOs also 
influenced bycatch policy through the implementation of the MMPA and ESA's 
statutory requirements. Law suits proved to be effective as threats, and favorable 
judgements assisted in increasing the level of marine wildlife protection. 
The comparative level of public attention afforded to dolphins was much greater that 
that for sea turtles. Indeed Congressional awareness of the public's outrage over 
dolphin bycatch was a significant factor in both the initiation and the form of the 
MMPA. A sympathetic media aided in the conveyance of this to Washington. 
Congress was already aware of and sympathetic to the need for a revised and 
strengthened endangered species legislation - although not specifically mindful of its 
application to turtles. Once enacted this provided the perfect tool with which to effect 
sea turtle protection. 
The lack of broader community involvement in turtle bycatch reduction can be 
attributed to NGOs' recognition of an alternate, and more appropriate, means of 
progressing this cause. Thus the lack of public participation can be linked to a lack 
media attention being sought by NGOs. Indeed, having seen the success of the dolphin 
campaign there is little doubt that a similar level of involvement could have been 
achieved for sea turtles. Instead sea turtle protection was derived from statutory 
provisions based on scientific evidence. 
The Role of Science 
Although not a particular influence in the creation of international policy, science has 
played a significant role in domestic tuna- dolphin and turtle- shrimp controversies. 
Dolphins by virtue of being marine mammals and thus under the protective regime of 
the MMPA were offered instant protection regardless of their state of endangerment. 
Science was not needed to justify their protection. Thus the main stakeholder group the 
ATA did not argue the magnitude of dolphin bycatch. Fishers did however use the 
promise of science and technological development though to convince Congress to 
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grant them a two year stay on the prohibition of taking dolphins incidental to their 
operations. 
The court throughout the tuna- dolphin disputes has been critical of the lack of 
attention paid to the gathering of scientific data by the responsible department. Under 
the MMPA, NMFS was required to generate a range of data with regard to a species 
for which a take permit was granted. This was a legal requirement of the broad 
regulatory scheme with which the agency was entrusted. The purpose of such 
information was clear: to prevent the decline of the species to the status of depleted. 
Misjudgment and lack of scientific data in the early phases caused in some cases 
delays to the protection of dolphin species, and in other cases over reactions and 
tightly set quotas. Thus fishers were able propose their own data and in this way to 
use science as a means to gain small quota concessions from the regulatory agency. The 
introduction of the observer system and its dual role in data collection helped to 
provide more accurate information and hence improved decisions. 
Science has proven to be much more controversial in the turtle- shrimp dispute, largely 
because the protective regime of the ESA is only invoked if the species in question is 
found to be threatened or endangered. The Act placed a burden of proof initially on 
the nominator, who had to provide evidence of why a species required listing. 
Information provided was then to be evaluated by the agency and the need for 
protection reassessed. In the case of turtles the requirement for the early use of science 
acted, rather than to provide comprehensive data, instead to delay the protective 
process. It took more than four years to finally have the precarious status of the sea 
turtle recognised under the ESA. Although comprehensive information was not 
available, it was chiefly an unrelated reticence by one part of the bureaucracy that 
delayed the process of sea turtle listing. 
Industry stakeholders also used science to delay the protective process. Significant and 
ongoing controversy arose over the validity of the science generated, in terms of the 
level of turtle mortality and the causes of turtle fatality. Indeed few articles have been 
written that do not devote entire sections to the role of science in sea turtle protection. 
Many of these overstate the disadvantage which fishers were at due to the absence of 
scientists in their employ. To be sure some data was based upon flawed 
methodologies, but claims of bias aimed at both agency and NGO scientists were 
disproportionate to the actual occurrence of misinformation. Moreover, industry's lack 
of access to expert scientists was used successfully as a political weapon with which 
to gain policy concessions. 
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Domestic Factors 
In the domestic arena the issues of turtle and dolphin bycatch were tackled with vast 
differences and stunning similarities. The need for dolphin protection was addressed 
directly by Congress and legislated according to its specific policy desires. A different 
statutory approach was applied to sea turtle protection. The level of protection 
required was left to the bureaucracy to control and regulate, further Congress failed to 
even specify which agency was to be in control of this task. 
When controversy arose, though, Congress failed to significantly intervene or bring 
closure to either issue. In this way Congress's intention in these enactments was largely 
left up to bureaucratic design and judicial determination. 
With regard to tuna- dolphin bycatch, notwithstanding a clear Congressional mandate, 
when the anticipated scientific solution failed to eventuate the executive branch was 
hesitant to impose the statutory zero mortality goal upon its key stakeholder group. 
NMFS has had considerable impact upon the final shape of what were relatively well 
articulated Congressional edicts. 
In response to agency reinterpretation of legal protective requirements, NGOs have 
repeatedly called upon judicial intervention. The courts have largely offered strict 
interpretation of the statutes, often - but not exclusively - to the favour of 
environmentalists. 
Interagency conflict also impacted significantly upon the protection of sea turtles. A 
struggle for jurisdiction over these species on the part of both NMFS and FWS led to 
the frequent stalling of species' listing under the ESA. Although eventually resolved, 
this scenario demonstrates the importance of assigning specific jurisdiction to certain 
agencies for the administration of particular statutes. This is especially so when one 
agency could be seen to have a conflict of interest due to the promotion of a key 
stakeholder group opposed to the policy in question also falling within its bailiwick. 
In the event a conflict of interest was faced by NMFS in both the tuna- dolphin and the 
turtle- shrimp controversies. It was required to implement a policy that reduced the 
catch levels of an industry it had been mandated to maximise the harvest of. In both 
cases it chose to progress marine wildlife protection through technological investment 
and developments, thus reducing the impact upon fishers. In this way, the agency was 
instrumental in devising a compromise position between NGOs and fishers. 
In both situations regulations were initially met with Congressional lobbying, protests 
and strikes, and administrative coercion, all applied with varying degrees of success. 
Eventually a policy of cooperation prevailed in the ETP that was not achieved in the 
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Gulf and along the Atlantic coast. Gear modifications were quickly adopted by tuna 
fishers although lobbying for quota increases was ongoing. Conversely, when a 
technological solution became available to shrimpers, industry intransigence mixed 
with a genuine belief that the device would make their operations economically 
unviable prevented its adoption. The difference in approaches well illustrates the 
significant role that industry plays in bycatch policy development and implementation. 
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Chapter Four - 
Bycatch Policy in the Reagan/Bush Era 
(1980-1992) 
4.1 Introduction 
Several of the events of the 1970s contributed to the success of Ronald Reagan 's 1980 
election campaign, based in part on the policy of federal downsizing. What have been 
described as the halcyon days of the 1970s fell at the hands of political deceit 
culminating in a failed Presidency domestically; and internationally a loss of 
confidence in the supremacy of the U.S. due to the Arab oil embargo, the climb in 
interest rates, and the embarrassment of the Iran hostage crisis.' 
The [Reagan] campaign rhetoric of economic vitality, the virtues of free 
enterprise, a strong national defense, and a reduced role for the federal 
government became translated into policy with unusual speed and 
success. For ocean policy, this resulted in three major themes. First policy 
was determined primarily by the budget, not substantive definitions of 
public problems. Second, the scientific and technical ethos which 
dominated the ocean agencies was challenged by perspectives grounded 
in political ideology. Third, the consequence of these approaches to public 
policy was an increase in conflict at all levels of government.' 
In the event, the use of the budget as the primary tool for policy making proved highly 
successful. Major policy shifts were promoted by sharp reductions in, or elimination 
of, funds to specific projects. As a consequence of the open hostility of the White 
House to the oceans issue area, between 1983 and 1990 the U.S. lost its capacity to 
speak with one voice on the marine platform.' The conflict that emerged as 
representative of the Reagan era is well evidenced in relations between Congress and 
the Executive in terms of appropriations allocated to many oceans agencies and 
programs.' Another byproduct of this period was the undermining of the strong 
bipartisan consensus that had been adopted in the 1970s in relation to oceans policy.' 
Insofar as the bureaucracy is concerned the 1980s was a period of considerable job 
reduction and conflict. The test for appointment was political ideology, based upon 
1 Curlin, J., "Federalism and Ocean Policy - A Commentary" (1988) 20 Marine Technology Society 
Journal 3. 
2 King, L. and Jennings, F., The Executive and the Oceans: Three Decades of United States Marine 
Policy" (1990) 22 Marine Technology Society Journal 17 at 22. 
3 Miles, E. and Fluharty, D., "U.S. Interests in the North Pacific" (1991) 22 Ocean Development and 
International Law 315. 
4 Cicin -Sain, B., "Managing the Ocean Commons: U.S. Marine Programs in the Seventies and 
Eighties" (1982) 16 Marine Technology Society Journal 4. 
5 King and Jennings (1990) op. cit. n2. 
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the belief that such a commitment was synonymous with a high level of competence.' 
This impacted heavily upon existing members of the civil service who were loath to see 
appointees who appeared hostile to the very programs they were charged to manage. 
And as conflict between these groups rose, communications within and amongst 
agencies plummeted.' From this overarching position, the oceans community struggled 
to implement the concepts of environmental protection enacted in the more prosperous 
days of the 1970s. 
The development of oceans policy in the 1980s has been well characterised as a period 
of "consolidation, implementation and introspection".$ Indeed one author assesses the 
period in the following manner 
marine affairs was never on the platform of the Reagan administration, is 
not prominent on the agenda of the Bush administration. Nor does marine 
affairs today benefit from the leadership of a strong personality in 
Congress as the field did during the tenure of the late Senator Warren G 
Magnuson.' 
Notwithstanding this demise in leadership, Congress remained the primary advocate 
for oceans programs. 
Bycatch initiatives of this era were confined to the expansion and implementation of 
U.S policies abroad, through the use of both trade sanction and multilateral 
negotiation. The U.S. fishing effort grew far more rapidly than expected, with the result 
that by the end of 1989 there was no longer any directed foreign fishing in the U.S. 
zone.10 Rather than access to U.S. waters, conflicts arose over the entirely new issue of 
access to markets. Numerous foreign fleets relied heavily upon the U.S. market to sell 
their ocean produce, and thus the threat of trade sanctions became and increasingly 
useful means by which to influence other nations' domestic actions. 
Consolidation and fine tuning of existing legislation was the main feature domestically. 
This was overlaid by a resurgence in NGO involvement. In the late 1980s the 
6 "A Reporter at Large" The New Yorker, 16 March 1981. 
7 Davies, C., "Environmental Institutions and the Reagan administration" in Vig, N. and Kraft, M. 
Environmental Policy in the 1980s: Reagan's New Agenda (Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington 
DC, 1984) pp.143 -160. 
8 Curlin (1988) op. cit. nl at 3. 
9 Miller, M. and Broches, C., "Congress, Issue Networks and Marine Affairs" (1989) 17 Coastal 
Management 263 at 264 -5. 
10 Access controls to the FCZ were harnessed as a means to stimulate joint ventures between U.S. and 
foreign fleets, thus building America's domestic effort. By 1987 U.S. vessels accounted for more than 90 
percent of the catch in the U.S. zone. Joint ventures began to decline in 1988. In 1989 the U.S. enacted 
legislation prohibiting the fishing of U.S. waters by foreign vessels, except where there is an excess catch 
not allocated to a U.S. harvester. Per. comm. Eugene Buck, Environment and Natural Resources Section, 
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 23 March 1999. 
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environmental coalition escalated its campaigns and made a concerted attempt to 
reduce the incidental catch of marine mammals. A hostile executive stimulated an 
increase in the use of the courts and public pressure via the market as a means for 
influencing bycatch policy action. The Reagan administration's attacks on the 
environment had acted to stimulate NGO membership, along with James Watt's 
alleged mis- stewardship of the nation's resources as Reagan s first Secretary of 
Interior.11 Further, any concern that the environmental movement would follow the 
classic social movement scenario of a rapid demise after a period of popularity, was 
negated. 
The fiscal austerity of the 1980s and political forces aimed at reducing the size and 
presence of the federal government led also to a "quiet revolution" among the states, 
where renewed vigor in their programs emerged to fill the vacuum created by federal 
downsizings.12 Indeed at times the state of Alaska seemed almost in sole control of 
U.S. fisheries policy. 
It is fair to say that between 1983 and 1991 the Department of State and 
the NMFS were in an advanced stage of disarray, that the federal 
government had largely abdicated its management responsibilities, and 
that the initiative on fisheries issues in the North Pacific for the U.S. had 
passed to the state of Alaska, led by Senator Ted Stevens? 
4.2 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
UNCLOS III negotiations began in 1974 and concluded in 1982 at which time the 
Convention opened for signatures, requiring the endorsement of 60 nations so as to 
become active. U.S. objectives at the beginning were varied, and included the 
stabilisation of international oceans law, the protection of free navigation, the 
establishment of clear ownership of the resources out to 200nm, and the creation of a 
deep seabed minerals regime based upon free market principles. 
In terms of fishing rights, the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) extended coastal 
State jurisdiction to 200nm and circumscribed freedom of fishing on the high seas. It 
gave coastal States the sovereign tight to exploit, explore, conserve and manage living 
11 Between 1980 and 1983 the Wilderness Society grew by 144 %, the Siena Club by 90% and 
Defenders of Wildlife and the Friends of the Earth by about 40% each (Mitchell, R., Mertig, A. and 
Dunlap, R., Twenty Years of Environmental Mobilisation: Trends among National Environmental 
Organisations" (1991) 4 Society and Natural Resources 219). 
12 Curlin (1988) op. cit. nI. Hershman suggests that there has been an increase in the role of the states 
in the formation of ocean policy since the 1983 declaration of art EEZ in five key policy areas of coastal 
zone management, oil pollution control, oil and gas development, marine mammals, and fisheries. 
Hershman, M., "Ocean Management Policy Development in Subnational Units of Government: 
Examples from the United States" (1996) 32 Ocean & Coastal Management 25. 
13 Miles and Fluharty (199I) op. cit. n3 at 316. 
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and non -living resources of the seabed and subsoil of super adjacent waters as an 
essentially non third party reviewable right.14 The LOSC then required that coastal 
States "use it or lose ìt "; that is they must utilise the resources within their zones or 
else allocate quotas to other nations based upon principles of equity for 
disadvantaged States or prior usage claimants. With respect to conservation aspects, 
concomitant to the right of exploitation a responsibility to ensure the maintenance of 
marine living- resources - that is a duty of conservation - was created, along with a 
requirement that in so doing the best available scientific evidence be taken into 
account's 
The 1982 LOSC addressed bycatch conservation through the consideration of both 
"dependant" and "associated species ". In Article 119(3) States are enjoined to take 
into consideration effects of harvesting a target stock upon associated and dependant 
species, with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such species above 
levels at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened. This injunction 
required nations to assess effects of fishing on such species using the best scientific 
evidence available, and where data suggested that fishing operations may impact upon 
a species such that its reproductive abundance level would become severely threatened 
or depleted, the dependant or associated species and impact should be considered in 
management decisions. 
Though the LOSC recognised the predominant interest of coastal States in straddling 
stock beyond their EEZ, it failed to adequately resolve the issue of the management 
and ownership of these stocks.16 The treaty stipulated that coastal nations and 
relevant DWFNs shall seek to agree on conservation measures applicable beyond the 
EEZ through either direct negotiations or via a regional authority." Importantly 
however nothing in the LOSC authorised one nation to take action on the high seas to 
enforce a conservation obligation of another fishing State.18 Possible instrumentalities 
remain, as before the Convention, in diplomatic actions, domestic remedies and 
international sanctions. Moreover, no punishment was to be inflicted upon States that 
fail to reach agreements. Similar shortcomings plagued the management of highly 
migratory species. These include: 
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (hereafter "LOSC"), 
Articles 60(a), 297(3). 
15 Ibid, Article 61. For discussion see Tsamenyi, M. and Aqorau, T., "Fishing Rights and 
Responsibilities at Sea: Analysis of Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea" in Tsamenyi, M. and Ilerriman, M., Rights and Responsibilities in the Maritime Environment: 
National and International Dilemmas (University of Wollongong, Wollongong, 1996) pp.67 -81. 
16 !bid, Article 116. 
17 Ibid, Articles 63, 117 -119. 
18 Panel on the l.aw of Ocean Uses, "U.S. Interests and the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea" (1990) 21 Ocean Development and International Law 373. 
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a absence of binding dispute resolution; 
a lack of compatibility between domestic and international management measures; 
inconsistencies in management throughout the range of the fish; 
insufficient monitoring for compliance, enforcement and reduction of effort; 
the insertion of politics; and 
scientific concerns over the method of setting the allowable catches and the 
consequential potential for over exploitation. 
At the conclusion of negotiations President Reagan announced that the U.S. had a 
range of perceived problems with the deep seabed mining regime.19 President Reagan s 
refusal to sign the new Convention also reflected the Executive branch's desire for a 
retreat from the U.S.'s previously prominent position with regard to international 
marine activities. 
Simultaneously to rejecting the LOSC based on the narrow issue of sea bed mining 
rights, President Reagan issued a proclamation with respect to the creation of a U.S. 
EEZ to replace the existing FCZ.2° Notwithstanding his refusal to sign, Reagan declared 
the U.S. would act in accordance with the Convention (with the exception of the deep 
seabed mining regime) and expected other nations to follow suite.21 This move was 
seen more as a gesture of commitment to a free enterprise system than as a policy of 
any real substance.' 
The Presidential statement was careful to iterate that the establishment of an EEZ did 
not alter U.S. fisheries policy, and that the U.S. did not exercise jurisdiction over 
"highly migratory species of tuna" maintaining these must be managed by international 
agreements. As well as its relevance in the ETP this was significant for South Pacific 
nations, where the U.S had carried out tuna purse -seining operations since 1976, and 
which had rapidly expanded in the early 1980s. ° The LOSC legitimised the creation 
of the South Pacific nation's EEZs and in accordance with the Convention they 
19 Statement of the President, 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 887 (9 July 1982). These included the 
lack of reflection of "interests" in the decision -making process, the requirement for technology transfer, 
and the absence of assurance provisions so as to promote to development of these resources. Several years 
after the United States' and several other major western Nations' refusal to sign the LOSC the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations initiated a series of informal consultation. These ongoing negotiations have 
had a significant impact upon other issues being debated at the same time. 
20 A Proclamation by the President: Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States (10 March 1983), 
reprinted in "Presidents Statement on United States Oceans Policy" (1983) 1 Public Papers 378. 48 
Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983). 
21 The U.S. President contended that these assertions were valid as the tenor of the LOSC generally 
conformed to existing international practice. 
22 King and Jennings (1990) op. cit. n2. 
23 Herrick, S., Rader, B. and Squires, D., "Access Fees and Economic Benefits in the Western Pacific 
United States Purse Seine Tuna Fishery" (1997) 21 Marine Policy 83. 
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claimed jurisdiction over the tuna within their zones. Such declarations were at odds 
with U.S. policy regarding tuna. In September 1984 this problem was resolved through 
the formation of a treaty between the US and South Pacific?' 
4.3 Catch & Bycatch in Long Pelagic Driftnets 
- An International Issue 
U.S. Interests in North Pacific Driftnetting 
North Pacific high seas driftnetting operations have been conducted by South Korean, 
Taiwanese and Japanese fleets targeting salmon, squid, tuna and shark u Although 
many of these operations have a long history, the origin of large scale contemporary 
driftnetting in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea can be traced back to only 1979, 
when Japanese, Taiwanese and South Korean fishers launched their neon flying squid 
driftnet fishing operations. Since this time North Pacific driftnet fishing operations and 
the targeting by DWFNs of U.S. spawned salmon has troubled relations between these 
countries26 
Insofar as these operations were concerned the only fishery that operated under the 
auspice of an international convention was the Japanese salmon fleet. In May 1952 
Canada, the U.S. and Japan entered into a consensus based, international convention 
concerning Japanese high seas driftnet fisheries operations in the North Pacific Ocean.Z' 
The North Pacific Fisheries Convention (NPFC) became active in 1953 and was 
implemented by the U.S. through the North Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954.28 The NPFC 
was established to conserve fish resources, especially salmon, by regulating the 
Japanese high seas mothership and land -based salmon driftnet fisheries.' To this end 
24 The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States, 26 I.L.M.136 (1987). 
25 Per. comm. Dr Robert Hofuran, Scientific Program Director, Marine Mammal Commission, 
Washington DC,15 April 1999. 
26 Because salmon originate from and spawn within national boundaries, but migrate to the high seas 
over their life cycle, the international legal regimes to ascribe harvesting rights have proven difficult to 
enforce. Sumi, K., "The International Legal Issues Concerning the Use of Drift Nets, with Special 
Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses ", in VanDyke, J., Zaelke, D. and Hewison, G. (ed), 
Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century - Ocean Governance and Environmental Harmony (Greenpeace 
Inc., Washington DC, 1993) pp.292 -309. 
27 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, 25 U.N.T.S. 65. 
(1952) (hereafter "North Pacific Fisheries Convention" or "NPFC"). 
28 With the 1951 signing of the Peace Treaty, Japan was restored its sovereignty and a new phase of 
U.S. -Japan fishing relations was entered into. The Peace Treaty required Japan to 
enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion 
of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of 
fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas (136 
U.N.T.S. 45 (1951)). 
29 Eisenbud, R., "Problems and Prospects for the Pelagic Driftnet" (1985) 12 Environmental Affairs 
473. 
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it specified an eastern boundary, and imposed time and effort restrictions upon 
Japanese high seas salmon driftnet operations in the North Pacific. 
Like the IATTC convention discussed in Chapter Three, the NPFC promoted and 
coordinated scientific studies relating to fish resources. It established the International 
North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC), which was charged with the task of data 
analysis and the recommendation of amendments to the Convention. 
In 1972 U.S.- Japanese agreement prohibiting the take of certain sea birds was created. 
Serious domestic attention had been given to the decline of species of migratory birds.30 
National efforts were however seen as superflourious unless coordinated between 
other nations into whose jurisdiction the birds venture. Hence and quite separate to 
NPFC though also on a regional basis, the impact of driftnet fishing on sea birds had 
been tackled. The Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in 
Danger of Extinction and Their Environment treaty was the first to overtly recognise 
the recreational, aesthetic, scientific and economic value of seabirds 31 Hundreds of 
thousands of birds are incidentally killed in the driftnet fisheries of the North Pacific 
Ocean. 32 Sixteen species of seabirds were incidentally captured by the Japanese 
Salmon motherfleet, thirteen of which were listed in an annex to a U.S. -Japan 
agreement. The Convention required that listed seabirds be maintained at optimum 
numbers, a similar concept to that of the OSP in the MMPA. 
In the U.S., these Conventions are implemented via the Migratory Bird Treaty Act 
(MBTA)33 and administered by the Department of Interior under the portfolio of the 
FWS. Legal advice from the Assistant Solicitor of the FWS however suggested that the 
incidental take of listed migratory seabirds by non -U.S. citizens, whilst constituting an 
offence under U.S. law, can only be prosecuted if occurring within the territorial 
waters 3' This advice was based primarily upon the absence of clear Congressional 
30 Migratory birds were first afforded statutory consideration at the turn of the century, see Protection 
of Migratory Game and Insectivorous Birds Act of 1900, 31 Stat. 187. 
31 Convention Between United States and Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in 
Danger of Extinction, and their Environment, U.S. -Jap. 25 U.S.T. 3329 (1972) (hereafter "Migratory 
Bird Treaty "). 
32 Data from the early 1970s had suggested that over 500,000 diving seabirds ere taken each year, 
severely exceeding the recruitment rate. Eisenbud (1985) op. cit. n29, at 477. 
33 Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 775 (hereafter "MBTA "). 
The U.S. had concluded earlier agreements with Canada (Convention Between the United States and 
Great Britain (For Dominion of Canada) for the Protection of Migratory Birds in the United States and 
Canada, U.S. -Gr. Brit. (1916)) and Mexico (Convention Between the United States of America and the 
United Mexican States for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals (1936)). 
34 Memorandum of 11 December 1980 from the Assistant Solicitor of the FWS to the Chief, Division 
of Law Enforcement, concerning extraterritorial application of section 2 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act; 
Memorandum of 27 March 1981, from Assistant Solicitor FWS, to Office of Migratory Bird Management 
concerning U.S.- Japan Migratory Bird Treaty. 
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statement of extraterritorial application of the Act n Thus and notwithstanding the 
presence of the treaty, no active efforts to ensure its enforcement were undertaken by 
Department of Interior. 
In 1976, a Protocol was added to the NPFC to reflect the establishment of the U.S. 
200nm FCZ.36 Although the Protocol reduced the total area in which Japanese salmon 
fishers could operate, it granted to the Japanese limited rights to fish within the newly 
claimed U.S. waters. Operations were excluded from Bristol Bay area and focused 
around the west coast of Alaska where the primary competition for resources was 
from indigenous Alaskan fishers" The addendum moreover provided that until June 
1981 the Japanese mothership salmon fleet would remain exempt from the 
requirements of the MMPA, which would otherwise have prohibited the incidental take 
of marine mammals within U.S. waters and thus caused the cessation of driftnet 
fishing operations. During this intervening five year period both nations were directed 
to (1) conduct research into the impact of fishing on marine mammal populations and 
(2) seek to reduce or eliminate the bycatch thereof.38 The North Pacific Fisheries Act was 
amended to implement these provisions.39 
In 1978 the INPFC began to assume responsibilities for reducing the incidental take of 
non -target species through its creation of an ad hoc Committee on Marine Mammals. 
Three years later the U.S. and Japan signed an MOU calling for research into the take 
of dall's porpoises. Also in 1981, under the auspice of the MMPA, NMFS promulgated 
regulations for a five year permit for the Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries 
Cooperative Association. This allowed for the continued take within the U.S. FCZ of a 
variety of marine mammals incidental to driftnetting operations.40 
Around this time however high seas squid driftnet operations began a rapid 
expansion. By 1981 the Japanese fleet numbered 534 vessels, and a fleet of 180 
Taiwanese and Korean flag vessels had commenced operations. Two issues arose out 
of this rapid expansion of North Pacific driftnet operations. Firstly Korean and 
35 MBTA, §703, [sll. 
36 Notwithstanding the expansion of U.S. jurisdiction, the MBTA was not extended beyond 12nm. 
37 Per. comm. Rod Moore, Executive Director, West Coast Seafood Processors Association, Portland 
(OR), 31 March 1999. 
38 North Pacific Fisheries Convention, Annex, para. (1)(c). 
39 North Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954, 68 Stat 698. 
40 The take of 5500 Dall's Porpoises, 450 northern fur seals, and 25 Steller's sea lions was 
authorised. 42 Fed. Reg. 27,056, 27,063 (1981) "Recommended Decision of Administrative Law Judge: 
Final Decision Issuance of Permit and Final Rule on Regulations to Govern the Taking of Marine 
Mammals Incidental to Salmon Fishing Operations ". 
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Taiwanese fishers were accused of illegal capture of salmon.41 Secondly the ecological 
impacts of driftnetting rose in prominence. 
Stemming from the dual effects of driftnet fishing, unusual alliances emerged. 
Environmentalists and the U.S. industry joined forces to oppose Japanese 
pelagic fishing. Since the U.S. salmon fishers did not use driftnets on the 
high seas, elimination of driftnet fishing meant both elimination of foreign 
competition and an environmentally destructive practice. ... The two 
groups proved to be a powerful political coalition in the Northwest A2 
Several advocate groups were formed in the 1980s in the U.S. in opposition to the use 
of pelagic driftnets on the high seas. The first was a combination of west coast fishers. 
The second, known as SEACOPS, linked the British Colombian fishing industry in 
Canada, with the Congressional delegates of all U.S. west coast states and a variety of 
environmental organizations. Thirdly Senator Ted Stevens and later Congressman 
Young assumed a role as advocates for Alaskan, and in particular indigenous, salmon 
interests. 
The issues for the fisher groups was clear - they desired the removal of Japanese 
motherships, and Japanese, Taiwanese and Korean driftnet fishing operators from the 
high seas.99 Seattle based Alaskan salmon fishers had long sought a ban on all high 
seas salmon fishing.45 SEACOPS in particular claimed that salmon illegally caught by 
DWFNs was being transferred to motherships and then sold back to U.S. and 
European fish markets through other countries.96 
The involvement of Congressional delegates was simply in a supporting capacity, and 
involved no more than the promotion of one of their major constituent's efforts for the 
41 Eisenbud (1985) op. cit. n29; Davis, L., "Northern Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untangling the 
High Seas Controversy" (1991) 64 Southern Californian Law Review 1057. Because salmon does not 
originate or spawn in either Taiwan or South Korea neither nation has rights to fish for these highly 
migratory species. Notwithstanding the lack of rights to harvest salmon there have been several reported 
incidences of the targeting of salmon by nations driftnet fishers 
42 Walsh, V., "Eliminating Driftnets from the North Pacific Ocean: U.S.- Japanese Cooperation in the 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 1953 -1993" (1998) 29 Ocean Development and 
International Law 295 at 308. 
43 SEACORPS is the Southeast Alaskan Coalition Opposed to Piracy of Salmon. 
44 For figures on salmon harvests see Davis (1991) op. cit n4I at 1068, footnote 99. 
45 Problems of indiscriminate take and overfishing due to the driftnet technique had been considered 
elsewhere. A progressive precedent had been set by the Danish government. The Danish high seas 
salmon long driftnet fishery in the Atlantic Ocean was closed in 1976 due to the combined impact it had 
upon bycatch species and fish stock. 
46 "A Group Policing the Sea" L.A. Times, 22 June 1990. See also Johnston, D., "The Driftnetting 
Problem in the Pacific Ocean: Legal Considerations and Diplomatic Options" (1990) 21 Ocean 
Development and International Law 5. To counter the problem of Taiwanese illegal salmon fishing the 
Taiwanese government placed a prohibition on the export of salmon and the Japanese government on the 
import of salmon from Taiwan. 
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removal of "foreign transgressors".' Environmentalists were motivated by the 
indiscriminate nature of driftnet fishing. They sought to protect marine mammals and 
seabirds and prevent their incidental take in driftnets. The involvement of this last 
group - with non -material interests - proved to be of significant value in efforts to 
mobilise both financial and political support 49 
It was estimated that by 1985 approximately 1693 pelagic driftnet vessels set over 
20,503 miles of net every day during the North Pacific fishing season, totaling and 
estimated 1,065,510 miles each year.49 Notwithstanding the growing impacts of the 
high seas operations, the U.S.- Japanese seabird Convention was still not enforced by 
either the U.S. or Japanese government in respect of Japanese salmon vessels' seabird 
bycatch.50 Nor had the validity of the Department of Interior's interpretation of the 
Act been tried in court. One commentary suggested that the selection of cases upon 
which the precedent for this advice was based may be misleading and that the Act 
indeed did have an extraterritorial application' The authors noted that 
[alt the present time, far less controversy surrounds the international 
treaties for migratory birds than other issue areas. Environmental groups, 
however, have not thoroughly researched the possible leverage they might 
have in the legal arena with respect to domestic implementation of the ... 
provisions of the treaties. It is not clear, either, to what extent pressure 
could be applied by the United States to encourage more active protection 
,.. in other countries. 52 
In 1986 the Japanese permit for marine mammal take in the U.S. EEZ expired. The U.S. 
government and Japanese fishers entered into compromise negotiations, the outcome of 
which was an offer by the U.S. government to chose between access to the Bering sea 
salmon fishery or groundfish within the U.S. EEZ. Japanese fishers chose the latter. As 
a part of the deal the parties developed an agreement as to a scheme of zonations 
wherein giinets could safely be deployed without the incidental capture of common 
murres. The threat of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act's strict no take provisions had 
provided sufficient impetus to ensure Japanese cooperation.' 
47 Burke, W., Freeburg, M. and Miles, E., "United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: An 
Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management" (1994) 25 Ocean 
Development and International Law 127 at 139. 
48 Per. comm. Rod Moore op. cit. n37. 
49 Eisenbud (1985) op. cit. n29. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Miles and Fluharty (1991) op. cit. n3 at 337. 
53 hidicello, S. and Lytle, M., "Marine Biodiversity and International Law: Instruments and 
Institutions that can be used to Conserve Marine Biological Diversity Internationally" (1994) 8 Tulane 
Environmental Law Journal 123. 
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NMFS also promulgated a permit for the incidental take of 6,039 Dall's porpoise over 
a three year period. No reference was made, however, to northern fur seals, their take 
was prohibited under the MMPA due to populations being found to be below their 
optimal sustainable level. Regardless, an agreement to fish the region had been made 
between the U.S. government and Japanese fishers, and on these grounds the 
Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries Cooperative Association filed suit for a quota to 
be allocated for the take of depleted northern fur seals. 
Meanwhile, the allowance of Japanese fishing within the EEZ and the allocation of a 
quota for the take of Dall's porpoise was met with considerable opposition from both 
North Pacific fishers and NGOs. Acting on behalf of Alaskan subsistence fishers the 
Center for Environmental Education (CEE)54 filed a lawsuit based upon alleged 
violation of MMPA provisions. The Kokechik Fishermen's Association sought to enjoin 
the permit which authorised the Federation of Japanese Salmon Fisheries Cooperative 
Associations to take Dall's porpoise incidental to its fishing operations. They claimed 
that in allowing the bycatch of Dall's porpoise other species which were not 
permissible bycatch would also be taken, for example the northern fur seal. 
In Kokechik Fishermen's Association v. Secretary of Commerce55 the court found in favour of 
the plaintiff. Further though, it called into question the legality of the permit system for 
marine mammal bycatch as established by NMFS. The court ruled that a permit could 
not be issued that would result in the bycatch of a protected marine mammal without 
first ascertaining whether that species had reached an optimum sustainable population 
leve1.56 Furthermore, an incidental takings permit could not be issued for one species in 
circumstances where the unpermitted taking of another species would result. 
In light of the Kokechik decision elements of the bureaucracy became concerned that 
NPFC relations would suffer 57 The Secretary of Commerce conveyed this concern to 
Congress during the 1988 MMPA reauthorisation hearings, and requested an 
exemption to foreign vessels be provided. Congress was not sympathetic to this 
request, however. Thus the Iast of Japanese fishing operations within the U.S. EEZ 
ceased. 
54 Later renamed the Center for Marine Conservation (CMC). 
55 Kokechik Fishermen's Association v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988) cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989) (hereafter "Kokechik "). 
56 Ibid at 802. 
57 MMPA Amendments of 1988, flouse of Representatives Report (Marine Merchant and Fisheries 
Committee) No. 100 -970 [To accompany H.R. 1489], 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154 (hereafter "H.R. Rep. 100- 970 "). 
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The situation on the high seas however did not improve. In fact in 1986 it escalated 
with the documentation of Taiwanese /Japanese harvesting /marketing operations and 
in 1988 large scale illegal salmon fishing by Taiwanese vessels on the high seas.58 
United States and Canadian fishers escalated their complaints that decreased catches, 
and the dumping of salmon on the world market had caused a significant downturn in 
prices.59 
The problem of incidental capture of other species also rose in prominence!' In 1983 
estimates emerged suggesting that Japan's 172 strong catcherboat fleet - which 
constituted less than 10% of the combined pelagic long driftnet fleet - caused the 
mortality of 5,500 Dall's porpoise, and between 250,000 and 750,000 seabirds each 
year.' By the mid 1980s the North Pacific Japanese driftnet fleet had grown 
considerably.' 
Environmental groups, in particular Greenpeace, raised concerns about the high level of 
conservation significant bycatch taken by driftnet. Also problematic were the indirect 
ecosystemic impacts caused by ghost fishing by lost or discarded nets. The extent of 
this, although unquantified, was believed to he enormous. Although at a glance 
appearing a small figure, it was estimated that 0.06% of Japanese salmon driftnets 
were lost " Converted into solid figures this makes 12 miles per night. Added to this 
are the other Japanese and DWFN fisheries totaling an estimated 639 miles of lost net 
each year. Added to this sum are discarded nets. Due to the threat of capture for 
illegal fishing in prohibited waters nets were not infrequently abandoned and left to 
ghost fish the oceans. 
Although consideration of the driftnet issue was well within INPFC's brief, the forum 
was predominantly scientific and thus poorly equipped to formulate a remedy. 
Moreover, and regardless of its capacity, the limited membership of the INPFC meant 
that even had restrictions been formulated, they would have been of only partial effect. 
58 In 1986 the NMFS seized a shipment of almost 600,000 lbs of salmon bound from Taiwan to 
Japan. In 1988 the Soviet Union seized four Taiwanese vessels targeting salmonoid on the high seas 
(Miles and Fluharty (1991) op. cit. n3). Thus the fishers' claims were confirmed. 
59 The Pacific Seafood Processors Association produced evidence of substantial salmon sales on the 
international market at a price about 50% below the U.S. export price. These increased sales appeared to 
have come from Taiwan with Japan acting as an intermediary. Under U.S. pressure Japan placed a 
prohibition on the import of salmon from any nation in which salmon was not produced. See ibid. 
60 Burke et al. (1994) op. cit n47 at 134 
61 Jones, L. and Actor, L., Progress Report for 1983 Field Research on Dall's Porpoise Incidentally 
Taken in the Japanese Salmon Gillnet Fishery (Ad Hoc Committee on Marine Mammals, International 
North Pacific Fisheries Commission, 1983), cited in Eisenbud (1985) op. cit. n29 at 474. 
62 The Japanese salmon driftnet fishery consisted of four mother boats and nearly 400 catcherboats and 
land based fleet vessels. Moreover, the Japanese squid fishery had 511 vessels and a third fishery targeting 
marlin and other billfish comprised 600 driftnet vessels. 
63 Eisenbud (1985) op. cit. n29. 
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The rapid expansion of the salmon driftnet fleet far outpaced the development of 
arrangements by which such operations could be managed, monitored and regulated. 
Recognising the lack of comprehensive data concerning the impact of this highly 
unselective fishing method the U.S. enacted the , the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, 
Assessment and Control Act,64 as part of the Marine Plastic Pollution and Control Act of 
1987. 
Other than periodic reauthorisations this was the first major legislative initiative in 
relation to marine bycatch since the very early 1980s -a reflection of the step away 
from administration that was part of the broader anti- government philosophy of the 
Reagan administration. Throughout the period 1981 to 1986 both the Republican 
Senate and Democratic House however had continued to oppose the extension of this 
philosophy into a reduction of marine funding, leaving the situation at a policy 
stalemate. Divided authority made a clear shift towards the Democrats side and by 
1987 it dominated both houses, creating an enhanced chance of seeing the same policy 
changes agreed to across Congress, and at the least ensure that proposals would be 
seriously considered.SS Another shift within Congress were developments in relation to 
leadership on key committees and the dispersal of key ocean interests from the Senate 
into the House.'6 
The Driftnet Control Act was clearly intended to regulate nations driftnetting in the 
North Pacific region'' - indeed some commentators have suggested the primary aim 
was the elimination of such activities all together.68 It was directed primarily at 
Taiwanese high seas driftnet fishers' illegal targeting of salmon.59 The Act required that 
the U.S. Secretary of State negotiate monitoring and enforcement agreements with 
nations who had high seas driftnetting fleets. The Act recognised the high level of 
bycatch that can result from driftnetting operations, and the need for improved high 
seas data and aimed to "monitor assess and reduce the adverse impacts of 
64 Driftnet, Impact, Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100 -220, 101 
Stat. 1477 (hereafter "Driftnet Control Act "). 
65 Knecht, R., Cicin -Sain, B. and Archer, J., "National Oceans Policy: A Window of Opportunity" 
(1988) I9 Ocean Development and International Law 113. 
66 The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Oceanography new chair was Mike Lowry a 
representative of an ocean oriented and environmentally sensitive constituency. Representative Gerry 
Studds took the chair of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife 
Conservation and the Environment. New members of senate who were prominent ocean activists included 
Senators Barbara Mikulski and John Breaux. For discussion on initiatives around this time see ibid. 
67 Driftnet Control Act, §I822, [s2021. 
68 Sumi (1993) op. cit. n26. 
69 South Korea does not appear to market illegally caught salmon internationally. 
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driftnets "' To this end it called for the creation of scientific and research programs 
and the deployment of observers. 
In case agreement was not forthcoming, the Driftnet Control Act endorsed the 
certification procedures of the Pelly Amendment. It set a deadline for the creation of 
bilateral agreements at 29 June 1989, at which time if no such agreement has been 
reached, Pelly Amendment provisions would be activated and these nations certified 
to the President " 
The U.S. subsequently entered into a series of bilateral negotiations with each of Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan. Japan formed an agreement by 23 June 1 989, six days before 
the statutory deadline expired. Taiwan and South Korea had not managed to create 
similar arrangements and consequently the certification procedure under the Act would 
be commenced. Several hundred million fish import dollars were at risk, and once 
again the threat of sanctions provided significant motivation for agreements to be 
formed. Hasty temporary arrangements with South Korea and Taiwan were executed 
by 8 September 1989. Although these agreements did provide some information, data 
and relief they were only an initial step and did not create a regulatory regime for 
driftnetting on the high seas. 
Meanwhile the domestic political situation with respect to driftnets had become 
treacherous. In light of the slow progress and anticipation of the weak outcome, a 
conference was convened between officials from British Colombia, Alaska, 
Washington, Idaho, Oregon, California and Hawaii along with NGO and industry 
representatives in July 1989. In November, and as an outcome of the conference, a six 
part declaration was issued calling on action from the Canadian and U.S. federal 
governments. They requested the respective governments: 
1. seek reductions in the Japanese high seas salmon fisheries; 
2. seek additional measures to reduce the impact of high seas squid fleets on 
salmonoids, albacore, seabirds, marine mammals, another living marine 
resources; 
3. take immediate action to establish a new convention in the North Pacific 
(between Canada, Japan, U.S.S.R. and the U.S.) to prohibit the take of salmon 
beyond a coastal states 200nm EEZ; 
70 Driftnet Control Act, §1822, [s202]. 
71 Furthermore, if bilateral agreements proved to be ineffective then the Secretary of Commerce was 
required to certify those states under the Pelly Amendment which then allows for the imposition of trade 
sanctions upon the fisheries products of the nations in question. 
72 Davis (1991) op. cit. n4I. 
73 In 1988 Taiwan's fishery imports totaled 8US320,000,000 and South Korea's were valued at 
SU S25 0, 000, 000. Ibid. 
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4. take immediate steps to form a multinational research organisation in the North 
Pacific; 
5. secure long term commitments of substantially increased fiscal and personnel 
resources for monitoring and enforcement of international agreements; and 
6. negotiate agreements to prohibit the sale, import or transshipments of salmon 
illegally harvested on the high seas. 
International Action -The 1989 UN Resolution 
The problem of marine bycatch in long driftnets had first been raised in a truly 
international forum at the 1984 World Conference on Fisheries Management and 
Development convened by the FAO. Greenpeace - recognising nation States' inability 
to take immediate legally binding action to sanction the practice --- submitted a paper 
to the conference which suggested that an evaluation of the impacts of the practice of 
pelagic driftnet fishing be undertaken. The conference was urged to adopt a three 
pronged resolution: 
1. to establish effective arrangements for an impartial observer scheme and data 
collection program, and registration scheme for all pelagic driftnets, indicating both 
flag state and vessel identity; 
2. for information sharing through [NPFC and other similar organisations aimed at the 
creation of legal and administrative arrangements to counter any harmful effect 
that driftnets may have; and 
3. to refrain from further investment in the pelagic driftnet industry until major 
problems resulting from such fisheries were resolved. 
These resolutions were not taken action upon as an agenda item but rather the 
conference devoted its attention to the construction and adoption of a broad guiding 
policy document. 
The U.S., at this same conference, issued a note to other delegations concerning the 
indiscriminate nature of driftnet fishing, the high resultant level of bycatch and the 
impact of ghost fishing. It was suggested that these issues be more appropriately 
included as an agenda item for discussion by the Committee on Fisheries, a Standing 
Committee of the FAO, due to meet in April the following year. The Committee, 
positioned within the Department of Fisheries, was mandated to "conduct periodic 
review of fishery problems of an international character and to appraise such problems 
and their possible solutions with a view to concerted action by nations, by FAO and 
by other intergovernmental bodies "." Following this advice the U.S. tabled an agenda 
74 Authorised by General Rules of the FAO, Rute XXX(b). 
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item at the April 1985 FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) meeting. In the event no 
significant action was taken on this issue. 
In 1989 the issue of long driftnet fishing was once again raised, this time by the South 
Pacific nations led by Australia and New Zealand. The chosen forum was United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of November 1989.'5 
Up until this stage, U.S. interest in the issue had been decidedly half -hearted. Around 
this time however, with this there was a new administration was elected, and the 
party structure and White House changed. The new deputy assistant Secretary of 
State had preciously worked on the staff of House Merchant Marine Fisheries 
committee, and gradually became interested in the driftnet issue. 
He saw this as something that was a good environmental issue for the 
republican administration and started taking up the cause internally 
within the State Department, and as bureaucracies go they run on inertia 
and you can eventually turn this around especially is you can get some 
political leadership.' 
Thus the U.S. stance quickly altered, and, subsequent discussions took place between 
the Secretary of State James Baker and Senator Ted Stevens. The new position was 
reinforced by a commitment issued to the U.S. Congress that America would do 
whatever was necessary to terminate high seas long dríftnet fisheries operations.' By 
this time, the resolution had been tabled by the Pacific nations and won the 
cosponsorship of the U.S.. 
The tabled resolution highlighted the indiscriminate and wasteful nature of large -scale 
driftnet fishing; its threat to the conservation of highly migratory and andronomous 
species of fish, birds and marine mammals; and a notation of the huge impact the 
activity was having on the south pacific region's ecosystem.'B By this stage between 
1000 and 1500 distant water driftnet vessels were operating on the high seas The 
resolution called for continued and enhanced scientific data collection and a review of 
this by 30 June 1991, an immediate ban on large -scale driftnetting in the south pacific, 
and a moratorium on all high seas drift net fishing by 30 June 1992 unless the afore 
mentioned unacceptable impacts could be mitigated. A Japanese draft resolution was 
subsequently tabled. This emphasised the need to hase regulatory action on scientific 
data and analysis and urged cooperation among states in respect to monitoring and 
75 See the Chapter One, Section 1.3 for a discussion on the role of the South Pacific nations and the 
influence of the Wellington Convention on the 1989 UN General Resolutions. 
76 Per. cornm. Rod Moore op. cit. n37 
77 Burke et al. (1994) op. cit. n47 at 137. 
78 UN Doc. A/C.2/44/L30, Rev.l (1989). 
79 Johnston (1990) op. cit. n46. 
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mitigation of impacts.80 The burden of proof of the unsustainable nature of the practice 
of driftnet fishing was however, in Japan's resolution, placed upon the nation(s) 
unhappy with the practice. In comparison, the Pacific Nations' resolution followed a 
precautionary approach and left it to the nation(s) active in driftnet fishing to prove 
that the practice was not unsustainable. 
The resolution as finally adopted was much more complex and considerably more 
balanced than either of its tabled predecessors. 
The presumed adverse impacts of driftnetting were stated more 
tentatively, small-scale driftnetting was expressly excepted, and the 
concern of coastal states for the effect of high seas driftnetting on stocks 
occurring within their EEZs was noted, along with the special concerns of 
the South Pacific region.' 
On December 22, 1989 the UNGA adopted Resolution 44 /225 and in so doing 
recommended: 
(a) Moratoria on all large -scale pelagic driftnet fishing on the high 
seas by 30 June 1992 with the understanding that such a measure will not 
be imposed in a region, or if implemented, can be lifted should effective 
conservation and management measures be taken based upon statistically 
sound analysis to be jointly made by concerned parties of the 
international community with an interest in the fishery resources of the 
region and to ensure the conservation of the living marine resources of that 
region; 
(b) Immediate action to reduce progressively large -scale pelagic 
driftnet fishing activities in the South Pacific region leading to the 
cessation of such activities by no later than 1 July 1991, as an interim 
measure, until appropriate conservation and management arrangements 
for South Pacific albacore tuna resources are entered into by the parties 
concerned; and 
(c) Immediate cessation to further expansion of large -scale pelagic 
driftnet fishing on the high seas of the North Pacific and all other high 
seas outside the Pacific Ocean, with the understanding that this measure 
will be reviewed subject to the conditions in (a).' 
In addition, paragraph eight iterated that regulations for the conservation and 
management of resources "should take account of the best available scientific 
evidence ". The resolution then recognised the severe lack of statistically reliable 
scientific information. To remedy this, the collection of data was urged and all 
specialised fisheries agencies, in particular the FAO, were asked to study the impacts 
80 UN Doc. A/C.2/44/L.28 (1989). 
81 Burke et al. (1994), op. cit. n47 at 141. 
82 United Nations: General Assembly Resolution on Large -Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its 
Impact on Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas (G.A. Res. 44/225), adopted 22 
December 1989; reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1555 (1990), paragraph 4. 
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of long pelagic driftnets on the environment and report their findings to the UN 
secretary general. 
Surprisingly perhaps, Japan, the U.S. and the coalition of nations who first raised the 
issue all supported Resolution 44/225. This wide ranging support is however most 
likely to be due to different interpretations of the Resolution rather than any 
commonality of viewpoints.' The Japanese, according to one commentator, thought 
they had secured their interests in the North Pacific, and could continue their 
operations subject to measures undertaken jointly with the U.S. and Canada 
The Environmental Coalition and the Data Gathering Efforts 
By and large the environmental coalition dictated the agenda and reportage on the 
issue of driftnet fishing. The well executed aim was to create a sense of urgency and to 
convince the public that a variety of species were seriously threatened with extinction 
by the practice. 
Strong links were formed between both South Pacific coalitions and their North 
American counterparts, as a number of key NGOs including Greenpeace, World 
Wildlife Fund and the Sierra Club both alerted and maintained community and 
political interest in driftnet fishing. Further and in particular in the U.S. 
... important links were forged between ,.. interest groups and the 
executive and legislative branches of their governments at both state and 
federal levels. Beyond these dynamics, the environmental coalition 
worked assiduously with the media to publicise what was perceived to be 
an immediate threat to the ecosystem of the world ocean u 
A perceived community urgency of the issue of driftnet fishing was encouraged by the 
use of highly visual slogans such as driftnet "curtains of death ", or "walls of death" 
or "marine strip mining ".86 In the U.S., Greenpeace launched a very public campaign 
wherein a three mile section of a driftnet was placed along the San Francisco 
waterfront and children were encouraged to write notes pleading for the cessation of 
this fishing practice. 
83 For a Japanese perspective see Sumi (1993) op. cit. n26. 
84 Burke et al. (1994) op. cit. n47. 
85 Ibid at 140. 
86 For example see: Nobel, G., "The Driftnet Menace: Walls of Death" (1990) September /October 
Wildlife Conservation 50; Tiwari, R., "United Nations: U.S. -Japan Clash Highlights Driftnetting 
Danger" Inter Press Service, 20 November 1990. 
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Another particularly effective tactic in generating public interest, was the presentation 
of a video by the Earth Trust. This declared the scale of destruction of Japanese squid 




harvest (No. individuals) 
squid 106 million 
fish* 39 million 
salmon 141,000 
blue sharks 700,000 
seabirds 270,000 
marine mammals 26,000 
sea turtles 406 
*the figure for "fish" did not include the commercial species of salmon or blue shark. 
These values were accompanied by photographs and video images of marine 
mammals, seabirds, tuna and sharks, and provided a compelling reason to the general 
public to circumvent the wastage and slaughter through the prohibition of the practice 
of high seas driftnet fishing. 
As well as the raising of public interest, NGO actions were important because of the 
force they Ient to the coalition in the U.S. Congress that was progressing the policy of 
sanctions being applied to nations who continued to use pelagic driftnets. From this 
point the issue gained greater political impetus in the U.S., as evidenced by its priority 
position on the bilateral U.S. Japan talks of that year.87The success of the NGO 
campaign is revealed in that it reached the public and put pressure on politicians in 
not only the U.S., but also in Europe. 
West Coast fishers and their Congressional sponsors capitalised on the high profile the 
issue of driftnet fishing had achieved.B8 Moreover, their complaints that ongoing 
salmon piracy was occurring, were supported by an April 16, 1990, NOAA report on 
high seas salmon interception. This documented U.S. authorities' seizure of over one 
million pounds of salmon laundered into the U.S. from Hong Kong, Singapore and 
other far Eastern nations past over the three and a half years!' Their grievances with 
the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act led to its amendment in 
1990, having been deemed insufficient relief. 
87 Walsh (1998) op. cit. n42. 
88 For example the 1990 amendments to the Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act 
of 1987 (Driftnet Amendment Act of 1990, FCMA § 1826, [s206]). 
89 Davis (1991) op. cit. n41. 
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The amendments to the Act firstly reiterated the serious threat that driftnetting posed 
to the marine environment. It then lent its support to the UNGA's permanent ban on 
driftnet fishing in the south pacific, and under FCMA amendments issued a 
prohibition on large scale driftnetting inside the U.S. EEZ and by U.S. citizens in other 
waters.9° Moreover, the Act sought to obtain a global ban on driftnet fishing.91 Should 
this fail to arise, then the Secretary of Commerce was directed to seek monitoring and 
gear provisions in international agreements so as to facilitate the minimisation of 
environmental impacts 92 This Act was too linked to Pelly Amendment provisions. It 
required that the Secretary of Commerce compile a list of nations that continued to 
engage in high seas driftnet fishing such that the effectiveness of any international 
agreement to which the U.S. was a party or subscribed would be diminished (thus 
several South Pacific conventions to which the U.S. had given in principle support but 
was not a party were included under this provision). For the purposes of the Pelly 
Amendment listing was deemed equivalent to certification and thus could result in the 
application of trade sanctions 9' At this same time the MMPA was amended so as to 
ban the importation of fish or fish products caught by or purchased from nations that 
were known to use large scale driftnets unless documentation could be produced that 
these operations were not conducted on the high seas.94 
Sketchy data had been collected from the June and December 1989 Japanese squid 
fishing season, and on 6 July 1990 figures were released by the NMFS. Extrapolation of 
the data was discouraged by Department of Commerce officials as it was collected 
from only 32 boats - that is only 4 percent of the fishery - and as such may be 
statistically unreliable95 The bycatch from the harvest of three million neon flying squid 
is shown in Table 1 " 
Although as stated, not statistically reliable, when considering this accounts for only 4 
percent of the Japanese squid fishery, the total bycatch for the reminder of this and 
other DWFN driftnetting operations "could be staggering"." 
90 The 1990 FCMA amendments prohibited the use of large scale drif net in American waters or by 
U.S. nationals. Driftnet Amendment Act of 1990, Pub. I.. No. 101 -627, 104 Stat. 4436, §1826, [s206]. 
Follow up Regulations acted to prohibit the importation of several species known to be captured in large 
scale driftnets (50 CFR §2I6.24(e) (1992)). 
91 Driftnet Amendment Act of 1990, §1826, [s206]. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid, §1826a, 1826b, [s206a, 206b]. 
94 MMPA, §1371(a)(2)(E), [s100(a)(2)(E)]. 
95 "Japan's North Pacific Squid Fleet Snares Dolphin, Tuna, Birds" Reuters, 6 July 1990. 
96 "Squid- Fishing Japanese Seen Killing Many Sharks, Dolphins" The Washington Post, 8 July 
1990. 
97 Davis (1991) op. cit. n41 at 1067. 
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The joint action called for in paragraph 4(a) of the 1989 UNGA Resolution was, in the 
end, undertaken only in the North Pacific Ocean. An observer program was 
established using nationals from the three fishing nations involved, the U.S. and 
Canada to obtain data on the number of bycatches of each species in large -scale 
driftnet operations on the high seas in 1990 harvests. Although not ideal every effort 
was made to standardise data collection so as to have uniform information by which 
to assess the impact of this fishing method upon the marine ecosystem 98 
Table 1: Species caught incidental to the harvest of three million neon flying squid in 
large -scale driftnet operations on the high seas in 1990. 
species bycatch (No. individuals) 
albacore tuna 59,060 









storm petrels 17 
northern fur seals 52 
sea turtles (leatherbacks) 22 (9) 
Information gained from the Japanese fleet whose season terminated earlier than that 
of the fleets of either of the other two nations was discussed at a meeting between 
scientists from Japan, South Korea, Canada, Taiwan, the U.S., Australia and the 
United Nations in June 1991. The conclusions drawn from a detailed assessment by 
this group are represented in Table 2 (below). The review, known as the Sidney 
Review, was later presented to the United Nations pursuant to Resolution 44/225 and 
1990 sequel, Resolution 45/197. 
98 For a discussion of the operation and problems involved in the observer program(s) see Burke et al. 
(1994) op. cit. n47 at 148 -155. 
99 Scientific Review of North Pacific High Seas Drifinet Fisheries, report for presentation to the 
United Nations pursuant to Resolutions 44/225 and 45/197 (Sidney, British Colombia, 11 -14 June 
1991). 
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Table 2: Expert conclusions on the impact of Japanese North Pacific squid driftnet 
fishing operations on non -target species (derived from the Sidney Report) 
Species Expert conclusions on Japanese driftnet fishing impact 
CETACEANS: 
northern right whale 
dolphin 





other small cetaceans 
large cetaceans 
Decline in population over the last ten years due to driftnet 
fishing. Uncertainty regarding the rate and severity of decline. 
Population will continue to decline if current catch rate is 
maintained. 
Currently at a high level of abundance but declining due to take in 
driftnet operations. 
Most Dall's porpoise take was from large stocks so the total 
mortality was not significant. Bycatch of the true i -type stock of 
Dall's porpoise was of concern however and any bycatch would 
severely endanger that population. 
No estimate of total mortality available. Additional mortality to 
particular stocks may be detrimental. 
Insufficient information available for an assessment. 
Small catches of these species unlikely to have a significant effect. 
No large cetaceans had been observed in driftnets and it was 
suggested that it was unlikely that these could he restrained by 
driftnets. However any mortalities to this group would be 
detrimental to some species. 
PINNIPEDS: 
northern fur seal No estimate of impact but noted that the annual deaths from trawls 





Endangered under IUCN. Threatened with extinction under 
Cf FES (Appendix I). Impact may vary from insignificant to very 
significant depending upon the stock composition of turtles taken. 
If the turtles came from Mexican stock then take would be 
insignificant. If originating from Malaysia then the bycatch would 
be significant due to the severely depleted nature of that stock. 
Threatened with extinction under CITES (Appendix I). Few 
recorded bycatches. Provisional agreement that the impact of 
driftnet fishing on the stock was probably negligible. 
Threatened with extinction under CITES (Appendix I). 
Endangered under 1TJCN. As with loggerhead turtle (above). 
BIRDS: 
short- tailed albatross 
dark rumpled petrel 
other bird species 
Recognised as endangered with a population of only 500 
individuals. No mortalities from driftnets were recorded and only 
small numbers appear in the driftnet areas, however any bycatch 
would be of concern. 
As with short- tailed albatross (above). 
Eight other bird species were reviewed but a lack of information 




other tuna and billfish 
blue sharks 
Predominant bycatch species. Impact assessment not possible due 
to the lack of information on total stock size. 
Insufficient information available for an assessment. 
Effected in only minor or insignificant ways by bycatches in 
driftnet operations. 
Although making up a significant portion of the bycatch, impacts 
on the species were assessed to be insignificant. 
-172- 
Chapter Four - U.S Policy 1980 -1992 
This was to be supplemented by another symposium held in Tokyo in the November. 
Before this was to occur however the U.S. submitted a report to the UN stating its 
opinion that the continued use of driftnets was not justifiable, and Secretary of State 
Baker committed the U.S. to the pursuit of a moratorium resolution without further 
ado.100 The U.S. policy paper attempted to manipulate Resolution 44 /225 such that on 
review a global prohibition would be inevitable. The resolution was interpreted so as to 
condition future driftnet operations on achieving: 
1. a statistically sound independent demonstration that unacceptable impacts on 
marine resources would not occur and the rights of other nations would not be 
impinged upon; 
2. an agreement by all affected international members for research monitoring and 
enforcement of all measures so as to mitigate unacceptable impacts; and 
3. a scientific assessment resulting in agreement by all States that no unacceptable 
impacts would arise. 
This last condition in particular was virtually impossible to achieve. 
An International Conclusion to Driftnetting - The UN Resolution 
The outcome of the 1991 UN Resolution was based heavily upon the findings of the 
Sidney Review. The burden from the 1989 resolution place both the onus of both proof 
and persuasion on driftnetting states. The U.S. used the data from the Sidney report to 
argue that best scientific data failed to show that there were no adverse impacts from 
high seas pelagic driftnet fishing, and that hence the concern raised in 1989 had been 
confirmed. 
A Iarge amount of uncertainty surrounded the figures presented from the 1990 
Japanese driftnet fishery, and polarised views on the degree to which politics overrode 
science have been formed. There were suggestions that mortality levels were, in reality, 
much higher. It was contended that drop -outs from the nets were not accurately 
counted, and that the actual amount of bycatch was twice that recorded. Furthermore 
the impacts of ghost fishing were not considered in the calculation of the bycatch level. 
Moreover the view has been put that though 
you can argue whether the bycatch of marine mammals is significant or 
not, but the bycatch of things like bluesharks and pomfret are just mind 
boggeling. Beyond that there was never anything done to try and estimate 
what the sustainable yield of the squid were. So it was a fishery where 
some people made an enormous amount of money but where no 
consideration was ever given to the sustainability of the fishery or its 
impacts on other things!' 
100 Department of State. U.S. Policy Concerning Large -Scale Pelagic Drifinets, Submitted to the 
United Nations' Office for Oceans Affairs and the Law of the Sea (Washington DC, 1990). 
101 Per. comm. Dr Bob Hofman op. cit. n25. 
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The alternative school of though maintained that the Japanese fishery was a much 
more consumptive fishery in terms of bycatch than were either the Taiwanese or 
Korean fisheries. Indeed the data when collated from the Taiwanese and Korean squid 
driftnet fisheries showed considerably lower bycatch than that recorded for the 
Japanese high seas driftnetters. In the event the final data on the Taiwanese and 
Korean driftnet fishing operations was not ready for some four months after the 
Japanese data and not released until the September and October of 1991 
respectively.102 The shorter Japanese season was due to a 1990 . order from the Fisheries 
Agency of Japan that all areas west of 170 °E were off limits to Japanese driftnet 
fishers due to the presence of Japanese squid jigging operations. Thus the Taiwanese 
and Korean fishers who paid no heed to the Japanese order, were able to fish longer 
and in different areas to the Japanese driftnetters. Confined to its eastern zone the 
Japanese driftnetting operations suffered a smaller target catch and greater incidental 
take than it otherwise could have. Due to its lateness in comparison to the already 
analysed Japanese data used in the Sidney Review the Taiwanese and Korean data 
was not presented to the UNGA at the time of the passage of Resolution 44/215 in 
1991. 
This the lack of recognition of the individual nature of each driftnetting fishery, and 
hence the failure to consider the bycatch and distinct impacts of each may have 
significantly affected the policy outcome. The three nations' fleets differed in size, in 
the areas they fished, and the season of fishing/°3 Both the Taiwanese and Korean 
operators moved westward each August and it was in this period that the bulk of their 
fishing occurred. Concomitant to this movement was witnessed a tremendous increase 
in the catch -per -unit- effort (CPUE) of squid. Using pomfret as an indicator species the 
amount of bycatch in the Taiwanese and Korean fisheries was found to be only to .28 
CUPE compared to in Japanese fisheries where it accounted for 70% or 0.7 CUPE. A 
similar pattern has been suggested to exist with respect to marine mammals and 
seabirds bycatch too. Such disparities raise the question as to whether the differences 
were sufficient to warrant individual treatment and management of each fishery. In 
any event, the three nation States' fisheries were treated together in the United 
Nations. 
In 1991 Resolution 46/215 was introduced to the UNGA to update the earlier 
resolution and was adopted on 20 December 1991 without a vote.1ó' The Resolution 
102 Burke et al. (1994) op cit. n47 at 145. 
103 Ibid. 
104 United Nations: General Assembly Resolution on Large -Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its 
Impact on Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas (GA. Res. 46/215), adopted 20 
December 1991; reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 241 (1992). 
-174- 
Chapter Four - U.S. Policy 1980 -1992 
pledged to terminate the practice of driftnet fishing on the high seas by 31 December 
1992. Criticisms of the failure to include data from Taiwanese and Korean fishing 
operations are supported by the more broad concerns regarding the scant role afforded 
to science in the formation of the Resolutions. Substantive concerns in particular 
question why the resolution applies only to large scale high seas driftnetting operations 
when small scale and highly intensive coastal ones are believed to have an enormous 
impact on the ecosystem and be equally indiscriminate. Indeed specifications as to 
what length of net constitutes a long driftnet were omitted from the discussion in the 
UN 105 Scientifically the issue is whether the impact of the driftnet is contingent on the 
driftnet's size as although high seas driftnets tend to be long they are not densely 
located." The second query pertains to why this resolution applies to only the high 
seas and not the coastal regions. The obvious answer is that a small number of DWFN 
were easier to target that numerous coastal states, especially as sovereign rights would 
not then be involved. It is a truism that if an international decision process is perceived 
to be unfair, then both the decision and the body which made it may loose credibility. 
It was this concern which led to the call in the 1992 UNCED Agenda 21 call for global 
implementation of the UN driftnet resolutions, and for an agreement governing highly 
migratory and straddling stocks.10' 
Other concerns surrounded the United State's pivotal role in achieving the resolutions 
and involved claims of "coercive diplomacy" by the U.S. to achieve its goal of 
termination of all high seas pelagic driftnet fishing operations.10B Indeed the U.S. 
played a central role in ensuring the compliance of the DWFNs to the resolution. 
Employing the threat of U.S. trade sanctions,109 Congress enacted the High Seas 
Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act in 1992.110 As suggested, this Act placed import bans 
on fish and fish products of nations whose nationals were identified conducting large 
scale driftnet fishing operations on the high seas. Acting as further disincentive, the 
Act also removed all port privileges and mandated import prohibitions on sport - 
fishing equipment. The significance of this legislation is that for the first time the 
imposition of trade sanctions against nations that violate the driftnet prohibition are 
mandatory. Moreover, after 6 months of certification under this Act the Secretary of 
105 Burke et al. (1994) op. cit. n47 at 129. 
106 The accuracy of the extent of impact caused by long driftnets has been called into question however. 
Burke et al. (1994) is highly critical of the Resolutions due to a disregard shown towards scientific rigour 
and concludes that as a consequence an the decision to ban high seas drift net fishing was unsound. Ibid. 
107 For discussion see Chapter 5, section 5.2 International Fisheries and Conservation Actions. 
108 Burke et al. (1994) op. cit. n47 at 128. 
109 "U.S. to Enforce Moratorium Driftnet Fishing" (1993) 4 U.S. Department of State Dispatch 158. 
110 High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102 -582, 106 Stat. 4900. 
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Commerce is required to also certify non -compliant nations under the Pelly 
Amendment. 
This threat of sanctions proved, as expected, sufficient motivation to induce the 
cessation of the operations of all three DWFN fleets. The Japanese cabinet, led by the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Industry, despite 
protestation from the fishers, quickly ordered the cessation of high seas driftnetting 
operations." In 1992 Japan provided to the UN a plan detailing its intended phase - 
out.nz Unsurprisingly Japan's rapid cooperation, and U.S. exertion of pressure on 
South Korea and Taiwan, led quickly to mirror action. 
Concluding Comments 
As with most other species and gear specific approaches to bycatch issues, driftnet 
fishing moved first through a phase of domestic, followed by international 
mobilisation. Unlike tuna purse -seining and shrimp trawling however, there was little 
conflict and a high level of cooperation amongst domestic actors. This approach had 
more to do with a commonality in the outcomes sought, than any maturation of the 
bycatch issue area or stakeholder relations themselves. 
Cooperation was first witnessed in the joint efforts of the Kokechik case, the primary 
aim of which had been to rid the U.S. EEZ of driftnet fishers. This successful outcome 
fulfilled the aims of domestic NGOs and fishers. NGOs' goal was the cessation of 
what was viewed as an indiscriminant fishing method, resulting in a range of 
environmental problems, not the least of which was the bycatch of endangered and 
other charismatic marine wildlife 
Secondly, fishers wished for the prohibition of Japanese driftnetting in U.S. waters so 
as to remove those foreign vessels in competition with domestic salmon fishers. In the 
international arena the removal of all high seas driftnetters expanded this issue to 
include squid fishers who were illegally taking salmon. Thus an analysis of the U.S.'s 
treatment of the driftnet bycatch issue in the North Pacific is complicated by the side 
issue of salmon interception by foreign fleets. 
With two of their main constituent groups supporting a particular action, federal and 
state politicians had little choice but to pursue their request. 
111 Walsh suggests that rather than the threat of sanctions it was the economic involvement of Japanese 
driftnetting firms in U.S. fisheries operations that explains the quick response by Japan to the resolution. 
Walsh (1998) op. cit. n42. 
112 With high seas driftnet fishing operations terminated, the INPFC was no longer needed and it 
ceased functioning on 21 February 1993. 
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In North America the driftnetting controversy has become a major 
political and diplomatic problem, both internally and externally. 
Normally warring factions such as the environmentalists, commercial 
fishermen, fish processors, native Indians, and sport fishermen have been 
able to unite in an anti- driftnet coalition to bring pressure on politicians 
and officials at both the federal and the state levels of government. 
the political problem is how the federal government can satisfy 
the strong demands of these combined pressure groups through actions at 
the international level. Externally, the problem is how the victim states 
can deal effectively with the culprit states within the limits of political, 
diplomatic, legal and ethical acceptability.13 
The 1987 the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act was intended to 
encourage cooperation between the U.S. and high seas driftnetting DWFNs in acquiring 
useful data. It required that the U.S. enter into negotiations aimed at ensuring effective 
monitoring and enforcement of laws, a process which was backed up by the invocation 
of the Pelly Amendment if no such agreements were forthcoming within 18 months. 
Indeed it appears that were these sanction provisions not available, then the 
agreements would not have eventuated. Only one nation was compliant by the 18 
month deadline, and the remaining two formed hasty agreements with the U.S. after 
the commencement of the certification process. 
Domestically, opposition to driftnet fishing continued to mount: politicians, fishers 
and NGOs from the northwest states called for a complete prohibition of the practice 
on the high seas. And with the abdication by the federal government of any real 
responsibility, Congress members from Alaska, Oregon and Washington assumed the 
role. Although achieving their desired result, this led to a lack of any real consideration 
of the range of U.S. fishery interests likely to be impacted upon by the policy stance 
assumed. Rather than a comprehensive position on high seas fishing and conservation, 
a contradictory approach to the issue of driftnet fishing was adopted. 
A compromise position at the 1989 UNGA led to an agreement for the monitoring of 
the situation with respect to bycatch in the North Pacific. Preempting the 1991 follow - 
up to the original resolution, the U.S. enacted the 1990 Driftnet Act Amendments. 
These incorporated and expanded the provisions of the Driftnet Impact Monitoring, 
Assessment and Control Act, and included a recommendation for a global moratorium on 
the use of large scale driftnetting gear. The adoption of a policy position prior to the 
acquisition of data on the matter, can be seen either to reflect the paucity of attention 
afforded science in resolving the driftnet issue, or as an appropriate application of the 
precautionary principle. 
113 Johnston (1990) op. cit. n46 at 13 -14 
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Regardless of the view of the role of science taken, that the issue was strongly driven 
by politics, is undeniable. In this regard, the political character of the issue is well 
evidenced from an examination of the U.S. stance on the use of high seas resources: the 
U.S. policy position with respect to driftnets differed noticeably from that it assumed 
in the contentious LOSC negotiations. hl the LOSC negotiations the U.S. opposed a 
regime governing the deep seabed due to the common law freedom to engage in the 
exploitation of a common property resource. Thus suggesting that its concerted effort 
to eradicate the practice of high seas driftnetting was based upon politics rather than a 
principled, determined stance. Further adding to claims of a politically motivated 
agenda, the U.S. failed to push for limits to nearshore driftnet fishing. 
4.4 The Endangered Species Act - TEDs & Domestic Turtle Protection 
The Voluntary TED Program 
To recall, as the development of the TED progressed NMFS officials began musing 
about the potential of a voluntary adoption scheme. Indeed early analysis of the TED 
suggested that the use of such a device would pay for itself within two years of use, 
through lowered fuel and other costs and increased shrimp catch.' By the end of 1981 
NMFS had made an internal decision not to require the use of TEDs under ESA 
authority, but to instead rely on convincing shrimpers of the apparent benefits offered 
by such devices, to achieve voluntary compliance. 
We thought because of the scientific studies we had done that the 
industry would embrace this device, because all of our studies showed 
that it had a very insignificant loss of shrimp, was extremely effective in 
excluding the turtles. ... we thought that the industry would just buy this 
device as a means for saving the fuel and making it easier to handle their 
catch but it didn't work out that way. Our industry, excepting a very few 
areas, did not embrace the TEDs .115 
This decision to pursue voluntary compliance began to emerge in 1982 with NMFS's 
indications of its responsibility to develop and maintain an economically viable shrimp 
industry. It presented the additional argument to fishers that only the widespread 
adoption of TEDs could avoid disastrously expensive legal confrontations that would 
result from environmentalists determination to see the ESA enforced 16 This fear came 
from provision of the ESA that allowed for citizen suits. Thus the Act could be 
enforced not only by government but also by the community.'" 
114 Study commissioned for the Center for Environmental Education and Monitor International. 
115 Per. comm. Jay Johnston, Assistant General Counsel, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington DC, 16 April 1999. 
116 Fee, R., "TED Confusion" (1987) 69 National Fisherman 20. 
117 ESA, § 1540(g), [s 11(g)]. There is a requirement that 60 days notice be given to the Secretary of the 
appropriate agency and the alleged violator before a suite can be lodged. 
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The potential of turtle exclusion devices to mitigate turtle bycatch, together with the 
anti- regulatory mood of the Reagan administration, also persuaded NGOs to pursue a 
voluntary approach to TED implementation. Thus, in 1982, the Centre for 
Environmental Education began a partnership arrangement with NMFS. The CEE also 
agreed to NMFS's suggestion to collaborate with industry organisations in promoting 
TEDs, and to this end the TED Voluntary Use Committee (a group of environmental 
and industry representatives) was formed to coordinate activities. The NGO's 
acquiescence to collaborate with the shrimping industry stemmed largely from their 
realisation that they would otherwise be unable to meet with the thousands of 
shrimpers located between North Carolina and Texas. Together NMFS, NGOs, 
scientists and industry bodies convened a working group to promote the voluntary use 
of TEDs. This group met regularly over the next several years. They sought to promote 
broader awareness of TEDs and to secure funding for further trials and training in their 
use. 
By the end of 1983 the Voluntary Use Committee had agreed to the goal of 50 percent 
TED coverage by the end of 1986. Furthermore it aimed that within three years a 
majority of southeastern US shrimpers would be using TEDs, with 100% coverage in 
areas of critical importance to sea turtles, in particular the Kemp's ridley. As voluntary 
TED adoption failed to gain support though, NGOs begun pressing for the mandatory 
adoption of TEDs. 
Meanwhile, throughout 1982 and 1983 NMFS continued testing its TED in the smaller 
trawls of the northern and western Gulf of Mexico. In tests on commercial trawlers 
TEDs greatly reduced sea turtle captures, maintain shrimp catch and reduced finfish 
bycatch. Field trials were concluded in 1984, by which time NMFS had spent 
somewhere between $2 and $3.4 million on the TED research.18 Testing all but ceased 
in 1984 when on the recommendation of Representative John Breaux of Louisiana - 
responding to the hostile view of his shrimp trawl constituents to TEDs - the House 
Appropriations Committee cut funds to TED research."' 
Notwithstanding this undermining of NMFS voluntary adoption program, in particular 
through a reduced capacity to educate and train shrimpers on the importance and use 
of TEDs, the NMFS remained reticent to promulgate compulsory TED regulations. 
Other players including the FWS began to push for mandatory TED requirements. The 
118 The figure depends on the source see Margavio, A., Laska, S., Mason, J. and Forsyth, C., 
"Captives of Conflict: The TEDs Case" (1993) 6 Society and Natural Resources 273; and Conner, D., 
"Turtles, Trawlers, and TEDs: What Happens when the Endangered Species Act Conflicts with 
Fishermen's Interests" (1987) 7 Water Log 3. 
119 Per. comm. Eugene Buck, op. cit. n10. 
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FWS had been protecting Mexican nesting grounds of the Kemp's ridley since 1978 and 
was adamant not to allow the gains offered by this protection be eroded by high levels 
of domestic bycatch. NMFS responded to the FWS's attempts to encourage greater 
action, by reaffirming its position that such regulations would be too burdensome for 
shrimpers. It argued that industry was suffering economic difficulties already, and 
urged the FWS and NGOs to have patience in pursuing the industry's the adoption of 
TEDs. 
On skeleton funding NMFS continued refining the devices. In November 1985 NMFS 
reported that it had perfected a lightweight collapsible TED that all but eliminated sea 
turtle bycatch, maintained shrimp harvest and reduced finfish take by 50 -70 percent. 
Notwithstanding these impressive results industry organisations still refused to 
commit their members to the use of the device. By this stage, less than one percent of 
shrimpers in the fishery were using TEDs. The original device's poor reputation had 
retarded the adoption of subsequent models - TEDs were thus tainted 120 
The Sea Turtle Recovery Plan was finalised and approved by NMFS in 1985. The U.S. 
Sea Turtle Recovery Team, composed of leading turtle scientists. They advocated 
enhanced protection for nesting beaches, and a range of measures to reduce sea turtle 
mortality on sea and land. These included the finding that the time for encouraging 
voluntary use of TED had passed, and that reversing the decline of sea turtle 
populations required definitive action in all waters from North Carolina to Texas 121 
By the mid 1980s the Kemp's ridley had reached dangerously low numbers. Only 200 
nests were found at the species principle nesting beach, and the total number of nests 
laid had dropped below 800. Concerned by these figures and the ongoing refusal of 
both NMFS to require and shrimpers to voluntarily use TEDs, in early 1986 a coalition 
of NGOs and requested that the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Management Council 
consider requiring the use of TEDs under the Magnuson FCMA. A similar request was 
made under the ESA. 
The FWS also remained concerned. The regional direction appealed to the Gulf of 
Mexico FMC to create compulsory TED requirements. A response emerged by the July 
when the Council recommended that shrimp vessels be required to use TEDs in certain 
locations and at certain times of the year. The Council was however accused of 
attempting to avoid the issue and its responsibilities under the FCMA, by handing the 
substantive management of the matter over to the NMFS. 
120 Conner (1987) op. cit. n118. 
121 Protected Species Program, Annual Report FY 85, Trawling Efficiency Device Project (Southeast 
Fisheries Center, NMFS, 1985). 
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It was around this time that it became clear to the NMFS that voluntary TED adoption 
was not going to occur. 
Some NMFS employees have blamed the lack of acceptance of TEDs upon the Sea 
Grant Extension Service (SGES). Though the SGES is not a federal agency, in the early 
1970s in a major administrative reshuffle the role for liaising between fishers and the 
NMFS who were responsible for the policy development and regulation. They were 
interpreters of policy and science for fishers.' This division of labor worked relatively 
well until the emergence of the TEDs dispute. It was at this time that the SGES's 
position of nonpartisanship became an issue. NMFS officials had hoped that marine 
agents would be helpful advocates of TEDs. The SGES viewed this as a violation of 
their professional mandate, and as an untenable position in opposition to the 
communities where they lived.' NMFS however saw the agents' attempts to remain 
neutral and their refusal to advocate the depar tilnent's position on TEDs as disruptive 
to the goal of the parent organisation, the Department of Commerce.124 To be sure the 
SGES's position, no matter how valid, can not have but impaired the adoption of 
TEDs by shrimpers. As a consequence, in January 1986 NMFS attempted to address 
the problems internal conflicts between itself and the implementing agency the SGES, 
which had by this stage reached high proportions.' NOAA initiated a series of 
conflict resolution workshops between NMFS and the Sea Grant Extension Service, 
which ultimately failed.'26 
Industry Opposition to TEDs & the Role of Science 
Among fishers there had emerged considerable unexpected opposition to the use of the 
new device. This came in particular from Gulf of Mexico fishers,' and NMFS was 
largely unsuccessful in its efforts to encourage voluntary adoption. 
122 Per. comm. Eugene Buck op. cit. n10. 
123 Margavio et al. (1993) op, cit. n118. 
124 The SGES was linked to the Department of Commerce as the Agency who administered the Sea 
Grant scheme under which the positions of these agents were coordinated. Per. comm. Rod Moore op. 
cit. n37. 
125 With the 1976 passage of the FCMA, the NMFS was allocated the regulatory role and the Sea 
Grant Extension Service adopted an educational and advisory mission. Notwithstanding some tension 
between the two agencies, this division of labor work relatively well prior to the emergence of unpopular 
regulations. 
126 In part this failure was due to the emergence of another issue - that of the NMFS willingness to 
listen to new innovation as proposed by fishers. According to Rod Moore, after the eventual passage of 
the regulations, numerous fishers commenced on projects to modify and redevelop the initial device. 
NMFS however, appeared unwilling to Iisten. The SGES constantly faced fishers coming to them with 
new adaptations of TEDs but with the complaint hat the NMFS refused to consider these, In their liaison 
role the SGES would then try to proposed these same ideas to NMFS and receive the same lack of 
attention. Per. comm. Rod Moore op. cit. n37. 
127 A disparity witnessed between Gulf shrimpers and Atlantic coast shrimpers reflects this perceived 
difference in their impact on sea turtle populations Gulf shrimpers maintained that they did not capture 
continued over page 
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Compounding the extant state of the fishery was the complexity of the device itself. 
Innovations are adopted rapidly and voluntarily when they are affordable and 
economically advantageous and the necessary changes do not require an alteration in 
existing perceptions or beliefs.' In the case of TEDs, fishers believed that none of 
these conditions had been met, though NMFS firmly felt that all such conditions had 
been obtained. The main reason for the failure of NMFS's voluntary adoption program 
was that many shrimpers believed that a significant impact would be imposed upon 
them due primarily to reduced catches. Moreover, they believed that the devices were 
unnecessary. They did not consider shrimping to be a major threat to sea turtles.129 
Federally or court- managed adoption of Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) 
by the American shrimp trawling fleet will not save any species of sea 
turtle from extinction. Mandatory TED utilization, however, will almost 
certainly cause economic hardship, dislocation and ruin to an important 
contributor to American culture and the economy.' 
The stark difference in shrimper perception and NMFS data on sea turtle bycatch rates 
is largely a result of the effect being cumulative. NMFS observers have documented a 
rate of one turtle capture for every 31 hours of towing off eastern Florida, with 20 to 
40 percent of these being dead when hauled aboard. Thus although individual fishers 
may rarely capture turtles, when extrapolated to several million hours of trawling the 
total annual catch mortality of sea turtles is unacceptably high. In terms of such data it 
is worth recalling that the ESA does not require that management decision be based 
upon perfect data, rather that the best used be made of available date' 
Resistance to TEDs also stemmed from a belief that they would add to the litany of 
woes that fishers already faced such as cheap imports, farm -bred shrimp, rising fuel 
and insurance costs, falling prices and a crowded fishery.132 On the other hand the 
benefits believed by NMFS to be offered by TEDs, such as fuel reduction, were 
sea turtles, and in fact their take rate was significantly less than their Atlantic counterparts, capturing one 
turtle per 322 hours fished as compared with one ever 20 hours (Henwood, T. and Stuntz, W., "Analysis 
of Sea Turtle Captures and Mortalities During Commercial Shrimp Trawling" (1987) 85 Fishery Bulletin 
813)_ 
128 Moberg, M. and Dyer, C., "Conservation and Forced Innovation: Responses to Turtle Excluder 
Devices among Gulf of Mexico Shrimpers" (1994) 53 human Organisation 160. 
129 Tucker, A., Robins, J. and McPhee, D., "Adopting Turtle Exclusion Devices in Australia and the 
United States: What are the Differences in Technology Transfer, Promotion, and Acceptance ?" (1997) 25 
Coastal Management 405 
130 Mialjevich, T., "Sea Turtles and TEDs: A Misdirected and Counterproductive Effort to Save 
Turtles" (1987) 7 Water Log 28 at 28. 
131 Conner (1987) op. cit. n118. 
132 Margavio et al. (1993) op. cit. n118. According to Dyer and Moberg (1992) the fishers' hostility 
is compounded by their lack of opportunity for occupational change. Substantial investments and their 
extensive experience in shrimping combined with a lack of formal education makes it extremely difficult 
for most fishers to change occupation. Dyer, C. and Moberg, M., "The 'Moral Economy' of Resistance" 
(1992) 5 Maritime Anthropological Studies 18. 
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considered by fishers to be slight. And in some cases, none of the anticipated benefits 
flowed.133 Cemented into fishers' psyche was the following view. 
It is certain ... that given increasing costs, decreasing or stable prices, 
imports, increasing effort, increasing numbers of boats, the entrance of 
new fishermen into the fishery, and the closure of the Mexican waters, 
TEDs will not benefit anyone in the shrimping industry - fishermen, 
processors, or dealers.134 
Once the industry opinion was formed, it proved near impossible to alter. After poor 
trials with early devices, and given the prevalent economic crisis, regardless of their 
utility for turtle exclusion, TEDs were never going to have been looked upon favourably 
by fishers.135 Indeed given the dire situation many shrimpers found themselves in, the 
introduction of TEDs became the proverbial last straw. In an industry already so 
besieged, these new devices were simply another perceived burden. The difference was 
that this burden could be protested against and acted upon, and thus fishers were 
provided with the belief that they were acting to remedy their situation. The TEDs 
issue was an easy banner to wave. 
The shrimp fishermen's objections include that: 
TEDs cause an unacceptable reduction in shrimp catch; 
TEDs are hazardous to deckhands; 
the regulations requiring TEDs is based on inadequate data; 
there was insufficient industry representation at negotiations; 
other factors are more significant in turtle population decline than is shrimp 
bycatch; 
TEDs are futile if other nations' fishers are not also required to use them; 
TEDs result in increased insurance costs and consumption of fuel; and 
the gear has not been adequately tested in some areas.'36 
133 For example, the expected cost reductions from reduced labor were not realised. It was thought that 
reduced bycatch would mean quicker catch sorting, fewer working hours and thus a reduced cost in 
wages. However, because the common method of payment was based upon a percentage of the catch value 
rather than an hourly wage the captains income did not increase per se. 
134 Durrenberger, P., "Policy, Power and Science: The Implementation of the Turtle Excluder Device 
Regulations in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico Shrimp Fishery" (1990) 3 Maritime Anthropological Studies 69 
at 77. 
135 With a start -up cost estimated at between 400 and 600 dollars and two year life expectancy of the 
device, the NMFS estimates an additional cost of $400 to $1500 for towing a TED. This cost does not 
however include potential shrimp losses. It is hoped that eventually the cost in shrimp will be offset by 
increases in towing time possible because of the exclusion of other unwanted catch from the nets. This 
however was little comfort to some shrimpers. Operating on a 20 percent or lower profit margin, even a 
temporary reduction in total catch would have been enough to drive some shrimpers out of the fishery 
(Conner (1987) op. cit. ní18.). 
136 Ibid. 
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Some of these complaints were later determined to be unfounded. Increased injury to 
deckhands due to the hazardous nature of TEDs was found to be an unwarranted 
fear. In more than 15,000 hours of testing on commercial trawlers and many more of 
actual use, only one TED related injury was reported and that was associated with 
improper use of gear other than the TED. thus related complaints of insurance hikes 
due to increased risk were similarly unfounded. 
Of these points, the major concern of shrimpers was the validity of the science upon 
which the regulations were based. Science is used to validate a policy position and 
legitimise regulatory actions and decisions. Thus uncertainty is concealed. Doubts 
surrounding data are exaggerated when particular scientists who are perceived as 
partisan are involved. 
Simultaneous tests conducted under the auspice of University of Georgia Sea Grant in 
the Cape Canaveral Channel off Florida in the August 1986 revealed that all models 
were effective in excluding the loggerhead turtles found in the region. Results were as 
follows: 
device % reduction of 
shrimp catch 
acceptable level of 
turtle bycatch 
% reduction of 
other bycatch 
NMFS TED 7.7 yes 44 
Georgia jumper increased 25.5 yes 24 
Cameron TED 1 yes 33.5 
Matagorda TED 7 yes 44.5 
Shrimpers were skeptical of these tests in particular suggestions of increased shrimp 
catch. They considered the season inappropriate for the gathering of reliable data 
because the catch was too small to be reliable. Other criticisms stem from the location 
and claims that the test ought not be extrapolated to Gulf fisheries. Indeed scientists 
have not been able to replicate these results. Separate tests have found between 23 
percent loss and four percent gain in shrimp harvest with the various TEDs and fishers 
themselves who have tested the gear claim to achieve only losses of between 15 and 28 
percent.' From both these and anecdotal evidence it appeared fair to conclude that 
'fEDs will at least initially - result in a reduction in the target catch also. The 
degree of loss depends upon a variety of factors including the weather conditions, the 
type of TED used, the skill of the shrimper towing the net, the nature of the bottom, 
and perhaps differences in water temperature, depth and salinity. With practice, 
familiarity and skills with the devices also increases, and after time it is possible to 
attain a catch rate approaching what had been the norm without the device. Moreover 
TEDs are continually being refined. 
137 Reported in ibid. 
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Fishers have complained that the TEDs have not been adequately tested in inshore 
regions and in the Gulf itself. This is, according to LAMES not for their lack of hying. 
Opportunity to test TEDs in inshore waters was offered but interest was minimal. In 
1985 as part of the NMFS technology transfer program the Gulf and South Atlantic 
Fisheries Development Foundation offered $30,000 to each Gulf state to conduct TED 
tests in state waters. Only Texas accepted at the time, although by 1987 all Gulf states 
were carrying out similar tests facilitated through the same funding source. Indeed, the 
lack of reliable inshore data led to NMFS's modification of the rule so as to eliminate 
TED requirements so long as tow time restrictions are observed. 
Counter claims that shrimpers are innovation shy were also unfounded, as can be seen 
through their record of gear experimentalism. Within living memory shrimpers had: 
adopted trawl nets and motorised vessels, 
switched from gasoline to diesel engines, 
expanded into the Gulf with larger vessels, 
experimented with various net configurations and riggings and largely replaced 
lugger- rigged boats pulling single nets with double -rigged boats pulling two nets, 
developed cannonball shooters to exclude jellyfish catch, and 
adopted a wide spectrum of electronic communication and navigation 
equipment.'" 
Regardless of their reasons for and the validity of their objections to TEDs, the 
strength of opposition should have been realised in 1983 when two hundred TEDs 
built by a government contractor and available largely free to shrimpers in South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida were met with a resounding silence. NMFS had also 
initiated a program to formally train and encourage shrimpers to use TEDs in their 
day -to -day operations. Fishers however, remained highly skeptical and few responded 
the agency's efforts. Even in the state of Georgia where $80,000 in fuel rebates were 
offered to shrimpers who agreed to use TEDs, little interest was attracted. 
One environmentalist contended that the shrimpers' belief that they had a problem 
with TEDs was due to persistent propaganda by leading industry representative 
bodies who found it to be to their advantage to create an environment of enormous 
perceived risk, and that shrimpers were sadly manipulated.'39 
138 White, D., 'Sea Turtles and Resistance to TEDs Among Shrimp Fishermen of the U.S. Gulf 
Coast" (1989) 2 Maritime Anthropological Studies 69. 
139 Reported in Margavio et al. (1993) op. cit. n118. 
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Mandatory TED Requirements 
On the 20 August 1986 NMFS held a briefing in Washington for shrimp and NGO 
representatives to unveil and explain proposed mandatory TED regulations. Rather 
than being left to a NMFS employee, because of their contentious nature, the 
presentation of the regulations was by the NOAA Administrator Anthony Calio. The 
proposed regulations compelled the use of TEDs by shrimpers, and then exempted 
some areas included in which were several regions where sea turtles were drowned 
regularly. These regulations were to apply only to the three Gulf states of Louisiana, 
Florida and Texas and were not intended to become fully effective until 1990. The 
route was not however to be a smooth one. 
As a result of political machinations, the federal government spent 
millions of dollars holding hearings at which the same people testified 
time and again making the same points, chasing down false rumours ... 
and devoting extra effort to enforcing the law of the land, a law that had 
been repeatedly upheld by the courts and Congress itself.10 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the draft regulations received criticism from all participants. 
Two days after their release CEE served notice of an impending law suit on the 
Secretary of Commerce. The basis of this was that NMFS, by failing to mandate the 
use of best available technology to prevent the take of endangered and threatened sea 
turtles, was in breech of the ESA. As provided for under the ESA if the agency took no 
steps within 60 days to remedy the situation the CEE could - and would - sue. Its 
statement of claim suggested such a suit would call for a closure of all shrimp fisheries 
bar those beyond the turtle's range, until TEDs were installed on all shrimp boats. 
Dissatisfied with the proposed rule and alarmed over the prospect of a fishing closure 
as threatened by NGOs, at the end of August 1986 the shrimping industry requested 
mediation. At this point the NOAA administrator suggested a novel but not untried 
alternative: negotiated rule making!' 
Several members of the environmental community at that time pressed to 
take us to court and we put that off by agreeing that we would convene a 
negotiated rule making. This is an unusual process for the government, 
where basically we would get the two sides that had an interest in this 
issue together, supply them with all the scientific information the 
140 Weber, P., Crouse, D., Irwin. R. and Iudicello, S., Delay and Denial: a Political History of Sea 
Turtles and Shrimp Fishing (Center for Marine Conservation, Washington DC, 1995). 
141 Ordinarily agencies use notice and comment rulemaking. Negotiated rule- making refers to face to 
face negotiation which allows parties to formulate their own mutually agreeable rule. It is often used in 
potentially explosive situations, instigated so as to avoid time -consuming and costly litigation between 
parties and involving the agency. Although previously used by the EPA with some success, the NMFS 
had never previously engaged this process. Critics warn of deals behind closed doors, but the benefits of a 
relatively uneventful review and public consultation period are believed often to outweigh concerns. 
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government had, supply them with the government's recommendations for 
where a solution might lie, but then ask them to develop the solution.12 
The result is often an endpoint rule with greater legitimacy than had the agency 
formulated a draft and pursued the normal consultation and rulemaking process. 
A professional mediator from Alaska was chosen for the task. Environmentalists were 
represented by several of the leading NGOs: the CEE, the Environment Defenders 
Fund, Greenpeace and Monitor all sent spokespersons. The only affected shrimping 
state that lacked industry representation at these negotiations was North Carolina.13 
The issue of finfish bycatch was initially floated by NGOs keen to include this in 
negotiations, however both NMFS and the industry were adamant that all negotiations 
would cease should finfish issues be raised again in this forum. 
Notwithstanding their beginning with vastly disparate positions, the parties eventually 
agreed on two principles - firstly that endangered sea turtles should be protected by 
whatever means available, and secondly that this should be done as far as practicable 
without adversely affecting the shrimping industry. In other terms the goals were 97% 
exclusion of turtles with 97% retention of target (shrimp) catch. 
Shrimpers emphasised the need for concomitant efforts to save sea turtles, such as 
hatcheries. They also raised the issues of foreign imports of shrimp produced by 
methods harmful to turtles and the need to limit these imports from U.S. trade 
partners, in particular Mexico. After 14 days of mediated negotiation, on 12 December 
1986 an agreement was announced and signed. Both sides felt the agreement had 
shortcomings, but at the time both parties seemed willing to live with the concessions 
they had in good faith made. Industry representatives agreed upon a three year phase 
in of TEDs in specified areas of the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico. Assisting in 
gaining this substantial concession was the IUCN's identification of the Kemp's ridley 
as one of the 12 most endangered animals in the world. And in turn, environmentalists 
conceded to a relaxed enforcement policy whereunder so long as shrimp vessels were 
installed with exclusion devices their operators would not be prosecuted for capturing 
endangered or threatened sea turtles. This agreement was to be formulated into 
regulations and published.' The NMFS also prepared a draft supplement to the 
original 1978 EIS and issued it in February 1987. 
142 Per. comm. Jay Johnson op. cit. n115. 
143 The shrimpers were represented by the Texas Shrimp Association, the Southeastern Fisheries 
Association, the Louisiana Shrimpers Association, the Concerned Shrimpers of Louisiana, the South 
Carolina Shrimpers Association, and the Bryan County (Georgia) Fisheries Co -op. 
144 52 Fed. Reg. 6179 (1987). 
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At the very conclusion of negotiations, but prior to signing, one member participant, 
Tee John Mialjevich "articulate shrimper from Delcambre" and representative of the 
Concerned Shrimpers of America,° was called away due to the sudden death of his 
mother. What followed has since entered the realm of folklore and is told as follows: 
TJ goes home and every one else signs. Word of the agreement leaks out 
and the more radical of the fishermen just went nuts. These guys then 
caught up with TJ before he went back to the meeting. Whether honestly 
trying to carry out of the wishes of the folk he went to represent, or if he 
thought that was a great way to be a leader and the others could take the 
blame is unknown. But anyhow TJ refused to sign. And fishers began to 
rally around this group. 
Subsequent to the conclusion of negotiations Mialjevich initiated a two pronged 
campaign of resistance. His primary strategy was to cultivate grass roots mobilisation. 
He has in his efforts however been accused of propagating misinformation and 
spreading fear throughout the industry, with claims that shrimpers didn't catch sea 
turtles, that the animals were not endangered anyhow, and that TEDs would cause 
economic ruin to the industry. Secondly Mialjevich sought to utilise more formalised 
legal and political means of resistance aligning his association whenever possible with 
dissident states. 
Mialjevich's opposition was based upon the basic premise that TEDs don't work. He 
contended firstly that the amount of debris caught in TEDs prevented the ejection of 
turtles and thus that TEDs were ineffective in saving turtles. Secondly, because 
shrimpers operate under a very small profit margin, he maintained that shrimp losses 
due to TEDs would make the industry unviable. As the closure of shrimping was not 
the goal of any involved such an outcome would have rendered the TED an 
unequivocable failure.'` 
This is not to say that Mialjevich offered no constructive proposals to assist sea 
turtles. Suggestions included an expansion of hatchery and headstarting programs and 
industry funding to assist such efforts.'"g While such initiative is laudable, these 
schemes were designed to function concomitant with, not as alternatives to, 
preventative measures. Thus such programs are criticised however as being halfway 
technology and stop gap measures and hence inconsistent with the goals of the ESA.19 
145 Formerly the Concerned Shrimpers of Louisiana. 
146 Per. comm. confidential source. 
147 Mialjevich (1987) op. cit. ní30. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Frazer, N., "Sea Turtle Conservation and Halfway Technology" (1992) 6 Conservation Biology 
179. 
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Similarly in defense of the ESA's substantial requirements for impact mitigation, it has 
been remarked that 
while undoubtedly placing a burden on shrimp fishermen, [the rule] is an 
inevitable consequence of policy choices that the American people, 
through their elected representatives, made when the Endangered Species 
Act was enacted in 1973.150 
Some have suggested that this was where NMFS's fatal error occurred. 
What they [NMFS] should have done was to sit down with fishers and 
the marine agents and agreeing to redevelop TEDs , recalling that one 
thing the fishermen like is a challenge. Saying we aren't going to pay any 
attention to Tee John with his fuss and you're all going to have to have 
TEDs with x, y and z but you can do anything else you like to them.'s' 
Meanwhile there was unrest within the environmental community whereby they 
threatened to sue if the NMFS did not carry out the actions agreed to at the 
negotiations, and thus the process of negotiated rule making began to skew from the 
textbook scenario. Indeed Conner warns that if the negotiators are not truly 
representative and do not have the power to bind their constituents the process may 
go awry. Both the representatives and the agreements may be repudiated if the 
outcome is perceived as unfairly unfavourable by one party. This is what happened in 
1987 with the shrimp industry's response to the mandatory TED rule. 
Notwithstanding that the final rule evolved out of a compromise between a panel of 
negotiators representing both shrimping and conservation interests, a large number of 
shrimp fishers have expressed a strong objection to the outcome of the negotiations 
and the rule that resulted. 
The campaign of public misinformation was escalated. For example several Louisiana 
state officials have claimed that a loss of $50 million in shrimp income would result 
from the implementation of the regulations. This figure was reached by using the 
highest tested shrimp loss for TEDs and extrapolating it to all shrimpers in Louisiana, 
instead of just those who would have actually been required to use the device by 1989 
(that is 26,000 rather than 2,000 shrimpers).' 
In this way shrimpers were provoked to actively oppose the regulations at public 
hearings in 16 locations across the region in March 1987. Led by Mialjevich, shrimpers 
turned out en masse. In Thibodaux, Louisiana the venue was filled to its 5,600 
capacity and state police were present to control both the traffic and the participants. 
So strong were their feelings against the TED that large numbers of inshore shrimpers 
150 Conner (1987) op. cit. n118 at 3. 
151 Per comm. Rod Moore op. cit. n37. 
152 Weber, M., "Turtles and the Tellico Dam Syndrome" (1987) 7 Water Log 32. 
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threatened to ignore the law and vowed that they would forfeit their vessels and go to 
jail rather than use TEDs. Some flew to Washington DC to give testimony at ESA 
reauthorisation hearings. Letter writing campaigns were organised and Southeastern 
Congressmen reported that the mail they received was of the ratio ten to one against 
the TED rule. According to Conner "government officials were heard to comment that 
they had never seen more people turn out on any fishery issue - ever.i' Indeed prior 
to the close of the review period in the May 1987 NMFS received thousands of written 
and oral comments on the rule. Predictably most were from fishers or 
environmentalists, although they came also from U.S. Congressmen, Governors, and 
Attorneys -General of several southern states. 
The various states reacted vastly differently to the proposed regulations, partisan lines 
seeming to have little to do with the issue. Acclaim for it appeared however to be in 
the minority, with Republican Congressman Arthur Ravenel of South Carolina one of 
the few members to outspokenly lend the TED law his support. 
In Mississippi the Governor and Attorney -General both condemned the mandatory 
TED regulation and a Mississippi state Senator announced his intention to introduce a 
bill which made the use of TEDs in state waters illegal. Similarly in Louisiana, the 
Attorney -General, the Governor, and federal Congressmen all vigorously opposed the 
device's mandatory introduction - the Governor remarking that "perhaps some 
species were just meant to disappear. "' Congressmen attempted to delay and relax 
TED requirements. In March 1987, Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee held 
TED hearings as it considered the reauthorisation of the ESA. The Committee twice 
rejected an ESA amendment to delay the TED requirements for two years. On 1 April 
1987 Bob Livingston introduced H.R.1898 to defer implementation of the regulation 
until 15 July 1988. Offered as a supplemental appropriations bill the final version 
allowed a delay only until 30 September 1987. Meanwhile Senator John Breaux 
attempted to provide a caveat whereby TEDs shown not to be 97% effective in shrimp 
retention would not be required to be used and alternate conservation techniques 
would be sought.155 This however was unsuccessful. 
As with most U.S. legislation, the ESA provides for periodic review by Congress in a 
process called reauthorisation. Congressional authorisation for the ESA expired in 
153 Conner (1987) op. cit. n118 at 14. 
154 Reported in ibid at 15. 
155 Senator Breaux has achieved a reputation as "moderating force ". His constituent is shrimp 
fishermen, however he has tried to look at the science behind the fisheries and has tried to walk a fairly 
narrow line of seeing the shrimpers aren't negatively impacted but accepting that when the science is 
there that something has to be done. Per. comm. Dr Deborah Crouse, Biologist, Division of Endangered 
Species, Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington DC, 20 April 1999. 
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September 1985. A combination of factors such as the controversy over sea otters, 
grizzly bears, red wolves, and later sea turtles, slowed Congress's process of 
reauthorisation for the Act. Indeed in the financial years from 1986 through 1988, 
when reauthorisation finally occurred, Congress continued to annually extend the Act's 
provision with interim funding bills. Although symbolically significant, there was no 
practical difference between this and reauthorisation. 
Unless a law has built -in "sunset" provisions (i.e. automatic expiration), 
reauthorisation is only a formal review. So long as Congress continues to 
appropriate funds for implementation and enforcement, the law is not in 
abeyance. In fact, even if Congress failed totally to provide interim funds, 
the ESA, as we have seen, is enforceable by private parties because of the 
citizen suit provisions.156 
Due to this intense grassroots pressure two of the industry representatives who had 
signed the original agreements recanted and withdrew their support for it. These 
belonged to the Shrimp Associations of Louisiana and of Texas. It has been suggested 
that compounding the pressure to resist the TED regulations was a lack of 
encouragement for TEDs from the SGES - the primary liaison agents. Throughout this 
period the SGES maintained the same non -advocacy position it had during the 
voluntary TEDs period. Some NMFS officials suggest that this went further and that 
some SGES employees publicly made disparaging remarks about the program.157 
Although the original participants of the negotiated rule were no longer formally 
involved the NMFS sought their opinion on changes to the final rule. Published on June 
29 1987 the final rule reflects a high level of compromise.15e Changes from the original 
negotiated rule include a delayed commencement date till January 1 1988 and October 
1 1987 for the Canaveral channel. Differences in where TEDs would be required, meant 
that they covered a greater area than the draft rule had proposed and extended over 
longer seasons. Regulations apply out to 15nm from shore in the Gulf for the first year 
and after that out the full width of the EEZ. They were however exempt from inshore 
waters with the proviso that tow times be restricted to 90 minutes.159 Tow times were 
measured from deployment to retrieval, hence the typical bottom time has been 
estimated to be roughly 60 -75 minutes which would cause negligible turtle mortality 
due to their 90 minute submersion capabilities. Finally vessels under 25 feet were 
exempted from requirements to use TEDs in offshore water provided that the tow time 
156 Conner (1987) op cit. n118 at 9. 
157 Margavio et al. (1993) op. cit. n118. 
158 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244- 24,262, (1987). 
159 Inshore waters generally refers to bays covered by state jurisdiction. The definitions of inshore and 
offshore have been clarified under 52 Fed. Reg. 37,152- 37,154 (1987). 
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limit was observed. The details required approximately 7000 out of the 20000 
operating shrimp trawlers to use TEDs. 
By 1987 when the first stage of the regulations became active, several models of TEDs 
had been approved by NMFS. These are the modified NMFS TED, the Georgia Jumper, 
the Cameron TED the Matagorda TED the Mississippi Hybrid and the Morrison soft 
TED."° These devices were estimated to cost about $400 for both materials and 
labour. NMFS expected the device to exclude 97 percent of turtles without a significant 
reduction in shrimp harvest: thus meeting both the principles established during the 
initial negotiations. 
Following the publication of the final rule, in August 1987 the Attorney -General of 
North Carolina petitioned NMFS to withdraw those parts of the regulations that 
applied to North Carolina waters and were not included in the draft proposal. He 
argued that the addition of such waters amounted to an abuse of agency discretion, 
and threatened to file suit in U.S. District Court if these section were not removed. In 
the October NMFS agreed to withdraw the disputed provisions. 
in November 1987 Congressman Billy Tauzin announced that he would try to attach 
an amendment delaying mandatory TEDs for the year to the ESA reauthorisation bill, 
at the time under consideration.161 In the December of the same year and during 
consideration of the ESA reauthorisation a fight on the floor of the House of 
Representatives concerning the TED requirements resulted in a 270 -147 vote against 
the delay of the regulations. 
Around this time the state of Louisiana filed suit in the U.S. District Court seeking an 
injunction against the enforcement of the final TED rule on the ground that the rule was 
arbitrary and capricious due to its lack of consideration of the special conditions that 
exist in each state.' This claim was based on four further contentions: 
160 Ibid. The baseline for approval of a TED by the NMFS is 97% exclusion of turtles, including those 
as wide as 32 inch curved carapace in the Gulf and 35 in the South Atlantic, and as small as 6 inch linear 
width (Conner (1987) op. cit. nl 18). 
161 In Florida commercial harvesters contribute relatively little to the economy compared to recreational 
interests. In Louisiana by contrast commercial harvesters are both economically, and by virtue of their 
number politically significant. Also is a historical long -standing tension between Washington DC and 
Louisiana, which became intertwined in the TEDs debate. For may years Congressman Billy Tauzin 
repeatedly put proposals before Congress that would either weaken the ESA as a whole or specifically 
amend it to weaken the sea turtle provisions. His constituency is the LA shrimp fishermen. Though there 
is some question as to the extent his proposed alterations were in response to this issue specifically or a 
more general desire to reform the ESA. Per. comm. confidential source. 
162 Ordinarily a court will overturn an agency regulation for only one of four reasons: 
1 . if the regulation exceed the agencies authority 
2. if the regulation is an abuse of the agencies discretion 
3, if the regulation is arbitrary or capricious or 
4. if the regulation was adopted by improper procedure. 
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a lack of testing of TEDs in the various states prior to the imposition of the rule, 
a lack of proof that endangered turtles occur in Louisiana waters in numbers of 
enough significance to justify the regulations, 
that the regulations were overly broad and not adopted in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedures Act and alternatives not adequately considered, and 
finally 
that the regulations violate the shrimpers constitutional right to due process of 
law and equal protection ' 
Attorneys -General in both Texas and Alabama expressed interest in joining as 
plaintiffs in the Louisiana suit. And the Concerned Shrimpers of America led by 
Mialjevich made a similar expression of interest 1 
Shrimpers and NGOs had meanwhile resumed negotiations endorsed by the Louisiana 
Senator John Breaux. These negotiations however broke down when shrimping 
representatives refused to describe a program of TED testing that they would find 
credible.' 
In mid 1988, Senator Howell Heflin of Alabama proposed an amendment to the ESA 
that would delay the TED requirements for two years and require a study of sea turtle 
conservation by the NAS. In so doing he questioned the endangered status of the 
Kemp's ridley.-63 With limited time before the TED regulations for the Gulf of Mexico 
became active the Senate approved Heflin's amendments. The provision calling for the 
NAS study was also passed, a concession to Senator Heflin so as to contain his 
objection to Senate consideration of the ESA's reauthorisation.167 After further 
negotiations between the House and the Senate, the House also passed the ESA 
163 Wilkins, 7., "TEDs and the Endangered Species Act of 1983" (1987) 65 Louisiana Coastal Law 1 
at 4 -5. 
164 Conner (1987) op. cit. nI18. 
165 Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. n140 at 16. 
166 The council came to be simply because the fishing industry did not believe the NMFS science that 
there was a bycatch problem so Congress said they would create this panel of independent scientists to 
assess the information. Per. comm. Theresa Conant, Fisheries Biologist National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS), Office of Protected Resources, Washington DC, 19 April 1990. 
167 Senator Heflin's power stemmed form a Senate rule that provides any Senator the ability to place a 
hold on any piece of legislation to prevent it from coming to the floor for action. 
Nowhere mentioned in Senate rules or precedents, holds are an informal device unique to the upper body. 
They permit a single Senator or any number of Senators to stop - sometimes temporarily, sometimes 
permanently - floor consideration of measures or matters that are available to be scheduled by the 
Senate. A hold, in brief, is a request by a Senator to his or her party leader to delay floor action on a 
measure or matter. It is up to the majority leader to decide whether, or for how long, he will honor a 
colleague's hold. Scheduling the business of the Senate is the fundamental prerogative of the majority 
leader, and it is done in consultation with the minority leader. Per. comm. Eugene Buck, op. cit. n10, 
referring to Oleszek, W., "Holds" in the Senate (unpublished report, CRS Government and Finance 
Division, Washington DC). 
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reauthorisation bill including the TED provision. The mandatory use of TEDs ìn 
offshore waters was not to take effect until the first of May 1989, and requirements 
that tow times be restricted to 90 minutes or that TEDs be used in inshore waters and 
bay was delayed an additional year. In October 1988 President Reagan signed this bill 
into law. 
Meanwhile the law suit brought by Louisiana and supported by several other states 
faltered. In early 1988 the Federal District Court in New Orleans rejected the plaintiff's 
arguments, finding ample evidence of the need for and efficacy of TEDs in reducing the 
bycatch of sea turtles, and upholding NMFS's authority to require TEDs. The court did 
however suspend the regulations pending an appeal by the state. And in response to 
the rule's suspension in Louisiana, the NMFS suspended the TED regulations 
throughout their range. At appeal the state of Louisiana's claims were again rejected, 
the court once again finding ample evidence of the need for and utility of TEDs. 
Having grown weary of this ongoing uncertainty and tired of waiting for federal action 
to conserve sea turtle, the state of South Carolina adopted its own TED regulations. 
These required the use of TEDs in all state waters in 1988, including inshore waters. 
The South Carolina, regulations did meet with opposition at the time. Regular 
challenges to the validity of these regulations were mounted and each time rejected by 
the courts. Throughout this process and during judicial review the regulations were 
periodically suspended. As newer and lighter TEDs such a the "Georgia Jumper" began 
gaining greater acceptance among some South Atlantic shrimpers, the South Carolina 
regulations became increasingly accepted as a necessary, and by some as even a 
beneficial, part of the shrimping. Notably the number of sea turtles washing up on 
South Carolina beaches declined significantly. 
Regardless of the legal and political machinations of the TED and turtle- shrimp 
process, the actualities were that for the short periods of 1988 where the TED 
regulations were active, there was widespread violation.' Indeed in final throws of 
1988 intense shrimping off the Florida and Georgia coast led to massive strandings of 
Kemp's ridley sea turtles, these making up 71 of the 171 dead sea turtle strandings. As 
a result of these strandings, early in 1989 the state of Florida, which had traditionally 
been opposed to TEDs, promulgated its own regulations requiring the use of TEDs in 
state waters. Federally, NMFS followed suit. 
168 Dyer and Moberg (1992) op. cit. n132. The situation was perhaps exacerbated in that, through 
1988, enforcement agents would only issue warnings to shrimpers who did not use TEDs in required 
areas. 
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With the inauguration of George Bush as President a new group of political appointees 
assumed responsibility for implementing the ESA, Most of them were entirely ignorant 
of the controversy over TEDs that had gone before them.169 Robert Mosbacher was 
appointed as the new Secretary of Commerce. A former Houston businessman, the 
anti-TED coalition sensed an ally. 
Secretary Mosbacher met with shrimpers and their Congressional representatives and, 
in contrast to the reaction of the previous executive, the regulations were rewritten in a 
matter of days. In response to political pressure Secretary Mosbacher announced that 
the enforcement of TED requirements would be suspended for another 60 days after 
the first of May. Justification for this extension was that it was necessary to allow 
shrimpers time to purchase and install the devices. The fact that shrimpers had known 
of the pending requirements for roughly seven months was apparently not relevant. 
Rather than having any particular sympathy for shrimpers however it has been 
suggested that though he 
may have been more vulnerable to the pressure from the industry, he was 
more just wishing that the issue would go away. ...Mosbacher was simply 
afraid to take a hard stance or firm position based on the science he was 
trying to appease every one.1° 
As the 60 day suspension period drew to a close, suggestions that there were 
unusually high levels of sargassum weed in the gulf clogging up TEDs began to spread. 
In response to claims by Congressman Tauzin of Louisiana that seagrasses clog up 
TEDs and that this would lead to the financial ruin of the industry, Secretary 
Mosbacher again suspended TED regulations while NMFS conducted surveys for TED- 
dogging seaweed. Investigations found in only 5 out of 250 trawl samples contained 
sargassum weed. Mosbacher reluctantly reinstated the rule, apologising to Gulf of 
Mexico Congressmen that he had no alternative, and on 22 July 1989 the Coast Guard 
was directed to enforce TED requirements. 
In response shrimpers began a concerted period of protest and civil disobedience. They 
blocked the Houston shipping channel, prevented navigation by ferries and weekend 
craft, and some resorted to throwing wrenches at Coast Guard personnel. Secretary 
Mosbacher flew to Galveston, Texas to meet with 24 members of the gulf 
Congressional delegation and the Concerned Shrimpers of America. In response to 
these talks he immediately announced the suspension of the TED regulations for a 
further 45 days. As a concession to NGOs the Secretary had been assured that 
shrimpers would avoid downing sea turtles by limiting their tow times to 105 minutes, 
169 Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. n140. 
170 Per. comm. Dr Debby Crouse op. cit. n155. 
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a duration well beyond that likely to cause a turtle to drown. Once again the Coast 
Guard found that the tow time restrictions were not being complied with. Of 473 
vessels observed in one period, 274 more than half - were exceeding the agreed 
tow time. 
Immediately after the suspension of the TED regulations the National Wildlife 
Federation and its affiliates filed suit to have the rules reinstated. In August a Federal 
District Court found that the suspension of the TED rules was unlawful, and ordered 
NMFS to reinstate the TED regulations or to adopt an alternate means of protecting 
sea turtles from bycatch. At the suggestion of the shrimping industry, NMFS proposed 
replacing mandatory TED requirements with continuation of tow time limits. The 
provision to use of tow times to minimise turtle bycatch lasted 30 days during which 
period the Commerce department reviewed sea turtle conservation in U.S. waters. In 
the face of massive violations of the tow times NMFS reinstated the TED regulations 
on 13 September 1989, and these were enforced by the Coast Guard by Mosbacher's 
direction as of October 15. One commentary has suggested that this was tantamount 
to admitting that even if tow times were observed that as many turtles would die as 
had there been no tow time limits at all. "' The regulations remained active in the Gulf 
of Mexico until the 30th of November. 
In a desperate search for a politically palatable solution, on a flight to New Orleans on 
8 September several Congressmen raised the issue, and by reports harangued President 
Rush to the extent that he directed his Chief of staff to look into the TEDs dispute. So 
directed, John Sununu met with Gulf representatives to procure alternatives to TEDs. 
In the event he decided not to pursue the issue. 
In April 1990 the NAS issued its long awaited report on sea turtles. Its investigations 
found that as many as 55,000 sea turtles were captured incidentally in shrimp trawls. 
It thus suggested that NMFS's estimates were as much as four times too low. The 
report's findings also confirmed NGOs' position that shrimp -turtle bycatch threatened 
the survival of sea turtles more than all other human activities combined and that 
TEDs are the single most important action needed for sea turtle recovery.' 
Some folk played the issue as far as they could but that ultimately the 
facts were compelling.... The NAS report brought some sort of closure to 
the issue, it had a tremendous impact, reinforcing what scientists had 
been saying all along and suggesting that NMFS estimates were too low by 
perhaps 4 times the facts directed the outcome.' 
171 Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. nI40 at 21. 
172 National Research Council (NRC), Decline of the Sea Turtle: Cazzrer and Prevention (National 
Academy Press, Washington DC, 1990). 
173 Per. comm. Dr Debby Crouse op. cit. n155. 
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The NAS report called for the use of TEDs in most places at most times of the year, 
including areas that were not within extant regulations. 
Given the events that surrounded the initiation of the report - that was, under 
persistent request from Senator Heflin a strong opponent of TEDs - the conclusions 
of the report were perhaps unexpected. Alternatives to shrimp related efforts, such as 
headstarting and captive breeding programs, were rejected as legitimate conservation 
options. In addition to the widespread mandatory use of TEDs the report called for 
the restriction of tow times to no more than 40 -60 minutes, if these were to be used at 
all. Several months later a NOAA technical Internal Review Committee convened after 
the release of the NAS report called for an extension of the seasonal TED requirements 
to year -round requirements. In so it they emphasised the importance of not allowing 
another season of shrimping in the waters of North and South Carolina, and Georgia to 
pass without TED requirements being fulfilled. Despite this position another season 
did pass without federal TED regulations. 
Some progress had however been made in the states. Earlier in the year the Florida 
supreme court had upheld the state TED regulations, and later in the year State of 
Florida promulgated regulations that required TEDs year-round on all trawls in state 
waters. In South Carolina where state promulgated regulations had mandated TED use 
until September 1 the number of stranded turtles was at a ten year low. The number of 
dead turtles washed ashore on the South Carolina coast however rose dramatically 
from September when the mandatory TED period closed. In October 1990 the State of 
Georgia followed suite implementing its own TED requirements.' 
Bowing to pressure from both the White House and Gulf of Mexico Congressional 
members NOAA convened yet another meeting of a TEDs advisory group in March 
1991. Little was achieved by this. No significant new information was presented and 
industry representatives refused to accept the NAS findings. 
In 1991 observations on commercial shrimp trawlers showed that as shrimpers gain 
experience with TEDs that losses in shrimp catch declines to less that one percent. The 
CEE, now renamed Center for Marine Conservation (CMC) began to press NMFS to 
take action on the NAS and NOAA Internal Review Committee recommendations. To 
this end a coalition of conservation organisations threatened to sue for such action. In 
mid 1991 NOAA administrator John Knauss presented a proposal to implement the 
NAS's recommendations. Unsurprisingly Gulf Senators objected to this. 
174 Significant differences exist between states depending on where most of the trawling is done and 
which shrimp species is being targeted. 
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On the first of August 1991 NMFS published proposed regulations to extend the TED 
requirements through the fall season in the Atlantic. These were later adopted. 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of both the NAS and its own internal review 
committee, NOAA however shied away from proposing these same regulations in the 
Gulf. 
In mid 1992 conservation organisations released a study of shrimp fishing since TED 
rules became effective. The study had found that since the use of TEDs was mandated 
the turtle take had significantly reduced and the shrimp catch had risen slightly. The 
predicted economic catastrophe had not materialised.15 Soon after NMFS published a 
proposed rule to extend TED requirements to all nets all year. 
In August 1992, with Presidential elections approaching, the Office of Management 
and Budget met to discuss the proposed TED regulations with shrimping 
representatives. Equity of access was denied to NGOs, as the office refused to meet 
with them. The outcome of the meeting was that in September 1992 the Office 
demanded an additional 45 day public comment period. This expired in the December, 
after the election. NMFS published its regulations implementing many of the NAS's 
recommendations. Specifically this compelled the use of TEDs on trawlers in offshore 
areas and larger inshore trawlers by January 1993, and for smaller inshore trawlers by 
December 1994. 
Concluding comments 
Once again as had occurred with U.S. tuna- dolphin bycatch, both the industry and 
government agency resisted the need to correct the resource management failure. The 
situation was however somewhat different with the turtle -shrimp issue in that this 
time rather than the bycatch being simply unpalatable and prohibited by law, the 
bycaught species' survival was also at risk. 
Early difficulties with the voluntary program can he attributed, at least in part, to the 
technical solution sought. A technical solution often requires high levels of skill and 
motivation. Indeed TEDs must be installed and used to fine specifications so as to 
work, and small adjustments may have major impacts upon shrimp loss. Poor 
175 It seemed that by this stage much of the opposition to TEDs had waned and that many fishers were 
aware of the benefits offered by TEDs. In mid 1992 Hurricane Andrew hit off the Louisiana coast and the 
NMFS quickly responded with a short term suspension of the TED regulations. Noteworthy however few 
vessels registered to take advantage of this temporary exemption. Many shrimpers preferred to continue to 
use TEDs. It has been mooted that this was both to avoid the alternative of restricted tow time that was 
required in lieu of TEDs and moreover because of the potential for TEDs themselves to exclude much of 
the debris that would otherwise be captured in the trawl. 
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communications also contributed to fishers antagonism towards TEDs, and even as 
the device improved the resistance offered by fishers continued. 
Conflict existed not only - as has become common in bycatch issues - between 
fishers and environmentalists, but also between and within federal departments. And 
in the Department of Commerce it flourished. Significant impairment to the progress of 
sea turtle bycatch reduction was caused by the breakdown in relations between NMFS 
and the SGES: that is between the policy section, and the implementation and 
education section of the Department. Although not causing the disturbance of latter 
years, the non -advocacy role assumed by the SGES can be blamed in part for the 
failure of NMFS's voluntary adoption scheme. 
Its refusal to actively promote TEDs did nothing to alleviate fishers opposition thereto, 
or to alter the mindset that the devices were unduly burdensome. This belief ran 
contrary to the position advocated by NMFS. And thus the validity of scientific data 
and opinion was another major component to the controversy. It is clear that 
shrimpers' perceptions of TEDs contrasts sharply with those of NZv1FS, though it is 
important to distinguish that shrimpers' problems were with TEDs and not the turtles. 
Shrimpers encountered the animals only infrequently.1ó Notwithstanding the 
occasional nature of encounters, the cumulative effect of the industry as a whole was 
devastating for sea turtle populations. However because of the dwindling numbers 
many shrimpers no longer had practical evidence for believing that shrimp fishing was 
a major cause of marine turtle mortality, hence nor that any modification to their 
practices were necessary. Secondly shrimpers debated with the NMFS the scientific 
rigor of its studies as to the degree of shrimp loss and turtle exclusion caused by TEDs. 
Disputes also arose between NMFS and FWS who desired a more stringent application 
of the ESA. Indeed NMFS was under siege from all quarters, 
[there was a] public charge by environmentalists that the NHS was 
dragging its feet on the implementation of TEDs. Many shrimpers ... 
argued that NMFS people were out to get shrimpers. Still others, like some 
officials with sea grant Extension Service argued that NMFS did not 
communicate enough with shrimpers.' 
As expected conflict also arose between environmentalists and fishers. Perhaps 
because of an awareness of the anti- regulatory mood of the government, the Executive, 
and Congress, NGOs did not appeal stringently to the public for support as they had 
on previous issues, but rather relied on judicial remedy. 
176 Weber et al. (1995) op. cit. n140 at 8. 
177 Margavio et al. (1993) op. cit. n118 at 277. 
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An intense legal and political battle followed the instigation of mandatory TEDs. 
While shrimp fishers may have the sympathy of their Congressional representatives, on 
a national scale environmentalists were able to secure much broader support. Thus 
efforts to create a "shrimping exemption" in the ESA failed. In 1989 the TED 
regulations were reimposed permanently, and two years later they were finally 
enforced. 
4.5 Section 609 ESA - Import Restrictions for Turtle Protection 
In 1989 Congress increased the protection offered to turtles through an amendment to 
the ESA."$ Attached as a rider to an appropriations bill, section 609 Conservation of 
Sea Turtles: Importation of Shrimp's conditioned the importation of shrimp on the 
meeting of certain conservation practices. To recall, one of the shrimpers' main 
complaints had been that without coordinated management across international 
boundaries few gains in turtle conservation would be achieved. To be sure as well as 
hoping to reduce the unnecessary bycatch of turtles by encouraging foreign countries to 
upgrade their sea turtle protection practices and technology, shrimpers hoped to create 
a level playing field between their domestic produce and imported goods. 
U.S. shrimpers were concerned that if they were pulling TEDs and facing 
the economic loss that went therewith then it wouldn't be fair if the 
Mexican shrimpers were not subject to the same requirements. Indeed 
many of the shrimping families are cross boarder families - there are 
Mexicans that live in Mexico and there are Mexicans that live in Texas 
and they both are in the shrimping industry, so they knew very well what 
was going on in Mexico and they didn't like it.18° 
In both these aims they were supported by NGOs. To environmentalists the 
extraterritorial application of the turtle bycatch laws was also a recognition of the huge 
threat that the US shrimp market places upon turtle populations outside the U.S.. 
A precursor to section 609 was introduced in March 1987 concomitant to domestic 
TED regulations. H.R. 1658 was introduced by a Texan member, Solomon Ortiz, to 
ban the import of shrimp and shrimp products that lacked provisions comparable to 
those in the US for protecting endangered or threatened species from incidental take. 
This however died in Committee. 
Although these amendments were technically not formal amendments to the ESA as they were 
adopted and codified as free standing legislation, they have subsequently been treated in court as part of 
the ESA regime due to their partial basis upon the ESA listing of turtles and habitat scheme, and because 
they furthered the policy objectives of the Act. 
179 Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 101 -162, 103 Stat. 1988, 1037 (1989), §609, Conservation of Sea Turtles: 
Importation of Shrimp (hereafter "section 609 "). 
1R0 Per, comm. Jay Johnston np. cit. n115. 
181 When introduced H.R. 1658 was referred to both the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries as well 
as the House Ways and Means Committees. Double referral often complicates the legislative procedure, 
continued over page 
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Also towards the end of 1989 President Bush signed into law PL101 -162 (section 
609). This required the embargoing of the importation of shrimp into the U.S. from 
nations that did not adopt sea turtle conservation measures as stringent as those in 
U.S. waters. interestingly, especially in light of the fate of previous legislative 
initiatives, section 609 was enacted as a rider to an appropriations bill. 
Appropriations riders allow significant changes in policy to occur without public input 
or legislative accountability, and have been criticised for being a circumvention of the 
democratic process. They are often used to avoid confronting fundamental conflicts in 
public values.' As such, most environmentally related laws passed as appropriations 
riders and have a clearly negative environmental impact, however section 609 does not 
fit this mould.' It can thus be mused that perhaps it was so passed to avoid the 
scrutiny of the agencies, and the White House ?' During the Reagan and to a lesser 
degree the Bush administration, Congress was known to resort to "omnibus" bills that 
combined Congress's priorities with some of the Presidents priorities so as to 
discourage vetoes.' 
Two action forcing mechanisms were contained in section 609. The first, subsection a, 
required the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with all foreign countries to 
develop treaties to protect sea turtles and to report to Congress on such negotiations. 
Subsection b(1) then requires the Secretaries of State, Commerce and Treasury to 
prohibit the importation of shrimp products from all nations that fail to mandate 
shrimp practices that provide a comparable level of protection as to that offered under 
U.S. counterpart laws. It is worth noting that. although the language makes such 
having to clear two committees before floor consideration is possible. Per. comm. Eugene Buck op. cit. 
n10. Bills to limit shrimp imports and place tariffs upon such have been routinely proposed since the 
1970s For example H.R. 16315, 17114 and 17532 in the 93rd Congress. These bills have consistently 
died in committee. In the late 1980s these evolved to be linked to sea turtle conservation requirements 
and ensuring that no competitive disadvantage due to TED requirements would emerge. Other bills 
introduced around the same time as H.R. 1658 include H.R. 2620 the "Turt1e Protection Parity Act of 
1989"; H.R. 3442 which not only required the use of TEDs but also prohibitions on the taking of eggs 
and other activities that hinder sea turtles reproductive abilities. These too failed to make it out of 
Committee. For a complete discussion see Ple, J -P., Just and Unjust Environmental Economic 
Intervention: An Analysis of United States Foreign Policy to Protect Whales, Dolphins, and Sea Turtles 
(University of Delaware, Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, 1995). 
182 Zellmer, S., "Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A 
Constitutional Crisis" (1997) 2 Harvard Environmental Law Review 457. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Due to the perceived inappropriateness of the use of appropriations riders to set policy directions 
and the lack of safeguards contained therein, there is a long standing prohibition on the use of 
appropriations riders to modify existing substantive laws or inclusion of new policy directives. 
"Standing rules of the U.S. Senate, Rule 16(4)" Committee on Pules and Administration, Senate 
Manual 624 (1995); and "Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule XXI (2)" in Johnson, C., 
Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives 624 (1995). 
Notwithstanding the existence of these prohibitions since the 1830s, Congress is able to suspend or 
waive these rules attached to appropriations riders. 
185 Ibid. 
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actions mandatory, when President Bush signed the bill into law he made it patently 
clear that the administration interpreted section 609 requirements as discretionary, 
stating 
under our constitution it is the President who articulates the Nation's 
foreign policy and who determines the timing and subject matter of our 
negotiations with foreign nations. Accordingly, keeping with past 
practice, I shall treat these provisions as advisory, not mandatory.186 
Subsection b(2) created a process whereunder nations desiring to import shrimp into 
the U.S. must be certified by the U.S. government. The U.S.'s leverage once again came 
from the considerable interest of the U.S. market. United States shrimp imports total 
more than $US1.2 billion per year.1R' Certification was to be carried out by the 
President (acting through the Secretary of State), and must be supported by credible 
evidence. It was available to fishing nations whose take rate was comparable to that of 
the U.S.'s188 as judged by meeting the following conditions:189 
countries with a fishing environment that does not pose a threat of incidental 
takings of sea turtles because of: 
a. an absence of the species within its jurisdiction, 
b. exclusive use of harvest methods which do not pose a threat to sea turtles, or 
c. whose commercial harvest occurs exclusively in areas where sea turtles do not 
occur; or 
harvesting nations that provide documentary evidence of the adoption of a 
regulatory program governing the bycatch for turtles in shrimp trawling operations 
to the effect that: 
a. requirements of the use of TEDs are comparable in effectiveness to those in the 
U.S., and 
b. a credible enforcement effort including monitoring compliance and appropriate 
sanctions is in place. 
Without certification the Secretary of State was required to embargo the importation of 
shrimp and shrimp products from the relevant nation(s). 
The actual process of shrimp certification was delayed due to recognition that both the 
responsible federal departments, and nations who wished to comply with the 
requirements, would need some time to get themselves economically and 
186 "Statement by President George Bush upon Signing H.R. 2991 21 November 1989" (1989) 25 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1808, 27 November 1989. 
187 Taken from a U.S. Commerce Department Report and reported in Ruling Seen Barring Most 
Shrimp imports to U.S., Reuters (3 May 1996) available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires file. 
188 The average incidental take rate will be deemed comparable to the U.S.'s if the harvesting nation 
requires the use of TEDs in a manner comparable to that of the U.S. program. 61 Fed. Reg. 17342 (19 
April 1996) 
189 56 Fed. Reg. 1051 (1991); 58 Fed. Reg. 9015 (1993); and 61 Fed. Reg. 17342 (1996). 
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administratively equipped. The certification program was to be formally implemented 
by 1 May 1991. Once again, though, the agencies failed to meet this deadline. 
When section 609 was applied, guidelines promulgated by the State Department 
interpreted the Act as only applicable to shrimp fishing nations in the Western 
Atlantic and Caribbean regions.190 The department justified this restriction of scope by 
contending that Congress had intended the TED requirement to apply only to sea 
turtles that were harvested in, or migrate through, U.S. coastal waters. Consequently 
section 609 was applied only to 16 nation States. Certification was based upon a 
minimum requirement for TEDs to be installed on a significant number of shrimp trawl 
vessels. Of these, only two were found to be compliant and certifiable. The State 
Department then delayed the application of embargo provisions on the remaining 14 
nations. It was later reported that the Department of State had been concerned about 
the economic hardship this would cause to these nations who combined, exported $3 
billion worth of shrimp to the U.S..' It has alternatively been suggested that the real 
impetus behind the Department of State's limitation of the application of these 
legislative requirements was political. 
It had to do with the Bush and Clinton Administrations' interest in 
avoiding a high -profile international trade dispute. Such a dispute could 
potentially undermine the United States' credibility as a free trade 
advocate, and therefore undermine adoption and implementation of 
GATT and NAFTA.192 
Concluding Comments 
Unlike the domestic TED requirements, section 609 was met with no complaint from 
domestic stakeholders. Indeed it had been the shrimpers who had originally requested 
the development of parallel international regulations. Regardless, the international 
developments simultaneous to domestic policy initiatives, had no apparent effect on 
shrimpers efforts to rid themselves of the troublesome TED regulations. Though 
perhaps in the long run these did help secure domestic enforcement. 
Notwithstanding the universal domestic support for section 609, the implementing 
agency, again the Department of State, seemed hesitant to impose the full force of the 
available sanctions. Perhaps unsure of its legal ground, it is however more likely that 
this tentative approach stemmed from ongoing international trade negotiations. 
190 58 Fed. Reg. 9015 -16 (1993). 
191 "Judge Says Law to Save Turtles Prevents Most Imports of Shrimp" New York Times, g January 
1996. 
192 Kibel, P., "Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of International Trade" 
(1996) 15 Journal of Environmental Law 57 at 64. 
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4.6 Domestic Tuna -Dolphin Bycatch Control 
To recall, the end of the 1970s saw the partial resolution of the issue of domestic 
dolphin purse -seine bycatch with the creation of a decreasing quota for U.S. ETP tuna 
vessels. The judicial interpretation of the MMPA in Committee for Humane Legislation 
Inc v. Richardson however led to heightened fears that the MMPA would be read to 
require incidental takings be reduced to zero regardless of the technology and 
practicability of such.193 These concerns of the potential implications of an 
unfavourable legal determination appear unfounded, and perhaps ingenuous, given 
both legislative history, and agency and judicial interpretations of the Act; replete with 
statements that the MMPA would not be used to force fishers out of business.194 
Nonetheless, the House Report makes it clear that the Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee were sympathetic to the tuna industry's concerns, and consequently the 
tuna fishers received the reassurance they sought.t95 The amendment was clearly not 
intended to signify any departure from the tenure of the statute as it stood -its intent 
was to create assurances that the Act would be interpreted to require that dolphin 
bycatch be reduced only as much as it was practically feasible. 
Thus in 1981 the MMPA was amended so as to introduce additional exemptions for 
purse -seiners, and to clarify the interaction of best feasible technology with the zero 
mortality goal. The Act was amended so as to qualify the zero take goal in relation to 
its application to yellowfin purse -seining operations. It provided that the zero 
mortality goal shall be satisfied in the case of the incidental taking of marine mammals 
in purse -seine operations by the 
193 Marine Mammal Protection Act: Hearings on HR. 2947 Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries 
and Wildlife Conservation and the Env 't of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (testimony of David Burney, Counsel, U.S. Tuna Foundation). 
194 For example the Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc v. Richardson, (540 F.2d 1141, 1148) 
reading congressional committee reports to state that the MMPA was "not intended to force tuna 
fishermen to cease operations"; see Alker, S., "The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the 
Approach to Conservation" (1996) 44 UCLA Law Review 527 at 538. 
195 The Committee found that: 
the administrative provisions of the MMPA relating to incidental take have been 
characterised by excessive litigation. The tuna industry is operating in fear of being 
shut down by law suits, a fear which hampers investment in America's distant -water 
tuna fleet. 
This fear is generated by those provisions of the Act which establish as the immediate 
goal of the Act that the incidental kill or serious injury of marine mammals pursuant to 
commercial fishing operations by reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero 
mortality and serious injury rate. ... The tuna industry ... would be faced with severe 
economic consequences if a court interpreted the zero mortality goal in the strictest 
sense and failed to take into account the economic and technical practicability of 
achieving that goal. (MMPA of 1972 House of Representatives Report (Marine 
Merchant and Fisheries Committee) No. 97 -228, [To accompany H.R. 4084] 97th 
Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1458 (hereafter "H.R. Rep. 
97- 228 "). 
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application of the best marine mammal safety techniques and equipment 
that are economically and technologically practicable.' 
In passing this amendment the "substantial progress made by the tuna fleet in 
developing new techniques and equipment for reducing marine mammal mortalities" 
was highlighted.197 It has been suggested that the amendments were made possible due 
to a shift in the political balance in the ATA's favour.'9s Such improvement had 
stemmed not from any active lobbying of Congress, but rather an impressive 
performance of bycatch reduction by the tuna industry: witnessed in the fall in 
incidental cetacean takings by tunaboat operators from an estimated 386,000 in 1972 
to 18,573 in 1980'99 
Despite the concession granted to the tuna industry, Congress made it clear that it did 
not intend to lessen the Secretary's authority to prescribe quotas. Reflecting that this 
was a genuine commitment, Congress did not interfere with recent NMFS regulations 
that limited the number of permissible dolphin mortalities caused by the U.S. fleet (of 
81 vessels) to 20,500 per annum, from 1980 until 1985.200 This was a considerable 
reduction from the previous quota of 31,150 dolphins as allowable bycatch each 
year 201 It was though, like the 1977 quotas, was based on economic and technological 
feasibility, while ensuring that the permissible take would not be to the disadvantage 
of the population 202 
Indeed Congress effectively offered an endorsement of NMFS's regulations and quota. 
It amended the statute to require that fishers submit to the NMFS quota -a significant 
change from the previous situation whereby fishers had not been prosecuted for failing 
196 MMPA Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97 -58, 95 Stat. 979 -80, §1371(a)(2), [s101(a)(2)]. 
197 H.R. Rep. 97 -228 op. cit. nI95 at I468. Interestingly however Congress declined to extend this 
amendment to all fishing operations. Other fishing industries compared poorly and were not seen to 
warrant similar favourable treatment. The Report went on to say that, in the absence of a similar safety - 
net extended to the entire fishing industry, the goal of the MMPA (to achieve a zero mortality) may itself 
be useful as a stimuli for the development of new bycatch reduction technology 
198 Black, D., "International Trade v. Environmental Protection: The Case of The U.S. Embargo on 
Mexican Tuna" (1992) 24 Law and Policy International Business 123 -156 at 128. 
199 Joseph, J., "The Tuna- Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pacific Ocean: Biological, Economic, 
and Political Impacts" (1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 1 at 3. It is worthwhile 
recalling however that the figure of 386,000 is however likely to be inflated due to the small amount of 
data from which the figure was extrapolated. Per. Comm. Dr Martin Hall, InterAmerican Tropical Tuna 
Commission/Scripps Oceanographic Institute, San Diego (CA), 26 April 1999; Per. comm. Euene Buck 
op. cit. n10. 
200 45 Fed, Reg. 72,178 (1980). 
201 MMPA, §1371(a)(2), [S10 (a)(2)] (as amended by the Act to Improve the Operation of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act of 1972, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 97 -58, 95 Stat. 979 (1982)); see 
Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 4. 
202 45 Fed. Reg. 72,179 -80, 72,185 (1980). 
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to comply with quota requirements.203 In so doing Congress also acknowledged the 
situation of small fishing operators and exempted them from the MMPA's cumbersome 
permit requirements for the incidental take of small numbers of non -depleted marine 
mammals.0p4 
The insertion of the prosecution provision caused considerable unrest in industry 
circles. In 1980 NMFS had promulgated to extend the allowable uses of information 
gathered by onboard observers so as to include "civil or criminal penalty proceedings, 
forfeiture actions, or permit or certification sanctions.i205 Notwithstanding that the 
practice of forwarding observer information had been occurring since 1974, subsequent 
to the 1981 Congressional amendments the tuna industry reacted severely to the 
formalisation of this arrangement.206 
203 See also Sauer, M., 'Balancing Marine Mammal Protection Against Commercial Fishing: The 
Zero Mortality Goal, Quotas, and the Gulf of Maine Porpoise" (1993) 45 Maine Law Review 419; and 
Alker (1996) op. cit. n194. 
204 H.R. Rep. 97 -228 op. cit. n195. These changes significantly broadened the protection offered to the 
fishing industry through the allowance of "infrequent, unavoidable, or accidental" bycatch. The 
streamlining of procedures was aimed at countering the situation whereby small fishers, whose take was 
much less than that of the commercial tuna fleet, were acting illegally by not applying for bycatch permits 
due to the complexity of procedures. The intention was to remedy this scenario by establishing 
arrangements where small operators were not in breach of the laws. Moreover, it was hoped that a more 
comprehensive application of the permit system would improve NMFS data. Consequently Congress 
conditioned this allowance on adherence to provision to be promulgated by the Secretary for guidelines 
for the monitoring and reportage of take. 
205 50 C.F.R. §216.24(f)(1) (1980); 42 Fed. Reg. 72196 (1980). 
206 Coinciding with the end of the two year exemption period for commercial fishing, and the 
invocation of the 1974 requirement for permits for the incidental take of marine mammals, the observer 
program terminated. Tt was clear, though, to the Secretary of Commerce that (as the anticipated 
technological breakthrough to eliminate dolphin bycatch had not occurred) the only effective means cf 
enforcing the Act was to retain observers on board. Further and in order for the Secretary to fulfil his 
duties in relation to the collection of scientific data "for the purpose of devising fishing methods ... so as 
to reduce to the maximum extent practicable the incidental taking of marine mammals in connection with 
commercial fishing" the continued presence of observers onboard was deemed necessary. 
To this end the Department of Commerce promulgated an uncontroversial regulation which created a 
non -statutory observer system for the purpose of conducting research or gathering information. This 
regulation provided that 
[a]ny duly authorised agents of the Secretary may from time to time, after timely oral or 
written notice to the vessel owner or charter, board and /or accompany commercial 
fishing vessel documented under the law of the United States, whenever the Secretary 
determines that there is space available, on regular fishing trips, for the purpose cf 
conducting research or observation operations (39 Fed. Reg. 32118,32124 (1974)). 
The role of observers did not however extend to the collection of information for civil or criminal penalty, 
or forfeiture proceedings. Notwithstanding the lack of such a provision, observer- gathered information was 
regularly turned over to the enforcement branch of NMFS which issued notices of violation against crews 
and vessels. And since 1977 administrative proceedings assessing civil penalties had been initiated based 
upon observer gathered information. Nonetheless the program was broadly acknowledged as a success and 
was supported by the tuna industry. Slade, D., "Back to the Drawing Board: Fourth Amendment Rights 
and the Marine Mammal Protection Act" (1986) 16 Ocean Development and International Law 91 at 93. 
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The ATA challenged the legality of the observer program and sought an injunction 
against NMFS with regard to the program's constitutional validity.20' The court in 
Balelo v. Klutznick208 based its decision upon the fact that a NMFS agent needed to 
board the vessel and hence required a vantage point not available to the public. It held 
in favour of the plaintiff, that the observer program did contravene the 4th 
Amendment. The court in handing down its decision enjoined the Secretary of 
Commerce not to condition the grant of bycatch permits upon the acceptance of 
onboard observers to collect information for purposes other than scientific 209 
The Secretary appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The 
decision handed down on 5 January 1983 not only upheld the previous finding limiting 
the collection of evidence for criminal, civil or administrative proceedings, but 
extended it. It held that the presence of observers onboard vessels for scientific 
purpose also constituted a warrantless search that was not otherwise specifically 
authorised under the relevant statute, the MMPA.210 
In 1984 this injunction was overturned on further appeal. The court in Balelo v. 
Baldrige211 found that observer regulation did not contravene the 4th Amendment and 
that Congress did not need to specifically authorise a search without a warrant 
provided it was implicit under the Act. The Secretary of Commerce was found to hold 
sufficient authority under the MMPA to authorise the observer program. Moreover the 
court upheld the earlier defense argument that observers do not constitute a search 
because they only report on that which is in plain view. Notwithstanding that the final 
decision saw the observer program reinstated, U.S. data on dolphin purse -seine 
bycatch was absent between 1981 and 1984. 
The MMPA was again amended in 1984. The major change to the quota system was 
the removal of the requirement for an annual formal review of the ATA's general 
permit. Aimed at streamlining the process, this action was consistent with the Reagan 
administration's belief that free market forces would allocate the nation's resources 
more efficiently, and that industry should be freed from governmental regulation in 
order to allow the market to operate!' 
207 The plaintiff contended that observers onboard constituted a "search" with neither warrant nor 
probable cause, and hence violated the constitution's 4th Amendment protecting against unnecessary 
searches and seizure. The defense countered that the stationing of an observer in plain view had been 
established by precedent not constitute a search. 
208 Balelo v. Kltttznick, 519, F.Supp. 573 (S.D. Cal. 1981). 
209 Ibid. 
210 Balelo v. Baldridge, Nos. 81 -5806 and 81 -5807 (9th Cir., Jan. 5, 1983) at Part IV. 
2 1 1 Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984). 
212 Knecht et al. (1988) op. cit. n65 at 121. 
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In effect the setting of a long term annual quota and removal of the review process had 
the impact of removing any requirement (and hence opportunity) for public, on -the- 
record hearings. In the absence of an annual review provision the tuna industry lacked 
any external incentive to reduce the mortality Ievel of dolphins as community 
perception of the product would not suffer from an increase in dolphin bycatch so long 
as it remained below the NMFS's allocated take limit 213 Furthermore the NMPS lost its 
mandate to monitor the industry so as to ensure best practice in available gear aimed 
at the prevention of dolphin take was being adhered to. 
Legislative changes were accompanied by the reauthorisation of the 20,500 dolphin 
quota with respect to the permissible mortality per year by purse -seiners in the ETP 214 
This quota was notwithstanding that by 1983 the annual dolphin bycatch was down 
to only 12,000 individuals per year.215 and that the quota applied to a decreased fleet 
of only 38 vessels, down from the 1981 count of 81.216 
Unsurprisingly the allocation of a non -declining kill quota and removal of the review 
process was seen by environmentalists as an affront to the immediate statutory goal of 
reducing dolphin mortality to zero. Further, NGOs highlighted the lack of consideration 
given to the number of trips taken and the rate per netting or trip, and more 
importantly what the bycatch figure would mean for the dolphin population as a 
whole, in the NMFS's permit allocation. 
In 1988, the MMPA was again up for reauthorisation. On November 23, towards the 
end of his second term, President Reagan signed the amendment bill into law.21' 
Responding to a perceived opportunity to affect the nature of proposed amendments 
to the MMPA, twenty five environmental and seventeen fisher based organisations 
formed an unprecedented alliance to seek opportunity for extensive alterations to the 
Act. The Earth Island Institute was at the forefront of environmentalist's efforts to 
educate both the public and the government about the extent and nature of the bycatch 
problem that pervades many fisheries methods. The catalyst which pushed the issue 
into the forefront of the public concerns was video footage, filmed in the Pacific Ocean 
213 Coulston, C., "Flipper Caught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorisation of the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act and its Effect on Dolphin" (1990) 11 Journal of Environment, Natural Resources and 
Energy Law 97 at 113. 
214 H.R. Rep. 100 -970 op. cit. n57 (recounting the content of the 1984 amendment). 
215 Edwards, E. and Perkins, P., "Estimated Tuna Discards from Dolphin, School, and Log Sets in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, 1989 -1992" (1998) 96 Fishery Bulletin 210. 
216 Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199. 
217 MMPA Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100 -711, 102 Stat. 4755. 
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and shown on almost every major news station, that depicted hundreds of dolphins 
dying in a fishing net' 
The Bill proposed by the House on 26 September 1988 suggested the addition to the 
existing legislation of performance standards for vessel operators, the prohibition of 
sundown sets, and one hundred percent observer coverage on tuna vessels 219 These 
were due largely to evidence presented by environmentalists, such as four fold 
increases in dolphin mortality during sundown sets. The same video that was 
successfully used to engage the public in the issue was shown at the National Ocean 
Policy Hearings and this appears to have had considerable effect on Congress.° 
In addition to these operational requirements the 'Studds amendment' called for an 
annual review of the ATA permit and required the Secretary of Commerce to 
modify the terms and conditions of the general permit issued on 
December 1, 1980, to the American Tunaboat Association, so as to reduce 
the number of marine mammals taken incidental to commercial purse 
seine fishing for yellowfin tuna, to reduce the percentage of sets made on 
marine mammals, or to require the use of alternative fishing gear and 
techniques, in order to meet the [zero kill goals of the Act] 221 
The effect of this was intended to cause NMFS to remove the static 20,500 quota and 
to encourage the tuna industry to further reduce dolphin mortalities. 
In the end, an amendment that established a five -year exemption for commercial tuna 
fishers allowing them to continue operations resulting in the incidental capture of 
20,500 non depleted species of dolphins per annum, without additional permits, was 
made with the caveat that NMFS observers were to be stationed on all fishing boats. 
This was intended to both obtain data on the impact of fishing operations on marine 
mammals, and in the absence of individual permits this system of reportage provided 
a useful method encouraging compliance. 
218 The film was made by Sam LaBudde a staff member of the Earth Island Institute, who obtained a 
crew position on the Panamanian -flag vessel the Maria Lusia and surreptitiously filmed the netting on a 
hand held camcorder. The footage was shown on all major television stations and at the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 8 September 8 1988. Considerable 
contention exists as to whether the film was actually shot during usual operations or if was staged. There 
are a number of things that are pointed to in the raising of these issues. One is the particularly good 
vantage point form which the film was shot, thus suggesting that either the captain did not realise the 
problems this would cause or that the film was intended for publicity purposes. Another issue is that the 
dolphin captured in the set are not a species that commonly associate with tuna, thus explaining the 
paucity of tuna taken in the catch. Regardless however to the veracity of the set filmed. The fact remained 
that there is cetacean mortality caused in the ETP by the practice of setting on dolphins. 
219 H.R. 4189, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), §4(d)(vi),(iv) & (vii), (House bill to become MMPA 
amendments of 1988). 
220 Marine Mammal Protection Act Reauthorisation: Hearings before the National Ocean Policy 
Study of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transport, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), at 
98 -103 (statement of Sam LaBudde, Earth Island Institute), 120 -28 (conversation between several 
Senators and witnesses). 
221 H.R. 4189, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), §4(e)(4)(B) . 
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The Bill as finalised in Senate on October 14 added several provisions and was 
returned to the House for final approval in the final legislative hours of the last session 
of the 100th Congress. Including were amendments to the Bill that addressed specific 
operational problems. A ban on the use of explosive devices was instigated.' The 
second and the major change to the Bill as forwarded by the House, was the removal 
of the Studds amendment. This has been attributed to considerable lobbying from the 
powerful ATA coalition. Although dissatisfied by this, Representative Studds, under 
persuasion from the environmental community, accepted the amendments rather than 
be without an authoritative source until a new statute could be devised." 
StarKist & the Introduction of Dolphin -Safe Tuna 
A concern expressed since the passage of the 1988 MMPA amendment legislation was 
that an additional obstacle had been placed in front of environmental groups intent on 
preventing dolphin bycatch. That is, by the shifting of the quota to legislation rather 
than permit requirements, avenues by which environmental groups could bring suit 
against the NMFS so as to compel enforcement of the MMPA's zero mortality goal 
were removed.' The only available remaining action would have been to compel an 
agency to comply with mandated procedures such as observer coverage. 
In the absence of the tool of litigation environmental groups began to search elsewhere 
for new ways with which to deter dolphin take. Relying on more grass roots efforts the 
movement looked to economic boycotts as an answer to what NGOs saw as an 
ongoing problem. They urged consumers not to purchase tuna caught in association 
with dolphins, and requested that manufactures boycott tuna caught by setting on 
dolphins. 
The public reacted with dismay that the government had permitted such activities to 
continue and beginning in late 1988 consumers began locally boycotting tuna. In 1989 
the Tuna Labeling Bill was introduced to Congress." The Bill required that tuna 
products were labeled in a manner indicative of the method of fishing used in the 
catch. Although unsuccessful at the time the Bill provided the precursor for future 
legislative action. Meanwhile, realising the power of the public groundswell caused by 
the heightening of the profile of dolphin bycatch, environmentalists took out full page 
advertisements in major newspapers including the New York Times petitioning 
222 S. 2810, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), §4(d), (Senate bill to become MMPA amendments cf 
1988). 
223 See 134 Cong. Rec. H10,512 (19 October 1988) (statement of Rep. Garry Studds). 
224 Coulston (1990) op. cit. n213. 
225 H.R. 2926, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Sponsored by Barbara Boxer of California. 
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StarKist (a subsidiary of H.J.Heinz Co.) to change its policy or face an even larger, 
nationwide consumer boycott. 
The result was that on April 12, 1990 StarKist made a surprise announcement that it 
would no longer buy tuna from fishers who set on dolphins or tuna caught on boats 
without official observers on board, and hence would offer only dolphin -safe or 
friendly tuna for sale. By agreeing to these product restrictions StarKist risked creating 
a price advantage for its competitors in the market. The cost of StarKist tuna products 
had risen due to the increased cost of production under these self imposed conditions. 
This price advantage did not eventuate however, as support for the move was offered 
by the next two largest tuna canneries in the U.S.; Chicken of the Sea and Bumble Bee 
quickly followed suite with similar statements. Indeed far from disadvantaging these 
companies all three received extensive free publicity and increased consumer 
support.as 
The resultant market closure to tuna caught by setting on dolphins caused an 
immediate decline in dolphin bycatch, with a reduction of at least 10,000 dolphin 
deaths per year by the U.S. fleet alone.' Although bycatch did decline between 1972 
and 1990, this sudden drop suggests that had a more aggressive approach been 
adopted towards the implementation of the MMPA by the government, then extensive 
bycatch reduction may have occurred much sooner. 
StarKist also agreed to support legislation introduced into the House of 
Representatives for labeling tuna cans as "dolphin-safe"." Included as part of the 
Fisheries Conservation Amendments of 1990 was the Dolphin Protection Consumer 
Information Act (DPCIA) which specified labeling standards for tuna products sold in, 
or exported from the United States.' Under the DPCIA "dolphin- safe" was defined 
to include any product made from tuna harvested by a fishing vessel that met three 
requirements. Firstly, that an official of the U.S. Department of. Commerce or IATTC 
confirmed that there was an approved observer onboard the vessel during the entire 
trip. Secondly the owner or manager was required to provide written a statement 
executed by the observer, to the effect that their net was not intentionally deployed on 
or around dolphins. And finally each exporter, importer or processor must endorse 
226 For example the newspaper headline reading "Tuna Canners Adopt Policy to Spare Dolphins" 
Boston Globe, 13 April 1990. 
227 "Dolphin Drownings in Fish Nets Fewer but Still Exceed U.S. Laws" San Diego Union Tribune, 
3 May 1995. 
228 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Authorisation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102- 
567, Title 111 § 302, 106 Stat. 4270. 
229 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 101 -627, 104 Stat. 4436, 
4465 -7 (16 U.S.C.1385) (hereafter "DPCIA "). 
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these statements, in writing' Thus in effect, dolphin -safe tuna referred to that which 
was not taken through the use of either purse -seine or long driftnet fishing methods.' 
Concluding Comments 
Between 1981 and 1988 three sets of amendments to the MMPA were carried out. The 
1981 amendments triggered an outcry from fishers, with regard to onboard observers 
due to a fear of their data being used as evidence in prosecutions for breech of bycatch 
laws. Several court cases ensued, the only long term substantive outcome of which was 
an absence of data between the years 1981 and 1984. The 1984 and 1988 amendments 
were generally to the fishers liking, however they placed considerable obstacles in front 
of NGOs wishing to monitor and contribute to the determination of tunaboat 
operators' bycatch levels. 
In response to a perceived inability to effect bycatch policy through traditional 
channels of annual review, and having had the option of litigation removed as a 
possible remedy, NGOs aimed at effecting the market for tuna products caught by 
setting on dolphins. This represented the first foray into the use of market forces by 
NGOs. In the event, market forces proved to be a highly successful tool. And NGOs 
demonstrated their ability to harness considerable media and public support. 
Perhaps anticipating the public mood and the relentlessness of NGOs in pursuing their 
cause, StarKist quickly acquiesced to the requested action. Alternatively, this may be 
seen as an active decision by StarKist that, given the public mood, such a move 
towards dolphins would be profitable and allow the promotion of the company as 
'green'. Notwithstanding the success of the move, it did risk awarding a competitive 
advantage to other tuna canners prices were increased without bestowing any 
benefit upon the consumer regarding product quality. The anticipated a downturn in 
profit due to market disadvantage did not however occur. With consumers viewing a 
more environmentally friendly production method as akin to an increase in product 
quality. 
The final outcome was the successful passage of tuna labeling legislation, and a near 
total cessation of the U.S. sale of tuna harvested by setting on dolphins. 
230 DPCIA, §1385(d)(2), [sll. 
231 Hurwitz, D., "Fishing for Compromises through NAFTA and Environmental Dispute- Settlement 
The Tuna Dolphin Controversy" (1995) 35 Natural Resources Journal 501 at 507. 
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4.7 International Reaction to Dolphin Bycatch Import Requirements 
In the ten year period from 1979 to 1989 the Mexican purse -seine fleet grew by about 
50% and the Venezuelan fleet tripled.' In this same period the foreign fleet's 
incidental dolphin capture rate increased from 20,000 to in excess of 100,000 per 
annum. " At the end of the 1980s foreign vessels caught 60 percent of the tuna in the 
ETP but accounted for almost 80 percent of dolphin mortalities " 
Joseph offers three possible reasons for the escalation in the 1986 bycatch figure.' 
Firstly the low estimates from preceding years could be attributed to a relatively 
low fishing effort from 1981 -85 due to anomalous ocean conditions and low 
apparent abundance of yellowfin tuna. 
Secondly reduced U.S. effort resulted from a transfer of vessels to the Western 
Pacific (where tuna and dolphin are believed not to associate), so as to comply 
with MMPA requirements prohibiting the catch of fish by setting on dolphin. 
Finally an increase in 1986 foreign fleet bycatch could be attributed to unusually 
high fishing effort due to the abundance of Iarge fish and the premium prices 
paid for these which stemmed from the low fishing effort of previous years. 
It is also necessary to recall that the 1986 estimates were the first truly reliable 
estimates 6 In 1976 IATTC governments' prepared a plan aimed at the reducing 
dolphins take to zero, and developing alternative methods of capturing yellowfin tuna. 
It was not until one decade later that full participation occurred and thus the first 
reliable estimate of non -U.S. vessel dolphin bycatch were available. ETP dolphin 
mortality for 1986 and 1987 was found to be 133,000 and 100,000 animals 
respectively.' 
Faced with this information Congress was confronted with the problem that although 
tuna importing foreign fleets were required to have parallel protection measures, no 
proof of enforcement was required before the tuna was allowed to enter the U.S. 
market. Consequently the existing import restrictions were largely ineffective. 
232 Nations seeking to expand their fishing fleets began to adopt the purse seine method. Between 1976 
and 1985 Mexico alone invested in 42 new vessels bringing its active fleet to 65 seiners and tripling its 
frozen tuna production. Black (1992) op. cit. n198. 
233 Parsons, M., "The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Working Toward an Effective International 
Solution to the Dolphin Problem" (1991) 4 Transnational Law 673. 
234 1{.R. Rep. No. 100 -970 op. cit. n57. 
235 Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 6. 
236 Littell, R., Endangered and Other Protected Species: Federal Law and Regulation The Bureau of 
National Affairs, Washington, DC, 1992). 
237 Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 6. 
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The 1988 amendments to the MMPA recognised this ongoing problem and provided 
additional regulations aimed at the control of foreign fishing operators.' In order to 
avoid trade sanctions a foreign nation was required to demonstrate both that it had a 
regulatory program to govern the taking of marine mammals in fisheries operations, 
and also that it had mortality rates comparable to the U.S.'s domestic operators 249 A 
breaking in period was allowed which set allowable levels at no more than twice the 
U.S.'s by the end of 1989 and no more than 1.25 times more by the end of 1990 240 
The MMPA also placed two additional constraints upon foreign operators: that no 
more than 15% of the bycatch was to be comprised of eastern spinner dolphins; and 
that a maximum of two percent was to be comprised of coastal spotted dolphins. In 
order to ensure the implementation of these amended quota requirements the 
Department of Commerce was required to investigate foreign tuna fisheries before any 
tuna was allowed into the U.S., and then if in violation of U.S. requirements of 
comparable dolphin kill rates, was to ban the importation of the nations' tuna 
products. 
Secondly in its 1988 MMPA amendments Congress expanded the embargo to also 
apply to "intermediatory" nations; that is nations who failed to prove that they had 
acted similarly to ban the importation of tuna from a nation subject to a U.S. 
prohibition. The intent of this was to circumvent the channeling of otherwise 
embargoed products through a non - harvesting nation. The inclusion of intermediatory 
nations increased the number of foreign states potentially affected from 10 or 12 
fishing States to 60 -65 nations.241 Finally the amendment provided that should any 
nation be subject to a ban for greater than six months, then the Secretary of Commerce 
must certify such fact to the President, which shall be deemed to be a certification also 
for the purposes of the Pelly Amendment. To recall such an action may result in the 
President directing the Secretary of the Treasury to ban the importation of all fish and 
wildlife products and derived merchandise to the U.S.. 242 
An amendment the Pelly amendment ensured that intermediatory nations were also 
captured under the Fishermen's Protective Act. A sentence was added so as to allow for 
the sanctioning of the importation of fish products from countries who were not 
themselves fishing nations. Fish products were defined as 
238 "Kokechik and the 1988 MMPA Amendments" in 1990 -1991 MMPA Annual Report, see url, 
http:/ /kingfish.ssp.nmfs.gov /tncimtyr /mammals/ 1990rept /chapt02.html. 
239 MMPA amendments of 1988, §1371(a)(2)(B), [s101(a)(2)(B)]. 
240 [hid, §1371(a)(2)(13)(II), [s101(a)(2)(B)(11)] (1988). 
241 joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 7. 
242 MMPA amendments of 1988, §1371(a)(2)(C) & (D), [s101(b)(2)(C) & (D)]. 
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any aquatic species (including marine mammals and plants) and all 
products thereof exported from an offending country, whether or not 
taken by fishing vessels of such country, or packed, processed, or 
otherwise prepared for export in such country or within the jurisdiction 
thereof.z°3 
It was not only the direct application of U.S. legislation to foreign fleets that caused 
changes in their tuna harvesting practices. The change in policy of the three major U.S. 
tuna canners also led to an alteration of world tuna trade. The closure of the U.S. as a 
market for the large yellowfin tuna of the ETP led to an influx on the European 
markets and a consequential drop in the market value of fish there. Secondly it caused 
an outflux of U.S. vessels from the ETP who saw the area as no longer financially 
viable without being able to fish for the larger tuna which swam in association with 
dolphins. Of the 35 large U.S. vessels operating in the ETP only seven remained: 17 
transferred to the waters of the Western Pacific where tuna and dolphin do not swim 
in association, and 11 were sold or became inactive. 
One author has suggested that this policy did not however reduce the bycatch of 
dolphins in the fishery. Instead the tonnage of tuna remained the same and the 
embargoed foreign fishers simply found new markets for their catches."' 
NGO Enforcement: The Earth Island Institute Litigation 
On March 26 1990 the NIvIFS issued regulations to implement the 1988 MMPA 
amendments as they applied to foreign fleets. These required countries to submit 
annual data on dolphin kill rates by July 31 1991. As such, two years after the 
amendments had been enacted still no real enforcing action had been taken: no import 
bans had been placed on any of the foreign fleets operating in the ETP, and no findings 
regarding the comparability of dolphin take in these operations had been made. 
One reason for the U.S.'s hesitance to compel nations to cease fishing on dolphins was 
the problem that had become apparent in aims to achieve the duel goals of maintaining 
the overall health of the ecosystem whilst preventing dolphin mortality. Those tuna 
caught and who swam in association with dolphin were the larger yellowfin tuna (and 
hence more economically worthwhile per head). If tuna capture by setting on dolphins 
were to be banned then fishers would have to resort to log fishing or fishing on schools. 
These methods result in the catch of smaller - possibly undersized - tuna, an 
ecologically unsustainable practice. Such a scenario is ecologically undesirable: not only 
would such a change in method lead to overfishing but, because the smaller yellowfin 
and skipjacks swim closer to the shore restriction of methods to log fishing or fishing 
243 The Pelly Amendment amendment of 1988, Pub. L. 100 -711, 102 Stat. 4772. 
244 Burke et al. (1994) op. cit. n47. 
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on schools would also cause political friction with relation to jurisdiction and access 
rights. As a consequence of this political unsurety and the proviso regarding 
ecologically sound methods, an immediate moratorium was deemed impossible. 
Responding to the perceived inadequacy of the administration's actions the Earth 
Island Institute (EH) and the Marine Mammal Fund brought a federal suit against the 
Secretary of Commerce in the federal court of California. In Earth Island Institute a 
Mosbacher the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Secretary from allowing the importation of 
tuna until an adequate comparability examination had been conducted and a positive 
finding (rather than the absence of a negative finding) had been made 245 On 28 August 
1990 district court judge The1ton Henderson issued a preliminary injunction in favour 
of the EII's request, based upon the finding that there was sufficient likelihood of 
success on the merits of the claim and also on the grounds that 
the continued slaughter and destruction of these innocent victims of the 
economics of fishing constitutes an irreparable injury to us all, and 
certainly to the mammals whom Congress intended to protect 246 
Pursuant to this preliminary injunction the Bush administration imposed tuna import 
bans on Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela and Vanuatu on 6 September 1990. The 
following day the NMFS undertook the requisite comparability examination and found 
in favour of Mexico, that the taking rate was only 1.58 times that of the U.S., well 
within the allowable double. This finding hence triggered the lifting of the import ban 
upon Mexican tuna. Within one week all the import bans except for that on Panama 
had been lifted, based upon the estimated dolphin mortality statistics for the first six 
months of the year. 
Disbelieving of the validity of the results and undiscouraged, the Ell again brought suit 
this time against NMFS, asserting that the agency had misconstrued the MMPA in 
making its comparability findings. Specifically the Ell contended that NMFS's finding 
that Mexico was within the allowable bycatch range was not calculated as per the 
requirements of the 1988 amendments. The MMPA required the use of annual 
statistics; presumably due to the otherwise possibility of seasonal permutations. In 
1989 NMFS had found that Mexican operators were in violation of the 15% limit on 
eastern spinner dolphin as total incidental take. In its new calculations however, it 
used the a six month period for the first part of 1990 and found that Mexico met the 
requirements. Secondly the plaintiff expressed concern at the speed with which NMFS 
was able to compile this data and noted that NMFS had in 1990 argued at the district 
level court that it would take at least six months to make such findings.Z47 Once again 
245 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d. 1449, 145 (9th Cir. 1991). 
246 Ibid at 975 
247 Ibid at 1451. 
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Judge Henderson agreed with the plaintiff and issued a temporary restraining order to 
ban the importation of tuna from Mexico. On 19 October 1990 this was converted into 
a preliminary injunction. 
In turn the federal government appealed to the Ninth Circuit asserting that the 
injunction infringed on the agency's discretion in interpreting the MMPA. The Circuit 
responded initially by staying Judge Henderson's decision but removed the stay and 
reinstated the ban soon thereafter. In mid April 1991, nearly a year after the initial 
case was laid, the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed Judge Henderson's preliminary 
injunction maintaining the import ban on Mexican tuna. The Mexican tuna embargo 
became retrospectively active from 26 March, 1991. This triggered secondary embargos 
which went into effect on May 24, sixty days after the original ban was reinstated. 
These secondary embargos though were placed only on nations who harvested with 
purse seines in the ETP, that is Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan and Panama. 
Certifications for non -compliance under the Pelly Amendment were placed upon 
Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Costa Rica, France, Italy, Japan and Panama and 
referred as required to the U.S. President. As required under the Act the President, 
between October 1991 and March 1992, issued responses to the certifications. These 
took the form of three separate "Letters to Congressional Leaders on the 
Determination Not to Prohibit Fish Imports From Certain Countries"." Such actions 
were a response to the ongoing negotiations with ETP nations who had been meeting 
since IATTC convened in September 1990 in Costa Rica to discuss a resolution to the 
issue of dolphin bycatch in the purse -seining operations in the region. 249 
The EII launched a third suit to force the Secretary of Commerce to extend the embargo 
to all secondary nations.' The court once again found for the plaintiff that the 
intermediatory embargo necessarily be placed upon tuna imports from all countries 
that imported yellowfin tuna to the U.S.. Hence almost 20 additional nations were 
listed to the embargo.' 
248 U.S., President, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Letters to Congressional 
Leaders on the Determination Not to Prohibit Fish Imports From Certain Countries (27 Weekly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 1479, Oct 21, 1991); U.S., President, Public Papers of the President of the United States, 
Letters to Congressional Leaders on the Determination Not to Prohibit Fish Imports Form Certain 
Countries (28 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 71, Jan 10, 1992); U.S., President, Public Papers of the 
President of the United States, Letters to Congressional Leaders on the Determination Not to Prohibit 
Fish Imports Form Certain Countries (28 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 392, March 3, 1992); cited in 
Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 9. 
249 By the end of 1991 ETP dolphin mortality had been reduced from 1990 levels by nearly 50 percent, 
to 27,000 animals per annum. 
250 Earth Island Institute v Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826,836 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
251 These were Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, 
Netherlands Antilles, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, and 
continued over page 
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The GATT Panel Decision 
In January 1991 Mexico lodged a suit with the GATT Dispute Resolution Panel (the 
Panel).ns The GATT had been the primary tool through which market liberalisation has 
been pursued by free traders in their attempts to diminish protectionist trade barriers 
throughout the world ' 
Mexico was supported by several intermediatory nations who contended that the 
U.S.'s action compelled them to either relinquish their right to export tuna to the U.S. 
or otherwise forced them to violate the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. The opinions and arguments of these nations were also heard by the panel. 
Notwithstanding the pivotal role that the EII had played in the U.S., the GATT did not 
formally recognise NGOs as having an international personality, and hence this group 
was excluded from participating, even as an observer." 
Mexico claimed that the U.S. embargos were protectionist tariffs and hence violated 
the General Agreement. More specifically Mexico contended that: 
a. the MMPA was contrary to Articles III, XI and XIII of the General Agreement; 
b. the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act was incompatible with Article IX; 
c. this was a prima facie case of nullification or impairment under Article XXIII; and 
that moreover 
d. neither Act was justified under the GATT us 
The Panel formed on 6 February 1991 and later that year on August 16 handed down 
its decision that the import ban imposed on Mexican tuna and tuna products by the 
U.S. was inconsistent with America's obligations under the GATT.ns There were two 
parts to the Panel's decision and report, both of which have been criticised as an 
extremely narrow reading of the General Agreement.ns The first part considered the 
conflict between two GATT articles: Article III, para. 4 and Article XI, para. 1. The 
Venezulea. See "Government Asks Appeals Court to Overturn Tuna Embargo and Stay Order Pending 
Appeal" (1992) 9 International Trade Reporter (BNA) at 234 (5 February 1992). 
252 Intermediatory nations in support of Mexico included Costa Rica, Panama, France, Italy and Japan. 
Oral and written presentations n support of Mexico at the GATT also came from Australia, Canada, the 
European Community, Indonesia, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Senegal, Thailand and Venezulea. 
253 Hurwitz (1995) op. cit. n231. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Hurlock, M., ''Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the 
Tuna/Dolphin Decision" (1992) 92 Colombia Law Review 2098. 
256 Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restriction on Imports of Tuna, 16 August 
1991, D /S21 /R, reprinted at 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (hereafter "Panel Report"). 
257 Kubasek, N., Browne, N.M., Young, M. and Hiers, W., "Protecting Marine Mammals: Time for a 
New Approach" (1995) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 1. 
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second part of the Panel report discussed the extraterritorial application of the MMPA 
as per Article XX exemptions to the General Agreement requirements. 
The U.S. argued that the tuna embargo fell under the jurisdiction of "National 
Treatment of Internal Taxation and Regulation" a provision which allowed for the use 
of internal measures so long as these treated both domestic and international products 
no differently. Article III, paragraph 4, provides that: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other country shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in 
respect to all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.$ 
This article when read in conjunction with Ad Article III,a9 at least by implication, 
provided permission for parties to the General Agreement to impose laws and 
regulations upon imported goods so long as the treatment given was no less favourable 
than that afforded to like domestic goods.260 Mexico did not disagree that the U.S.'s 
actions were consistent with this article. It argued instead that acceptance of the U.S.'s 
regulations as an Article III regulation did not exempt it from complying with the 
Article XI requirements regarding "General Eliminations of Quantitative Restrictions ". 
Article XI, paragraph 1, simply reads that: 
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on 
the importation of any product to the territory of any other contracting 
party 
The dilemma for the Panel thus was the characterisation of the U.S.'s action as either a 
"quantitative restriction" under this article or an "internal regulation" as per Article III, 
and the relationship between these two provisions. In this regard Mexico argued 
simply that these two articles were in fact not, as the U.S. had presumed, mutually 
exclusive. 
258 Protocol Modifying Part II and Article XXVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
(1948), article III, para 4, (T.I.A.S. 1890, at 4). 
259 Ad Article III reads 
Any internal tax or other internal charge, an any law, regulation or requirement of the 
kind referred to in [Article III, para. 1] which applies to an imported product and to the 
like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at 
the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or 
other internal charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in 
[Article III, para. I], and is accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III. 
'bid, Ad article ill, para. 4. 
260 Spracker, S. and Lundsgaard, D., "Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of Free 
Trade and Protection of the Environment" (1993) 18 Colombia Journal of Environmental Law 385. 
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The panel found in Mexico's favour. To so do it made a critical and significant 
distinction between the regulation of a product per say, and the regulation of the 
process by which the product emerged 2' The panel took a literal reading of the GATT 
and held that Article III could only pertain to a product qua product and not the 
process by which such was made. As such tuna was tuna regardless of the catch 
method and the U.S.'s ban on the Mexican product was in relation to the process 
rather than the product itself. Hence the U.S.'s extraterritorial application of the 
MMPA was found to be inconsistent with Article XI's prohibition on quantitative 
import restrictions. As one author has stated: 
in other words, the panel ruling means that Mexico can produce tuna in 
. 
any way it pleases, even by injuring marine mammals, and the United 
States may not regulate the tuna unless the regulation focuses on some 
characteristic of the final product 262 
The second contention the U.S. raised was that the Article XX exemptions validated 
its embargo of tuna caught in association with dolphins. Because the nature of Article 
XX is that of an exemption, the burden of proof rest upon the party who is asserting its 
relevance263 An earlier panel report had held that the purpose of Article XX exceptions 
is to "allow contracting parities to impose trade restrictive measures inconsistent with 
the general agreement to pursue overriding public policy goals to the extent that such 
inconsistencies were unavoidable.i2 The U.S. argued that the ban was justified by 
Article XX and drew upon sub sections (b) and (g) which read as follows: 
Subject to the requirements that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures:.... 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health:.... 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption.se 
In terms of the first, the panel found that in order to restrict the GATT's application 
those aspects of health and safety under consideration must occur within the 
jurisdiction of the party invoking the exception. This Article has historically been 
261 See ihid for discussion of the significance of this decision. 
262 Kubasek et al (1995) op. cit. n257 at 16. 
263 Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, in General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 30th Supp.. 140, 164 (1984). 
264 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, in General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 37th Supp., 200, 223 (1990). 
265 GATT, Article XX. 
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interpreted narrowly, and this panel interpretation followed in accord.2f The concern 
of the panel was that extraterritorial application of subsection(b) may lead to the use 
of trade sanctions to unilaterally regulate health and safety in other jurisdictions. It 
further held that with regard to the tuna embargo, the extraterritorial application of 
health and safety concerns would not meet with the requirement of necessity due to the 
lack of all other options available to the U.S. (such as multilateral negotiations) not 
having been exhausted.26' 
Not dissimilar was the panel's evaluation of subsection(g). It held that the exception 
could not be employed to justify measures designed to protect natural resources that 
existed outside of the jurisdiction of the party involved, that is beyond the 200nm 
EEZ. As with sub section(b) it held that allowing such action may provide for 
unilateral control of the commons or of another sovereign jurisdiction's policies, this 
time in relation to conservation. Secondly, the panel in considering XX(g) highlighted 
the precedent which required that measures justifying its use be "primarily aimed" at 
the conservation of the resource in question: that is tuna, not dolphins. 258 Moreover it 
found that in relation to the U.S. ban on tuna the embargo was based on a highly 
variable data and that given this, the embargo could not be primarily aimed at 
conservation. Indeed the panel seemed to be of the opinion that the import ban was 
more to do with trade protection than conservation. 
These decisions have been widely criticised by conservationists and academics alike. 
Criticisms have been both in terms of the potential impact of this decision on the 
sovereign rights of a nation to ban certain produce from entering its territory, and the 
health and environmental repercussions which may stem therefrom. The panel did note 
that its review was limited in scope, confined to the relevant provision of the GATT, 
and was not a statement on the relative merits of American and Mexican conservation 
policies 269 It also stated that the labeling provisions of the U.S. DPCIA were not 
inconsistent with the General Agreement because any adverse effect that may be felt by 
imports that failed to meet dolphin -safe criteria would be caused by consumer action 
rather than the provision of the Act ' 
266 Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, in General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 35th Supp., 98, 114 (1988). 
267 Panef Report op. cit. n256 at 1620. 
268 Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, in General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 35th Supp., 98, 114 (1988). 
269 Panel Report op. cit. n256 at 1622. 
270 Ibid. 
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Secondly several of the bases for the panel's decisions have been questioned. Cited as 
a "slippery slope" argument" the contention that extra -jurisdictional applications 
would undermine GATT has been criticised as misplaced due to panel's failure to 
distinguish between the application of GATT in another nation's jurisdiction and its 
use in the global commons. Additionally the panel's narrow interpretation of Article 
XX was deemed ingenuous in its failure to consider the potential impact of the even 
broader exception of Article XXI relating to self- defense and which defers almost 
complete judgement to the invoking party.272 
The U.S.'s response to the tuna- dolphin decision was, rather than adherence to the 
GATT panel's decision, one of defiance. Congressional leaders announced that trade 
sanctions would remain an integral part of the nation's domestic legislation.' 
The panel decision meant that if the GATT Council adopted the ruling then punitive 
tariffs would be imposed upon U.S. exports to Mexico. Following the decision though 
two other conditions had to be satisfied before such measures could be taken. The first 
was that the plaintiff had to pursue the decision so as to have it adopted. This was an 
action that Mexico chose not to take v9 Mexico's hesitancy in pursing the matter before 
the Council of Representatives was due primarily to its fear of disenfranchising the 
U.S." - at the time of the Panel decision Mexico was participating in ongoing North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations, which would open to Mexico 
a $US6 trillion North American market. This was seen by the Mexican President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari as the best chance for alleviating Mexico's "nagging inflation 
rate, widespread unemployment, poverty and mounting trade imbalance ".J6 Not only 
would failure to have secured the NAFTA agreement been bad for the country but 
would have significantly damaged President Salinas' personal reputation and that of 
his party in the 1994 Mexican Presidential elections. 
271 Alker (1996) op. cit. n194. 
272 Jackson, J., The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 
(1989) cited in Alker (1996) op. cit n194 at 205. 
273 On 21 November 1991 in response to the tuna- dolphin decision, the House majority leader Richard 
Gepphardt and 21 co- sponsors introduced a resolution stating that Congress would not approve enabling 
legislation for the free trade agreement with Mexico and the GATT Uruguay round if the agreements 
jeopardised the America's health, safety, environment or labor laws. H.R. Res. 246, 102d Cong. 1st 
Sess. (1991). See "Waxman Measure Urges Administration to Safeguard U.S. Laws in GATT, PTA" 
(1991) 8 International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1740 (27 November 1991). 
274 "GATT: Mexico agrees to Defer Action on complaint on 11.S. Tuna Embargo" (1991) 8 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 1351 (18 September 1991). Note also that the EU has continued to 
press for the adoption of the report on the grounds that it affects the interpretation and hence relationships 
between the environment and trade, for example see "EC and other Delegations Push for Adoption of 
GATT Tuna -Dolphin Panel" Inside U.S. Trade (21 February 1992). 
275 Charmovitz, S., "Environmentalism Confronts GATT Rules: Recent Developments and New 
Opportunities" (1993) 27 Journal of World Trade 35. 
276 "Can Mexico Clean Up Its Act ?" L.A. Times, 17 November 1991. 
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Mexico's fate when it brought the tuna- porpoise controversy to a General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel, won, and then was 
forced to suspend any further action in order not to have the issue 
brought into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) debate. 
The diplomatic and economic weight of the United States prevailed.' 
In what seemed in the wake of the decision to be the least likely outcome, the GATT 
case appears to have inadvertently promoted the protection of dolphins. Subsequent 
to the decision Mexico and the U.S. entered into bilateral negotiations. On 24 
September 1991, following the Panel Report's release, President Salinas announced the 
initiation of a ten -point program designed to protect dolphins. Although not banning 
the use of tuna purse -seiners in the ETP, it did mandate two significant policy changes. 
International observers were to be placed on all of Mexico's tuna boats, as compared 
with the previous arrangement of only one third coverage.278 And secondly, President 
Salinas allocated $US1 million for research into dolphin -safe fishing practices. 
In July 1992 the European Community (EC) filed a formal complaint at the GATT 
council regarding the lack of adoption of the tuna- dolphin panel decision. At a hearing 
before the council the EC and twelve other nations argued that, as a matter of 
principle, and regardless of the parties' desires, the panels decision should be 
adopted.' At the behest of both the U.S. and Mexico however the EC's motion was 
denied.280 
Had the EC been successful or Mexico requested adoption of the report then the U.S. 
had several options it could have pursued. The first was to vote against the ruling and 
hereby invalidate it. The GATT Council is composed of all the governed nations and 
any single nation has veto power in relation to the accepting of a panel ruling. The risk 
involved in so invalidating the ruling was that other countries adhering to GATT 
rulings in the favour of the U.S. could hence also refuse their restrictions. The second 
option open to the U.S. was to amend the MMPA provisions regarding the embargo so 
as to make them comply with the ruling. Even though the MMPA trade sanctions had 
277 Hurwitz (1995) op. cit. n231 at 524. 
278 "Tunaboat Turnaround: Mexico Announces a Dolphin Protection Plan" L.A. Times, 25 September 
1991. 
279 The other nations were Argentine, Canada, Peru, Japan, Colombia, Senegal, South Korea, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Brazil, and Hong Kong. See "EU Urges Adoption of Tuna Report but U.S. Mexico 
Claim Accord is Near" (1992) 9 International Trade Report (BNA) 524 (25 March 1992). 
280 "GATT Council Refuses EC Request to Adopt Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo" (1992) 9 
International Trade Reporter (BNA) 353 (26 February 1992) . 
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been found to violate the GATT they remained valid under U.S. law.' As discussed 
though Congress was unwilling to relax the U.S.'s import restrictions. 
The Lajolla Agreement & the IDCP 
By 1988 many foreign tuna vessel owners had recognised that the issue of dolphin 
bycatch was significant and was not going to dissipate on its own. They clearly 
conveyed their message to the skippers of their vessels, that current practices needed 
to be changed a2 Also in response to the dilemma in the ETP, nation States began 
negotiations in 1990. Initially Mexico had refused to participate in the negotiations 
that were run by IATTC which Mexico was not a member of. It did, however, attend as 
an observer. In January 1991, ten ETP nations concluded and, by 1992 had signed, the 
LaJolla Agreement. Mexico did not initially join the agreement, however with the 
renewed U.S.- Mexican relations that had formed in the wake of the GATT tuna - 
dolphin decision, Mexico later assumed a lead role in the construction of ETP 
arrangements. This voluntary, non - binding agreement established the International 
Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP) as the means of implementation. The intent of 
this Program was to provide strong comprehensive dolphin protection, and to limit 
dolphin mortalities to very small numbers." 
The LaJolla Agreement consisted of five parts. The two key elements were the 
requirement for an observer on every vessel,' and individual dolphin bycatch quotas 
allocated to individual fishing vessels within the international fleet as part of a strict 
overall annual dolphin mortality limit. Several environmental groups strongly opposed 
the quota arrangement stating that any dolphin mortality in the fishery was 
unacceptable. Under the LaJolla Agreement the following allowable dolphin bycatch 
levels were established and recorded in a Schedule of progressively decreasing annual 
limits as follows: 
281 Congress has the power to abrogate treaty obligations by enacting a more recent statutes, so long as 
the intention of the new law is clear. Had Congress intended the MMPA sanctions to be limited by the 
GATT this would have been specified therein. 
282 Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall op. cit. nI99. 
283 See Summary Minutes of the 50th Meeting of the Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission, 16- 
IR June 1992 (IATTC, LaJolla, 1992) Appendix 10. 
284 This applies from 1 January 1993, to every vessel greater than 400 short tons carrying capacity. 
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The total quota was to be divided each year between those vessels intending fo fish for 
tuna in association with dolphins, so long as those vessels met certain conditions such 
as the education and training of key crew members, and possession of equipment 
enabling the unharmed release of captured dolphins. Vessels applied for allocation of 
individual dolphin mortality limits (DML) to be calculated as fraction of the total 
allowable bycatch, the individual allocation thus depending on the number of 
applications. Once a vessel reached it's individual quota or DML it was no longer 
permitted to fish for tuna in association with dolphins. This method of allocation of 
annual quotas by a central body, to individual vessels, was an entirely new mechanism 
in international fisheries management. It was perhaps the administration of this 
scheme however that has had the greatest impact on its success. That is, utilising the 
highly competitive nature of most fishers, slowly has created an atmosphere wherein 
low dolphin take is a sense of pride and a highly sough after accolade by most vessel 
captains 286 
The first of the remaining three parts of the agreement was the establishment of an 
International Review Panel to meet tri- annually and report on the compliance of the 
international fleet and individual vessels with the LaJolla Agreement. A process of 
infractions was potentially fraught with a variety of shortcomings. Perhaps the most 
serious of these was the potential of backdoor deals to be done between nations. To 
counter this two steps were taken, the first was that vessels would be judged with 
anonymity and as such a nations would not be able to favor its own vessel, and 
secondly that NGOs be present whilst infraction were being discussed!' Thus the 
285 Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 1 1. 
286 The scheme is run such that all the vessels are ranked in terms of their cetacean bycatch level. The 
rank of each individual vessels is revealed only to the captain of that vessel, along with information as to 
why the take was at a particular level and how this could be improved. Although being informed 
privately as to the comparative performance of the vessel it has become "a source of pride to beat the 
others and a source of shame to do badly ". Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall op. cit. n 199. Similarly the role 
of moving dolphins from the net, once a task given to the laziest on the vessel, has become a role of 
increased status. 
287 This was initially met with considerable resistance but was eventually approved by participant 
nations. Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall op. cit. n199. 
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Panel was comprised of government, fishing industry and NGO representatives. A 
second body composed from essentially the same groups, was a Scientific Advisory 
Board designed to assist the director of the TATTC in his efforts to coordinate, 
facilitate and guide research. The La Jolla Agreement hence also called for a 
comprehensive research program designed to improve purse seining technology to 
allow for further reduced dolphin mortality incidental to tuna fishing, and the 
development of alternate methods of yellowfin tuna fishing which is not in association 
with dolphins. 
The IDCP was boosted by genuine U.S. support. This was made possible because of 
the LaJolla agreement's consistency with the objectives of the MMPA regarding 
international cooperation, in particular in the ETP aimed at the conservation of marine 
mammals, the use of best practice technology, and further research efforts into less 
impactive fishing methods. Moreover, the U.S.'s determination to conclude and 
implement a negotiated agreement had intensified in light of the August 1991 GATT 
reprimand for its lack of effort to find a consensus solution to the tuna- dolphin 
dispute.' 
Subsequent to the conclusion of the LaJolla Agreement due to the problems associated 
with the U.S.'s inability to provide for relief from embargos, the Bush administration 
even prior to a finalised agreement sought from Congress amendments to the MMPA. 
The International Dolphin Conservation Bill was introduced into the U.S. House of 
Representatives. This closely resembled an earlier moratorium bill which had been 
rejected by Congress. 
U.S. Legislative Action to Further Protect Dolphins 
The International Dolphin Conservation Bill had two primary aims. The first was to 
resolve the dispute with Mexico and Venezuela on whom, notwithstanding the LaJolla 
Agreement, the U.S. had import embargos placed. The second intended a remedy the 
disparity between the 27,000 dolphin kills each year in foreign waters, and the 
MMPA's zero mortality goal. The Senate Committee on Commerce Science and 
Transportation was presented with a choice between two different approaches to 
effect a reduction in foreign fishing fleet dolphin by catches. The first option was a 
global moratorium on the setting of purse seines on dolphins, and the alternative the 
T.a Jolla Agreement of incremental reductions in permissible dolphin mortality.' The 
288 As noted by Charmovitz thought the panel remained silent on Mexico's refusal to participate in and 
"stonewalling" of the regional negotiations. Charmovitz (1993) op. cit. n275. 
289 Letter from Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Charimean, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science 
and transportation, to Dr. James Joseph, Director, Inter -American Tropical Tuna Commission, 15 July 
continued over page 
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U.S. administration supported the moratorium bill and indicated that the governments 
of Mexico and Venezuela had also agreed to support it in exchange for a lifting of their 
import embargos.290 
Two disparate schools of thought emerged on the preferred form the Act would take. 
On one side were a portion of U.S. environmental groups, the U.S. Congress and U.S. 
cannery companies, and on the other the Bush administration, moderate environmental 
activists and the Mexican government and Mexican fishers.241 
Perhaps most curious in these alliances appears the positioning of the NGOs. Mexican 
groups were by and large silent on the issue, which could be attributed to three factors: 
a little reported fallout between many U.S. and Mexican NGOs due to perceived 
discrepancies in their interests; the political situation in Mexico whereby the Salinas 
government had successfully disempowered these groups; and concern over loosing its 
support base by condoning the sensitive the issue of U.S. policing of Mexican fishers. 
In the U.S. the internal split in environmental groups stance was more directly related 
to the issue at hand. Those NGOs, such as EII, that favoured the embargo viewed 
Mexican efforts as superficial. Further they claimed that the Mexican tuna industry 
would not suffer financial loss from improved use of and care taken with gear, and 
hence there was no valid reason for its resistance to the moratorium. 
On the other hand "anti- embargo environmentalists" opposed the arbitrariness of the 
comparability provisions, whereunder foreign fleets were required to assume a take 
level based on the actual U.S. dolphin bycatch rate, rather than the legal level of 
20,500.292 Further groups such as Greenpeace contend that setting on dolphins also 
occurs in the Western Pacific Ocean, and thus the U.S. moratorium on setting on 
dolphins in the ETP was unjust. 
The Mexican government and Mexican fishers agreed with the views of the anti - 
embargo environmentalists, however pointed more stringently to the non -endangered 
status of the dolphin. They ultimately saw the conflict as a human versus dolphin 
trade -off. Moreover they felt that the economic symmetries between the U.S. and 
1992, cited in Joseph (1994) at 12. See generally Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 17 -25 for a detailed 
discussion on the benefits and problems of each option. 
290 These nations later issues statements dening such agreements had been forthcoming. See Letter 
form Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria, Republic of Venezuela, to James A. Baker, III, U.S. Secretary of 
State, July 22, 1992; Communique of the Secretaria do Relaciones Exteriores de Mexico, "Mexico en 
Favor De una Defensa real y Eficaze de los Delfines" (Tlotelolco, Mexico, october 31, 1992); reported in 
Joseph (1994) op. cit. n199 at 12. 
291 Hurwitz (1995) op. cit. n231 at 510. 
292 Greenpeace, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade: A Greenpeace Perspective 3 (1992), cited in ibid at 
517. 
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Mexico had not been adequately addressed or considered in the imposition of U.S. 
requirements on their poorer southern neighbours.243 The Mexican government was 
supported in its stance by the Bush administration who actively opposed the 
placement of embargos on Mexican tuna imports. The executive's opposition to the 
embargos stemmed primarily from the surrounding political climate: NAFTA 
negotiations were ongoing and the U.S. was actively seeking Mexican support and 
participation therein. Moreover the U.S. was realising an increasing interdependence 
and an enhanced desire for cooperative approaches to regional problems. Indeed keen 
to foster good will between the two nations, when the U.S. government lost the EH 
litigation it was reported to have told the Mexican government that it would "get the 
dolphin protection law weakened".' 
The U.S. Congress was, however, of a very different view. Both Congress and the U.S. 
cannery companies had faced the public outcry from the strong NGO push which led 
to the introduction of dolphin -safe tuna products. For political and economic reasons 
the public sentiment was sufficient to gain the support of both these groups for a 
moratorium on the importation of tuna caught in association with dolphins. 
The Bill passed thorough the Senate on October 8, in the final hours of the 1992 
Congressional session, and became the International Dolphin Conservation Act 
(IDCA).295 The IDCA amended the MMPA to add Title Ill as part of a compromise 
between the Bush Administration and environmental groups. The plan was quickly 
introduced into Congress. Title 111 allowed for the resolution of the tuna -dolphin issues 
outside of the MMPA framework, and hence isolating the tuna- dolphin controversy 
from the general workings of the Act.296 
The 'MCA provided that U.S. fleets were not to take more than 800 dolphins between 
1 January 1993 and 1 March 1994. The Act then established a five year moratorium on 
the encirclement of dolphins in purse -seine nets, to take effect also on March 1 1994. 
Internationally it authorised the Secretary of State to negotiate the said global 
moratorium on the setting of nets on dolphins, and imposed strict non -discretionary 
embargos upon those nations who failed to comply therewith. These included broad 
fish product sanctions, that it was estimated were worth $US100 million annually to 
Mexico alone. 
293 Ibid. 
294 "Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade" Washington Post, 19 October 1991. 
295 International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102 -523. 106 Stat. 3425. 
296 kubasek (1995) op. cit. n257. 
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Included in the IDCA however was the caveat that the moratorium would not become 
active unless at least one other major fishing nations agreed to comply therewith. The 
Act then offered that general embargos in place under the MMPA would be lifted from 
nations who agreed to these provisions of the IDCA. Those nations that had not made 
such a commitment by 1 March 1994 were hence subject to embargo297 
Although Mexico and Venezuela initially indicated they would implement the U.S.'s 
moratorium provisions, they later withdrew this support and instead participated in 
the dolphin protection program created under the auspice of the IATTC. The 
cooperation of Mexico or Venezuela, the two extant embargoed nations, was of 
particular significance given the provision in the Act whereby the moratorium is not 
activated until at least one other major tuna fishing nation (that is with in addition of 
a 20 vessel fleet) agrees to comply with it. 
Several of the provisions contained in Act were however to apply regardless of 
agreement from any other major fishing nation. These included the requirement for 
observer presence on all vessels where it was determined that there was a regular and 
significant interaction between fishing operations and marine mammals, and a ban on 
the encirclement of eastern spinner and coastal spotted dolphins. Moreover a 
prohibition was placed on the sale, purchase or transportation of tuna caught in 
association with dolphin by U.S. citizens. 
Finally, the Act provided that if the moratorium was effected then the mortality limit 
of 20,500 dolphins and the exemption granted by the MMPA authorising such vessels 
to fish, would be revoked. If the moratorium fails to be activated then the exemption 
would remain in place until December 311999, although the limit would be reduced. 
Concluding Comments 
To recall Congress was motivated in 1988 to amend the MMPA so as to impose 
embargos on foreign fishing fleets operating in the ETP fishery that did not meet U.S. 
standards in their dolphin conservation efforts. As with previous similar laws, the 
reason behind this was twofold: firstly because of the continuing impact that dolphin 
bycatch by foreign fleets was having on the U.S.'s efforts to reduce dolphin mortality. 
Secondly Congress was concerned that U.S. vessels were being disadvantaged by the 
competitive edge that foreign vessels had by not needing to comply with the relatively 
stringent conditions imposed on domestic operators. Combined these motivated strong 
297 A caveat was added to the effect that this blanket ban on all fish products would only be up to 40% 
of the aggregate value of such products. This figure was chosen so that in the event of an embargo due to 
the dolphin issue, Mexican shrimp imports would not be affected. Joseph (1994) op. cit. nI99 at footnote 
52. 
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domestic support from both fishers and conservationists. These and various other 
interests (e.g. labor unions, consumer protection advocates) formed a strong coalition 
and ensured that Congress's commitment to reducing dolphin bycatch and leveling the 
domestic /foreign fishing playing field did not waver. 
Once again, as had occurred with section 609 shrimp import restrictions, the U.S. 
bureaucracy wavered in its application of sanctions on foreign nations. Litigation 
proved a useful tool for NGOs in their efforts to have the laws applied as Congress 
had intended. A series of judicial determinations found unanimously for the plaintiff 
and each required incremental steps towards the full implementation of import 
restrictions. 
Unsurprisingly embargoed nations were unhappy with the new requirement placed 
upon them. Mexico took its grievance to the GATT panel for adjudication who found 
for the plaintiff that the U.S. had indeed violated the GATT. The reaction from the 
two primary litigants was interesting. The U.S. Congress was almost uninterested in 
the decision, and vowed to continue with the application of the embargo. Mexico 
decided not to have the decision adopted, thus making it neither binding to the U.S. 
nor allowing for its reliance upon as a precedent in subsequent cases. Mexico's reasons 
were to do with other negotiations, in particular the NAFTA, which were ongoing at 
the time. Indeed it can be mused as to whether Mexico ever intended to have the 
decision adopted or was simply hoping for additional bargaining leverage with the 
U.S. in other forums. 
With both nations keen to seek an amicable solution to the tuna- dolphin controversy 
plaguing the region, a multilateral arrangement under the auspice of IATTC was 
formed. It is conceivable that the La Jolla Agreement would not have come about had 
the U.S. not launched its unilateral restrictions. Thus suggesting that these 
internationally illegal actions, were a necessary catalyst to the formation of a 
negotiated regional agreement. 
Regardless of U.S. participation in and condoning of the agreement, domestically once 
again the issue became contentious. The need for the U.S. to give legislative backing to 
both the agreement and a promise to remove sanctions from those IATTC nations 
participating in the IDCP, brought the issue of the conflict between quota arrangements 
and the MMPA zero mortality goal into the limelight once again. The MMPA still had a 
20,500 dolphin bycatch limit, but with the introduction of labeling legislation the actual 
U.S. take was near nothing. Thus lobbying for a moratorium on driftnetting on the high 
seas was pursued by NGOs, with effectively no domestic fishing opposition. This 
position was actively opposed by the government. A strange compromise was reached, 
and in the end the moratorium was never activated. 
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4.8 Concluding Comments to Chapter 4 
Domestic Factors 
The big picture with respect to federal political machinations is difficult to see when 
concentrating on a single issue area such as bycatch. This discussion is more likely to 
contribute meaningfully as part of a wider body of literature on the Reagan/Bush era. 
With regard to the oceans however the downsizing of the service and the loss of the 
leadership of several strong proponents in Congress contributed to the reduction of the 
issue's prominence and attention through this period. Indeed it can be observed that 
very few new laws were enacted, as Congressional efforts were directed towards 
preserving existing schemes and infrastructure, though existing statutes were 
reauthorised and amended. 
Though not intended merely to comply with the Reagan policy of small government, the 
one major domestic legislative alteration of the 1980s was the 1988 MN/IPA where 
virtually all restrictions on bycatch were removed. This is a notable exception to he 
incrementalism and administrative alterations to the era due a mention here in that it 
was perhaps passed because of its complementarity with the policy of the day. 
Notwithstanding these limitations several domestic patters are clearly observable. One 
of these was the conflict that emerged domestically as a part of the move to downsize 
government. 
Two of the case -studies in this chapter, TEDs and driftnetting, demonstrate the power 
of a unified domestic stance on foreign policy. Litigative action by fishers and NGOs 
removed foreign driftnet fishing in U.S. waters. Building on this environmentalists used 
community opinion as a disincentive to prevent opposition to the driftnet initiatives 
from the Reagan administration. Thus no particular position was taken by the 
Executive or Congress and the outcome left up essentially to one representative from 
Alaska to influence. 
In the international application of TEDs, fishers and NGOs again had a joint position: 
they wanted foreign shrimp imposts caught by methods involving sea turtle bycatch 
prohibited. Distinct from the driftnet case though, Congress took an active role in the 
enactment of section 609. As was reported 
[a] broad spectrum of U.S. political constituent groups, including 
environmental organizations, commercial and recreational fishermen, 
labor unions, consumer protection advocates, and others, perceive such 
sanctions as the most effective, and perhaps in some cases the only 
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feasible method to get foreign nations to alter their behaviour. The use of 
unilateral trade sanctions also has a broad support in Congress '8 
Action subsequent to the enactment of section 609 well reflects how agency opposition 
to a policy can impact upon its implementation. Section 609 was interpreted to apply 
only to specific nations, and even then was not actively applied. Moreover, in the 
application of domestic turtle bycatch policy, as well as the international application 
of tuna- dolphin laws, the implementing agency can be seen to act in contempt of 
Congressional edicts, a view confirmed by the courts in their strict interpretation of 
these laws. 
Finally the role of individuals can be seen clearly through the discussion of the turtle 
case. Firstly in the form of Tee John Mialjavich who resisted pressure to become 
signatory to the initial NGO industry negotiations and later led the resistance to TEDs. 
And second, in an examination of the role of the Secretary of Commerce under the 
Bush administration. Originating from Texas and with obvious sympathies towards 
the fishers light Mosbacher had a considerable input into and impact on the progress 
of TED policy. Interestingly although these two men stood out in the discussion on the 
development of TED policy, both assumed positions in opposition to the eventual 
policy that was implemented. Thus it could be suggested that an individual may have 
a significant role with respect to a policy however if this runs in the face of majority 
opinion it is likely to do little more than delay the inevitable. In comparison with these 
examples, Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska actively promoted the prohibition of 
driftnets and was indeed instrumental in the generation of U.S. support, and the 
creation of such a policy internationally. 
International Influences 
In general the Reagan era has been noted for its pull away from international 
leadership. This was not however witnessed in the issue area of bycatch policy. 
The first major move was the U.S.'s involvement in the banning of a particular fishing 
method in order to protect stocks. The driftnet ban represented an international 
campaign to reduce the bycatch of a range of species through multilateral pressure on 
the distant water fishing nations. Although not binding by international law the UNGA 
driftnetting resolutions served to provide an indication of the consensus view and 
hence to isolate and put pressure on nations that fail to conform. 
298 ludicello and Lytle (1994) op. cit. n53 at 142 -143. 
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The other source used was unilateral trade sanctions. Enacted in 1971 the Pelly 
Amendment is unique within the U.S. system because it allows sanctions to be invoked 
under a number of other statutes - in effect acting as a supplementary procedural 
mechanism for other marine conservation statures. Unlike other statutes it had not 
been challenged under the GATT as it had never actually been enforced, the threat of 
certification being sufficient to garner action from a recalcitrant nation. 
On the two occasions where trade sanctions were invoked, the tuna- dolphin and 
international aspect of the turtle- shrimp issues, Congress had been heavily influenced 
by a strong domestic coalition. A powerful coalition of commercial and recreational 
fishers, animal protection and environmental organisations, labor unions and consumer 
protection bodies have encouraged the use of trade embargos as an effective means of 
both broadening environmental protection and of leveling of the playing field. 
The ESA itself does not provide for the issuance of trade sanctions upon nations that 
do not comply with its provisions. Remedies contained therein are restricted to 
criminal and civil proceedings. However when a problem of a market advantage for 
foreign importers due to the imposition of strict environmental conditions upon 
domestic shrimpers arose, trade sanctions were invoked by Congress as the means by 
which to equalise this situation. It is likely that this instrument was chosen due to the 
familiarity of the tool. 
The international community has not appeared nearly so enthusiastic. Dispute panel 
action under the GATT has appeared openly hostile to the use of trade sanctions to 
achieve environmental goals. Moreover, international pressure on the Bush 
administration to be lenient with its application of embargos, and this led to its refusal 
to sanction nation's fish products until forced to so do by the courts. 
Notwithstanding international displeasure with the U.S.'s use of sanctions they have 
been effective in some cases in propelling an issue to the limelight and even in creating 
multi lateral negotiated regimes for their management. 
The Impact of NGOs 
The activism with regard to the international banning of driftnetting on the high seas 
was prompted by NGO action in particular by Greenpeace, and a consequential 
upsurge of public opinion against driftnet fishing. The media was thus used as a means 
of stifling the Reagan Administration's opposition to the progress of the driftnet 
initiative. Although having some involvement in multilateral negotiations, NGO actions 
were by and large still restricted to the domestic arena as these organisations were not 
seen as having an international personality. 
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Through the 1980s NGOs often relied upon judicial determinations based upon 
enactments of the previous decade. This was due to an unsympathetic attitude in 
Washington, and the stalemate that had developed on particular issues within many 
government departments. Indeed many of the developments in the international arena 
with respect to the application of unilateral trade sanctions would not have occurred 
with out persistent NGO intervention. 
The other significant contribution of the 1980s made by NGOs was the employment of 
market incentives to encourage more environmentally friendly production habits. This, 
along with the use of litigation, and greater contribution to scientific debates, reflected 
increased innovation within NGOs. This realisation of the need for a broader set of 
tools with which to address environmental issues, also reflects a maturation of these 
organisations. These have well equipped them to better manage the complexity of 
issues that arose in the 1990s. Without such developments the continued input of such 
organisations may well have been in significant jeopardy. 
The Role of Science 
In the case of driftnet fishing in the North Pacific science was used to validate what 
were ostensibly political choices of policy, rather than these policy decisions being 
steeped in rigorous science. The timely communication of scientific information to 
decision makers had little bearing on the policy to ban driftnet fishing. Science, is only 
one of many factors which inform decision makers when choices of policy are involved. 
In terms of the international driftnet ban, science was used by and large as a 
supporting, not determining, mechanism. The debate was not centered around 
conclusive evidence, but rather revolved around political and emotional 
considerations. 
Rather than being successfully manipulated by one party as occurred in the driftnetting 
scenario, and bringing closure to the issue, the inadequacy of scientific data was 
realised by the protagonists to change: in this case domestic shrimp fishers. Thus in the 
turtle- shrimp debate scientific uncertainty was harnessed by both parties to the 
dispute, often causing a stalemate to develop. This lasted several years, and politics 
once again became the main factor in the progress of the policy. The solution to this 
unpalatable situation in which any decision was difficult to defend, was the 
sequestering of an independent report into the statue of sea turtles and the extent of 
impact that shrimp trawling had upon them. The need for this information was 
apparent. Both parties strongly believed in the validity of their evidence, though one 
was more scientific and the other more anecdotal. 
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Unexpected though they were, when the result did not meet one party's expectations, 
rather than graciously accepting defeat, the report was then targeted for bias. By this 
stage however scientific evidence was solid enough that policy development went 
ahead regardless of the dissenting voices. The turtle- shrimp controversy at the 
domestic level well reflects how scientific uncertainty can be used to delay action as 
well as to progress the formation of a particular policy. 
The question then arises as to why the shrimp fishers were so well able to utilise the 
uncertainty, when DWFNs in the driftnet dispute were not, even though they perhaps 
had a much more solid scientific basis for dissent. The answer perhaps relies upon the 
forum in which the issue was discussed. Early on in the process the U.S. government 
raised the issue of dríftnetting at a FAO meeting and it was promptly referred to the 
fisheries branch of the organisation. Later the South Pacific nations raised it in the UN, 
that it was accepted there reflected that it had clearly become a political issue and, in 
that, a political decision. Thus, regardless of the evidence and of Japan's efforts to 
ensure the decision was based upon scientifically formed opinions, a decision made in 
the UNGA was always going to be primarily political. By comparison the framework 
for the determination of the sea turtle issue in the U.S. was the ESA. To recall formed 
soon after a burst of scientific interest in the U.S. this statute relied heavily on the 
status of the species and the abatement of threats thereto. Thus science was to be 
much more contention and the justification for actions much more rigorous. 
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Chapter 5e 
U.S. Bycatch Policy: 1992-present 
5.1 Introduction 
By the 1990s, fisheries related environmental concerns had risen to the top of the 
political agenda in the U.S. and many other countries, and hence had become a major 
consideration in international relations. In this regard, and in contrast to the 
domestically progressive 1960s and 70s, in the late 80s and early 1990s advances in 
marine and environmental policy more often occurred at the international level.' 
One of the primary forces behind the globalisation of environmental issues was a 
growing realisation of the interrelated nature of many natural resources and associated 
management problems. In response to increased internationalisation , environmental 
NGOs assumed an expanded role as they become significant players in the diffusion of 
new principles and norms: both between international regimes, and between the 
national and international levels.' This increased involvement was facilitated by four 
changes in the characteristics of global policy- making and of international NGOs. 
These are: 
increased networking by and between NGOs, in part a reflection of global 
shrinkage and advances in communications technology; 
greater transparency in international negotiations and easier access to the 
diplomatic process; 
the greater frequency with which NGO representatives were included in national 
delegations; and 
the increased sophistication of NGOs in the disciplines of science, law, economics 
and politics, hence providing them with greater net bargaining power through an 
increased role as a provider of information in complex policy debates. 
The 1990s have also been labeled as the post -modern era, where politics can be 
characterised as an "expression of societal fragmentation and [reflected by the] 
erosion of the nation -state as the most legitimate unit of action"? This too has allowed 
for the elevation to prominence of other levels of political action and the multiplication 
of political action units such as NGOs. 
1 Knecht, R., "Essay: Emerging International Goals and Principles and their Influence on National 
Ocean Governance" (1994) 22 Coastal Management 177. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Finger, M., "NGOs and Transformation: Beyond Social Movement Theory ", in Princen, T. and 
Finger, M. (ed), Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (Routledge, 
London, 1994) pp. 48 -68 at 61. 
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In the U.S., after 12 years of Republican Administration, the return of a Democratic 
President and the appointment of a Vice President renowned for his environmental 
credentials' brought with it high hopes for the conservation movement.' In the period 
of the 103rd Congress however, many of these hopes failed to be realised. Indeed one 
government official commented that the White House's main interests have been in 
terms of 'big picture' issues such as climate change, to the neglect of other concerns.' 
An alternative explanation refers to the evolution of environmental issues to a 'second 
generation' of more complex and costly problems that have little to capture Congress's 
imagination. Notwithstanding a lack of legislative action, there does however appear 
to have been a movement into government of many NGO representatives, portending 
improved implementation of existing laws.' 
The 1990s also saw a new approach to science and the issue of uncertainty. 
Ecologically sustainable development (ESD) emerged as a governing principle of 
resource management, and within this framework a precautionary approach to natural 
resource decision- making was promoted.' The precautionary principle recognised that 
science can not provide clear policy prescriptions and that criteria need to be 
developed to systematically address resultant uncertainty.' The benchmark that was 
designated appropriate, was that where there are threats of serious of irreversible 
environmental damage, a lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason 
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation. This infiltrated 
fisheries management at both the national and international levels.]" 
4 Indeed Al Gore had written a book entitled Gore, A., Earth in the Balance : Ecology and the 
Human Spirit (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1992). 
5 Kitsos, T., "The Clinton Administration, the 103rd Congress, and Environmental Policy: Strange 
Things are Happening ", in Cicin -Sain, B. and Leccese, K. (ed), Moving Ahead on Ocean Governance - 
Roundtable Summaries (Center for the Study of Marine Policy, Graduate College of Marine Studies, 
University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, 1994) pp.25 -29. 
6 Per. comm. confidential source. 
7 Hewison, G., "The Role of Environmental Non -Governmental Organisations ", in Mensah, T. (ed), 
Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century (Law of the Sea Institute, University 
of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1996) pp.115 -137. 
8 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 31 I.L.M. 974 (1992) (hereafter "Rio 
Declaration "); and United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) (hereafter 
"Convention on Biodiversity"). 
9 O'Riordan, T. and Cameron, J., Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (Earthscan Publications, 
London, 1994); and Harding, R. and Fisher, E., "Introducing the Precautionary Principle" in Harding, 
R. and Fischer, E. (ed), Perspectives on the Precautionary Principle (Federation Press, Sydney, 1999) 
pp.2 -27. 
10 Article 6.5 of the Food and Agriculture Organisation's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing 
holds that nation States should apply a precautionary approach widely in the conservation, management 
and exploitation of living aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment. 
And in some countries, parallel legislation requiring that a precautionary approach be adopted in fisheries 
management decisions was enacted. For example the Sustainable Fisheries Act (U.S.) was enacted in 
1996 and the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Asst.) was amended in the following year: both laws 
require a precautionary approach to fisheries management. Food and Agriculture Organisation, Code of 
continued over page 
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5.2 International Fisheries and Conservation Actions 
Early in its term, the new Clinton Administration began to reassess its ocean policy 
options, and to consider available avenues for international environmental leadership. 
One of its first actions was to inform the UN of its desire to find a solution to the 
deadlock of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). On 16 November 1993, Guyana 
became the 60' nation to sign the LOSC, triggering its passage into action one year 
later. Following the 1993 Prepcom series of negotiations, aimed specifically at dealing 
with outstanding issues, the U.S. has again considered acceding to the 1982 
Convention. 
The lack of adequate high seas fisheries provisions in the LOSC - as highlighted by 
the emergence of problems such as the pelagic driftnetting issue - led to two separate 
1992 events to focus on these problems." The first was at a meeting resulting in the 
Declaration of Cancun, which pushed forward the idea of a Code of Conduct to be 
created under the auspice of the FAO.'' 
The second was the Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 which emerged from the Rio Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED).13 Agenda 21 recognised the need to 
promote the development and the use of selective fishing gear and practices so as to 
minimise the bycatch of non -target species both in the high seas and areas of national 
jurisdiction.14 Moreover, it called for an intergovernmental conference with a view to 
promoting the effective implementation of LOSC provisions on straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. The response generated by these 1992 developments has been 
referred to as a twin track approach; whereby a binding agreement, and a much 
broader and more detailed voluntary code of conduct, were simultaneously 
developed.15 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO(UN), Rome, 1996) in Report of the Conference of FAO, 28th 
Session, Rome, 20 -31 October 1995, Doc. C 95/REP, (hereafter "Code of Conduct "). 
11 Burke, W., Freeburg, M. and Miles, E., "United Nations Resolutions on Drifinet Fishing: An 
Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management" (1994) 25 Ocean 
Development and International Law 127. 
I2 The Declaration of Cancun came out of a meeting hosted by the Mexican Government in May 
1992. Haward, M., "Management of Marine Living Resources: International and Regional Perspectives 
on Transboundary Issues" in Blake, G., Chia, L., Grundy -Warr, C., Pratt, M. and Schofield, C., 
International Boundaries and Environmental Security: Frameworks for Regional Cooperation (Kluwer 
Law International, London, 1997). 
13 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, United Nations, Rio 
de Janerio, 3 -14 June 1992, UN Doc. A /CONF.151 /26 /Rev.1, Vol. 1, Annex II (hereafter "Agenda 21 "). 
14 Agenda 21, para. 17.46 and 17.75. 
15 Edeson, W., "The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries: An Introduction" (1996) 11 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 233. 
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A series of meetings through 1993 and 1994 concluded with a report to the 48th 
UNGA, which resulted in the September 1995 Agreement Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNTA 
or the Implementing Agreement).16 Included in this new agreement was explicit 
recognition of the need to minimize the bycatch of fish and non -fish species." 
Also in September 1995 the United Nations FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries was finalised and adopted. This highlighted, among other things, the 
minimisation of bycatch.'8 The General Principles of the Code stated that 
[ management measures should not only ensure the conservation of target 
species but also of species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated 
ecosystems dependent upon the target species1' 
and section 6.6 directed 
States and users of aquatic ecosystems [to] minimise waste, catch of non- 
target species, both fish and non -fish species, and impacts on associated 
or dependent species. 
Together these initiatives,2° underpinned by the LOSC, "constitute the basis for future 
directions in the area of fisheries'.21 
5.3 The Use of Trade Instruments 
important changes occurred, also, in terms of international trade agreements during the 
1990s. The GATT panel's tuna- dolphin decision was significant not only for its 
outcome, but also because it was the first time that lawyers from both sides of the free 
trade debate consciously focused on the implications that trade liberalisation may 
have for environmental protection. Though it was not the first case to raise issues of 
trade /environment conflict, it was the first case that managed to capture the attention 
of lawyers, economists, politicians and policy -makers u 
16 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (hereafter "The Implementing Agreement" or 
"UNTA "). For discussion see Anderson, D., "The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995 - An Initial 
Assessment" (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 463. 
17 UNIA, Article 5(f). 
18 Code of Conduct, Annex 1. 
19 Mid, Section 6.2. 
20 At this same time a third significant development was also occurring. This was the creation of the 
FAO Compliance Agreement, intended to reduce fishing on the high seas contrary to internationally 
agreed conservation and management measures. The compliance agreement was adopted by the 1993 
FAO Conference. Food and Agriculture Organisation Agreement to Promote Compliance with 
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 33 I.L.M. 
968 (1994). 
21 Edeson (1996) op. cit. n15 at 234. 
22 Carr, L, "Environment versus International Trade: Where are We Now ?" (1997) 3 International 
Trade Law and Regulation 130. 
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The GATT was traditionally guided by a liberalist ideology, promoting free trade to 
encourage economic growth and raise standards of living. From 1986 to 1994 a new 
(Uruguay) round of trade negotiations were conducted. Given the publicity the 1991 
tuna -dolphin decision received, it is surprising that the issue of trade /environment 
relations was not considered throughout the ongoing Uruguay round negotiations. One 
suggested explanation for this was the political nature of the issue, with regard to the 
north -south economic divide.23 Indeed, when the topic of environment was raised in 
the 1990 Brussels meeting, its inclusion was widely resisted!' 
In the U.S., the 102nd Congress's position was made clear when, in 1992, the House of 
Representatives passed Resolution 246. Herein, a vote of 362 to 0 called for the 
President to 
initiate and complete negotiations, as part of the current Uruguay Round 
GATT talk, to make the GATT compatible with the MMPA u 
It seems, however, that only after the major deals had been done, in April 1994 while 
arrangements for the signing in Marrekesh were being finalised, that issues of the 
environment were considered. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round to the general 
agreement, the GATT panel was replaced by a new body to administer the general 
agreement's implementation - the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The preamble of 
the agreement establishing the WTO did, in the event, make special reference to the 
environment, and mandated that 
economic endeavour shall be conducted while ... allowing the optimal use 
of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development, seeking both the protect and preserve the environment. 
Notwithstanding that some reinforcement of the validity of environmental protection 
measures occurred, instead of (as Congress had directed) making the international 
trade regime compatible with the MMPA, the Uruguay round of negotiations may have 
served to strengthen existing (incompatible) arrangements - the WTO agreement 
strengthened the enforcement measures applied to nations who violate the regime. The 
WTO's increased strength comes from its economic enforcement measures and means 
of implementing a decision,26 ironically the same measures that the U.S. has been 
condemned for using unilaterally. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Von Moltke, K., International Environmental Management, Trade Regimes and Sustainability 
(International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winipeg, 1996). 
25 246 Cong. Rec. H7699 (6 August 1992). 
26 The WTO had altered the previous situation of the GATT whereunder a plaintiff could choose not 
to lodge a decision into precedent. Now, unless a majority of nations including complainants voted not 
to have a decision adopted, it automatically entered into international law. 
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Indeed, through the 1990s unilateral trade sanctions have become the U.S.'s instrument 
of choice. Many commentators and officials strongly believed in their utility, allowing 
timely action and costing less than multilateral negotiations 2' To be sure, the new U.S. 
administration heralded the use of unilateral trade sanctions as a tool of influence. 
[F]very nation in the world is today headed towards using dolphin -safe 
fishing practices, because of the power of American markets. We took a 
stance, saying we are going to impose and embargo on the products of all 
countries which violate accepted environmental norms. Think about the 
power of that principle.... The idea will provide the next great 
international opportunity: to come together with other countries to say we 
are going to use the markets of the world as a stick to enforce 
environmental standards 28 
The international community's position on the use of unilateral sanctions is complex 
and varied. Principle 12 of the UNCED Rio Declaration and similar statements 
elsewhere hold that "unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside 
the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided".' Although not 
contradicting this, a notable shift in emphasis was seen in the WTO Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade. This recognised that no country should be prevented from 
taking measures to protect the environment so long as these are not more restrictive 
than is necessary, and principles of non -discrimination are respected. 
In an attempt to find some middle ground and constancy between the trends for 
reduced international trade barriers and increased environmental protection, a 
Committee on Trade and the Environment was established in the final Uruguay round 
negotiations at Marrekesh.30 This was provided with extensive and detailed terms of 
reference, and has, since the WTO came into existence on January 1 1995, conducted 
considerable work on resolving incompatibilities in these paradigms. 
At the same time as the Uruguay Round, negotiations for a regional agreement were 
underway. NAFTA discussions were conducted from 1990 through 1992, and the 
Agreement was signed in by Canada, the U.S. and Mexico in 1993.21 The NAFTA 
brought into sharp focus the interface between trade and the environment, and 
27 For example, McLaughlin, R., "UNCLOS and the Demise of the United States' Use of Trade 
Sanctions to Protect Dolphins, Sea Turtles, Whales, and Other International Marine Living Resources" 
(1994) 21 Ecology Law Quarterly 1 at 25. 
28 Remarks from the Secretary of the Interior's lecture at the University of Colorado Law School, 29 
October 1992, cited in Rabbit, B., The Future Environmental Agenda of the United States" (1993) 64 
University of Colorado Law Review 513 at 521, 
29 Rio Declaration, Principle 12(3). 
30 The Marrakesh Ministerial Decision on Trade and Environment wherein Trade Ministers in 
Marrakesh agreed to establish a WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). See un: 
http://www.wto.org/wto/environ/marrakes.htm 
31 The North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993). 
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represented the first international trade agreement to specifically incorporate 
provisions for environmental protection (as compared to provisions for exemption 
from trade requirements on environmental grounds). 
The events surrounding NAFTA negotiations were the main reason for these inclusions. 
Support for the Agreement in America was slight, and the inclusion of what were 
usually peripheral issues was one means used to sway the balance of approval. Thus 
substantial environmental concessions were made, and the NAFTA thus gained the 
support of a number of environmental organisations, as seen in the WWF's comment. 
Trade has an enormous impact on the planet's ecological health yet trade 
agreements have always been actively hostile to environmental protection 
NAFTA's passage will ensure that future trade negotiations, including 
those on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA 11), follow 
suit." 
The environmental component to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation often referred to as the Side Agreement, created the 
Commission on Environmental Cooperation.33 Included in the Side Agreement were 
commitments to cooperate on environmental issues, the opening of procedures to the 
public, and the inclusion of NGOs and non government persons in the discussion 
process. The actual utility of this agreement has however been questioned; one NGO 
referring to it as nothing more than "window dressing".' Moreover there are serious 
health and environment concerns that stem from the parent treaty's arrangement to 
expedite clearance agreements of member nations 3s 
Both NAFTA and the WTO have fueled concerns that increasingly trade is shaping 
environmental policies, and that an excess of power is being concentrated in economic 
interests. It is largely because of developments on trade issues, that President Clinton 
has been accused of selling out the environment, and doing so without anybody really 
noticing. Given the suite of recent trade /environment disputes, evidence that the 
prioritisation of trade liberalisation has undercut environment protection is mounting. 
32 World Wildlife Foundation, Questions and Answers on NAFTA (1993) at 3. See also Katz, D., 
The Mediterranean Free Trade Zone: Lessons from NAFTA (World Wildlife Foundation, city, 199 -) 
33 North American agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) (hereafter "Side 
Agreement "). See Thomas, C. and Tereposky, G., "The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on 
Environmental Co- operation" (1993b) 27 Journal of World Trade 5. 
34 Per. comm. Peter Fugazzotto, Associate Director, Earth Island Institute (EII), Sea Turtle 
Restoration Project (STRP), San Francisco (CA), 30 March 1999. 
35 Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall, InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission/Scripps Oceanographic 
Institute, San Diego (CA), 26 April 1999. 
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5.4 The Marine Mammal Take Reduction Process 
In 1990, the MMC, under statutory direction from Secretary of Commerce, conceived a 
new regime for the management of marine mammal -fisheries interactions?' Under 
advice from its Committee of Scientific Advisors, and subsequent to a period of public 
comment, the MMC recommended a reiteration of the general principles contained 
within the Act, with some additions. Procedurally, it supported the reinstatement of 
the general permit and small take provisions, and introduced the concept, though not 
the nomenclature, of what was to become the potential biological removal rate or 
PBR.' The PBR was intended to ensure that some take of animals be allowed, but at 
such a low level that, even given errors that may be made in abundance estimates and 
reproductive rates, few enough animals would be taken so as to ensure that stocks 
would not fall below their OSP 38 
Based upon MMC advice, NMFS proposed a permanent program to address the levels 
of incidental take that were being recorded.39 This further developed the concept of 
PBR, with two key players attributed with its genesis; Douglas DeMaster from NMFS 
Science Center,' and Paul Wade and his team of population modelers 41 
The PBR was defined using a formula which took the minimum population estimate, 
and multiplied by one half the maximum estimated growth rate.42 If dealing with an 
endangered, threatened or depleted stock, or a stock of unknown status, the above 
36 The MMC was required to design a scientific rationale by which to determine the number of marine 
mammals that may be incidentally taken could be determined. Factors to be considered included the 
status and trends of affected stocks, their annual net recruitment level, a measure of uncertainty, and the 
effect that incidental take would have upon the species recovery to OSP. Marine Mammal Commission, 
Annual Report of the Marine Mammal Commission (Marine Mammal Commission, Washington DC, 
1990). 
37 Initially termed the Maximum Allowable Removal Level this phraseology acted to aggravate a host 
of stakeholders so was changed to the PBR level. Per. comm. Dr Robert Hofman, Scientific Program 
Director, Marine Mammal Commission, Washington DC,15 April 1999. 
38 MMPA Reauthorisation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Environment and Natural Resources 
of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong., 2d Sess (1993) (hereafter 
"MMPA Reauthorisation (1993) "), statement of Diana Josephson, Acting Under -secretary for Oceans and 
Atmosphere, NOAA. 
39 NMFS, "Proposed Regime to Govern Interactions Between Marine Mammals and Commercial 
Fishing Operations" presented at MMPA Reauthorisation (1993) op. cit. n38. See also Alker, S., "The 
Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the Approach to Conservation" (1996) 44 UCLA Law 
Review 527 at 545. 
40 Per. comm. Dr Robert Hofman op. cit. n37. 
41 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young, Marine Mammal Scientist, Humane Society of the U.S., Woods 
Hole (MA), 7 April 1999. 
42 Taylor discusses the rationale of the use of minimum population abundance. She states that Nmin 
will allow for more conservative management when precision is low, and that this strategy is consistent 
with the Act's management objectives. Taylor, B., Defining "Populations" to Meet Management 
Objectives for Marine Mammals, LJ -95 -03 (NMFS, Washington DC, 1995). 
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number would then be multiplied by a recovery factor anywhere between 01 and 10 ' 
The recovery factor was designed to take into account uncertainties inherent in the 
other parameters." 
Neither the environmental nor fishing communities were satisfied with the NMFS 
model, and thus once again joined together to negotiate their own proposal. The 
concept of PBR - enacted as described above - was not at issue. The proposals 
considered most problematic included the observer program, the authorisation of lethal 
take,' the information available and manner in which NMFS would make its decisions, 
the delay in placing of a strict limit on marine mammal take, and the need for a 
monitoring system or enforcement measures 46 
A mediated negotiating process led to the joint preparation of a document by 31 
fishing organisations and seven combined environmental bodies. The package was 
presented to Congress, with the caveat that there were a few issues on which no 
consensus was reached. It was nonetheless heralded as a truly cooperative 
agreement." Due Iargely to the strength of the alliance between these two traditionally 
opposing groups, a substantial portion of the industry/environmental proposal was 
used by Congress used to craft the 1994 MMPA amendments. 48 
An important factor in the end -product agreement was the fisheries groups who 
participated.49 Most of the fishermen who participated in negotiations felt that the 
43 There have, however, been some objections to the recovery factor because it is too "squishy'. For 
example if you "change the recovery factor of harbor porpoise from 0.5 to 0.9 you might not have much 
of a bycatch problem." Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
44 Taylor (1995) op. cit. n42. 
45 Another significant marine mammal- fisheries problem was competition for particular resources. In 
particular the consumption of endangered salmon and steelhead trout on the Pacific Coast by protected 
but unthreatened sealions and seals. The MMPA was amended in response to both this situation and the 
judicial decision in United States y Hayashi (22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1993)) where the court had 
overturned a conviction on a fisher who had fired bullets at dolphins to keep them from interfering with 
his gear. The amendment allowed for fishers to deter marine mammals from interfering with or damaging 
their catch or gear, but only through the use of non -lethal and non -injurious means. 
46 MMPA Reauthorisation (1993) op. cit. n38, statement of Dr Sharon Young, Wildlife Consultant, 
International Wildlife Coalition; per. comm. Dr Robert Hofman op. cit. n37. 
47 140 Cong. Rec. S3293 (1994) (21 March 1994), statement of Senator Kerry. 
48 Alker (1996) op. cit. n39. 
49 One issue was the absence of the ATA for the first time. This allowed the 1994 amendment process 
to be a uniform consideration of the bycatch issue. Having previously played a major role in the MMPA 
legislative process, reasons for the ATA absences have been suggested to include the IDCA's coverage cf 
the tuna issue, or else that the issue itself has been by and large resolved by the 1990 commitment of 
major canning companies to no longer buy tuna from fishers who set on dolphins, Indeed data from 1989 
to 1991 suggests that the number of dolphin captured as bycatch in the ETP was by the early 1990s of 
only a minor problem. Coulston, C., "Flipper Caught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorisation of the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act and its Effect on Dolphin" (1990) 11 Journal of Energy, Natural 
Resources and Environmental Law 97; Kubasek, N., Browne, N.M., Young, M. and Hiers, W., 
"Protecting Marine Mammals: Time for a New Approach" (1995) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 1. 
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majority of fisheries did not have a marine mammal bycatch problem, and moreover 
that those fisheries with a high bycatch rate needed to improve their performance due 
to the negative image it conferred upon the entire industry 
Tt is important to note in this regard that most of the fleets represented were trawl and 
longline organisations, that is, the 'big money fisheries'. The northeast gi lint fisheries, 
for example, are small and individually owned and operated, and were not well 
organised and hence had scant representation.51 These were the fisheries that were 
chiefly attributed with the taking of unsustainable levels of marine mammaLs.52 Thus 
the main fisheries to be effected by MMPA amendments were not at the negotiating 
table in any real numbers. 
As a moot solution to several of the perceived problems of the NMFS proposal, the 
environmental /industry group constructed a process called take reduction (TR) 
planning. To so facilitate, the long- standing requirement to obtain a permit before any 
incidental taking of marine mammals occurred, was removed. In lieu, take reduction 
teams (TRTs) including scientists, conservationist and animal welfare groups, industry 
representatives, and state and federal government managers, would be charged with 
developing a plan for strategic stocks: a take reduction plan (TRP). The teams were a 
determined move towards an inclusive approach based on the theory that more people 
will be satisfied with an outcome to which they have contributed. 
Another important aspect of the process was that it was to be consensus based. If all 
participants were unable to agree then the duty of preparing a plan reverted back to 
NMFS.53 As denoted by game theory, such an arrangement will only work, if both sides 
feel that the TRI' is the best forum for achieving a result. If any party feels that it can 
achieve better results by an alternate means, be that a legal suit or appealing to 
Congressional representatives to take up their cause, then the TR process will not work 
because there is no incentive to compromise. 
Together, the PRR and the TR process saw a major shift in the scheme of the Act. A 
new classification system under the guise of the Marine Mammal Authorisation 
Program was introduced. Two schemes were established, one assessing the health of 
50 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young np. cit. n41. 
51 Ibid. 
52 The NMFS had identified those fisheries of particular concern as these in the Gulf of Maine that 
took harbor porpoises, and the drìftnet fisheries off the Californian and Atlantic coasts. Per. comm. 
Victoria Cornish, Fishery Biologist, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Office of Protected 
Resources, Washington DC, 19 April 1999. 
53 The legislation provided that if the TRT could not agree, then the NMFS had R months to develop 
a draft plan, followed by a 90 day public review period, and then 60 days in which to publish a final plan 
and final regulations. 
- 246 - 
Chapter Five - U.S. Bycatch 1992 - present 
the stock, and the other the threat posed to marine mammals by various fisheries. With 
regard to the first, the Secretary of Commerce was required to undertake and publish 
stock assessments within 12 months of the passage of the amendments and to 
periodically conduct stock reports.' Where a stock is endangered, threatened or the 
level of mortality is at or near the PBR level, then the stock was to be designated as a 
strategic stock.' Such a designation automatically triggered the establishment of a 
TRT. 
Categories were also assigned to each fishery based on the "relative frequency of 
incidental serious injuries and mortalities of marine mammals in each fishery" with 
decreasing risk as the scale increased in number from Category I through II156 As of 
March 1996, the MMPA required owners of vessels or non -vessel gear, engaged in a 
Category I or II fishery, register with NMFS and obtain a marine mammal authorisation 
in order to lawfully take a marine mammal incidental to their operation. 
A series of strict deadlines was then placed upon the agency.' This was significant 
due to the procedural requirements it placed upon NMFS. According to one NGO 
representative 
The point of doing that is that it lets you sue. Because if the law says you 
must do something by a certain time and you haven't done it then they 
have violated the law. 58 
It was then proposed that the PBR be systematically reduced each year hence 
furthering the goal of zero mortality. In this way the proposed scheme 
contains a new system for allocating quotas for incidental take of marine 
mammals to certain commercial fisheries, [and meanwhile] retains the 
long -standing zero mortality goal associated with the commercial fishing 
exceptions in the MMPA 59 
54 To facilitate data collection for the calculations of PBR levels, three scientific review groups were 
constructed for each of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and Alaska. These groups were also required to 
investigate the impacts of habitat destruction on marine mammals. 
55 A strategic stock is a species which is 
listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA, 
declining or likely to be listed under the ESA, 
listed as depleted under the MMPA, or 
has direct human caused mortality which exceeds the stocks potential biological removal level. 
56 MMPA, §1383a(b)(1), 1387(c)(1)(A), [s114(b)(1), 118(c)(1)(A)]. 
Regulations were established to implement this amendment. These defined the terms "frequent ", 
"occasional" and "remote likelihood" for each of the categories respectively, and required that the 
allocation of fisheries into each Category was to be reviewed and revised annually. 
57 Once formed the team had 6 months to develop a take reduction plan: this was to outline the 
mechanisms to be used to reduce the take to a level below the PBR. The NMFS was then afforded 2 
months to consider the plan and publish a draft, followed by 90 days of public comment. The plan was 
then to be published and the fisheries allowed 6 months to achieve results. 
58 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
59 Sauer, M., "Balancing Marine Mammal Protection Against Commercial Fishing: The Zero 
Mortality Goal, Quotas, and the Gulf of Maine Porpoise" (1993) 45 Maine Law Review 419 at 422. 
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The amendments required that incidental serious injury and mortality be reduced to 
insignificant levels approaching zero mortality within a seven year period, that is by 
the year 2001.` Quite some discussion had occurred as to the ZMRG and the notion 
that it was an unrealistic concept has been raised.' At a June 1994 workshop, 
however, NMFS, FWS and MMC biologists recommended that the ZMGR be set at 10% 
of the PBR level.'Z Building upon these discussions, and in an attempt to define the 
ZMGR, NMFS issued proposed regulations. Comments received from both the fishery 
industry and scientists, however, made it retract that part of the regulation. These 
groups concurred that the definition was a very low target, and potentially a burden 
beyond Congressional intent. 
Overall the 1994 changes suggested a move from marine mammal protection to 
population sustainability.° They also resulted in a shift in the burden of proof, to 
require that NMFS prove that fishing was harmful to the population if the take was to 
be banned. That is, incidental taking of marine mammals is categorically permitted 
unless and until there is reason to believe it its causing a problem. 
NMFS was critical of this shift in burden from the proponent to the agency, due to a 
concern that it carried a presumption that incidental take would not cause harm.` 
There was also some uncertainty as to whether adequate appropriations would be 
allocated to carry out assessment tasks " Over time the scheme has assumed a much 
more positive reputation. 
The TRP gave us the teeth to do our job [and] .,. allowed us to take all the 
information that we had collected on population size, on incidental take, 
and to develop a plan that would actually decrease the take to a target 
level." 
In May 1995, one year after the amendments to the MMPA were passed, researchers 
estimated that 3200 marine mammals were being killed annually in Atlantic fisheries, 
and 4400 in Pacific coast fisheries. 
60 It was mandated that levels approaching zero mortality were to be reached by 30 April 2001. 
61 "Is it zero, or is it some level of sustainability that the population can sustain ?" Per. comm. 
Victoria Cornish op. cit. n52. 
62 That is, 10% of the number of marine mammals that could be taken while still maintaining stocks 
at their OSP. Baker, B., "Marine Mammal Protection Increased" (1995) 45 BioScience 317, 
63 Chmael, G., Ainsworth, K. and Kramer, R., "The 1994 Amendments to the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act" (1995) 9 Natural Resources and Environment 18. 
64 MMPA 1993 Reauthorisation op. cit. n38, discussion between Dr. Nancy Foster and Senator 
Kerry. See also Alker (1996) op. cit. n39. 
65 Per. comm. Victoria Cornish op. cit. n52. 
66 Ibid Positive reaction within the agency came from additional NMFS authority to place observers 
on vessels in a whole suite of fisheries that may have interactions with marine mammals, and an 
expansion in genetic work on stock differentiation also occurred. Long term methods for gather data 
through continuation of species monitoring programs were established. 
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Category I fisheries were identified. A compendium of all available information was 
compiled and recommendation on research needs were made. Five TRTs were formed 
based upon the stock assessment report data. These were the: 
Gulf of Maine Harbor Porpoise, 
Mid - Atlantic Coastal Gillnet, 
AtIantic Large Whale, 
Pacific Offshore Cetacean, and 
the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean TRT. 
The Harbor Porpoise: Mid- Atlantic & Gulf of Maine Coastal Gillnets 
Harbor Porpoises are taken in gill/lets used in the Gulf of Maine and mid -Atlantic in 
fisheries for cod, pollock and other groundfish. Though the same migratory porpoise 
stock, due to the strong differences in the fishers and their fishing practices, these 
fisheries were tackled as separate teams." 
Even prior to the establishment of the TRT, the Gulf of Maine fishery had a history of 
bycatch mitigation. As early as 1982, harbor porpoise take was considered to be a 
problems' - research had shown that the incidental take of harbor porpoises in New 
England was probably not in small numbers, and that the fishery was having a 
significant effect.b' 
Though of scientific concern, this issue was not high on the public agenda. Towards the 
mid 1980s, a unique coincidence occurred, and harbor porpoise bycatch was 
catapulted onto the policy agenda. Gillnet fishers had lodged a series of complaints 
that longliners and trawlers were dragging gear across their nets. A reporter from 
Sports Illustrated magazine was undertaking research for a story, when the vessel he 
was on hauled in three harbor porpoises. An article in Sports Illustrated resulted?' 
This publication marked a growth point for the recognition of the issue. 
In 1984, under the small-take exemption provision, NM-FS granted a five year 
exemption to allow the incidental gillnet take of 180 harbor porpoises and 50 harbor 
seals annually in the Gulf of Maine.' In accordance with the 1988 amendments to the 
67 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41 
68 The problem with harbor porpoise bycatch was recognised in 1982, when the widespread nature of 
marine mammal bycatch began to be realised, and MMPA provision were amended to allow for the 
incidental take of small numbers of animals. See Chapter 4, text accompanying footnote 204. 
69 Per. comm. Dr Robert Hoffman op. cit. n37. 
70 Indeed, while out on the boat the reporter had inquired in passing about harbor porpoise bycatch. 
Though the skipper acknowledged their occasion capture, he surmised that the existence of any actual 
problem was largely a figment of an overactive imagination. 
71 Issuance of a Letter of Exemption, 49 Fed. Reg. 5645, 5646 (1984) 
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MMPA, during the early 1990s NMFS initiated an observer program to collect 
information on the life history, population size and incidental take levels of Gulf of 
Maine harbor porpoises. 
Tn May 1992, a group of scientists met to determine the status of harbor porpoise :2 It 
was concluded that the gillnet bycatch level probably exceeded the sustainable level of 
the stock. At least 1800 of the 45,000 strong population of harbor porpoises were 
killed each year in Gulf of Maine gillnetting operations, a level which scientists 
recommended be reduced.' In addition to this toll, it was estimated that Mid- Atlantic 
gillnetters took 200 harbor porpoises per annum. What was once considered a fishery 
with insignificant take, had become a cause for concern. 
Soon thereafter NGOs submitted a petition to NMFS that the harbor porpoise be Iisted 
under. the ESA. In response, NMFS floated a proposal that the harbor porpoise be 
designated as a threatened species.74 The recommendation raised concern among 
fishers that regional gillnetting operations may be outlawed.7$ Compounding this fear, 
was the coincidence of these policy developments with a marked decline in 
groundfish.'6 In the event, a decision on the nomination was deferred until take 
reduction efforts and information gathering had been progressed. 
The Gulf of Maine gillnetters' preferred instrument under which to effect a bycatch 
minimisation scheme, was the FCMA.77 The logic being, that if adequate protection 
could be found under FCMA management plans, then the harbor porpoise would not 
be listed under the ESA, as one criteria for listing a species thereunder is the absence of 
existing regulatory mechanisms.'$ In the absence of FCMA regulatory measures, the 
listing of harbor porpoise under the stricter ESA provisions was much more probable. 
72 Ibid 
73 For 1990 and 1991 respectively it was estimated that approximately 2,400 and 1,700 harbor 
porpoises (respectively) were caught incidental to groundfish gillnetting operations. See Harbor Porpoise 
in Eastern North America: Status and Research Needs, Results of a Scientific Workshop held May 5-8, 
1992 at the Northwest Fisheries Science Centre, Woods Hole, Northeast Fisheries Science Center 
Reference Document 92 -06 (Marine Mammals Investigation, NMFS, 1992) cited in Sauer (1993) op. cit. 
n59. 
74 58 Fed. Reg. 3108 (1993). 
75 "Porpoise Caught in Gill -Net Dispute" Maine Sunday Telegram, 19 January 1992. 
76 Plante, J., "Double Dilemma Challenges Gillnetters" (1992) December Commercial Fisheries 
News 11; Plante, J., "Gillnet Fishermen: Harbor porpoise Listing, Groundfish Cuts Exact Dual Toll, 
(1993) February Commercial Fisheries News 13; and Plante, J. "Working Group Plans Harbor Porpoise 
Technical Workshop" (1993) March Commercial Fisheries News 19. 
77 Plante, J., " Gillnetters Proposal" (1992) December Commercial Fisheries News II. 
78 ESA, §1533(a)(1)(D), [s4(a)(1)(D)1. Encouragement came from the NMFS office of protective 
resources which commented that proposed amendment #5 would likely satisfy the agency's requirements 
not to list the species. Payne, quoted in Plante (1993) op. cit. n76. 
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Accordingly, in October 1992, the Department of Commerce, under the authority of the 
MMPA, requested that the New England FMC take action under the FCMA to reduce 
harbor porpoise mortality in the Gulf. Specifically, the northeast multi- species FMP 
was to be amended so as to include an objective pertaining to the reduction of harbor 
porpoise bycatch. A working group was established. 
The working group showed considerable interest in pinger technology and in affected in 
harbor porpoise bycatch reduction more generally. By 1993, an interim measure to 
reduce harbor porpoise bycatch was in place, and a range of amendments to the FMP 
had been proposed.80 The goal was the reduction of harbor porpoise mortality by half, 
over a five year period. Despite its best intentions, the FMC's bycatch working group 
lacked the power it needed to reach this target.' 
During the 1994 MMPA hearings, Gulf of Maine gillnetters expressed concerns that 
proposed changes to the Act would significantly affect their fisheries operations.' To 
recall, there had been scant involvement of gillnet fishers in the negotiated amendment 
put to Congress during reauthorisation. 
The northeast harbor porpoise was the first TRT to be convened under the MMPA's 
new scheme. Though chiefly because of scientific, public and hence Congressional 
concern about the stock, a lack of representation from gillnetters is sure to have 
contributed to the singling out of that particular fishery .9 By April 1996, harbor 
porpoise bycatch was supposed to be below PBR. 
Though the TRT was a fairly large team, it had an advantage in that the fishermen 
were already aware of the problems associated with bycatch, due to their ongoing 
meetings with NGOs and other officials. In this scenario, it was external influences that 
proved problematic to the smooth passage of the creation of a plan. Of particular 
concern were unproductive and uncoordinated interactions with the FMC process. 
You had the TRT trying to make all these decisions about the pingers and 
closures, and so they'd develop a consensus, and then the FMC would do 
something and then they [the Team] would have to scramble and change 
what they did. So it was a competing process, and until the agency had 
79 Letter from William W. Fox, Jr., Director, NMFS, to Joseph Brancaleone, Chairman, New 
England Fishery Management Council (15 October 1992). 
80 New England Fisheries Management Council, "Modifications and More Options: New Proposals 
for Groundfish Amendment #5 ", (1993) May Commercial Fisheries News 14. 
81 Time -area closures proved to be too narrow in both duration and size, and the use of acoustic 
deterrent devices, or pingers, were not adequately adopted. Marine Mammal Commission, Annual Report 
to Congress (Marine Mammal Commission, Washington DC, 1997). 
82 For example, see letter from the National Fisheries Institute, Inc. Arlington, Va_, and signed by 85 
commercial fishing organisations, to Charles Lamella, NMFS (20 December 1991) discussing the impact 
the NMFS's legislative proposal would have upon the fishing industry and consumers. 
83 The PBR was 403 and bycatch was estimated at that time to be 1400 individuals per annum. 
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acknowledged the Team's plan and begun to implemented it, the FMC 
was still moving along its process and making it very difficult to 
implement the Team's plan. They were shifting the foundation of what the 
Team's plan was built on ' 
The main impairment to a successful TR process, however, was the lack of scientific 
data available. The team submitted its draft TRP in August 19% and NMFS issued a 
proposed rule. This first TRP relied upon data that was several years old.' This lack 
of up -to -date information led the TRT to recommend the continuation of existing FMC 
bycatch mitigation measures: that is, the use of pingers, and a series of three or four 
small time area closures, encompassing the areas of coincidence between primary 
fishing effort and incidental takes.86 
Although intended to be published by December 1996, in the event the TRP was 
delayed to await the release of 1995 and 1996 data.87 Other (side) issues then took 
over -a law suit concerning large whale bycatch in particular took precedence, and 
with insufficient staff and three northeast TRTs meeting simultaneously, the harbor 
porpoise was pushed to the background. 
Data became available in late 1997, and with its receipt it became obvious that the 
draft plan was not going to work. 
We would have as much bycatch in the next two years as in the previous 
because the porpoise had shifted outside the closed areas ' 
Data indicated that, because of the mobility of harbor porpoises, mitigation efforts 
needed to cover virtually their whole range. The related problem was that (given the 
main mitigation tool was area closures) such action would have also resulted in the 
closure of the fishery.' A new plan was needed. To this end a TRT meeting was 
convened for December 1997. Held only 2 weeks before Christmas, there was very 
little attendance by fishermen. The team devised an overall strategy: though due to 
non -attendance it was not considered a consensus solution. 
The TRT suggested a very large, nearly complete, closure. A caveat was placed on this 
however, that as pingers has shown some success in the reduction of harbor porpoise 
84 Per. comm. Victoria Cornish op. cit. n52. 
85 The most up to date data available was from 1993. Per. comm. Laurie Allen, Fishery Biologist, 
Protected Species Program, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Northeast Region, Gloucester 
(MA), 5 April 1999. 
86 The TRT's proposed time area closures did, however, expand on those outlined in Amendment 7 
of the Multi- Species FMP. Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 This is because, as is often the case, the best time to fish was also the time when the harbor 
porpoise were present. 
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bycatch, fishers who used pingers in these areas were exempt from the closure 
September through May (effectively the whole of the fishing season). With the strong 
support of fishers on the Team, NMFS converted these suggestions into a final rule. 
Much to NMFS's surprise, many fishers reacted negatively to inclusion of the pinger 
requirement in the rule.90 And in the event, the final TRP was never published. 
On 21 August 1998, the CMC and HSUS filed suit in the District Court of Colombia 
charging that the U.S. Department of Commerce and NMFS had failed in their legal 
responsibility to protect harbor porpoises from unsustainable levels of bycatch by New 
England gillnetters.91 In this regard the plaintiff contended two points. Firstly that 
NMFS had violated the ESA in its failure to publish a final determination on the 
proposal to list the harbor porpoise under that Act. And that, because the take of 
porpoises was greater than the population could sustain, NMFS had erred in its failure 
to publish a plan under the MMPA to reduce the incidental take of the species' 
The case was based upon the defendant's missing of statutory deadlines. According to 
NMFS employee Laurie Allen "the thing that was odd was that justifications as to 
why the delay occurred were pretty valid." However the perception from the plaintiffs 
was that the delay was never likely to end. 
The team reached consensus on a plan in February 1996, they never 
published it, never did anything with it, they sat on it. So we worked with 
them, we helped get some of the points of the plan put into the FMC as 
part of the groundfish management plans, but they were totally 
inadequate to reduce bycatch. Effort shifted in a way people had not 
predicted. The plan clearly was not working, we negotiated with them 
90 At the meetings the overwhelming preference expressed by the fishers was to impose strict pinger 
regulations, but declare no closures (Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85). Pingers had been first 
developed at the behest of fishers who has sought the collaboration of the University of New Hampshire. 
The devices were reasonably priced, at a once -off cost of $ÚS3500 per vessel. They functioned by sending 
out a signal and alerting marine mammals to the presence of an object. Marine mammals do not echo - 
locate in familiar coastal environments, because they know their surroundings 
Indeed it had been NGOs and the NMFS who, at the time, had displayed the most caution about a 
pinger -based approach. Though there was some positive evidence as to the success of the devices, 
conflicting evidence from experimental fisheries suggested that mitigation may be as low as 50% (though 
scientific experiments that were well controlled provided between 90 -100% exclusion). Moreover 
enforcement and correct use were thought to pose a problem: 
we began to place observers on boats, and there were meant to be 40 pingers per net. 
The observers were starting to record 10, 20, 30 pingers, not the full complement (and 
there was some incidental take being recorded).... It was getting fishermen to 
understand how the pingers were intended to work and getting them to use them 
properly that was the hardest part (Per. comm. Vickie Cornish op. cit. n52). 
There also remain questions as to the long -term impacts of pingers in the field. How does the noise effect 
both cetaceans and other species? Is there habituation by dolphins? 
91 The CMC and HSUS were joined in the suit by the International Wildlife Coalition and HSUS 
members Sharon Young, Cherie Mason and Barbara Birdsey. "National Marine Fisheries Service has 
Violated Marine Mammal Protection Act and Endangered Species Act, Lawsuit Charges" Media Release, 
HSUS and CMC, 21 August 1998. 
92 Ibid. 
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and made promises that by January [1997] we will do this and by 
February we will do that. But [NMFS responded that] we can't do it right 
now because the right whale team is meeting and we need to meet that 
court mandate so we'll do it here. And then in Fall of last year we [HSUS] 
said no more. The plan was a consensus plan of 1996, the law says you 
are meant to be at PBR by 1996, you have missed every deadline, it is 
now fall 1998 you have done nothing, you keep saying you are going to do 
something, you are not.' 
The judge examined the case and suggested a settlement: he made it clear that NMFS 
would loose if the case went to trial. So, unusually, the action was settled out of court. 
As part of the arrangement thereunder, a commitment was given by NOAA to a series 
of deadlines on harbor porpoise action. These included the immediate publishing of a 
rule under the MMPA to regulate and reduce the bycatch of harbor porpoises, with a 
waiver on the usual 30 day waiting period 94 
On 11 September 1998, NMFS published a proposed rule to implement the Harbor 
Porpoise TRP operating in both the Gulf and mid-Atlantic. The final rule was 
published on December 2 and became operational two weeks later. Six areas in the 
Gulf were be closed to gillnetting, though, during the majority of each closure, fishers 
were permitted to continue their operations so long as they fitted pingers to their nets 
so as to deflect approaching porpoises. A statement by NMFS indicated an expected 
reduction from the figure of 2000 harbor porpoise mortalities, to a take of less than 
400 individuals each year. This figure sits within the expected range as determined by 
the PBR of 483 per annum.95 
Though harbor porpoise bycatch in the New England region began as the primary 
concern, as fisheries regulations became more restrictive, and groundfish more scarce, 
fishers moved south targeting monk and dogfish in the mid -Atlantic. Consequently, 
harbor porpoise interactions began to increase in the more southern areas,96 and it was 
decided that a mid Atlantic TRT was needed.9" 
93 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
94 Laurie Allen of the Office of Protected Resources was critical about the impact that bring the suit 
had upon relations between the fishers and the NGOs, saying that the primary outcome was increased 
animosity because of the plaintiff's requirement for immediate implementation. This requirement placed 
an obvious economic hardship on fishermen, and some of them had to cease fishing for several weeks so 
as to regear and to rehang their nets. Sharon Young a plaintiff in the case and an employee of the Humane 
Society of the United States, contends however that there was sufficient lead up to the case to have 
allowed fishers to make the necessary changes without undue hardship. Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. 
cit. n41; Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
95 "Feds and Northeast Gillnetters to Reduce Harbor Porpoise Entanglement in Gear" Press Release, 
NOAA, 1 December 1998, 89 -R169. 
96 Between 1995 and 1997 the bycatch estimate of harbor porpoise in the mid -Atlantic increased from 
100 to 570. This was due to both the shift in effort due to the collapse of the groundfishery in New 
England, and the acquisition of a more complete data set. 
97 Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
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Initially the team attempted to consider and regulate the bycatch of cetaceans in the 
mid- Atlantic region in terms of target catch. However, NMFS's attorneys vetoed this 
scheme due to difficulties that would likely arise with enforcement.' So the mid - 
Atlantic TRT altered its strategy to that of a gear based approach. It formulated gear 
modification requirements based upon mesh and net size' In determining the specific 
modifications, the team looked to the fishers that seemed to have least bycatch - the 
local fishers. The parameters of their gear and the locally prevailing factors were 
examined.10° Gear modifications and area closures, but not pingers, were required in 
the mid- Atlantic.101 The anticipated harbor porpoise bycatch once these arrangements 
were in place, was less than 50 porpoises per annum. 
When finally the regulations were drafted, NMFS decided that because it was the same 
stock in the mid -Atlantic and New England area, it would publish the bycatch 
reduction plans as a single document.'= 
Also in the settlement was a requirement that a decision be made by 4 January 1999 on 
whether to list harbor porpoises as endangered under the ESA. Although petitioned for 
listing as threatened more than five years ago, a decision was never made because of 
the hope that the 1994 MMPA amendments and the new TRT process would remedy 
the species' decline. In October 1998, NMFS reopened the comment period on the 1993 
proposal to list the east coast harbor porpoise under the ESA. The MMC 
recommended that listing proceed unless sufficient bycatch reduction occurred to 
reduce the stock below the PBR level the following year. On 5 January 1999, the NMFS 
published a notice stating that it was withdrawing its earlier proposal to list the Gulf 
of Maine and Bay of Fundy harbor porpoises as threatened under the ESA, having 
found that such listing was not warranted at this time. It did, however, decide to 
retain the species on the candidate list, signifying that it requires careful attention and 
monitoring.103 The HSUS is still reserving judgement on whether to sue on this decision. 
98 A target species approach is somewhat unenforceable. Although the area fished and hence bycatch 
differs, because the gear is the same for several of the fisheries it is too simple for fishers to lie as to their 
target species, and alternatively, regulation post catch by percentage of species can not be done until the 
fishers dock, which itself presents a very difficult regulatory scenario. 
99 For example, for a 45 net cap was placed upon dogfish sized nets which were those under 7 ", and 
for larger meshes (primarily targeting monkfish in the mid -Atlantic) a different net limit and a different 
floatline length was regulated 
100 Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
101 Gear modifications included limits on the length and number of nets, and minimum twine 
diameters. 
102 Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
103 The benefit of inclusion on the candidate species list was that, although not triggering regulatory 
mechanisms, funding was available to monitor these species. /bid 
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Also potentially the subject of legal action is the lack of consideration afforded to the 
bycatch of bottlenosed dolphins. Its omission from the mid -Atlantic plan was due to a 
lack of information. The stock had been identified as a strategic stock because of its 
status as depleted under the MMPA, so should - technically - have been included 
in a TRP. Indeed, notwithstanding the lack of observer information, a survey of 
strandings with signs of entanglement placed the body count over the PBR. 
NMFS, however, maintained that there was no point holding a team meeting when 
data was not available.104 Though environmental groups were not happy, it was agreed 
that the observer program would be allowed to operate for one year before any action 
was taken. Once again the process stalled. In January 1999, under threat of legal 
action, fishers supported the NGO's demand that a team be convened. No action has 
occurred and legal proceedings are imminent.' 
Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan 
The northern right whale is the most endangered marine mammal in U.S. waters. Its 
largest known population is 300 individuals.1o6 It is also a bycatch in several fisheries 
off the Atlantic coast. Thus NMFS was required to consider not only large whale - 
lobster pot and gìllnet interactions through the TR planning process, but also under an 
ESA section 7 consultation. 
Several years prior to the instigation of TRPs, the Marine Mammal Commission 
recommended to NMFS that a right whale recovery plan be created to reduce the take 
of these large cetaceans. Though initially depleted by commercial whaling, modem 
threats of mortality were through collisions with boats and entanglement in fishing 
gear. The NMFS right whale recovery plan was adopted in 1991. 
Given the critically endangered status of the northern right whale, the biological 
opinion created under the ESA had found that if either fishery continued operating as 
it was, it would jeopardise the continued existence of right whale. The ESA limits 
incidental take to situations where it will not jeopardise the continued existence of the 
species. In situations where any take is significant to the species' survival, incidental 
take allowances can not be issued.1°' 
104 Reasons that NMFS did not wish to address the bycatch of bottlenosed dolphins included 
uncertainties about stock separation. This issue created controversy both from a scientific angle in terms 
of how the stock separation lines are drawn, and also from a management perspective due to the 
resistance of fishers to managing several stocks. 
105 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
106 Marine Mammal Commission, Annual Report to Congress (Marine Mammal Commission, 
Washington DC, 1998)_ 
107 This differs from the normal situation. Usually, even though take is prohibited, an allowance for 
legal lethal takings can be issued so long as it does not jeopardise the species' survival. 
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The ESA is aimed not at preventing actions, but at allowing activities to continue 
within parameters. Reasonable prudent alternatives to closing the fishery were sought. 
To this end, the ESA's critical habitat provision was invoked. Unlike a 'jeopardy 
opinion' whereunder conservation measures decided on are mandatory, critical habitat 
does not have any restrictive mechanisms. Right whales appear every year inside Cape 
Cod Bay, as well as in an area rich in plankton off the bottom of the Cape. Those two 
areas were designated as critical habitat under the ESA, and gillnet fishing was 
prohibited between 1 January through 31 May, and lobster fishing was subject to 
stringent gear requirements. 
Notwithstanding these efforts under the ESA, right whales were still declared a 
strategic stock under the MMPA, and a TRT was convened in August 1996. Included 
in its brief, was ensuring that the bycatch of humpback, fin and minke whales was 
below their PBR levels. However, as the PBR for Atlantic right whales was calculated 
to be 0.4 per year - a figure significantly below the actual removal rate - most 
attention was focused on this species. 
The fisheries that came under consideration were the east coast lobster, the New 
England sink gillnet, the mid- Atlantic coastal gillnet, and the southeastern U.S. shark 
gillnet fisheries. Initially, NMFS had opposed the classification the lobster fishery as a 
Category I fishery, due to the political unpalatability of such a move: the lobster 
fishery generates a considerable income and consequently has powerful Congressional 
support.108 NMFS was mindful of making the 'wrong folk mad' and the budgetary 
repercussions that may have followed. In light of NMFS resistance, Richard (Max) 
Strahan the national campaign director of GreenWorld sued. In an amended complaint 
to the case Strahan y Linnon, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that NMFS had failed to 
classify the New England lobster fishery as a Category I fishery, and thus that the 
Services' right whale recovery plan was deficient.109 
The court issued a ruling on 1 April 1997, by which stage NMFS had remedied many of 
the complaints, making several points moot. These included action to develop a TRP 
and the categorisation of the lobster fishery as a category I fishery. The process of this 
litigation however allowed NMFS to align itself with the fishermen on the 
understanding that they too are against the classification of the lobster fishery as 
Category I, but have been ordered by the courts to take action. Responsibility to alter 
the situation, hence necessarily lay with Congress, through the amendment of the 
legislation. 
108 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
109 Strahan y Linnon, District Court of Massachusetts, 7 July 1994. 
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Although some aspects of right whale bycatch reduction were agreed upon by the TRT, 
the team was unable to develop a consensus plan that all participants felt met the 
objectives. Particular points of contention were the extent of time area closures and the 
modification of gear.' Thus, in February 1997, the TRT submitted its report to NMFS, 
detailing those areas of agreement and dispute. 
Based on this report, NMFS was then required to publish a proposed plan within two 
months. The interim final rules for the Large Whale TRP were published in July 1997.11' 
It was opined that the author of the plan "locked himself in an office and never talked 
to any of the fishermen ".112 Indeed the plan inflamed fishers. It included, for example, 
gear modifications in areas where whales do not go.113 The lobster fishery sought 
recourse through its Congressional representatives, who called for hearings. As a result, 
NMFS was strongly censured, and reactively produced a plan that essentially 
maintained the status quo.114 
Subsequent action has seen a huge amount of money poured into those fisheries, 
through monitoring and gear modification schemes. Final regulations were published in 
the Federal Register in February 1999, and NGOs are now very closely monitoring the 
situation expecting whale mortalities to continue, at which time again the issue may be 
taken to court. 
The Pacific Offshore Cetacean 
The Pacific Offshore Cetacean plan was intended to address the bycatch of pelagic 
cetaceans in the west coast driftnet, longline, and pair trawl fleets.115 The Pacific 
driftnet fishery TRT was a very small group of 12. Though limited data presented 
difficulties, it was essentially a very tidy process: within 6 months, a consensus on 
how to reduce takes had been reached. 
The Pacific Offshore Cetacean TRT submitted its draft plan to NMFS in August 1996. 
It recommended that nets be fished at a minimum depth of six fathoms, that a pinger 
experiment be conducted, that both California and Oregon reduce the number of 
inactive permits, and that skipper workshops be held to educate fishers about marine 
110 Marine Mammal Commission (1997) op. cit. n81. 
111 62 Fed. Reg. 39157 (1997). 
112 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
113 For example the regulations extended all the way to the shoreline and into areas such as Naraganzet 
bay. 
114 The 1998 plan included an increase in the efforts made to free any entangled right whales, the 
improvement of some fishing gear so as to prevent entanglement or to make it easier for the creature to 
disentangle itself (breakaway lines), and regulation through fishing closures in critical right whale habitat. 
115 With respect to the driftnet fleet also a right whale had been caught. 
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mammals and solicit input for methods of take reduction. On 3 October 1997, NMFS 
promulgated regulations requiring training and gear modifications so as to minimise 
marine mammals injury and mortality. 
The Atlantic Offshore cetacean 
The Atlantic Offshore Cetacean TRT was established to address cetacean take in 
Atlantic pelagic driftnet and Iongline fisheries. The offshore team in the Atlantic had 
its last meeting in 1997. 
TRI' strategies to reduce marine mammal take included the compilation of fishery, 
education and outreach materials. In the driftnet fishery, recommendations included a 
closure south of Hudson Canyon, allocation of a finite number of sets between extant 
fishers, limited entry, 100% observer coverage, and a buy -out program. The mid - 
Atlantic and Northeast Coast were concentrated on as the primary areas of bycatch 
for the longline fishery proposals, which included the reduction of line length, reverse 
retrieval of gear to maximise soak time, shift in fishing location after one marine 
mammal interaction by a vessel, increased observer coverage, and enhanced 
communications between fishers. The TRT also looked at pair trawl fisheries which, 
although not authorised at the time, were a potential future fishery. A series of 
conditions such as education for operators, gear specifications, and research on marine 
mammal behaviour around nets, were suggested. 
In the event, the Atlantic offshore cetacean a final TRP was never released. This was 
because of the concurrent development of a swordfish, shark and tuna FMP. This FMP 
was crafted in consultation with the recommendations of the TRT. The majority of 
TRT recommendations were included in the FMP as requirements for permit holders. 
Thus coordination and the implementation of several legislative initiatives, all under an 
single plan, were achieved.1ó 
The other major reason for this approach was that one of the main marine mammal 
interactions was removed part way through the TR process. The swordfish tuna 
driftnet fishery had been found to pose a jeopardy to right whales due to the take of 
one such marine mammal, and thus was closed through an. emergency FCMA 
regulation, from 5 December 1996 to 26 November 1997. Early in November 1997, a 
NMFS proposal to close segments of the Atlantic Pelagic driftnet fishery through July 
1998 was drafted. This also expanded the scope to cover shark and tuna target 
operations. The final rule was issued in December 1997. Thus a major component of 
what the Atlantic offshore team discussed, was no longer at issue. Subsequently, the 
116 Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
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attribution of fault for mortality was altered, such that the first fishery that entangled 
a marine mammal was the one that would be held accountable for the mortality. 
Because the right whale was actually taken by two different fisheries and the gillnet 
fishery was the second fishery, the lobster fishery became responsible for the mortality. 
After this decision the impetus for keeping the driftnet fishery closed was removed, 
and hence it was reopened without a TRP. Fishers were allowed to driftnet for ten 
days only due to their strict swordfish quota, and in that period 300 marine mammals 
and 25 turtles were killed. This placed the fishery at the limit of its ESA turtle take, 
and over PBR for beaked whales and dolphins. Indeed, surprise at the level of bycatch 
within the NMFS was so great, that one NGO representative received calls from four 
different people relaying the data but requesting anonymity. 
Regardless of this bycatch, because the swordfish quota was not reached the fishery 
was to be reopened for an extended season. in response, HSUS drafted a temporary 
restraining order and presented this to the under secretary of Commerce with a threat 
to sue regarding both MMPA and ESA take limits, as well as the absence of a TRP. As 
a result of this action the fishery was shut permanently. 
On 26 January 1999, swordfish driftnets were banned by NMFS in a rule stating the 
reason for this as the recent high marine mammal bycatch in the fishery. 
The closure was, in part however, also because the lucrative nature of swordfish 
fishery, and the wealth of the longline fleet that competes for quota with the relatively 
small and vulnerable driftnet fishery. As one NGO representative explained 
the excuse was the bycatch but in fact it was a swordfish issue. Any of us 
who work with it know that. The thing 1 resent about that, is that when 
the Act [MMPA] is discussed fisheries can point to it and say it closed a 
fishery - when we know it was used to close a fishery but that that's not 
why." 
Three years later there is still no plan for the longline fleet. The issue was recently 
raised with the Secretary of Commerce, again with mention of a possible legal 
challenge.ns 
Concluding Comments 
The 1994 MMPA amendments altered the entire thrust of the Act, from a focus on the 
optimal sustainable population level, to an attempt to actually reduce bycatch in 
117 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op cit. n41. 
118 The value of raising the issue within the bureaucracy before pursuing legal action is two fold. 
Firstly a negotiated solution may be presented, and secondly, if this fails, then the NGO's case is 
strengthened because an administrative record has been created. 
- 260 - 
Chapter Five - U.S. Sycatch 1992 - present 
commercial fisheries. The mandated level of PBR in the Act is, a fairly restrictive 
target, though one that is lenient and flexible enough to allow the majority of fisheries 
to continue. The amendments were particularly significant because, for the first time, 
they included a means for the reduction of the take of animals that were being killed 
over and above PBR. Up until that point, the Act had no mechanism for reducing 
bycatch, it simply stated the goal of bycatch reduction without elaboration. 
The TR process by which the goals of the amendment act were to be facilitated 
provided for the influence of two key factors. The first was domestic players, and the 
second, science. Although the emphasis on science has allowed for inflated claims of 
uncertainty and thus at times has unnecessarily delayed the reduction of bycatch or 
acted as a stalling mechanism, it has by and large provided for the proactive tackling 
of bycatch issues without the need for a high level of public action. Moreover the 
manner in which science was used in the early stages - to propel an issue on to the 
policy agenda - has meant that many of the lower profile cases, such as those with 
restricted geographic scope or less public interest, have been afforded due attention. 
Interestingly, the use of science in the search for technological solutions seems to have 
encouraged a better understanding between scientists and the industry, as increasingly 
industry is realising the potential offered by scientist's skills in creating gear alterations 
to mitigate bycatch, whilst allowing for continued viable fishing operations. This trend 
is well demonstrated in the creation of pingers as well as in the subsequent seabird 
bycatch scenario (described below). 
Notwithstanding improved relations, the heavy reliance on data mandated in the TR 
scheme does not however guarantee a smooth process, in particular with respect to the 
role science plays in the second phase of the policy cycle. Even with a complete set of 
data, it is sometimes difficult to find workable management options. And conversely, 
the mere presence of information is insufficient safeguard to ensure a quality 
management decision. 
Similarly to science, domestic players were afforded an increased role under the TR 
process. This was, in part, due to the central role of fishing interests, 
environmentalists, and animal welfare advocates in crafting the 1994 amendments - 
the subsequent system for reducing marine mammal mortality mandated the inclusion 
of these participants. 
Benefit offered from the inclusion of fishers' in marine conservation policy formation 
was not only to be derived from reduced public conflict, but also from their significant 
insight and problem solving skills. 
Fishers have to believe that they can solve anything - if you don't believe 
that somehow you can solve anything, then you're insane to go out to sea 
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in a fishing boat, in the middle of winter, hunched of miles from shore. 
You have to believe you can solve anything and that's the kind of person 
you have fishing, and those kinds of minds can come up with all sorts of 
solutions with the right incentives. And they know their fishery best 19 
NGOs have always played a significant role in agenda raising and implementation 
aspects of marine mammal and bycatch issues. Through participation in the TR 
process, the Act has also opened the problem solving phase of the policy cycle up to 
NGOs. Not only is this more constructive for the organisation themselves, but it 
facilitates relationship building between NGO and fisher representatives. 
Even within this revised and cooperative process, however, a significant amount of 
litigation still, occurs. Indeed, the 1994 MMPA amendments, through their strict 
deadlines, have provided an easy means of pressing suits. The formalisation of the 
process has, however, decreased the complexity of suits brought, most being 
procedural and concentrated on agency adherence to legislative time- lines. 
The issues have however at times become blurred, even under this rigorous and open 
process. As has occurred previously with other bycatch and conservation issues such 
as sea otters off the south west coast, marine mammals have been blamed as the 
reason for closures, when in reality, it was primarily a gear competition issue. Though 
not a problem, per se, this impacts upon NGO -fisher interactions as well as the public 
and political view of the organisations. 
A final, interesting, observation, is that as the Act comes up for reauthorisation, a 
strange silence pervades. This is, perhaps, a reflection of a general acceptance of the 
extant negotiated legislation, and a belief that no great gains are available to any 
parties. 
5.5 Seabird Bycatch 
To recall, the issue of seabird bycatch was considered under the auspice of high seas 
driftnetting operations, in the international arena, in the 1980s. In the 1990s, two 
domestic seabird bycatch concerns emerged, close in both proximity and time to each 
other. These focused on gillnet and longline operations off the northwest coast. 
Incidental Take in Gillnets 
Gillnetting concern originally focused on the take of marbled murrelet. These birds, as 
well as rhinoceros anklets, became most commonly entangled in sockeye salmon 
gillnets, because both feed by chasing fish underwater. The marbled murrelet had been 
listed under the ESA in the early 1990s. The reason for the bird's endangerment was 
119 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
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not fishers themselves, but rather habitat destruction caused by the logging of old 
growth forests, and the consequential loss of 90 -95% of the bird's nesting and breeding 
habitat. Marbled murrelets were, however, also thought to become entangled in fishing 
nets when they feed. Although alone, gillnetting would have had little impact upon 
their population, given their already reduced numbers, any take was deemed 
significant. 
Under the ESA, FWS is the lead agency for all avian species, and in August 1995 it 
released the draft recovery plan for the marbled murrelet and sought public comment. 
Although little mention was made of fishing impacts, the industry displayed 
considerable concern about the fate of these birds. The FWS in cooperation with fisher 
groups in the Washington State Puget Sound area, initiated two observer programs. In 
the event not a single marbled murrelet was captured in the gillnets!'" 
There were however a large number of common murres and diving alceds taken. This 
bycatch had the potential to trigger the Migratory Bird Treaty Act: a highly restrictive 
regime which operates within the 12nm area. The MBTA prohibits the take of any 
birds, and thus the closure of the fishery was mooted as a potential outcome - a 
option some folk in the environmental and recreational fishing community were said to 
have favoured.t" 
The north west gillnet fishery is a low budget community fishery. Federal funding for 
bycatch mitigation was not available, and so the fishers approached University of 
Washington fish biologist Dr Ed Melvin for help. Within a few weeks, a pilot program 
began testing different gears. Fishermen worked weekends sewing together different 
kinds of nets and reconfigurations! 
The 1995/1996 study identified three potential means of reducing seabird bycatch ín 
the Puget Sound drift gillnet fishery. The first of these was termed abundance -based 
120 Per. comm. Dr Ed Melvin, Marine Fisheries Specialist, University of Washington/Washington Sea 
Grant Program, Seattle (WA), 2 April 1999. 
12I This is well evidenced by I -640, an initiative at ballot in Washington State, that would have 
outlawed most forms of commercial fishing based on bycatch rates. In the U.S., initiatives provide a 
process by which voters can prepare a petition and if they get enough signatures it goes to ballot for a 
vote. I -640 was authored by a group called Save Our Sealife (SOS) which was a front for recreational 
fishing interests. Seabird bycatch in gillnets was their most potent weapon - and in their efforts, they 
even brought a suit against the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife for allowing the fishery to 
take place. In the event, I -640 was soundly defeated, primarily because SOS grossly overstated the 
problems and it was very clear their interest was to gain a greater allocation of fish for recreational fishers. 
Indeed, almost all conservation NGO's allied themselves with the commercial fishermen to defeat the ban. 
Per. comm. Dr Ed Melvin, Marine Fisheries Specialist, University of Washington/Washington Sea 
Grant Program, e-mail communication 30 August 1999. 
122 Per. Comm. Dr Ed Melvin op. cit. n120. 
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or ecosystem management, and utilised seasonal knowledge of seabird abundance.' 
The remainder relied upon gear modifications and diurnal patterns. 
The way these nets are fished they're fished from the surface down (drift 
gillnets), so we put some real visible webbing up in the top of the nets so 
that when birds came across the corkline they could look down and see 
trouble. And we also found that we caught lots of them right around 
sunrise, so eliminated sunrise fishing. We figured that by using these 
methods, and if they actually managed the fishery rationally, we could 
reduce bycatch by almost 3/4.124 
The report concluded that using a combination of all three modifications, bycatch 
could be reduced by between 70 and 75 percent, with little loss in catch.' In 1998, the 
regulations were implemented fully in the fishery!' 
Incidental Take in Longlines 
The incidental capture of birds in demersal longline fishing operations was also tackled 
under the ESA. Concerns were first raised in 1989 under a FWS biological opinion 
relating to the MMPA small take exemption, that also considered the impact of 
bycatch on other species including the short -tailed albatross. The short -tailed albatross 
is listed as endangered under the ESA. The biological opinion concluded that bycatch 
did pose a threat to the species, and required that reasonable and prudent mitigation 
measures be taken. This issue then seemed to slip off the agenda until the mid 1990s. 
In 1995, the FWS issued an amendment to the original 1989 biological opinion and 
consultation, herein requesting observer data on sitings and fisheries interaction. Later 
that year a short -tailed albatross was taken in the Western gulf of Alaska. As was the 
case with murrelets, the culprits for the current endangered status of this bird were not 
the fishers. The short -tailed albatross suffered from plundering of its nests on the 
Japanese islands where they breed." Blame was not the issue however, with only 300 
short -tailed albatross left, any take was, once again, significant. 
123 The fishery was managed through the real time setting of openings, based upon fish abundance. 
When information was first collected on seabird abundance it was revealed that seabirds were migrating 
from Puget Sound, and becoming increasingly plentiful as they traveled north. They were then 
intercepting fish on their southern migration, and the fisheries managers were setting openings right 
where these two animals met. Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Melvin, F., Conquest, L. and Parrish, J., Seabird Bycatch Reduction - New Tools for Puget Sound 
Drift Gillnet Salmon Fisheries: 1996 Sockeye and 1995 Salmon Test Fisheries (Washington Sea Grant 
Program, Seattle, 1996). 
126 Although the pressure has ebbed off some of the environmentalists are still in the background 
making quiet noises. Per. comm. Dr Ed Melvin op. cit. n120. 
127 Supporting this theory is the comparative health of two other North Pacific albatross species: the 
black footed albatross which has over 60,000 breeding pairs, and the Laysan which has a healthy 
population. 
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The longliners had an advantage over many other industry organisations, in that their 
director was lawyer, and knew that taking an ESA listed species was of particular 
concern. A couple of months later, in early 1996, the fleet caught a second short -tailed 
albatross, and Thorn Smith of the North Pacific Longline Organisation (NPLA), 
became concerned. A meeting of NPLA members was called and they were alerted to 
the problem. The NPLA fishers were aware of the potentially severe impact of a clash 
with the environment community, which had to that date been unusually quiet 
regarding the problem of longlining bycatch.128 
As had occurred with sea turtle bycatch, the fishers had difficulty conceptualising the 
problem because they so rarely caught albatross. The issue of bycatch, however, was 
not a new one to the longline fishers of this region: they had previously solved a 
problem of halibut bycatch.' The NPLA decided to model mitigation methods after 
the NMFS's Antarctic and Southern Ocean bycatch prevention regulations relating to 
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.130 The 
CCAMLR regulations were distributed to all the members, and the initiatives 
contained therein were discussed one by one, to determine which actions would be 
viable in the North Pacific. Additional gear modifications were also considered. 
From this, a set of draft regulations was created. The NPLA followed the government 
process and sent out the regulations to all North Pacific longline associations and 
asked for comments.131 This exercise was repeated three times: revised draft 
regulations were faxed out to the boats, and comments returned. Though the debate 
was on occasion acrimonious, Thorn Smith emerged from this process with a positive 
feeling about the industry's response. 
I think the most remarkable thing was that everybody agreed that yes it 
was time to do something - normally when you come to fishermen with a 
problem like this they are just as resistant as they can be, and it takes 
years. These guys just said 'yep gotta do something'.132 
128 This was in part, in recognition of the work that was being done by the fishermen in the area. NGO 
efforts were thus directed towards other problems perceived to be of a more urgent nature, including the 
bycatch of pelagic operations and longlining in warmer regions. 
129 Halibut is the target species of another fishery. Thus the longline fleet needed to find a system that 
would ensure the live release of halibut. Through the use of gear modifications, they managed to cut 
halibut mortality by half. Per. comm. Thom Smith, Executive Director, North Pacific Longline 
Association, Seattle (WA),1 April 1999. 
130 See Chapter 1 for further discussion on the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980) (herafter "CCAMLR "). 61 Fed. Reg. 8438 (1996). 
131 The regulations applied equally to both small and large vessels. There are 35 big and thousands of 
small longline vessels fishing in the Pacific Ocean. The only policy difference between the fleets is that 
the large vessels have 100% observer coverage and the smaller ones only 30% coverage. Per. comm. 
Thom Smith op.cit. n129. 
132 Ibid 
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Subsequently, the NPLA petitioned the North Pacific FMC and requested that it adopt 
the regulations by recommendation of an emergency rule.133 At its December 1996 
meeting, the Council unanimously voted in favour of the mandatory use of bycatch 
mitigation gear on longlining vessels!' Prior to these emergency regulations becoming 
active, another short -tailed albatross mortality occurred. 
In March 1997, FWS published proposed regulations under the ESA to govern the 
bycatch of seabirds in longlining operations.135 The process involved a section 7 
consultation between FWS (who had jurisdiction over the birds) and NMFS (as 
managers of the fishery). A biological opinion was issued, included in which was an 
incidental take statement for short -tailed albatross. The final rule required that the 
incidental take of short -tailed albatrosses be kept below one bird per calendar year. 
This was later expanded to two birds. 
If this mortality rate were reached then the FWS would be required to resume 
negotiations with the NMFS. Vivian Mendenhall, a FWS scientist, commented that 
although no such severe steps have been considered to date, indeed the fishers' fear of 
closure was valid, in that one option would be the prohibition of longlining.136 
It is important to note, however, that the two bird limit was not based on a scientific 
study of the species viability and the PBR as occurs under the MMPA. The two bird 
limit was reached by FWS in cooperation with the NPLA, by examining the historic 
catch. There had only been three known cases of short- tailed albatross take, and two 
had been in one year. The FWS thus concluded that historically two birds have been 
taken in one year without endangering the population and thus the limit was set.137 
Analysis of data suggests that this figure could in fact be much greater. Data collected 
by a scientist who had worked for the FWS in the 1980s was modeled., and the result 
suggested that an estimated ten birds a year, for ten years, could be taken without 
effecting the recovery of the species!' 
133 The request for immediate approval of emergency regulations prior to the season's commencement 
was so as to allow fishers time to purchase or construct the gear they would need to fish in compliance 
therewith. 
134 The provision passed by the FMC were essentially gear modifications, such as the use of bird bags, 
or streamers, or tori lines to deter the birds from the vessels. The rule was to remain in effect for 180 days 
or until permanent regulations were published. 
135 62 Fed. Reg. 10016 (1997). 
136 Reported in Matsen, B., "For the Birds" (1997) 77 National Fisherman 20. 
137 Per. comm. Thorn Smith op cit n129. 
138 Ibid. 
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In addition to the development of regulations, a concerted education campaign was 
undertaken as a cooperative effort by industry and government. 139 A year and half 
passed in which no birds were taken, then, in September 1998, two more short -tailed 
albatross were taken. By that time, the limit had been altered to allow the take of 4 
birds over a two year period. Nonetheless, concern about the possibility of closure, led 
the NPLA to reassessed its mitigation measures. Extant arrangements appeared to be 
working very well for the smaller boats, but the freezer longliners had been less 
successful.140 
In December 1998, the NPLA once again approached the FMC, this time to request it 
consider the use of lining tubes.141 The devices were fairly controversial with the 
fishermen due both to their cost 142 and their placement at the back of the boat where 
they had a tendency to develop problems 143 Moreover, NMFS and FWS were hesitant 
to endorse the use of devices they had not trialed. One of the boats, however, agreed 
to install a lining tube as a trial. That vessel recorded very little bird bycatch.144 
Meanwhile, NMFS committed to the creation of a research plan for seabird longline 
bycatch. According to Ed Melvin, who had been intimately involved with the gillnet 
issue, the process was somewhat unproductive as the agency refused to involve 
industry in the planning process, due to the concomitant requirement to also involve 
environmental representatives.'" 
139 The FWS and NMFS provided some money, the NPLA received a grant from a private group, and 
Audab n n contributed. A mailout was done, including: 
12000 guides on birds, bycatch problem how to fix a tori line; 
3000 copies of the book "Longline Fishing Dollars and Sense" in both Spanish and English; 
11000 copies of a guide on how to identify the various species, along with lifesized beak profiles; 
and 
regulation translated into plain English. 
140 There are a number of reasons that could explain these difference in bycatch mitigation results 
between the smaller and larger vessels. There may be more birds where freezer longliners focus their 
efforts, in the Bening Sea, which due to the heavy weather small boats tend to avoid; also the larger 
vessels shoot their bait from higher up, and hence the possible zone for hooking is larger; and finally the 
larger vessels shoot three times as many hooks a day than do the smaller boat. 
141 Lining tubes are devices that set longlines underwater. 
142 Installed lining tubes cost about $US45,000 or more. 
143 In the southern hemisphere a lining tube ripped off a boat, and tore a hole in the bottom of it; per. 
comm. Thom Smith op. cit. n129. 
144 An alternate, more affordable device has been developed. A line shooter acts to drive the ground -line 
and pulls it through the auto -baiter at an even rate so that the line can be set slack, and hence will sink 
much easier. If successful this may prove a financially preferable solution to the problem, as these devices 
cost only $US 10,000. Another idea is that of dying the bait blue so that the birds cannot see it, or 
developing an artificial bait that the target species will like but non -target species will not. 
145 This refusal to involve industry led Dr Melvin to submit a successful research proposal on longline 
bycatch mitigation. Results are expected towards the end of 1999. Per. comm. Dr Ed Melvin op. cit. 
n120. 
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To be sure, the issue of sea bird bycatch on longline vessels had been on the Southern 
Hemisphere agenda for some time. In 1998 the U.S., Australia and Japan brought this 
into the international arena, where the issue was pursued under the auspice of the 
FAO. Efforts began with the March meeting of an FAO Technical Working Group, 
followed by several other meetings that same year. 
On 15 -19 February 1999, the 23rd session of the COFI met to consider proposals for, 
inter alia, the incidental take of seabirds in longlining operations. An action plan to 
minimise seabird bycatch in longline fisheries was adopted by UN member nations, 
with only two abstentions.!' Herein the U.S., among others, was commended for the 
work it had undertaken towards seabird bycatch reduction.147 
The Emergence of the Longline Bycatch of Sea Turtle 
Cases of ingestion of hooks, or entanglement, or external hooking of sea turtles in 
longline vessels, have been known to the scientific community since the early 1980s.'4ß 
It is thought that the fishing location, depth of hook, and use of lightsticks to attract 
the target, all contributed to the catch rate of sea turtles!' 
Both scientific uncertainties, and the multilateral nature of the problem, have made the 
longline take of sea turtles a difficult one to remedy. Because of the cumulative impact 
of longline fisheries on the highly migratory sea turtles, the impact of bycatch can be 
attributed to no single nation, and hence international cooperation is required.150 
146 Adoption of the plan was voluntary having been created under the auspice of the FAO Code of 
Conduct as envisaged by article 2(d), and relating directly to articles 7.6.9 and 8.5 of the Code. Code of 
Conduct op.cit. n10. 
147 FAO, International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline 
Fisheries (Rome, FAO, 1999) paragraph 5. 
148 Hillestad, H., Richardson, J., McVea Jr., C. and Watson Jr, J., "Worldwide Incidental Capture of 
Sea Turtles ", in Bjorndal, K. (ed), Biology and Conservation of Sea Turtles (Smithsonian Institution 
Press, Washington DC, 1982) pp.489 -495; Balaz, G., Annotated Bibliography of Sea Turtles Taken by 
Longline Fishing Gear (unpublished report, NMFS Southwest Fisheries Centre, Honolulu Laboratory, 
1982); and Witzell, W., "The Incidental Capture of Sea Turtles in the Atlantic U.S. Fishery 
Conservation Zone by the Japanese Tuna Longline Fleet, 1978 -81" (1984) 46 Marine Fish Review 56. 
149 Anonymous, "News and Legal Briefs: Suit Filed to Protect Turtles of Hawaii" (1999) 84 Marine 
Turtle Newsletter 17 (source: Paul Achitoff, Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund). 
150 Nishemura and Nakahigashi estimated an annual capture of 21,200 sea turtles with a mortality of 
12,296 (primarily) loggerheads, in Japanese Western Pacific and South China Sea tuna fisheries. Crouse 
using data from Aguilar et al. estimated that take by the Spanish swordfish fleet in the Western 
Mediterranean was between 4,600 and 10,700 loggerhead sea turtles per annum. Aguilar, R., Mas, J. and 
Pastor, X., "Impact of Spanish Swordfish Longline Fisheries on the Loggerhead Sea Turtle Caretta 
caretta Population in the Western Mediterranean ", paper presented at Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual 
Workshop on Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation (NMFS, Georgia, 1992) pp.1 -9; Crouse, D., "The 
Consequences of Delayed Maturity in a Human- Dominated World" (1999) 23 American Fisheries Society 
Symposium (in press); and Nishemura, W. and Nakahigashi, S., "Incidental Capture of Sea Turtles by 
Japanese Research and Training Vessels: Results of a Questionnaire" (1990) 51 Marine Turtle Newsletter 
. 
Sea turtle mortality in longlines is a combination of loggerheads who tend to swallow the hooks and get 
snagged but do not immediately die because they can reach the surface due to the length of the gangent, 
continued over page 
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Moreover, the longline bycatch turtle problem is not so much that of mortality, but 
rather, serious injury; U.S. observer reports read, for example, "hook in mouth, 
swimming sluggishly'.151 Animals that are caught are commonly released alive, but the 
long -term survival rate is uncertain, the only study done suggested a 30% post -catch 
and release mortality rate.152 NvIFS suggests that each year there are thousands of sea 
turtles subject to non -lethal take, though these figures are little more than a rough 
estimate.'53 And, due to the delayed maturity of sea turtles, the effect of such activities 
may not be apparent for some time yet.154 
Between 1989 and 1991 longlining in Hawaii increased markedly,155 thus resulting in 
the incidental capture of hundreds of sea turtles.15' Frustration over the lack of action 
by NMFS, led, in February 1999, to the CMC and Sea Turtle Restoration Project 
(STRP)'s launch of a judicial challenge against NMFS in relation to the bycatch of sea 
turtles in longlining operations. Filed in the Federal District court of Hawaii, it was the 
first time the issue had been seriously raised on the public agenda. The suit sought to 
mitigate the incidental take of sea turtles in the 110 strong long line fleet operating in 
the U.S. EEZ north of Hawaii. The plaintiffs alleged that NMFS was in violation of the 
ESA by its failure to take action to conserve three species of turtle: the leatherback, the 
Olive Ridley and loggerheads. In response, the suit sought to compel NMFS, as 
defendant, to undertake an EIA, and to prepare a biological, opinion of the fishery's 
impact on the sea turtles. 
Shortly prior to, and anticipating the decision, NMFS announced its intention to 
prepare an EIS.157 On 18 October 1999, Judge Ezra ruled in favour of the plaintiff, 
ordering that NMFS prepare an EIS. The ruling found that the harm done to turtles, 
through longline fishing in Hawaii waters, was "incalculable" and ordered the closure of 
and leatherbacks who don't swallow the hooks because they are not after the fish, they eat jellyfish 
instead, but who do get tangled in the lines. It is the loggerheads in particular that the post -hook 
mortality studies are focused on. 
151 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41; per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. 05. 
152 Aguilar et al. (1992) op. cit. nI50. Thus recent section 7 ESA consultations have looked at the 
total number of turtles captured, and taken 30% of that figure as the allowable mortality level. Per. 
comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
153 Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
154 Crouse (1999) op. cit. n150. 
155 This increase followed the depletion of the Atlantic Swordfish stock by overfishing, and the 
consequential relocation of many swordfish longliners to Hawaii during the late I980s. Ibid. 
156 NMFS, Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation Biological Opinion: Impacts of the 
Hawaii Longline Fishery on Listed Sea Turtles (NMFS, Honolulu, 1993). It was estimated that in 1991 
the Hawaii longline fishery took 752 turtles with 148 of these immediate mortalities. 
157 "Court Finds Longing Fishery Violating Environmental Law, Orders Injunction" Media Release, 
Earthjustice, 20 October 1999. 
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thousands of square kilometers of Pacific Ocean to longliners while the EIS is being 
prepared. lss 
Although the focus to date has been on tropical waters, there are also documented 
takes of sea turtles in pelagic longline operations in northeastern waters, off Cape 
Cod.159 It has been speculated that the problem in this region is as severe as in 
Hawaii.' The true extent remains unknown, as little gathering or analysis of data has 
occurred on either the east or west coasts' - it has been suggested, however, that the 
impact of longlining on sea turtle populations may be equal to the threat posed by 
trawling,162 
Concluding Comments 
Considerable maturation of the bycatch issue and stakeholder relations is evidenced in 
the progressive action taken in respect of seabird bycatch in the North Pacific in the 
1990s, especially when compared with the treatment of sea turtle bycatch a decade 
earlier. This is, perhaps, a recognition of the lack of demonstrable outcomes from the 
conflict and turmoil witnessed in the turtle- shrimp debate, though the cultural 
differences between these two regions are also of some significance. 
The comparatively successful treatment of the seabird longline bycatch issue can be 
attributed to several factors. Firstly, is the familiarity of the issue. This applies in 
158 Per. comm. Dr Pam Plotkin, Senior Conservation Scientist, Centre for Marine Conservation, 
Washington DC, email communication 19 November 1999. "Court Closes Large Area of the Pacific to 
the Longline Fishery to Save Endangered Sea Turtles" Press Release, Earth Justice, CMC and STRP, 
26 November 1999. 
159 The northeast distant waters we get more turtles than down south even, because of the way 
the gulf stream goes up the Atlantic you get all these warm core rings way out in the 
middle of nowhere, and of course all the tuna and swordfish love those too and so all 
the big turtles are out there, its probably 50/50 loggerheads and leatherbacks. Per. 
comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
See also Gerrior, P., "Incidental Take of Sea Turtles in Northeast U.S. Waters" in Willians, P., 
Anninos, P., Plotkin, P., and Salvini, K., (ed), Pelagic Longline Fishery - Sea turtle Interactions: 
Proceedings of an Industry, Academic and Government Experts, and Stakeholders Workshop held in 
Silver Spring Maryland 24 -25 May 1994, NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS -OPR -7 (NMFS, 
Washington DC, 1996). 
160 Considerable controversy arose from the Hawaiian biological opinion on longlining impacts on sea 
turtles. As a result, the NMFS in Hawaii are currently conducting a post hooking mortality study. The 
study is in its third year and a report is expected soon. See Polovina, J., Kobayashi, D., Ellis, D., Saki, 
M. and Balaz, G., "Turtles on the Edge: Movement of Loggerhead Turtles (Caretta caretta) Along 
Oceanic Fronts in the Central North Pacific, 1997- 1998 ", paper presented at 2nd ASEAN Symposium and 
Workshop on Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation: Beyond the Beach, Kota Kinabalu, 15 -17 July 1999 
(University of Malaysia, Sarawak, in press). 
1.61 The lack of attention to these issue areas of bycatch may be in part because the agency has been 
hesitant to tackle it due to the scale of the northeast longline fleet. Discussions on the fishery refer to 
balance of trade issues, and participants therein have considerable influence in Congress, due to the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars they contribute to Congressional campaigns. Per. comm. Dr Sharon 
Young op. cit. n41. 
162 Per. comm. Dr Deborah Crouse, Biologist, Division of Endangered Species Fish and Wildlife 
Service (formerly with the CMC), Washington DC, 20 April 1999. 
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terms of bycatch in general - the longline fleet having already tackled a halibut 
bycatch problem with great success. Moreover, the issue of sea bird bycatch by 
longliners was not a new concern, the take of albatross having been well considered in 
Southern Ocean waters since the early 1990s. 
In addition, in both cases of gillnetting and longlining, the rapid development or 
adaptation of mitigation gear, and the leadership in redressing the issue that was 
taken by the industries themselves, led to the rapid conclusion of the issue with a 
minimum of conflict. In both seabird bycatch issues, the lead role has been taken by 
industry in acknowledging the problem, and in devising technical adaptations for its 
solution. Thus demonstrating the advantages of a consultative process driven by 
industry themselves. 
It was the threat of closure under the governing legislation, rather than any active 
persuasion by NGOs that facilitated such action. In part, the constructive response of 
industry reflects a greater familiarity with bycatch, and the removal of the perception 
that a bycatch concern is a death knoll to a fishery. Thus, rational consideration of the 
issue and options available occurred, moreover leading to a sense of empowerment for 
the fishery. 
5.6 The Panama Declaration Sr IDCPA - redefining "dolphin- safe" 
Although silent for some time, the tuna -dolphin issue never really left the political 
agenda, and in the 1990s controversy emerged with respect to dolphin -safe tuna 
labeling. 
By the end of the 1980s, significant changes had occurred in the fishing and exporting 
patterns of many of the nations fishing in the ETP. Some countries refused to embargo 
friendly neighbours or trading partners." And these and other tuna harvesting nations 
learned to survive with embargos: through the development of new markets,164 
increased domestic consumption,' and the circumvention of embargos through "not so 
kosher techniques ". " 
163 For example the relationship between Costa Rica and Panama. Per comm. Dr Martin Hall op. cit. 
nî5. 
164 For example, the market in Spain has increased. Ibid. 
165 For example, Mexico. Ibid. 
166 Such techniques included for example diverting fish through several other countries before entering 
the U.S.. Adding to this were the difficulties that has surfaced associated with the labeling scheme 
whereunder an NG had been charged with monitoring the dolphin safe status of imported tuna, a task of 
monumental difficulty due to the flow of tuna throughout the world, and hence criticised as ineffectual. 
Ibid. 
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In addition, ecological concerns had begun to surface. As ecosystem management 
replaced ESD as a catchcry of the 1990s, the public denouncements of Dr Martin Hall 
and others, regarding the high bycatch of undersized fish species and endangered 
marine wildlife such as sea turtles that occur in log sets, began to be heard.167 
The GATT Tuna II Decision 
Subsequent to Mexico's refusal to have set into precedent the GATT panel's tuna - 
dolphin decision, the EC and the Netherlands challenged the MMPA's intermediatory 
nation embargo!' 
In 1993, the GATT released its verdict on the second tuna- dolphin case. As did its 
predecessor, the GATT panel found that the U.S. had violated its obligations under 
the Agreement by imposing an embargo on the said nations. This was based again on 
the imposed restriction being classified as quantitative under Article XI, and hence that 
the exceptions contained in Article XX did not allow for such action. 
Its reasoning, however, differed substantially from that of the first panel. It applied a 
three step analysis to the issue of Article XX exceptions: 
1. It firstly considered subsection (g) and whether dolphins were exhaustible natural 
resources that could be depleted. Finding in the affirmative it held that the MMPA 
was within the scope of policies covered by the exceptions. In so doing the panel in 
tuna -dolphin 11 reversed the first panel's decision that Article XX(g) can not be 
invoked to protect extraterritorial resources. 
2. Secondly the panel considered whether the issue was related to the conservation of 
an exhaustible natural resource. In coming to its decision the panel made several 
observations: (1) that the U.S.'s tuna ban applied whether or not the particular 
tuna had been captured in association with dolphin mortalities, (2) the embargo 
was an attempt to change other nations conservation policies and if such did not 
occur then the conservation of the resource in question would not be achieved, and 
(3) thus that the embargos were aimed primarily at altering other nations internal 
laws not at the conservation of a resource. 
3. Finally, the embargos with respect to Article XX(b) were examined. Using a similar 
process to point 2, the panel considered if the action sought was necessary to 
protect an animal's health, and if trade measures were necessary to achieve that 
167 Hall, M., "On Bycatches" (1996) 6 Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 319; Hall, M., 
"Strategic Issues in Managing Fisheries Bycatch ", in Solving Bycatch: Considerations for Today and 
Tomorrow, Alaska Sea Grant College Report No.96 -03 (University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 1996) pp.29- 
32; and Hall, M. and Campa, M., "Solving the Tuna -Dolphin Problem in the Eastern Pacific Purse - 
Seine Fishery" (1999) unpublished manuscript. 
168 GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna DS29 /R 
(circulated 16 June 1994 - not adopted), reprinted in 33 I_I..M. 839 (1994) (hereafter "tuna- dolphin II "). 
272- 
Chapter Five - U.S. Bycatch 1992 - present 
objective. Again the panel found against the U.S. that the embargo was not 
necessary in achieving the MMPA as it was directed at changing other nations' 
internal policies. 
The U.S., in its defense, attempted to invoke Article XX(d) which allows for the 
creation of embargos where such are necessary for the achieving of an internal law or 
regulation. The GATT panel, however, found that, as the law that the secondary 
embargo was aimed at supporting had earlier been found to be GATT inconsistent, 
that this provision could not be used to support the use of other measures. 
The Panama Declaration and Dolphin -Safe Tuna Labeling 
Following StarKist's 1990 introduction of the dolphin labeling scheme, all but six of the 
U.S. fleet's vessels moved to the Western Pacific, where tuna and dolphin do not 
habitually swim together. Thus, by 1994, the U.S. fleet's bycatch level had dropped to 
104 takes. Under the auspice of the IDCP, the foreign fleet's bycatch had dropped too, 
measuring less than 4000 dolphins per annum.159 With the issue having been again 
considered by the GATT, this dramatic drop in bycatch figures raised the question of 
whether the U.S. should maintain embargos on tuna. In 1995, the six ETP fishing 
nations party to the LaJolla Agreement, issued a joint declaration urging the U.S. 
government to take into consideration the achievements and success of the IDCP and 
lift the embargos imposed under the MMPA and modify the concept of dolphin -safe 
so as to include products caught in accordance with the LaJolla Agreement. 10 
To be sure, the ETP nations had made good -faith efforts to participate in the IDCP 
and had dramatically reduced dolphin bycatch. The anticipated recognition of these 
achievements had not, however, followed. In the absence of such action, these States 
threatened withdrawal from the Program.' Concerned that positive steps taken under 
the LaJolla Agreement were being eroded, a coalition of five NGOs entered into talks 
with Mexico to develop the framework for a new international agreement. This formed 
the basis for what was to become the Panama Declaration in 
169 Marine Mammal Commission, Annual Report to Congress (Marine Mammal Commission, 
Washington DC,1995). Thus the DML was lowered to 9,300 for 1995. 
170 See Minutes of the 30th Intergovernmental Meeting on the Conservation of Tunas and Dolphins in 
the Eastern Pacific Ocean of the IATTC, La Jolla, June 1995, Appendix 5. These nations are Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, Ecuador, and Venezuela. 
171 Indeed, in 1996 Mexico suspended its active participation in the program, and was hence no longer 
bound by DMLs, though it agreed to continue to carry observers. 
172 Declaration of Panama, See Minutes of the 30t5 Intergovernmental Meeting on the conservation of 
Tunas and Dolphins in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, of the IATTC, Panama City, Panama, 4 October 1995, 
Appendix 4. 
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The Declaration reaffirmed governments' commitment to the LaJolla Agreement, and 
announced an intention to formalise the IDCP as a legally binding treaty. It also altered 
the LaJolla Agreement by setting the elimination of all dolphin mortality in the ETP as 
an agreed goal, and, more immediately, lowered the total dolphin mortality limit 
(DML) to 5,000. Thirdly, within that limit, the Declaration also created new stock 
mortality limits to better protect all dolphin populations. The net limit and the species 
specifications meant that the total bycatch of dolphins was likely to be significantly 
less that than the permissible figure of 5,000.13 The Declaration, however, made clear 
that its adoption into law was contingent upon the U.S. taking these earlier requested 
actions regarding the relaxation of its domestic laws. 
The benefits offered by a legally binding treaty are significant, not the least of which 
concerns the issue of enforcement. It was hoped that the creation of the Agreement on 
the IDCP as an international law, would alter the following scenarios. 
Sometimes time lapses such a way that measures can't be adapted to 
sanction nations that have done poorly. So you go to court in a particular 
nation, and the captain has hired a lawyer, and they say he was seen by 
an observer. ... Who is an observer? What is an observer? That is not a 
police officer or interpol! He is a student at a university often. ...So who 
employed him to do this? An international organisation. .... So the 
domestic legal argument is difficult - he [the observer] does not have a 
legal role under the nation's Constitution so suddenly there is a complex 
legal position. ... We have heavy fines for offering bribes, and then we 
send the information to the countries and they say OK we will investigate, 
and then nothing happens ' 
U.S. legislative action to implement the Panama Declaration, and hence make way for 
an Agreement on the IDCP, was thus initiated. The bill was primarily to amend 
MMPA provisions concerning tuna- dolphin interactions in the ETP. It also included 
provisions allowing U.S. vessels to once again participate in the lucrative ETP tuna 
fishery on an even plane with foreign vessels.'' The bill had the support of the federal 
administrative departments and fishing industry bodies. Senator Barbara Boxer " a 
long time opponent to the process of setting on dolphins, sponsored an alternate bill. 
And thus the lines were drawn. 
173 Mary Beth West, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Statement to the House Committee on 
Resources, Committee of Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans, Washington DC, 9 April 1997. Indeed in 1998 
the estimated dolphin take for foreign vessels was approximately 2000. 
174 Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall op. cit. n35. 
175 Mary Beth West, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Statement to the House Committee on 
Resources, Committee of Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans, Washington DC, 9 April 1997. 
176 Barbara Boxer was a Representative in the House in 1990, by 1994 she had become a Senator, so 
although she was a junior senator she was a senior in the Congress. The tuna dolphin issue was a key 
platform to her. 
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In favour of the initial proposed legislation were over 100 recreational bodies and 
environmental NGOs, including the CMC, the WWF, the National Wildlife Federation, 
Greenpeace, and the Environmental Defenders Fund. It has been suggested that among 
the motivations that explain this shift in policy for some of the NGOs who supported 
the bill, was a desire for credibility and approval in Congress, a wish to gamer 
international support, and a compromise for the sake of their projects, programs, and 
contacts in Latin America.' 
Another explanation for some NGOs' concerted turn from the policy of a prohibition 
on setting on dolphins, was that the alternative fishing methods were increasingly being 
revealed as ecologically unsound.18 Sets on objects result in the take much smaller fish 
than do sets on dolphins.' The result of removing animals at a pre -reproductive 
phase is that the number of offspring per animal becomes very low.180 Tuna are very 
fecund, so that overfishing in the short term is not an issue, but it is a long term 
concern.181 Indeed Dr Martin Hall of the IATTC secretariat believes that setting on 
dolphins is the most environmentally benign option, "the only way of fishing should be 
on dolphins, and we should ban all the other ways in theory. "182 
An equal number and calibre of environmental groups opposed the bill though, 
nicknaming it the "Dolphin Death Act ". These included the Sierra Club, the Humane 
Society, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and the Earth Island Institute *83 
To be sure, it was in this context that the tuna -dolphin issue became significantly an 
ethical, rather than scientific, debate. 
177 Per. comm. Dr Naomi Rose, Marine Mammal Scientist, Humane Society of the U.S., Washington 
DC, 16 April 1999. 
178 Fish Aggregating Devices or FADs have been used for years in other fisheries (such as in the 
Philippines) since the discovery that fish are attracted to floating objects. Fishing on naturally floating 
objects in the ETP has not historically been significant, except for a short period in the mid to late 
1970s. Significantly this corresponded to a marked decline in the tuna population. 
179 Fish caught with FADs average I4cm 51b compared to a 1 -1.3m and 60 -701b minimum with those 
caught fishing on dolphins. Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall op. cit. n35. 
180 In other oceans where FADs have been used intensively the stocks have crashed. The Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans have voluntary closure systems, which last about three months and cover huge areas of the 
ocean as a way to recover stocks from the previous fishing. 
181 The yield per recruit (growth and age) is also problem. Yellowfm tuna's growth curve dictates that 
if you catch a fish that is 14cm long then the average yield for each individual in the fishery is .21b, if 
you allow the same fish to go to 80cm (lyear) the production goes to 91b. Thus in one year more than a 
doubling in size and weight occurs. In theory if you could catch only yellowfin that were one meter long 
the yield would be the largest. 
182 In this regard, the 1995 San Jose Declaration states that "setting on dolphins is the most effective 
method of protecting the biodiversity and the marine ecosystem in the ETP ". San Jose Declaration, July 
14, 1995 (available from Conservation Biology Discussion Group, Message ID 
41cr31 $nun @newsbf02.news.aol.com). 
183 Kronman, M., "`Dolphin -safe' redefined" (1997) October National Fisherman 10. 
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Due to the polarity of opinion presented by these usually allied groups, several 
Congressional members commented that they found the issue a particularly difficult 
one to address: 
We had a lot of trouble lobbying during the time there were two bills 
...we'd get to the Hill and one of the other groups would have just left and 
they [Congressional members] would say "why are you guys fighting 
anyway, its very disturbing to us to see these environmental groups 
divided like this, it certainly harms your credibility ".184 
At issue was the definition of dolphin -safe. One opinion held that the old usage of 
dolphin -safe to mean that no net has been intentionally set around a dolphin for the 
entire fishing trip, had become obsolete. The premise upon which this claim was based 
was that in the seven years since embargos had been in place, foreign fleets had not 
ceased setting on dolphins. The proposed label redefined dolphin -safe such that it 
would refer to tuna sets in which no dolphins died. 
One criticism of this proposed legislation was that only the actual kill of dolphins 
would be considered.' It did not take into account indirect impacts which would 
result in dolphin mortality, for example, serious injuries, predation by sharks and 
stress on the animals.18' And thus, operations which resulted in mortalities from the 
indirect effects of purse -seining would, at law in the U.S., be permitted to claim 
dolphin -safe status for their tuna. It was this aspect of the legislation that was subject 
to the harshest criticisms. 
Eventually in the U.S. and the IATTC, the truth didn't matter - they didn't 
care what the biological facts said, they didn't care what the truth was or 
what was really the best solution, what they wanted were two things: 
they wanted to be allowed to set on dolphins because it is the cheapest 
easiest way of catching tuna, and they wanted the little blue label. 
Because it has become so entrenched in the public market mind, people 
buy canned tuna and look for that little label (at least in the U.S.) and if 
they don't see it they'll wonder why it isn't there. 
Put those two together then setting on dolphins has to become dolphin - 
safe - they have to spin, twist and permeate it so that it is dolphin -safe. 
And that is what all this has been in aid of. All the lobbying on the Hill 
and legislative debate has been in aid of creating the public view that 
setting nets on dolphins is dolphin -safe. And in a very basic common 
sense way, that is clearly absurd. Even if it doesn't kill them, it is not 
safe .1'7 
184 Per. comm. Dr Naomi Rose op. cit. n177. 
185 This was emphasised by the definition of take under the MMPA, which included harassment. 
Regardless of the policy position taken, it was clear that setting on dolphins equated to harassment as 
defined at law. Because, however, of the inclusion of the entire ETP section of the MMPA under a 
separate part of the Act, the definitions of harassment taken for other marine mammals was not applicable 
in this situation. Thus the ETP is considered as alien, separate and unequal to the rest of the statute. 
186 Kusabek et al. (1995) op. cit. n49. 
187 Per. comm. Dr Naomi Rose op. cit. n177. 
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In 1996, Barbara Boxer and Joseph Biden threatened a filibuster to prevent any further 
consideration of the bill.188 And in the last days of the 1996 Congressional Session, 
these two senators successfully blocked any attempts to have the bill unanimously 
passed. Key Congressional supporters of the bill pledged to reintroduce the legislation 
in the 1997 session. After protracted discussions on H.R. 408 and S. 39 a compromise 
was reached.'" 
Notwithstanding criticisms, the new legislation passed through Congress with 
overwhelming approval, and was signed into law by President Clinton on 15 August 
1997. Although referred to as a "compromise" bill the International Dolphin Conservation 
Program Act (IDCPA) was strongly reminiscent of the original proposed statute.190 The 
compromise component was essentially that implementation of the new definition 
would be delayed until March 1999 when the NMFS was due to release the findings of 
a study into the health of ETP dolphin stocks. If there was a finding of "significant 
adverse impacts" to depleted dolphin stocks, then the label definition was not to be 
changed. The study was to investigate not only direct mortality, but also the extent to 
which dolphins are traumatised by their experiences of purse -seines and the impact 
this has upon their reproductive capacity. A second requirement was notification to 
Congress of the creation and activation of the IDCP treaty. 
The enactment of this legislation paved the way for negotiations on the Agreement on 
the IDCP, which commence in February 1998. In addition to the dolphin related 
provisions, the treaty also acted to consolidate the whole IATTC program. It 
introduced the concept of dealing with other bycatch species, with the precautionary 
approach, and ecosystem management, issues that have been attended to in other 
bycatch contexts.19t 
188 A filibuster is a means of delaying passage of legislation. Its use in the U.S. Senate is made 
possible due to two characteristics of Senate standing rules. Firstly, the lack of time limits on individual 
Senators to debate; and secondly the absence of any available motion by which a majority of Senators can 
bring the Senate to vote on approving a debatable motion, amendment or measure. For information on 
ending a filibuster through cloture procedure and other details of Senate floor procedure see Bach, S., 
Senate Floor Procedure: A Summary (Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 1997) 
189 The compromise Bill passed in Senate in a 99 -0 vote, and by unanimous consent in the House. 
190 International Dolphin Conservation Program Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105 -42, 111 Stat 1122 (16 
U.S.C. 1414). 
191 For example approximately 100 sea turtles (mostly Olive Ridleys) are caught each year. Fatality is 
caused by the dropping of the turtles from a height and breaking of the carapace. Secondly they may 
drown if they are left underwater for an extended period of time. Solutions to avoid the sea turtle bycatch 
is the use of speed boats in the area where the net is going out, so as to spot the turtles, so the solution 
is do not let the turtles go high and release them when only two feet out of the water. IATTC has also 
begun resuscitation courses. Even though no official action has been taken, mortality has been decreased 
by roughly half. 
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In February 1999, the Agreement on the IDCP became active following its fourth 
ratification.192 And on March 3, the Secretary of State provided certification of this to 
Congress. 
One step still remained, that of the scientific review. Conflict arose between NMFS and 
IATTC regarding the validity and use of certain data. NMFS refused to use the IATTC 
data in its IDCPA assessment because it claimed the numbers were inaccurate due to 
concerns of misreporting, and inadequate consideration of the impacts of stress and 
fatigue on dolphins. Although IATTC acknowledged that these factors may have a 
considerable impact, even if the IATTC take levels were multiplied by a factor of 70 
they would still be within the sustainable level. In the event, the report to Congress was 
submitted in April, the alteration to the new scheme was approved on the grounds 
that there was insufficient evidence to determine significant adverse impact.193 In early 
May1999, the provisions of the IDCPA became active. 
Concluding Comments 
Reassessment of the performance of ETP tuna harvesting nations, and recognition of 
their reduction in dolphin bycatch, as well as a change in the dominant scientific belief, 
led to a reassessment of the U.S.'s tuna -dolphin embargo policy. The 1990s witnessed 
a huge decrease in the number of dolphin mortalities caused by foreign purse seine tuna 
fleets in the ETP. 
What was done with the dolphins was a sum of things: it was not just 
technology, it was not just education, it was not just management, 
individual limits, NGO participation, cooperation and dialogue, industry, 
environmentalists. It was scientists communicating with fishermen, it was 
scientists communicating with NGOs and with industry, all those things 
happened together. It was not just one of them.194 
These developments, and the unprecedented step of NGOs negotiating an agreement 
with foreign nations, led to the need to reconsider U.S. ETP policy. Indeed, though 
driven largely by international considerations and science, this is another example (as 
with the TR process) of NGOs taking a proactive stance in the policy development 
phase of the cycle. 
192 Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, text available at tut; 
http: / /www.state.gov /www /global /oes /oceans /dolphin.html. Ratifying nations are the United States, 
Panama, Ecuador and Mexico. 
193 Gerrodette, T., Preliminary Estimates of 1998 Abundance of Four Dolphin Stocks in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific, Southwest Fisheries Science Center Administrative Report LJ -99 -04 (NMFS, LaJolla, 
1999). For further details of the International Dolphin Conservation Program survey of dolphins in the 
ETP, conducted by the Southwest Fisheries Science Center see url: 
http://swfsc.ucsd.edu/IDCPA/IDCPAfront.html. 
194 Per. comm. Dr Martin Hall op. cit. n35. 
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Although it is national actions, not that of an international entity, that is at issue in 
this thesis, it is worthwhile to recall that IATTC was given a mandate to investigate 
and to reduce the take of dolphin, not to stop fishing in a particular way. Thus the 
emergence of information suggesting that the taking of marine mammals was only one 
of several bycatch issues to consider, and that alternate fishing techniques had an 
overall greater impact on the ecosystem, also contributed to IATTC's change in 
priorities. In this way, the IATTC's investigation of wider ecosystem conditions in turn 
impacted upon the U.S.'s policy development. 
The issue of scientific uncertainly was, once again, a focus, as information that sets on 
dolphins were likely to have less severe environmental impact, than fishing on Fish 
Aggregating Devices. The result has been a war of science, with different people 
accusing each other of utilising incorrect ecological facts. 
The debate over dolphin labeling that ensued, focused on not only scientific 
consideration, but also ethical concerns. The issue of whether the aim of the U.S. 
Congress was sustainability or preservation was a question which would be answered 
by the shape of resultant legislation. Though NGOs had considerable involvement in 
the labeling debate, it is questionable as to whether, in their absence, the result would 
have differed at all. As with any diverse group, NGOs will not always be able to reach 
a consensus. 
In the end, the decision was made largely on pragmatic terms, influenced by 
international tradeoffs. Indeed this is probably the most comprehensive example of a 
nation and an international community interacting together to achieve a mutually 
acceptable outcome. An agreement was forged, with the incentive of its elevation to 
treaty status, should the U.S. take certain action. The U.S., having legislated the 
particular action as requested, made this IegisIation subject to the carrying out of the 
original deal. The creation of the treaty saw the triggering of the activation of the U.S. 
legislation. 
Many other people want to hear the story, and the reason is that every 
one want to hear a success story and that they have learnt a lot, and so 
the methodology is transported along and is important. Reducing bycatch 
has to be seen as an incremental and cumulative solution to the problem, 
run as a campaign akin to a military operation.195 
195 Ibid. 
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Indeed, other bycatch species, and issues such as ecosystem management, have been 
paid recent attention in the ET?. Even though no official action on sea turtle bycatch 
has been taken, mortality has been decreased by roughly half.196 
This sort of proactive approach to bycatch of particular marine wildlife, mirrors that 
seen in the north pacific longline fishery. The solution was sought, or at the least the 
process underway, before public recognition of the problem occurred, and prior to the 
emergence of the common accusatory and adversarial scenario. 
5.7 Achieving Marine Turtle Protection 
In comparison to tuna- dolphin bycatch where international issues and science 
maintained centre stage, and NGOs continued to hold an important but residual role 
from 1980 through to the 1990s - the main influences on the issue of turtle- shrimp 
bycatch have undergone a significant departure from their previous path. The 
dominant influences on sea turtle policy development during the 1980s were NGOs, 
industry bodies and science. The 1990s saw a radical departure from this, in part due 
to the shift from the formation into the implementation phase of the policy cycle. The 
influence of key industry and environmental players subsided, and reduced lobbying 
resulted in much reduced Congressional interest in the issue. The STRP emerged, with a 
mandate of ensuring enforcement of the laws, as opposed to the creation or alteration 
thereof. This role was played out in both the international and domestic arena. The 
second noteworthy change was the emergence of the issue onto the international arena: 
which resulted first in conflict, and then saw a gradual maturation of the issue, as a 
negotiated solution emerged. Similarly on the domestic level, in addition to legal 
challenge, parties have also sought a more productive solution. This loosely followed 
the domestic tuna -dolphin labeling model. Although the endangered status of sea 
turtles removed some of the philosophical considerations that have plagued tuna - 
dolphin labels, this marketing scheme has proved to be much more problematic for 
practical implementation. 
Unilateral Embargoes and Domestic Action 
To recall, section 609 was enacted on the 21 November 1989, and placed two 
requirements upon the Secretary of State. The first was to embargo those nations that 
imported shrimp but did not have protective harvesting requirements for sea turtles 
equivalent to U.S. standards. The second, required the Secretary of State to negotiate 
measures to ensure sea turtle protection by shrimp harvesting nations. 
196 Sea turtle ETP purse -seine bycatch has been reduced from about 40 to 20 animals every 1000 sets, 
lbid. 
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With regard to the placement of embargoes on nations which did not meet U.S. 
standards, the Department of State decided in 1991 to limit this provision to nations 
in the Caribbean region.`97 The official basis for this decision was that these were the 
areas where U.S. turtles migrated through. As section 609 was to be applied only to 
those species that were protected by United States regulations, that is only those 
species of turtles that were found in U.S. waters, the law was interpreted to mean that 
if the turtles were not part of the U.S. migratory stock, then there was no benefit to the 
nation in protecting them. It has otherwise been suggested, though, that the decision 
was political, and intended primarily to prevent the trade disruptions that may have 
accompanied widespread embargoes.198 Indeed, other agencies engaged in the 
discussion about how to interpret the law when it first was passed, opposed the State 
Department's decision to geographically limit the law's application.'99 
Of the 16 shrimp harvesting Caribbean nations, only two were using methods that did 
not endanger turtles to the U.S.'s satisfaction. The remaining 14 were not found to 
have provisions which met the comparability test and thus were embargoed under the 
new law. 
To achieve comparability a commercial shrimp vessel was required to use TEDs in all 
trawls, with turtle exclusion as effective as that of the U.S. - that is a 97 percent 
turtle exclusion rate. Moreover regulatory programs had to have reasonable 
enforcement, monitoring and penalties. Notwithstanding the inability of 14 of the 
nations to meet these requirements the Department stalled its enforcement of section 
609, and affected nations were granted three years to bring their regulations up to U.S. 
standards. Thus under this arrangement, by 1994 TEDs were to be installed on all 
shrimp trawlers. Most countries did not seem to have difficulties gaining certification, 
and by 1997 12 of the 14 nations were certified as being in compliance with section 
609.20° 
Meanwhile environmental groups, unsatisfied by the limited geographical application 
of section 609, sought remedy through the courts. The STRP (Ell) was created in 1988 
197 58 Fed. Reg. 9015 -16 (1993). 
198 Kaczka, D., "A Primer on the Shrimp -Sea Turtle Controversy" (1997) 6 RECIEL 171; Donnelly, 
M., "Evolution of the Western Hemisphere Sea Turtle Treaty" (1996) 72 Marine Turtle Newsletter 18. 
199 Per. comm. Jay Johnston, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Commerce, NOAA, 
Washington DC, 16 April 1999. 
200 There are questions about the rigour as well as the validity, of some nations' compliance to the 
standards set forth in this law. Preliminary evidence in a study commissioned by the National Wildlife 
Federation in Washington DC suggests that the number of nations certified under section 609 is not a 
true reflection of those countries that maintain standards for mitigating sea turtle bycatch in commercial 
shrimp trawling operations that are equivalent to the TED program in the U.S.. Per. comm. Dr Jack 
Frazier, Research Associate, Conservation and Research Centre, Smithsonian Institute, Royal Front 
(VA), email communications October/November 1999. 
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in direct response to the federal government's perceived poor performance in sea turtle 
conservation.201 Ell acted as lead plaintiff in this, and subsequent ongoing section 609 
interpretation actions. 
Hesitant after the GATT tuna- dolphin panel decision to bring an environmental suit 
before a specialist trade court, NGOs sought in February 1992 to be heard before the 
federal district court in San Francisco 202 The defendant - the Department of State - 
tackled the challenge by contending that the issue was outside of the court's 
jurisdiction, and that, by virtue of the 1980 Custom Court Act, the Court of 
International Trade in New York City had exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning 
import and export restrictions20s 
In the opinion of many environmentalists, the CTf favoured the same pro -trade 
ideological inclinations as the GATT panel. Thus the plaintiff NGOs disputed the 
appropriateness of the forum of the CIT for determining what they claimed to be an 
environmental issue, rather than a trade barrier. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the federal district court's dismissal of the EII's contention, and found that the 
legal questions raised concerning the ESA's section 609 shrimp embargo provisions 
were clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT.2°4 
As a result of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision, the Ell's only course of 
legal redress was to be found with the court of trade. A 1995 case had provided 
encouragement that the CIT had some conservation sympathies though.205 Thus, in 
1995, the Ell lodged a challenge to the government's decision to limit the application of 
section 609 to Atlantic and Caribbean shrimp fishing nations, claiming that the 
201 Per. comm. Peter Fugazzotto op. cit. n34. The Sea Turtle Restoration Project (STRP), operated 
until 1999 under the auspice of Earth Island Institute (EIl). 
202 Kibel, P., "Justice for the Sea Turtle: Marine Conservation and the Court of International Trade" 
(1996) 15 Journal of Environmental Law 57. 
203 Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96 -417, 94 Stat. 1728 (1980), § 201. The Act had been 
passed in order to clarify jurisdictional uncertainties of its 1926 and 1970 predecessor laws, by providing 
exclusive (rather than concurrent) jurisdiction, as well as to expand the range of issues the court was 
charged with overseeing so as to include the fields of international tariff and embargo disputes in its 
bailiwick. Cong. Rec. 27,063 (1980). 
204 Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (hereafter "Eli v 
Christopher"). 
205 Florrheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 848 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995). Herein the CIT 
upheld an import ban whereby the President had used the Pelly Amendment to restrict the importation 
of a product from a country engaged in trade of endangered species. Although the import ban was placed 
upon shoes made of Finnish Elk - not itself an endangered species - the country of origin, Taiwan was a 
major importer of rhinoceros and tiger body parts, animals acknowledged as endangered under the 1972 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). The 
plaintiff argued that the Pelly Amendment only allowed for bans on products that originated from within 
its own boarders. The CIT strongly rejected this argument, and upheld the validity of the ban imposed 
under the Pelly Amendment, and went as far as to condone the behaviour of Taiwan as covert to the 
intent of CITES. 
- 282 - 
Chapter Five - U.S. Bycatch 1992 - present 
resultant inaction in other regions was inconsistent with the intent of the law.206 In its 
complaint EII sought two remedies: firstly an order compelling the State Department to 
initiate negotiations regarding sea turtle protection with all foreign governments that 
export shrimp to the U.S.; and secondly an order compelling the State Department, as 
well as other federal agencies, to apply shrimp certification requirements to all foreign 
countries, regardless of geographic location.'" 
The government's defense was based firstly upon standing rights, which were upheld 
for the EII 208 The more substantive contention of the Department of State was that it 
had made a reasonable interpretation of section 609. The court's December verdict 
invoked an established test for assessing a defendant's claim to reasonable 
administrative interpretation of legislation. This required the court to determine 
whether the meaning of Iegislation was clear and unambiguous, irrespective of the 
agency's interpretation.209 The CIT held that the meaning of the word "all ", in the 
relation to the application of shrimp certification to all foreign nations, was plain 
enough. In finding for the plaintiff, the CIT held that the State Department had limited 
the intended geographic scope of the legislation, and that, as such, the interpretation 
was invalid.210 
A second substantive argument raised by the State Department in an attempt to assert 
the validity of its limitation of geographical scope, was that the program, as 
established under the Act, conflicted with GATT trade rules. Hence it was claimed 
that the CIT should concur that the government's minimalist interpretation was 
necessary in order to avoid challenge or conflict under the GATT. The defense relied 
206 Ell v Christopher. 
207 Kibel (1996) op. cit. n202 at 65. 
208 The defenses contention on standing was based primarily on the US Supreme Court ruling in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992)). Hereunder standing was denied to a NGO 
whose members had been engaged in scientific study of endangered species threatened by a proposed 
project. It was held that the interest was too speculative and the plaintiffs were unlikely to suffer 
imminent harm to their personal interests. Further Judge Scalia expressed that "[v]indicating the public 
interest ... is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive" (at 2145) (for discussion on Lujan see 
Sustein, C., "What's Standing After Lujan: of Citizen Suits, "Injuries ", and Article IIP' (1992) 91 
Michigan Law Review 163). 
In Ell v Christopher however the court, although within the analytical framework, departed from the 
spirit of the Lujan decision. The CIT found that Ell demonstrated sufficient longstanding interest in sea 
turtle conservation, and also adequately demonstrated that the government's failure to implement § 609 
presented an immediate and imminent danger to those interests, and that the relief sought would provide 
redress to the identified harm (Ell v Christopher at 567). 
209 Established in the case Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 467 U.S. 837 (1984) at 
845. If the meaning of the legislation was not found to be clear, then the second stage of the test required 
the court to uphold the agency's interpretation thereof, even if the court in considering the issue de nova 
would have opted for an alternate interpretation. In Ell v Christopher however this second stage was not 
invoked. 
210 Ell v Christopher at 578 -9. 
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upon precedents set in two earlier GATT panel decisions211212 regarding exceptions to 
the general agreement as they related to like treatment requirements (Article HI) and 
prohibition of quantitative trade restrictions (Article XI) 213 
Although agreeing to the broad principle of minimizing international trade conflict, the 
court suggested that section 609's alleged conflict with the GATT was too speculative 
to warrant limiting the application of the shrimp certification program.214 
It has been suggested that the CTT's finding in respect of the government's contentions 
relating to GATT, may have been motivated by broader concerns. There had been 
increasing dialogue, in both academic and popular press, regarding the legal 
distinctions drawn between the regulation of products and production methods, to the 
extent that it was suggested that in the GATT panels' recent treatments, Article HI had 
been misunderstood and misapplied.215 One opinion holds that 
[t]he differentiation between products and production processes cannot 
be sustained in an ecologically interdependent world. For example, to say 
a nation must accept an imported semiconductor because it physically 
resembles a domestically produced semiconductor is absurd if the 
211 The first panel decision related to Canadian restrictions on the export of unprocessed salmon and 
herring (Canada Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, 22 March 1988, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1989). Canada had argued that the provision under challenge was 
necessary to ensure the preservation of the market value of its domestic catches and that such was needed 
and closely related to the nation's efforts to prevent overfishing. Canada hence claimed processing 
requirements were justified under Articles XX(b) (measures necessary to protect human plant or animal 
life and health) and XX(g) (measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources). The 
GATT panel disagreed and held that the measure was, rather than based upon the protection of the stock, 
an attempt to protect the domestic fishing industry. For discussion see McDorman, T., "International 
Trade Law Meets International Fisheries Law: The Canadian/U.S. Salmon and Herring Dispute" (1990) 
7 International Arbitration 107. 
212 The second decision was that of the already reported US/Mexican tuna- dolphin controversy Dispute 
Settlement Panel Report on United States Restriction on Imports of Tuna, DS21 /R (circulated 3 
September 1991 - not adopted), reprinted at 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991). For earlier discussion see Chapter 
Four, section 4.7 "International Reaction to Dolphin Bycatch Import Requirements ". 
213 From these cases the defense drew three points: 
that a distinction must be made between the application of Article III's like treatment requirements in 
that these apply only to products and not production methods; 
that if a national conservation measure provides significant economic benefits to a national industry it 
may violate GATT even if it also has conservation goals; and 
that national policies that aim to force other nations to alter their environmental policies are not 
justified tinder Article XX(g). 
See Kibel (1996) op. cit. n202. 
214 Ibid. 
215 For a comprehensive discussion see Chamovitz, S., "Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GATT Rules and 
their Application to Environmental Trade Measures" (1994) 7 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 299. 
See also Hurlock, M., "Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Tight of the 
Tuna/Dolphin Decision" (1992) 92 Colombia Law Review 2098; Porter, S., "The Tuna/Dolphin 
Controversy: Can the GATT Become Environmentally -Friendly ?" (1992) 5 The Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 91; and Southworth III, H., "GATT and the Environment" 
(1992) 23 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 977. 
For popular media coverage see "The Cruel Trade -Off', T h e Guardian, I I September 1991: and 
"WTO's Knee -Jerk Decisions Hamm Environment ", The Australian, 27 May 1998. 
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product was made in violation of the Montreal Protocol, restricting the 
use of chemicals harmful to the ozone layer.216 
Indeed an examination of the background of the GATT suggests that it sought not to 
eliminate the use of trade restrictions to impose environmental or health requirements, 
but simply to establish a set of the rules under which such could be applied217 
On handing down its finding, the CTT proceeded then to issue a statement to compel 
the State, Commerce and Treasury Departments to implement an import ban upon all 
shrimp and shrimp based products from uncertified nations, by 1 May 1996 218 
Two immediate responses to the CTT decision occurred: one by foreign nations, and the 
other by the U.S. federal government. In March 1996, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), along with India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Korea, Australia, 
Mexico and Venezuela, protested the U.S. ruling to the WTO219 In July 1996, Suvit 
Khunkitti, Thailand's Agriculture and Cooperatives Minister, issued a statement 
warning the U.S. to ease the ban or else the ASEAN members would raise the issue at 
the WTO's December 1996 meeting. 0 In the event only four nations, India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Thailand, requested consultations. 
Consultations occurred in November, wherein this coalition of nations argued the 
appropriateness of the U.S.'s attempts to impose its domestic policies, upon foreign 
nations, through import restriction. Unsatisfied with the outcome of consultations, 
these four nations requested the establishment of a dispute settlement board to 
consider the legality of section 609 embargos. Unlike the tuna- dolphin case, this was to 
be heard under the jurisdiction of the WTO, and not a GATT panel. 
In April the following year, the WTO established a three person dispute resolution 
panel. Findings were passed down a little over twelve months lateral U.S. measures 
216 Esty, D., Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (1994) at 51, cited in Kibel 
(1996) op. cit. n202. 
217 When the GATT was adopted in 1947 there were already numerous examples of trade measures 
based upon environmental and health concerns. Steve Chamovitz, director of Yale Global Environment 
and Trade Study maintains that the GATT intended to reaffirm the legitimacy of these measures, and that 
hence the issue is "not whether process standards are acceptable as trade rules. That was settled decades 
age. This issue is what specific standards are appropriate." Charnovitz, S., "Environmental 
Harmonization and Trade Policy" in Trade and the Environment: Law, Economics and Policy (1993) at 
269 -70, cited in Kibel (1996) op. cit. n202. 
218 Ell v Christopher, at 579 -80. Or not listed on sea turtles and hence not covered under the section 
609 regulations regarding requirements of certain levels of sea turtle protection in order to be granted 
certification. 
219 Batcki, C., "Trade War over Turtles ?" (1996) Summer Earth Island at 9. 
220 Kibel (1996) op. cit. n202. 
221 World Trade Organization, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT /DS58/R (15 May 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998). 
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were found to be inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT, which maintains that WTO 
members shall not impose import restrictions. The U.S. again argued that the measures 
fell within Articles XX(b) (relating to the protection of animal life or health) and 
XX(g).tm The Panel however disputed these claims and insisted that the U.S. measures 
were an unjustifiable discrimination between nations and hence did not comply with 
the necessary conditions of the introductory sentence of Article XX. 
The U.S. government reacted to the CIT decision by petitioning the court to consider a 
motion to extend the compliance deadline for an additional year, due to 
administrative considerations' The court granted the petition be heard, then on 10 
April 1996 considered and vehemently denied the government's requested 
postponement. CIT Judge Thomas Aquilino declared that 
§ 609's mandate to negotiate as soon as possible and to apprise Congress 
not later than one year after the date of enactment hardly bespeaks an 
additional annum of delay more than six years after that date 224 
Although he did not pursue any action, Judge Aquilino went so far as to suggest that 
the government's petition, based upon the "paucity of evidence offered in support of 
its motion ", may warrant sanction under CIT Rule 11 which forbids parties from 
submitting motions that are primarily intended to "harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. "' 
The second response to the April 1996 CIT decision, was the State Department's 
promulgation of new regulations to implement the foreign shrimp certification 
program.us These regulations required shipment -by- shipment certification of shrimp 
caught with TEDs. They provided that all shipments of shrimp and shrimp products 
into the U.S. had to be accompanied by a declaration that the harvest was either under 
conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles; or in waters subject to the 
jurisdiction of a nation currently certified by the President. The primary intent of this 
222 To recall XX(g) reads: 
Subject to the requirements that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures:.... 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.... 
223 Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (hereafter "Ell y 
Christopher (II) "). 
224 Ibid at 625. 
225 Ibid at 618 and 625 (quoting CIT Rule 1 l) respectively. 
226 61 Fed. Reg. 173342 (1996). 
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shipment -by- shipment allowance scheme was to place the U.S. in compliance with the 
WTO ruling.' 
Once again the Department of State's interpretation was met with resistance. The 
NMFS is on record as opposing a shipment -by- shipment basis on the grounds that 
such regulations would be completely unenforceable ' In addition, the Department of 
Commerce was of the opinion that greater turtle protection would be achieved by 
insisting that other governments adopt comparable policies 229 
Once again, the Ell sought redress from the CIT, filing a motion that the State 
Department regulations were in compliance with neither the original enactment, nor the 
two previous CIT determinations.' The plaintiff claimed that the regulations allowed 
for countries to evade the law's embargos by exporting shrimp caught by a few 
designated vessels equipped with TEDs, while maintaining a predominantly turtle 
unsafe fleet.' Yet again the Cif held for the plaintiff. The decision stated that shrimp 
or shrimp products that were not harvested by citizens or vessels from a certified 
nation could not enter the United States. In handing down this decision, Judge Aquilino 
remarked that 
they [the State Department] blame this litigation for their approach now. 
But the regime upon which it is based has governed them since May 1, 
1991, and been part of the United States Code before then. Certainly they 
have had ample opportunity to propose, if not realise, legislative 
amelioration of what is now clearly perceived to be a daunting remedy. 
Perhaps the reason this has not happened is that the harm the remedy 
attempts to allay has been equally well- understood, by both President 
and the Congress.' 
The defendants sought a stay of the Court's injunction that ordered the State 
Department to eliminate the provision whereby uncertified nations could import turtle - 
safe shrimp. On 25 November 1996 this was denied.' The opinion issued, however, 
did act to further clarify the October ruling. It determined that shrimp harvested by 
means not requiring TEDs (for example in aquaculture facilities or by using tow time 
restrictions) could be imported regardless of the nation's certification status, but that 
227 Kibel (1996) op. cit. n202 at 75. 
228 NMFS is supposed to provide the technical guidance and the expertise, and don't implement the 
law in itself though are able to provide input into the process - the Department of State is responsible for 
implementing the law itself. Per. comm. Theresa Conant, Fisheries Biologist National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS), Office of Protected Resources, Washington DC, 19 April 1999. 
229 Per. comm. Jay Johnson op. cit. n199. 
230 Earth Island Institute y Christopher, 942, F Supp. 579 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996): No. 96 -165, slip 
op. (Ct. Intl Trade, 8 October 1996). 
231 Ibid at 6 quoting Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 3. 
232 Ibid at 15 -16. 
233 Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 948 F. Supp. 1062 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996). 
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shrimp harvested in vessels using TEDs could only be imported if the nation of origin 
was certified under section 609. 
International Negotiations 
Meanwhile, in the international arena, negotiations for a consensus sea turtle 
protection regime in the Americas had been commenced. In the U.S., this initiative was 
led by the Department of State. Obviously not relishing its new role as international 
enforcer of sea turtle preservation standards, and mindful of the CIT's requirement 
that it seek international sea turtle conservation action, the Department pursued a 
more cooperative arrangement. Reportedly, the U.S. government's strategy was to 
create a treaty that would automatically result in the certification of signatory nations. 
To this end, the State Department also approached several key NGOs, including the 
Ell whom it was battling in the courts, and sought its general endorsement for the 
proposed treaty.tm 
Because of tensions created by U.S. shrimp embargos, Mexico's assistance was also 
sought. Mexico initially assumed the role of host and lead nation,' and remaining 
western hemisphere nations quickly saw the potential benefit of foregoing the annual 
certification process. Though negotiations for the Inter- American Convention for the 
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles (IAC)236 were not entirely smooth, they 
took only four rounds. In September 1995, delegates from 24 South and Latin 
American and Caribbean nations, joined together. Aiding the process the FAO 
provided financial, technical and legal support to some of the negotiations. 
In addition to government representatives, a number of members of the environment 
community were present throughout the negotiating process.' A number of NGOs 
however declined offers to participate, perceiving that in its initial genesis the 
Convention was related too closely related to section 609 and was a 'TEDs treaty', 
rather than a sea turtle agreement. Given the origins of the issue and the Convention - 
234 Per. comm. Todd Steiner Director Earth Island Institute (EII), Sea Turtle Restoration Project, San 
Francisco (CA), 30 March 1999; Per. comm. Dr Deborah Crouse op. cit. n162. 
235 The original draft had been formulated after a 1994 meeting of the Latin American Organisation for 
Fisheries Development (OLDEPESCA; that is the Government group of Latin American nations formed 
primarily to discuss and find common positions on fisheries policies). Some reports suggest that this was 
written by the State Department and translated into Spanish then given to the Mexican government. Per. 
comm. Todd Steiner op. cit. n234. 
236 Initially named the "Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles in the Western 
Hemisphere ". Text of the Inter -American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles 
(hereafter "IAC ") available at url: http: / /www.seaturtle.org/iac / >. 
237 This occurred through membership on delegations and in later meetings as observers. For example 
Marydele Donnoly of CMC was included in all four of the U.S.'s negotiating delegations. Per. comm. Dr 
Jack Frazier, Research Associate, Conservation and Research Centre, Smithsonian Institute, Kota 
Kinabalu, Malaysia, 16 July 1999; Per. Comm. Dr Deborah Crouse op. cit. n 162. 
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including a Iong and beleaguered history of domestic TED regulations - it is perhaps 
not surprising that some NGOs and scientists were skeptical of the merits of the 
Convention. 
In the event, the IAC evolved to become a much more comprehensive arrangement. A 
turning point for NGO support was the consideration of the Convention at the meeting 
of the Latin American Reunion, and the passage of a Resolution of Endorsement and 
recommendations that followed.' At the third and fourth meetings of Convention 
negotiations, in April and September 1996, there was a marked increase in attendance 
by NGO representatives and scientists. Due to this dilution of fishing interests by the 
participation of these other communities, the text of the draft Convention was 
significantly revised. In its final form it created a scientific committee, introduced the 
concept of user pays, and endorsed a habitat approach. 
The final version of the Convention was aimed at the 
protection, conservation and recovery of sea turtle populations and the 
habitat on which they depend, based on the best available scientific 
evidence, taking into account the environmental, socio- economic and 
cultural characteristics of the Parties.' 
Under the Convention, the use of TEDs was mandated so as to prevent sea turtle 
bycatch in all bar a few rare circumstances. These TED requirements were placed in an 
Annex rather than the body of the treaty text: thus alterations could be made by 
consensus at any subsequent meeting of the Parties. Each nation was assigned 
responsibility for the enforcement of TED regulations within its own boarders.24° 
Significant opposition to the use of trade related sanctions was also voiced in 
negotiating meetings. This was manifested in the requirement that all parties act in 
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement establishing the WTO, as adopted in 
Marrakesh. 
The IAC was opened for signature on 1 December 1996. It was to remain open until 31 
December 1998, and required the ratification of at least eight member parties before 
becoming active 291 The U.S government signed the treaty on the 13 December 1996. 
238 Frazier, J., Documentos de la Reunion del Grupo de Especialistas de Tortugas Marinas de 
Latinoamerica (1996) at 1. At the 16th Annual Sea Turtle Symposium this document was passed in a 
formal resolution. 
239 IAC, article II. 
240 Ibid, article III. The geographical range was to include all land territories in the Americas and 
regional waters over which the signatories exercised sovereignty. 
241 Ibid, article XXII. The eight required ratifications have not as yet been achieved, and as such, the 
precedent set by the Inter- American Convention is yet to be determined, the Convention is imperfect and 
there remain many unknowns. Indeed it is in may ways a test case, using a flagship species as a means of 
injecting responsibility into industrialised fisheries. Bache, S., "International Bycatch Policy: Impacts 
and Lessons for the South -East Asian Nations ", paper presented at 2nd ASEAN Symposium and 
continued over page 
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In May 1998, President Clinton transmitted the IAC to Senate for ratification, along 
with a report prepared by the Secretary of State. The IAC had gained a powerful ally 
in the Chair of the Senate foreign relations committee, who had not traditionally been 
interested in environmental treaties 242 Although anticipated to have received quicker 
passage, the process's delayed can be, in part, attributed to external factors, such as 
the "Monicagate" issue gas 
Perhaps with mind to a WTO appeal, in June 1998 the Department of State appealed 
the decision in FTT y Christopher to the Federal Court of Appeals 294 The grounds of 
appeal were procedural rather than substantive, the Department claiming that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction because the NGO plaintiffs had withdrawn their motion on 
which the court's decision had been based. The court found in favour of the 
Department and the October and November 1996 rulings were vacated. Thus on 28 
August 1998 the Department of State reaffirmed its April 1996 regulations. New 
guidelines for the assessment of comparability and certification were issued, such that 
shrimp imports could be assessed on a shipment -by- shipment, rather than nation -by- 
nation, basis.2`5 
The Department attempted to address concerns that nations that had been certified as 
comparable to the U.S. would abandon their programs given the new shipment -by- 
shipment assessment provisions, or that uncertified nations would see no benefit in 
expanding their policies, as their product was already granted U.S. import access. The 
Department stated its policy position that TEDs should be used wherever there is a 
danger of sea turtle bycatch, and that there was no evidence to suggest that a lack of 
incentive by the U.S. government would cause nations to revoke, or refrain from 
adopting such policies. However, in case of such an occurrence, the Department of 
State committed to reviewing the effect of the decision, every six months, over a three 
year period, and to redressing the decision should TED programs be abandoned or 
their adoption dwindle. Given the State Department's apparent approval of the 
widespread use of TEDs, its decision has been interpreted by and large as a reaction 
Workshop on Sea Turtle Biology and Conservation: Beyond the Beach, Kota Kinabalu, 15 -17 July 1999 
(University of Malaysia, Sarawak, in press). 
242 Senator Helms authorised his staff to work on the treaty, and furthermore sent a letter to Secretary 
Albright indicating that was one of the few environmental treaties that he perceived as a priority and that 
the Senate would probably work on that session. Per. comm. Dr Deborah Crouse op. cit. n162. 
243 Aid 
244 Earth Island Institute v. Albright, 147 F. 3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
245 Several additional alterations were also made. These included that, in order to prevent against fraud 
in nations that were not certified, both the exporter and a government official were required to certify that 
the shrimp was harvested in a manner that did not effect sea turtles. 
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to and preempting of a WTO appellate decision.246 Indeed, in July 1998, after two 
months of concerted NGO campaigning, the U.S. had lodged an appeal on the WTO's 
turtle- shrimp decision. This action was certainly encouraged, if not precipitated, by the 
receipt of more than 30,000 letters and phone calls to the White House 24 %298 
In August, the Appellate body heard both oral arguments by the parties and accepted 
three amiss curtail "friend of the court" briefs from NGOs 243 In issuing its surprise 
findings on 12 October, the Appellate body largely rejected the Panel's original 
decision, describing its earlier interpretation as "a result abhorrent to the principles of 
interpretation we are bound to applÿ :u0 The Appellate body interpreted its governing 
Convention in light of its general preamble, which endorses sustainable development 
and environmental protection. They found that sea turtle were endangered world wide, 
that shrimping was the greatest source of mortality, and that TEDs were the best, 
inexpensive way to eliminate that mortality. 
Although upholding the application of Article XX(g) to section 609, the Appellate 
body was essentially critical of the U.S.'s application of the law, saying that it resulted 
in arbitrary and unjustified discrimination against the four complainant nations. Its 
criticisms took issue with several aspects of the U.S. law, including that: 
246 Environmentalists point to pressure from the WTO as the motivation for the government's 
lowering of environmental protection standards. 
Its extremely disturbing that the State Department seems to be formulating policy 
based on the suggestions of an outside trade body... The shipment -by- shipment 
standard may be a trade solution, but it is an annageddon for sea turtles. 
( "Environmentalists File Suit to Protect Sea Turtles form New U.S. Guidelines which 
Open the Door for Sea Turtle Slaughter" Press Release, Sea Turtle Restoration 
Project, Earth Island Institute, 17 September 1998). 
247 In May 1998 NGOs also launched a campaign where more than 30 organisation sent letters to 
President Clinton and more than 30,000 phone call were made to the White House urging an appeal to 
the WTO decision be lodged. (EII per comm.) Two advertisements were also taken out in the New York 
Times, berating the President's pro -trade stance and calling for greater consideration to be afforded to the 
environment. 
The more activist tactics of some NGOs also received considerable attention. Though raising the profile 
of the WTO's decision domestically, their actual impact on international decisions can only be 
speculated. One particular incident was the throwing of cream pies at the director general of the WTO as 
he was leaving from a speech he had delivered defending the panel's turtle- shrimp decision. "WTO 
Director Hit by Cream Pies" Associated Press, 30 October 1998. 
248 Letter from Mireille Cossy Secretary to the Panel on "United States - Import Prohibition on 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products" to Mr Tim Eichenberg, Center for International Environmental 
Law, August 1997. 
249 Initially when several NGOs sought to submit comments to the panel the Secretariat refused these 
requests on the grounds that the groups were not member parties to the WTO. Subsequent to an appeal it 
was determined that individual panels were the correct bodies to decide the issue of allowing amicus 
cutriae briefs. This was based in part upon the Secretariat acting beyond their jurisdiction, and failing to 
provide the panel with the opportunity to solicit additional information as is provided under the WTO. 
250 World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT /DS58 /AB /R, 12 October 1998, reprinted in 38 LL.M. 118 
(1998). 
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the four complainant nations had received a significantly shorter compliance time 
than had other nations; 
insufficient account was taken of the conditions in the different nations from which 
the shrimp export originated; and 
that the U.S. had made inadequate efforts to secure international agreements with 
the complainant nations. 
Subsequent to the decision by the dispute settlement body, the 132 member nations of 
the WTO adopted the decision by consensus on 6 November 1998. 
Various government departments and U.S. trade representatives heralded the WTO 
appellate decision as a victory. Not everyone in the U.S. has applauded this decision 
however. The El view the decision as having done little more than overrule the most 
heinous parts of the initial decisions.' 
Meanwhile, NGOs had pursued several actions. On 16 November 1998, the SII, the 
Sierra Club, and the HSUS had filed a suit, again at the CIT, to compel the government 
to return to a nation -by -nation standard.' Their aim was again to mandate the 
requirement of national policies with levels of protection comparative to the U.S.'s, as 
a condition for shrimp importation. In April 1999, the CIT found in favour of the 
plaintiff. 
In response, the State Department announced that it nonetheless did not intend to 
alter its certification process. It did, however, propose a new scheme whereunder 
harvesting nations wishing to export to the U.S. would be required to ensure that TEDs 
were used by all commercial shrimp trawl vessels operating as a distinct fishery, in a 
clearly defined area, large enough to yield a significant conservation benefit zs3 
Although unlikely to be considered ideal by any of the stakeholders - governmental or 
citizen - this was a compromise proposal, and was the most likely scheme proffered 
to date that may have been acceptable to all involved. This was not, however, well 
received by NGOs and had not to date been given effect to. The Department has since 
announced its intention to re- appeal the CIT's decision. 
251 Per. comm. Peter Fugazzotto op. cit. n34. 
252 Earth Island Institute v. Daley, WL 224602 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1999). 
253 Department of State, Draft Proposed Regional Approach, (unpublished, Washington DC, July 
1999). 
254 Per. comm. Dr Jack Frazier op. cit. n237. 
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Labeling: Turtle -Safe Shrimp 
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. marketing community discovered that, by 
advertising products with particular environmental credentials, the sale of the product 
could be improved.us Environmental NGOs took this lesson, and adapted it, so that, 
through the offer of being set apart from their competitors, companies could be coerced 
into being more environmentally friendly. From the consumer's side, labeling campaigns 
allowed the buyer to decide what tradeoffs they were willing to make, between the 
economic cost they would incur to purchase an item, and the environmental impact 
they were willing to condone. 
In theory, such programs allow for what economists describe as bringing an externality 
into the internal cost of the product. That is to say, the cost of the TED, or more 
correctly the cost of ensuring that shrimp is harvested with minimum turtle mortalities, 
is added into the cost of bringing the product to the table 256 The processor is willing to 
pay extra for the shrimp because this allows access to a label which will fetch a greater 
price on the open market. The extra income that the shrimper earns for his /her catch 
then contributes to the cost associated with gear modification. 
Insofar as domestic shrimp production, NGOs claimed that a number of vessels did 
not employ the use of TEDs, as evidenced by the large number of strandings seen each 
year during the shrimp harvesting season!' It is, to be sure, very difficult to attribute 
causes of strandings. NMFS, however, had determined that they are closely correlated 
to the Texas shrimping season.ns 
Although perhaps not common, violations did occur, and successful prosecutions were 
rare." The situation is complicated however because TEDs are not designed to be 
255 Studies undertaken indicated that 94% of the U.S. population would make an effort to purchase 
goods from an environmentally aware company and of those 88% would he willing to pay higher prices 
for those products. Raines, J., "Environmental Law: The Green Giant, Environmental Marketing Claims" 
(1992) 45 Oklahoma Law Review 689. 
256 Bache (1999) op. cit. n241. 
257 In 1996, fearing that Texan bycatch management was failing to have an impact upon fishers 
practices, the EII and CMC brought suits in an attempt to tighten constraints on shrimp fishers and to 
close large areas. These were however dismissed, the court having found that most Texan fishers 
complied with the legislative requirements for TEDs to be used on all shrimping vessels. Per. comm. 
Jay Johnson op. cit. n199. 
258 Texas waters are closed to shrimping out to 200nm every year as a fisheries management initiative 
in an attempt to build up shrimp stock, and as soon as they close the waters there are no strandings and 
as soon as the waters are opened a huge peak of strandings occurs, a trend repeated year after year after 
year. A very tight correlation can be seen, and the evidence according to one NMFS employee is 
indisputable. Per. comm. Theresa Conant op. cit. n228. 
259 increasingly NGOs are again blaming the NMFS for a lack action to ensure compliance with TED 
requirements by recalcitrant shrimpers, in particular in Texas (see Sea Turtle Restoration Project, Earth 
Island Institute, Action Alert -Texas Turtle Tragedy undated open letter from Todd Steiner). In 1998 
following a high level of sea turtle strandings, the Coast Guard and NMFS began a program of night 
continued over page 
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100% effective. Indeed, experts allowed for approximately 4000 mortalities under 
section 7 ESA negotiation.26° 
Disillusioned with the progress of the government and aware of the impact that the 
dolphin -safe tuna campaign had upon the industry, the public, and eventually 
legislators, the Earth Island Institute began promoting a similar scheme for turtle -safe 
shrimp. 
The market- oriented approach to reducing sea 
turtle bycatch was launched through high level 
publicity, including full-page newspaper 
advertisements, public television service 
announcements, and the distribution of 
brochures. The aim was educational: to both 
inform the public about the problems of sea 
turtle bycatch, and to familiarise consumers 
with the turtle -safe shrimp seal. 
The label was available to shrimpers who signed an agreement with Ell that they 
would use TEDs properly, and allow monitoring by turtle -safe program observers. No 
fee was charged to participate. The initiative was adopted by several Georgia based 
fishers, and South Carolina operators have since joined the scheme. The first turtle - 
safe certified shrimp entered the market around August 1996 261 Subsequently a turtle - 
safe advisory board consisting of fishers, dock owners, and environmentalists was 
formed. In the second year of the turtle -safe shrimp program, three major retailers and 
several smaller stores in the U.S. began to promote this form of shrimp, and numerous 
restaurants began offering it on their menus.262 Many shrimpers however remained 
unconvinced of the merits of the program. 
hoardings. From this exercise a Louisiana shrimp captain and vessel owner received a 86000 fine for 
sewing closed his TED. 
A related problem that had arisen had been that of sea turtle mutilations. In this regard the industry 
bodies were also concerned, offering rewards for information that would lead to prosecution for such 
actions, "Seafood Industry Offers Rewards in Texas Sea Turtle Cases" Press Release, National Fisheries 
Institute, 1 December 1997. 
260 Per. comm. Theresa Conant op. cit. n228. 
261 By mid -1997 the President of the Georgia Shrimpers association and the bulk of South Georgia 
shrimpers were participating in the initiative. `Local Georgia Shrimpers to Appear on ABC Discovery 
News Regarding Turtle -Safe Shrimp" Press Release, Earth Island Institute, 26 August 1997. 
262 The turtle safe shrimp campaign had more than eighty organisations with over six million members 
endorsing their campaign. Shore, T., "Certified Safe Shrimp Workshop" (1998) 82 Marine Turtle 
Newsletter 15. 
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Criticisms leveled at the turtle -safe program have come from both the fishing fraternity 
and government managers. The first of these is concerned chiefly with the level of 
compliance with the TED law currently practiced by U.S. shrimpers. All U.S. shrimp 
trawlers deemed by the government to pose a significant threat to sea turtles are 
required by law to use a TED in both state and federal waters. Moreover all wild catch 
shrimp imported into the U.S. is required to be turtle -safe. Thus the utility of labeling 
some shrimp as turtle -safe is brought into question. That is, if all shrimp caught in the 
U.S. are turtle -safe then why is there a separate scheme whereunder only a fraction of 
vessels are authorised to make such a claim. Ell counter this criticism with the 
assertion that there is such a high level of TED non -compliance that entering into such 
agreements whereby the shrimpers view the use of TEDs as financially profitable, is of 
benefit to all concerned 263 
The harshest critics of the scheme go further than questioning its necessity, and suggest 
that the turtle -safe scheme is simply a fund raising mechanism for those proffering the 
labels. This criticism is only partially valid: although certainly raising the organisation's 
profile, and potentially increasing its revenue through an increase in memberships, Ell 
has stated that there is no charge levied to the fishers, the processors, or the merchants 
of the products.se 
Another criticism leveled was that the turtle -safe shrimp label is very difficult to 
verify. That the label even needs verification assumes that a substantial level of non- 
compliance with TED laws does in fact occur, and hence that turtle -safe is not a 
characteristic of all shrimp sold in the U.S.. Given such a belief, then there would need 
to be sufficient safeguards in place so as to be able to ensure, to the satisfaction of 
consumers, that any product carrying a turtle -safe claim had been caught in a manner 
which was not harmful to turtles. With regard to shrimp, this is not a simple task. 
Unlike tuna, shrimp is not a canned product. It is sold fresh or frozen, and the 
attachment of a permanent verifiable label presents a problem. Moreover, instead of 
having several key processors, shrimp is supplied from countless small, often 
dockside, operations.2u It has been contended that this dispersed processing regime 
makes it impossible with any level of confidence to verify that shrimp marked turtle - 
safe actually fulfils the claim. Other than through the threat of legal action for false 
marketing claims, it is impossible to prevent any individual from placing a label saying 
263 Per. comm. Todd Steiner op. cít. n234. 
264 Ibid. 
265 An estimated 15000 individual, small scale operations exist in the Southeastern United States 
alone. United States International Trade Commission, Conditions of Competition Affecting the U.S. 
Gulf and South Atlantic Shrimp Industry, Report to the President on Investigation No. 332 -201 (USITC 
Publication 1738, Washington DC, 1985). 
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"turtle friendly shrimp" on their package. Thus the eco- labeling of shrimp products 
presents a scenario open to a high level of fraudulent use of the labels. 
An alternate labeling scheme has been recently initiated involving the North Pacific 
Seafood Processors Association. Instead of relying on a particular type of gear 
modification, this arrangement operates under the principles of responsible fishing, as 
are applicable to fishers, processors, aquaculture, importers and exporters?` The use 
of the label is contingent upon the preparation of a plan specifying how the elements 
contained in the code will be implemented. 
Concluding Comments 
Although unilateral embargoes have had some success internationally in spreading the 
U.S.'s sea turtle conservation efforts, their impact has been limited by both 
international resistance and domestic failure to implement Congress's mandate. Indeed 
in the 1990s both national and international courts have played a significant role in sea 
turtle bycatch policy. In terms of domestic policy NGOs have once again used the 
courts to effect the implementation of a law that was not favoured by the department 
tasked therewith. Although the endpoint is not certain, this has clearly been a battle 
between the Department of State and NGOs. 
Internationally the situation is also complex. The use of sanctions to implement 
domestic legislation abroad remains contentious on both ethical and on legal grounds. 
The WTO turtle- shrimp case followed on from the tuna -dolphin trials, albeit under a 
modified regime. The result of hearings initially followed the lead of these earlier 
findings, however on appeal a substantial reversal of policy occurred. Though still 
relegating environmental concerns as secondary to trade and tariff laws, the WTO 
appellate case has provided some additional leeway in the use of trade measures for 
conservation purposes. The appellate case may, however, have never come to trial if 
not for the concerted efforts of NGOs to raise the issue, and its importance, in both the 
public and political spheres - aiming their campaign directly at the White House. 
It is important though, to recognise that the international situation is not uniformly 
characterised by U.S. application of its will upon reluctant foreign nations. Indeed 
almost contemporaneously with early American regulations, Indonesia introduced 
national TED requirements.' Moreover, considerable efforts had been made by foreign 
266 Per. comm. Rod Moore, Executive Director West Coast Seafood Processors Association, Portland 
(OR), 31 March 1999. 
267 In addition, some of the Latin American countries have been very progressive in protecting turtles, 
even before U.S. action commenced in respect of protecting beaches and prohibiting turtle or egg harvest. 
These nations adopted TEDs with a minimum of fuss, though to be sure, with other nations it was the 
economic pressure caused the adoption of TED technology. Per. comm. Jay Johnson op. cit. n199. 
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nations towards the use of TEDs in their shrimp fisheries, often in cooperation with 
U.S agencies!' An approach using encouragement rather than enforcement, and 
placing money into training programs rather than legal fees, may be a potentially more 
useful means of minimising bycatch. 
Policy action that has had an impact on domestic sea turtle bycatch includes the 
assignment of appropriations to facilitate TED enforcement.269 Indeed since the issue's 
emergence in the 1970s, the states of Texas and Louisiana have remained resistant to 
TED adoption. One suggestion is that this is due to the sympathetic nature of 
Congressmen and the state legislature: whereas where shrimpers have not perceived 
that their complaints would be pursued, they have been much more compliant. 270 
An alternate approach, initiated by an NGO, of a consumer based scheme, is 
undeniably a good one: based upon an essentially democratic market system, and 
displaying the desired principle of equity. Actual results are, however, yet to be seen. 
During this period, the overall merit of focusing on a single threat was questioned by 
NGOs and scientists alike. The impacts upon sea turtles of other fishing methods make 
both turtle -safe shrimp labeling and sanctions somewhat incomplete remedies to the 
problem of sea turtle bycatch. For example, the impacts of both driftnetting and 
longlining upon sea turtle populations are of concern. Indeed, as was earlier suggested, 
the impact of longlining on sea turtle populations may be equal to the threat posed by 
trawling.27 ht addition to fishing, attention must be afforded to other impacts such as 
subsistence harvesting of sea turtles and habitat destruction. 
One means of so doing evolved directly out of governmental concern over the effect of 
the annual certification process on regional relations. The introduction of a treaty, 
based initially on TEDs, expanded in the final negotiations to be a sea turtle 
conservation regime. It was the intervention of scientists in the first, and then the 
268 In 1994 a NMFS team from the Florida office led by Chuck Oravetz made two trips to India to 
conduct training and provide technology transfer. Pamela Plotkin, a ex -NMFS employee and researcher at 
the University of Delaware contends that the adversarial approach of sanctions has in the end been 
detrimental to the cause of turtle protection. Per. comm. Dr Pamela Plotkin, Associate Professor, 
Entomology & Applied Ecology, University of Delaware, Newark (DE),13 April 1999. See also Bache 
(1999) op. cit. n241. 
269 A recently formed protected resources enforcement team equipped with their own vessels now parole 
regions where due to jurisdiction the coast Guard was unable to go. Previous reliance upon the Coast 
Guard meant vessels in state waters were unable to be boarded. The acquisition by NMFS of their own 
teams seems to have had a significant effect on non -compliance and hence sea turtle standings. Per. 
comm. Theresa Conant op. cit. n228. 
270 Dual deputisation problems still exist in some states. Louisiana state law prohibits state officers 
from enforcing the federal regulations. Texas claims they can not use their officers due to Constitutional 
constraints. In comparison, states like Florida, South Carolina, Georgia when the Federal regulations 
were slowed in the late 1980s put in place their own state regulation saying as a cost of shrimping. 
271 Crouse (1999) op. cit. n150. 
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broader acceptance of the convention by NGOs, that led to the marked alteration in 
the policy direction, so as to encompass this much broader range of concerns. 
5.8 National Bycatch Provisions 
By and large, NMFS activities to redress both fish and marine mammal bycatch have 
been piecemeal. In recent years, however, the inter- related nature of bycatch and 
overfishing have gained increasing recognition.' As John Witzig of the NMFS noted 
"There is much interplay between marine mammal bycatch and what happens to 
fisheries management ".73 
When, in the early 1990s, Roland Schmitten became assistant administrator for NOAA 
fisheries, one of his primary interests was the development of a comprehensive bycatch 
plan for the agency.' The need for this document was twofold. Firstly, although work 
was being done on gear development, technology transfer and management techniques, 
no coordinating overall long -term strategy to link these elements existed.' Secondly, 
there had been suggestions that the upcoming FCMA reauthorisation was likely to 
introduce the issue of bycatch, and the plan was intended to pre -empt this ' 
Schmitten's interest in bycatch was largely restricted to incidental fish catches. This is 
well illustrated in the composition of the team charged with constructing the bycatch 
management plan, comprised of managers and scientists from all the regions. Although 
the agency initially proposed that marine wildlife representatives be included on the 
team, a directive was issued to limit participation to the exclusion of the protected 
resources managers. 
The plan had a long gestation process: intended to take about ten months, in the event 
it took almost two and a half years to complete. As a prelude to the plan, a number of 
NMFS and NOAA sea grant sponsored workshops were arranged in 1992 through 
early 1995. The intent of this exercise was to encourage industry involvement and to 
identify common themes and issues which would benefit from a national plan, while at 
272 Per. comm. Dr Steve Murawski, Lead Fisheries Scientist, Northeast Fisheries Science Centre, 
National Marine Fisheries Service, Woods Hole (MA), 7 April 1999. 
273 Per. comm. Dr John Witzig, Chief, Fisheries Statistics Office, Northeast Region, National Marine 
Fisheries Service, Gloucester (MA), 5 April 1999. 
274 Prior to recent developments, the regions were semi -autonomous in their handling of bycatch issues. 
They had addressed particular fisheries, and in a way were developing things that were somewhat parallel 
to each, but no coordinated arrangement or goals had been formed. 'bid 
275 National Marine Fisheries Service, Managing the Nation's Bycatch: Priorities, Programs and 
Actions for the National Marine Fisheries Service (Department of Commerce, Washington DC, 1998) 
(hereafter "Managing the Nation's Bycatch "). 
276 There had been a significant amount of interest in particular from Senator Ted Stevens in addressing 
bycatch in the reauthorisation of the FCMA. 
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the same time addressing bycatch issues on a region -by- region basis.' Indeed, the 
team was surprised when it began this process, to discover how little was known 
about bycatch." In compiling the bycatch plan, NMFS thus gave priority to the task of 
information gathering.' 
At the beginning of 1995, the NMFS team began to develop an internal policy for 
dealing with bycatch, and herein create a framework for major issue areas such as the 
need for quantitative data, outreach programs, education, and infrastructure building. 
Early in 1996, the reauthorisation process for the renamed Magnuson -Stevens FCMA 
commenced. NGOs lobbied heavily on select issues, including bycatch.280 The statute 
reauthorising the FCMA was entitled the Sustainable Fisheries Act, and was signed into 
law in October 1996.2x1 Congressional amendments to the "national standards" 
highlighted, inter alia, the need for bycatch management2x2 National standard 9 
required that within each fishery management plan: 
Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, 
(A) minimise bycatch and (B) to the extent bycatch can not be avoided, 
minimise the mortality of such bycatch. 
The use of the phrase the "extent practicable" was chosen deliberately because 
Congress intended that the Councils should make reasonable efforts, but did not want 
to impose costs on fishermen and processors that could not be reasonably met Zxs It 
was however the FCMA definition of bycatch that raised the most concern. This was 
due both to its general restrictive nature,' and more specifically, with regard to marine 
277 Per. comm. John Witzig op. cit. n273. 
278 Indeed one of the greatest problems pointed to in the report stemmed from this void of knowledge, 
and that in its absence "the issue is frequently driven by misconceptions, mistrust and inaccuracies. One 
of common trend from the series of workshops held, and that was noted in the draft plan, was the "dearth 
of credible scientific information to frame bycatch issues." Managing the Nation's Bycatch (1998) op. 
cit. n275 at 4. 
279 Data on the "character and magnitude of the bycatch .., the population, ecosystem and socio- 
economic effects that bycatch or its mitigation" was needed. Ibid at 4. 
280 Per. comm. John Witzig op. cit. n273. 
281 Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1997, Pub L. No. 104 -297, 110 Stat. 3559 (16 U.S.C. 1801). 
282 National standards are the overall principles by which fishery conservation and management 
programs are developed and judged. A set of National standard guidelines then interpret the national 
standards and provide detailed guidance to the regional FMCs and act as a guide to the Secretary in the 
review and approval of the FMPs. 
283 Senate Report (Commerce, Science, and Transport Committee) No. 104 -277 [To accompany S39], 
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4073 (1996), statement of Congressman Young. 
284 Sustainable Fisheries Act, § 1802(2), js3(2)]. Altered at the last minute, according to the law as it 
stands, if a fish is caught and sold or kept for personal use it is not bycatch- this excludes any incidental 
catch that is kept in a directed fishery and is not in keeping with the traditional definition on what 
bycatch. 
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wildlife, because although it included sea turtles under its jurisdiction, marine 
mammals and sea birds were specifically excluded 28' 
In March 1997, NMFS released for public comment a draft bycatch management 
plan 286 Comments received were critical of the plan's heavy orientation towards 
finfish take, and led to attempts in the final document to address marine wildlife 
considerations 2a' 
The final document, Managing the Nation's Bycatch, is a decade long blueprint to 
guide the agency's research and management of bycatch related activities. It 
acknowledged that there is no single solution to the bycatch problem, but rather that 
fishers, managers, scientists, conservationists and other interest groups must work 
together towards a solution. It proposed seven national objectives, and outlined six 
actions needed to achieve these goals. These included bycatch monitoring and data 
collection programs; research into the selectivity of fishing gear and bycatch survival 
rate; investigations into the population, ecosystem, and socio- economic effects of 
bycatches; implementation and monitoring of bycatch management measures; and 
public and fisher education. 
In part in reaction to Congress's restrictive interpretation of bycatch in the FCMA and 
national standard 9, the bycatch plan recognised the range of marine wildlife species 
including marine mammals, sea birds and sea turtles, and acknowledged its mandate 
to conserve, manage and protect these species as well as fish stocks 2ss A third 
category of mortality was also added to the definition, that being unobserved fishing 
practices, and gear interaction.289 Although acknowledged as a progressive inclusion, 
the issue of unobserved mortality is also recognised as a very difficult one to address. 
Research has been identified as a first substantive step, necessary to quantify the 
magnitude of this mortality component 29° 
285 As per the definition of "fish ". FCMA, §1802(12), [s3(12)]. "Fish" is defined as "finfish, molluscs, 
crustaceans, and all other forms of marine animal and plant life other than marine mammals and birds" 
thus excluding all marine wildlife other than sea turtles. 
286 Managing the Nation's Bycatch (1998) op. cit. n275. 
287 Indeed the strategy goals identified in the final plan encompass the need for attention to all types cf 
hycatch. Per, comm. John Witzig op. cit. n273. 
288 The plan identified 149 species of bycatch and estimated that marine wildlife comprised 37 °% or one 
third of the total U.S. fisheries bycatch. That is to say that 50 species of marine wildlife are taken 
incidentally in fishing operations by U.S. fleets each year. Managing the Nation's Bycatch (1998) op. cit. 
n275. 
289 As sea turtles are not excluded from the legislative definition, the inclusion of unobserved 
mortalities may apply to impacts of their bycatch of in longline operations. 
290 Per. comm. John Witzig op. cit. n273. 
- 300 - 
Chapter Five - U.S. Bycatch 1992 - present 
Initial reactions to the report's release were very enthusiastic. Implementation, 
however, has been slow - by and Iarge due to the absence of additional 
appropriations or allocation of time to facilitate completion of the task ' 
5.9 Conclusions to the U.S. situation 
In the U.S. the three phases of policy development, as characterised through the three 
chapters, can themselves be broadly considered as corresponding to the three phases 
in the policy cycle. That is: 
Chapter Three enunciates the raising of the issue onto the agenda and 
preliminary attempts to form policies therefor, such as the tuna- dolphin and 
turtle -shrimp consideration; 
Chapter Four is dominated by the creation of a new set of mechanisms, in 
particular in the international arena (for example the LaJolla Agreement and the 
dolphin -safe label); and 
as examined in Chapter Five, this was followed in the 1990s by a period of 
consolidation and implementation of both new and existing policy items into 
actual actions, as seen internationally in the TAC and Agreement on the IDCP, 
and domestically through the TR process and the rapid handling of seabird 
bycatch. 
This is, of course, a crude simplification of the many intricate and intertwined events 
of the past three decades of marine wildlife, and more generally environmental policy 
development. 
Bycatch, having gained recognition as an issue of valid attention, was able to turn its 
policy efforts in the second half of the 1990s, towards the consideration of the topic 
and issue more broadly, rather than being limited to individual fisheries and specific 
species. This reflects not only a maturation of the issue, but also a gradual shift in the 
philosophy underlying the priorities of many fishing operations: from a competition 
between development and the environment to an understanding of the interrelated 
nature and mutual benefits that cooperation offers for protagonists on both sides. 
The Impact of NGOs 
Perhaps one of the greatest transitions seen in the period from the 1980s to the 1990s 
was that of the entrance of NGOs as players in the formation phase of the policy 
cycle. This can be seen in several developments. Firstly, the Ell's initiative in creating 
the turtle -safe shrimp labeling scheme, secondly in that of the inclusion of NGO 
291 Indeed, when work on the plan began it was estimated that an additional $15 million a year was 
needed at a very base level. Ibid. 
- 301 
Sali Jayne Bache 
representatives on the TRT's mandated under the MMPA, and internationally in 
NGOs' role in negotiating the Panama Declaration. 
Suggestions have also emerged that this increased role is a result of NMFS - though 
still considered by many to be a captive of the industry becoming more sympathetic 
to NGO views than ever before. This is, perhaps, a reflection of the mainstreaming of 
environmental issues and, more specifically, the bycatch issue. 
The increased role of NGOs in the policy creation phase, is not to suggest that they 
have deserted their traditional bastions of power: the courts and the legislature. These 
forums are still utilised by NGOs for agenda raising and policy implementation. In 
particular, the courts have been used by NGOs to steer the TR process in their desired 
direction. 
This role of NGOs has, of late, due to the ease with which suits can be lodged under 
the time constraints imposed by the MMPA, been criticised as on occasion counter- 
productive. Though having a legitimate role in propelling issues that have stalled, and 
in motivating government when it becomes stuck in bureaucracy, at times NGOs may 
initiate a law suit that actually works to slow the process, because the people that are 
charged with the responding to the law suit are also the ones charged with the initial 
task. Perhaps, however, a long -term outcome will be recognition of the need for 
increased agency funding and personnel to attend these issues. 
Domestic Factors 
The anticipated integration of the policies of the 1970s into a coordinated national 
policy in the 1980s failed to evolve: and in the absence of such a development, the 
1990s were entered into without a framework in place and the task of creating one 
ahead. 297 More generally, 
President Clinton has encouraged the application of principles of 
entrepreneurial public organisations described by David Osborne and Ted 
Gaebler in Reinventing Government... letting the government steer rather 
than row; empowering communities rather than simply delivering services; 
encouraging competition rather than monopolies; driving by mission, not 
by rules; funding outcomes rather than inputs; meeting the needs of 
customers, not bureaucracy; investing in prevention rather than cure; and 
solving problems by leveraging the marketplace, rather than creating 
public programs.293 
292 Kitsos, T., "Congress and the Oceans: Shaping Marine Policy for Three Decades" (1990) 22 
Marine Technology Society Journal 33. 
293 Foster, N., "The Magnuson Act: Expanding the Vision" (1993) 18 Fisheries 15 at 18. 
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Insofar as individual players in the bycatch policy issue, as in previous years, 
Congressional members have had the greatest influence. This is clearly displayed in 
regard to agency decisions made under the TR process that have paid heed to which 
members are in charge of appropriations. In the absence of a judicial determination, an 
action contrary to the will of members who control the future funding of programs 
would, quite simply, never have occurred.29' 
Relatedly, jurisdictional disputes between FWS and NMFS have over time dissipated, 
and increased cooperation has occurred.295 Notwithstanding the NMFS and FWS 
adversary over shared sea turtle authority, of late the lines have become blurred. This 
maturation assisted in both the smooth passage of the U.S. bycatch action plan and 
the eventual re- inclusion of protected resources concerns. 
Also of importance is the considerable dispersion seen in the voice offered by fishing 
representatives. Different sectors and different fishing interests have come out 
separately, to take a stand on their perceived rights, as opposed to the earlier 
consideration of fishers as a relatively homogenous interest group" 
Notwithstanding earlier comments regarding NGOs' continued utilisation of the courts 
and lobbying, one area that seems to have received less attention than in the past, is 
the media. This is, in part, explained by the perception of several NGOs that public 
interest has decreased: explained by a complacency in knowing the legislation is in 
place, and because "righteous indignation" can be sustained for only so long 297 
International Influences 
The 1990s witnessed a tendency towards the removal of the reservation allowance in 
conventions and its replacement with a form of multi- national democracy or consensus 
decision -making. This was in part, due to a realisation of the globalisation of resources 
management and environmental issues, and their inter- dependant nature. It was also a 
reflection of an increased willingness to reduce sovereign control, in order to reach 
agreement between nations. 
294 Per. comm. Laurie Allen op. cit. n85. 
295 The preamble to the plan highlighted Congress's role in the creation of provision dealing with 
bycatch in three key statutes - the FCMA, the MMPA and the ESA. It is from the use of these three 
statutes that the NMFS draws its role as the agency primarily responsible for bycatch reduction. 
296 Sometimes in opposition have been the NFI an industry group focused on the interests of importers 
and exporters of fish products. Of less national significance have been the ATA but sectoral interests, such 
as the Georgia Fishermen's association or the NPLA, have emerged. 
297 Per. comm. Dr Sharon Young op. cit. n41. 
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Within this, another interesting trend can be seen. Interaction between the U.S. and the 
international community has become more of a bargaining situation, than the previous 
scenario of the imposition of one nation's will upon others. As foreign nations have 
become accustomed to trade sanctions on their fisheries products, although still 
desiring access to the U.S. market, they have become no longer slave to it. In this way, 
foreign nations have acquired collective bargaining power. The use of this can be most 
clearly seen in the Panama Declaration and the Agreement on the IDCP, as well as the 
relevant U.S. legislation. In both situations the activation of various clauses were 
conditioned on the performance of the other party or parties in the negotiations. In this 
way, the will of international communities or allegiances have come to play a greater 
role in influencing U.S. policy, than they had previously done. 
Also in the international arena, a change can be seen in the interaction between 
environment and trade. Although still very much in the process of formation and 
refinement, greater acknowledgment has been evident of the need to strike a balance 
between the international trends toward reducing protectionist actions, and creating 
greater environmental protection. 
Still strongly held in the U.S. is the perception that unilateral economic sanctions are 
the single most effective means of making foreign states adopt stricter environmental 
standards. Supporting this belief is a strong coalition of NGOs and commercial fishers, 
as well as some labor unions, consumer advocates, animal rights advocates and 
industrial concerns. Since the election of President Clinton, these bodies have gained 
the attention of both Congress and the White House administration, leading to some 
prediction that such initiatives will accelerate in the future 298 Indeed, the WTO turtle - 
shrimp appellate decision with regard to the application of section 609, has done 
nothing to discourage this approach. 
The Role of Science 
With the maturation of bycatch as an issue, science has been able to play a greater role 
in policy development. This trend is reflected internationally, with regard to ecosystem 
consideration in tuna- dolphin management practices. In the U.S., the increased 
acceptance of science can be largely attributed to two developments. Firstly, data 
collection was mandated as a part of the take reduction process for marine mammals. 
In this way science has played an increased role in the second phase of the policy cycle 
--- that of creating solutions. Second and relatedly, an increased acceptance by fishers 
of the use of technology based science as a means to create viable bycatch mitigation 
298 McLaughlin (1994) op. cit. n27. 
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gear, has led to a reduced resistance of sciences use more broadly in policy formation. 
The role of science, as an essential part of marine policy creation, has not however 
evolved so far as to become universally accepted. 
In some situations, even getting a measure of bycatch remains problematic. This is, by 
and large, because an accurate picture of bycatch requires the placement of observers 
onboard vessels, but fishers are reluctant to have observers and appropriations for the 
purpose are vastly inadequate. Without observers, vessel data is unverifiable, and 
according to some fisheries managers, is not worth collecting.2e Under the MY PA, 
there is a requirement for data collection, and the dilemma arises as to whether, by 
continuing to collect unverified data, scientific credibility is lent to it beyond that 
which is warranted, and increased pressure to use that information is applied. Science 
has continued to be used as an excuse for the failure to take action, as is seen in the 
case of the bottlenosed dolphin - and thus flying in the face of the current convention 
of a precautionary approach. 
And indeed, scientists themselves appear to have become more active in their push to 
see the conversion of science into policy actions. This is witnessed in particular in the 
involvement of scientists in the IAC process. Though this can be considered a positive 
move reflecting a more proactive use of science, conversely such action could be 
perceived as further evidence of partisan bias by scientists. Both the tuna- dolphin and 
turtle -shrimp policy formation processes have been highly political, and some of the 
data supply and presentation was not necessarily driven by science. Instead, science 
was viewed as a tool for achieving certain aims, and the data was thus prohibited 
from telling its own story in a manner that would inform the public and allow them to 
make their own decisions. 
Though some of what has been discussed in this and the preceding two chapters is 
enunciated in existing literature, several recent developments, trends and aspects 
unique to marine policy formation, have been poorly considered. Areas that have been 
paid considerably less attention than they warrant in theoretical literature include the 
role that has been played by industry bodies in marine bycatch policy formation, the 
increased use of science by NGOs, and the impact that individuals have on policy 
outcomes. These and other developments that have emerged in the progression of the 
issue of marine wildlife bycatch from a gear competition concern, to a genuine 
consideration of the problem itself, are outlined in the concluding chapter. Lessons that 
can be taken from this in depth examination of U.S. marine wildlife bycatch policy 
299 Per. comm. John Witzig op. cit. n273. 
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development, and applied to the more formative Australian situation, are also 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
This study has traced the development of marine wildlife bycatch policy in the U.S. 
with mind to the lessons that can be learn both in general and, more specifically, for 
Australia. The U.S. case -study began with the emergence of the issue in the late 1960s, 
and traced the issues development through to the current early stages of a national 
bycatch policy. In particular, the research contained herein has explored the key 
influences on the initiation, creation and implementation of policy developments. 
Earlier work, by other authors, has reported some of these cases and analysed the legal 
or scientific bases; but a consideration of marine wildlife bycatch as a concise issue 
area has, to date, been lacking. Moreover, comprehension of the multiple lessons that 
can be taken from earlier and related cases, seems to have been missing in all bar a 
small number of these previous bycatch discussions and analyses. The examination of 
issues in isolation, such as the tuna- dolphin controversy, the turtle- shrimp dispute, 
albatross longline bycatch, or large scale driftnets, have often led to ad hoc 
generalisations of the ways in which the bycatch of marine wildlife species is handled. 
In the Introduction, policy analysis was defined as both the description and 
explanation for the causes and consequences of government activity. Chapters Three 
through Five have provided an extensive description and explanation of the evolution 
of U.S. wildlife bycatch policy. The logic behind these detailed examinations is that 
only with a complete understanding of the events and causality of these, can the 
various factors and actions, and their influence on bycatch, be understood. Much can 
be learned of bycatch management, and indeed in more general terms, of both fisheries 
and other natural resources, by an examination of the evolution of bycatch policies. 
These Iessons are not confined to the particular nation in question. By way of example, 
not only did those addressing sea bird longline bycatch off the northwest coast learn 
from the mismanagement and failure of U.S. implementation of TEDs, but also U.S. 
experience was used to highlight the pitfalls to be avoided in Australia's introduction 
of TEDs. It has become an anti-best practice model around the world. 
The scheme laid out in Chapter Two, and followed through in the subsequent case 
studies, provides a framework with which to examine marine wildlife bycatch policy 
development, in a series of stages. It looks at the key factors or players in each stage, 
and the manner in which they have acted and evolved, either inhibiting or promoting 
policy developments. 
This Chapter examines the four factors - international influences; non -governmental 
organisations; science in decision making; and domestic actors - and their role in each 
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stage of the cycle of bycatch policy development. A number of parameters and 
influence have either evolved since, or have simply been overlooked or paid insufficient 
attention, in earlier policy framework analyses. Included herein are the impacts of 
several aspects of what has previously been classified as domestic influence. Of 
particular significance is the role of industry bodies. Also affecting the policy outcome 
is the impact of the extent to which a society is litigious in nature. Another issue is the 
existence and nature of a functional funding framework for data collection and to aid 
in the development of bycatch mitigation techniques and their implementation, 
including observer coverage. With respect to international factors, new tools are 
emerging to deal with the trend of globalisation. NGOs have altered their approach to 
policy: both through the increased usage of high grade technical skills; and also through 
a shift in their goals, from the creation of policy, to advancing the implementation of 
existing mechanisms. Notwithstanding the dangers of co- option, this still appears to 
be a much sought after arrangement, having expanded from a domestic scheme to also 
being pursued in both the formation and implementation policy phases in international 
forums (e.g. The IAC and IATTC respectively). Finally, there is the role of science in 
policy creation. Although strong differences of opinion exist as to the appropriate role 
of science in the process of natural resource policy formation, this is, perhaps, the 
factor that has been best explained by extant literature. One recent alteration has been 
the changing shape of science itself, emerging from the increased interest in, and 
reliance on, ecosystem modeling and risk analyses. 
As was stated in the Introduction, no attempt has been made in this thesis to evaluate, 
on its merits, each bycatch policy outcome. Instead the creation of a policy is 
determined by the simplified indicator of issue closure - where closure is taken as a 
point at which all stakeholders are accepting of the outcome, and the process of 
ongoing implementation can proceed. It is recognised, however, that in many situations 
closure is not permanent.' 
The particular aim of this thesis is to illuminate the current path of U.S. and 
Australian bycatch policy development; and to suggest those factors of particular 
influence and those which have been overlooked in earlier commentaries on marine 
resource policy development. The intent of this exercise is to facilitate improved 
I The reopening of an issue several times can make finding permanent closure a very difficult process. 
In one instance, trade -offs are that if an agency tries to solve a problem in a single move, then there may 
be a revolt due to the perception that too much is being asked: on the other hand, the repetitious raising 
of an issue may also lead to its rejection due to a building resentment of being constantly bombarded 
with new and cumulative requests for altered fishing practices. In this last situation the perception may 
also arise that those leading the process are incompetent due to their failure to coordinate issues and to 
effectively deal with the problem at hand. Alternatively reopening of an issue may occur due to other 
external factors such as a shift in another nation's or in regional policy. 
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understanding of the process of policy formation with respect to bycatch, so as to 
instruct the Australian situation as well as other future cases. The belief is that 
improved comprehension of the issues involved in bycatch mitigation, and the trade- 
offs that are required by the various participants, will allow for better informed 
decisions. Below, the behaviour of the various factors of influence is examined during 
each of the three policy cycle phases of agenda raising, policy formation and 
implementation. There are, however, two factors that do not fit neatly into these 
stages, and which have a persuasive influence throughout the policy process - 
discussed below, these are the impact of predetermined factors and the influence of 
individuals. In concluding this thesis, some observations are made as to current trend 
and the likely future of bycatch management and policy development in both Australia 
and more generally. 
Impact of Predetermined Factors 
It is important, in discussing the preceding bycatch case -studies, not to dismiss the 
influence of their inherent differences on the development of policy outcomes. Though 
not determinative of the absolute outcome, the factors below are suasive. By way of 
example, the degree of endangerment of the species is significant, not just as a matter 
of science, but also in relation to the legislative tools that can be used, and the policy 
position pursued. Notwithstanding this difference, the lack of threat posed to 
populations and species of dolphins in purse -seiners vis a vis sea turtles in trawling 
operations was never really considered in the U.S.'s decision to impose embargo 
provisions on foreign fleets. 
The economic value and wealth of the fishery may also have a significant impact. This 
is both in terms of the income generated (the greater the income the more hesitant a 
government is to close a fishery) and the wealth of the fishery (the more financially 
secure the fishery the greater their capacity to absorb additional costs). For example, 
compare the Gulf of Maine gillnet fishery and the north Pacific longline fleet: public 
and policy awareness of the issue for gillnetters, came at a time when, due to the 
collapse of the groundfishery, they were already facing potentially severe restrictions 
on their operations. This situation bears a marked difference to that of the longline sea 
bird bycatch issue off the west coast, where the fleet has been better equipped to 
combat bycatch problems, and hence less hostile to change. 
Additional considerations come into play when more than one nation is investigated. 
Differences in state -federal relations, the litigious nature of societies, and the structure 
of a Presidential versus a Parliamentary system of governance, all impact upon the 
process of policy -making in Australia and the U.S.. 
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The Influence of Individuals 
A significant influence on policy formation, to which inadequate attention has been 
paid, is that of the role and impact of individuals. Individual actors may alter the path 
of a particular policy area equally at any stage in the policy cycle. In this thesis, several 
individuals - from a range of backgrounds - have featured. These include scientists 
like Nigel Brothers; and bureaucrats or managers such as Martin Hall, who has 
influenced not only domestic but also regional policy developments in the ETP. 
Brothers' collection and presentation of information outside of the realm of academia 
and science, and his continued communication of this science in policy forums, 
provided the impetus for the commitment made by Australia to albatross -longline 
bycatch mitigation. In a similar regard, comparison has been drawn in the U.S. between 
the creation of harbor porpoise and bottlenose dolphin TRPs: the progression of the 
former and lethargy of the latter being, to an extent, attributed to the respective 
presence and absence of a committed and charismatic scientist willing to present him 
or herself and their science to policy makers. Ed Melvin of the University of 
Washington who played a significant part in finding a workable reduction to the 
bycatch of seabirds in gillnets - as with those individuals discussed above - 
demonstrated a practical approach to solving bycatch problems, and an ability to 
generate respect from the fishers he worked with. A commonality shown amongst these 
unique individuals, is their willingness to think about solutions at the time the problem 
emerged, rather than at a later stage when the problem had become entrenched. 
Both taking a lead role in the creation of bycatch policy, and an active role in impeding 
the development thereof, have been industry representatives. Evidencing leadership in 
policy development is Thom Smith, lauded for his vital role in sea bird bycatch 
mitigation in the northwest longline fishery. Filling the latter scenario of impeding 
policy creation, was Tee John Mialjevich who exerted a significant retarding influence 
over the progress of consensus building during the TED dispute of the 1980s in the 
Gulf of Mexico. These individuals, as leaders of industry groups, are in positions of 
considerable power. They command the respect of the fishing community they 
represent, and hold an understanding of the policy process in which they are working. 
This, perhaps enviable, position can lend industry representatives significant influence 
over the policy outcome, or at the least over the path the process takes. 
Commonly, for individuals to have an impact on policy development they require a 
niche of power or influence: be this in the form of mass public or concentrated industry 
support; knowledge of, or willingness to use, the law or scientific data and 
understanding; or an ability to act as a bridge or moderator between competing 
interests or hostile parties. Without a particular and often unique strength, regardless 
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of how well intentioned or charismatic an individual may be, their influence upon 
policy development will be limited. Conversely, an absence of ability or desire to 
communicate with at least one group of actors, no matter what information or 
understanding is held by an individual, will render their influence unremarkable. 
Agenda Raising 
In practice, agenda raising in the domestic arena has primarily relied either upon the 
presentation of empirical evidence, that is science, or through an appeal to the public 
to take action to persuade politicians to rectify a perceived wrongdoing. Under Cobb, 
Ross and Ross's scheme of agenda raising these would be classified as insider and 
outsider models respectively.' 
The reasons for NGO attention to an issue have not been well explored however. 
Explanations for attention to particular issues - including bycatch - have been 
suggested by some to be little more than manipulative revenue and power raising 
campaigns. The example most commonly offered is that of the turtle -safe shrimp label. 
Indeed, two of the characteristics of NGOs that enable them to gamer power, are their 
financial capabilities, and their public support base. 3 Thus it is possible that NGOs' 
desire to command a considerable budget and public profile, so as to acquire the 
bureaucratic and political attention that this generates, has led some organisations 
towards a policy position or action that they would not -on merit - have chosen to 
take. 
Conversely, the realisation by the public of an issue, in particular involving large fauna, 
can generate pressure for a particular NGO to pursue a certain issue. Member demands 
may lead to consideration of an issue that, due either to the unthreatened status of the 
species or lack of viable solutions, would have otherwise been a low priority for the 
organisation. 
With the maturation of the way in which bycatch is, at large, regarded, a third factor 
has emerged as a significant influence on agenda raising - that is, the bureaucracy. 
Bycatch has become increasingly viewed as unacceptable, not because of any 
substantial alteration in public or private philosophies since the issue's emergence in 
the 1970s, but rather due to greater recognition of the finite nature of marine resources 
2 Cobb, R., Ross, S. and Ross, M., "Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process" (1976) 70 
American Political Science Review 127. See Chapter Two at footnote 183 and accompanying text for 
discussion. 
3 Princen, T., "NGOs: Creating a Niche in Environmental Diplomacy ", in Princen, T. and Finger, M. 
(ed), Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global (Routledge, London, 
1994) pp.29 -17. 
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and the need for the conservation of these. Seen as inherently wasteful, bycatch's 
condemnation is thus explained. Prior to the evolution of this public attitude, little 
evidence of the use of a mobilisation model of agenda raising had occurred in the 
bycatch policy arena.' It is now recognised however that 
it is preferable to develop bycatch policies and action plans before there 
is a call for their application - and especially before the respective 
positions on the issue becomes polarized or emotional: 
Moreover, in both the U.S. and in Australia there has been a realisation of the 
permanence of the issue of bycatch. Industry resistance to bycatch on the agenda, 
though not gone entirely, has been reduced. This move has been assisted by 
international trends towards the acceptance of bycatch as a key concern, and an issue 
area requiring attention, as can be seen in several recent developments.' This 
international recognition has in turn assisted domestic moves towards the 
development of domestic policies by which the problem of incidental take can be 
uniformly and strategically addressed. 
Policy Formulation 
Policy formation commonly requires the accomplishment of two interrelated tasks. The 
first is the identification of the specific sorts of issues under consideration. In terms of 
bycatch, a checklist would include characteristics such as: 
primary stakeholders; 
technological aspects of the fishery (such as the spatial and temporal 
pattern of the bycatch, frequency with which bycatch occurs, the impact of 
bycatch upon the species population); 
the level of control that participants in the fishery have over bycatch, the 
degree of predictability; 
legal considerations associated with bycatch issues; and 
socio- economic considerations.' 
4 To recall a mobilisation model is one wherein issues are placed on the formal agenda by the 
government and potentially may involve neither a public grievance, nor public involvement in the 
subsequent policy formation process. 
5 Metzner, R., "Bycatch: Do We Care ? ", paper presented at ABARE Outlook '99 ( ABARE, Canberra, 
1999) in press. Dr Rebecca Metzner works for the Fisheries Department of the Government of Western 
Australia, Perth, Australia. 
6 Raising of an international agenda tends to occur by nations that have already addressed an issue on a 
domestic level and are looking to extend their policy beyond their jurisdiction. Examples include the 
expansion of U,S. tuna -dolphin and turtle- shrimp policies, and Australia's international promotion of a 
driftnetting ban. Recent international developments include the UK bycatch resolution put to the 
November meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Bonn Convention, and ongoing FAO attention to 
bycatch reduction. 
7 Hall, M., "On Bycatch" (1996) 6 Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 319. 
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The second part of the policy formation process is the selection of tactics amenable to 
problem mitigation and broader management needs. Options available for fisheries 
bycatch include: the threat or use of law both domestically and internationally; 
education and training schemes; trade, labeling and consumer demand mechanisms; 
and voluntary gear modification and mitigation tactics such as area closures. A 
combination of aspects of several of these tactics is often needed to successfully form 
a policy. 
The policy formation phase of the cycle is dominated by members of the policy sub- 
system, who bring some minimum level of knowledge to discussions. In regard to 
natural resources, science and domestic actors have tended to be the key factors in this 
stage of the policy cycle. 
Debate over the empirical nature of science and its degree of politicisation have led to 
polarised views over its correct role and influence in the policy forming process. 
Increasingly, science seems to be evolving into - rather than provider of empirical 
truths -a bridging mechanism between a purely evidentiary role and a judgement 
capacity. This has stemmed in part from a move towards interdisciplinary training, 
thus providing participants with an understanding of both science and policy process, 
as well as through the emergence and increased reliance on techniques such as 
projection modeling and risk weighted management. No longer are these two 
responsibilities of data generation and decision making strictly separate. There are 
dangers associated with this role with its obvious judgmental elements, including that 
a reduced level of confidence will be placed upon science by decision makers, or that 
scientists will use these new tools to enter further than the data supports into the 
realm of policy choice. Indeed it remains a truism that the job of a scientist is not to 
make moral decisions: the position of authority afforded scientists ought to be used to 
convey only those messages that are supported by the science. 
Notwithstanding advances in scientific knowledge over the decades, science still is (in 
general) unable to provide definitive answers. Instead, what has emerged is a series of 
arguments as to what to do in the face of uncertainty, the generally accepted position 
being that a precautionary approach ought to be taken. This is, in part, a recognition 
that, although scientific information today is so much greater than when decisions were 
-313- 
Sali Jayne Bache 
first being abdicated on the basis of insufficient knowledge,' uncertainty is an intrinsic 
part of any ecosystem.' 
Indeed, the increase in data gathering and analysis capabilities have led science to 
change over time from a species focus to more complex levels of stock differentiation 
at the meso, and ecosystems interactions at the macro scale. As scientific information 
and understanding increases, policy makers are calling upon more and more detailed 
explanations upon which to base their decisions. Irrespective of these advances, the 
available data differs across issue and jurisdiction. Though a heavy reliance on 
scientific information is a statutory requirement of Australia's endangered species 
legislation, the data gathering mandate in the U.S. under the MMPA, has not been 
replicated in Australia. Even in the U.S. where bycatch data has markedly increased, it 
is still rarely sufficient to provide any Ievel of 'certainty'. As stated, it is generally 
accepted that in situations where data is inconclusive a precautionary approach is 
required. Though the tenor of the precautionary principle is very clear, what is not so 
obvious is when to make a decision - how much is sufficient information, and how 
much is insufficient? 
The second identified key factor in the policy formation phase of the cycle, was that of 
domestic actors. Much extant literature refers to the domestic contingent of actors 
without adequate attention to each facet thereof. Of particular impact, and routinely 
under-recognised in its influence on policy formation, is that of industry bodies. 
Indeed, the influence of foreign organisations upon bycatch policy development is often 
equal in magnitude to the well documented impact of environmental NGOs. Industry 
bodies are not, however, always consistent in the policy position they take, operating 
at different times as both a promoting and retarding influence. The inadequacy of 
attention these groups have received can be, at least in part, explained by the 
intentional low profile they assume due to their preconception that most any publicity 
will be bad publicity. 
Industry groups tend not to have good media connections, be scornful of and not want 
to deal with publicity, and tend to be scattered into individual or regional efforts. They 
are often fiercely independant people, who live in a sub -culture that does not desire 
publicity. As one industry representative remarked: 
8 In the 1970s, when the issue of bycatch first emerged, the claim of a lack of data was a very real 
issue. Estimates of the number of dolphins taken in the ETP in an annual fishing year varied by orders of 
magnitude. No real information on the population sizes, or the needs of the species in regard to 
replenishment of deplete stock, were known. 
9 A reflection of the greater amount of information that is available today are recent legislative trends 
that direct the use of science based decision making such as is evidenced in the Australian ESPA. See 
Chapter One sub section 1.6 for discussion. 
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there is a lot of stuff that goes on that you don't hear about, because 
people either don't want to tell the story because they think it's a waste 
of time to be bragging, or they are afraid that someone is going to come 
after them because they are admitting that they killed a dolphin once, or 
they just don't have the capability and organisation and publicity 
machine. io 
Due to the direct relations the fishing industry has with its Iead agency, and the 
national revenue they raise and regional employment they provide, industry exerts 
considerable influence over both the administrative and the elected branches of 
government. This means that they do not need the same level profile as NGOs, who 
rely in part upon public opinion for their influence. Industry also tends to not to record 
events, they communicate at fishing shows and through word of mouth. In this regard, 
this thesis makes a contribution through the documentation of significant actions by 
the fishing industry, both voluntary and coerced, in relation to marine wildlife bycatch. 
A variety of the changes here discussed have led to the emergence of a more 
consultative framework for fisheries management policy in both the U.S. and 
Australia. In particular this has emerged through TRTs in the U.S and, to a lesser 
extent, through fisheries management advisory committees and more recently bycatch 
working groups in Australia. The holding of small closed meetings, comprising all 
stakeholders, has been lauded as providing a forum where a greater exchange of 
information and ideas, than occurs in a public meeting, is possible. 
Such governance arrangements serve to create a new role for NGOs and industry alike. 
Increasingly, these previously opposed groups, still with different primary aims, are 
liaising and compromising on outcome objectives. The strengths of the TRT model 
include that they are consensus rather than majority rule and thus encourage a 
bipartisan arrangement to be reached. Another lauded, though somewhat contentious, 
characteristic is the absence of a government official on the committee, agency 
employees being restricted to an advisory role.' In terms of participation in bycatch 
management, the U.S. has much more experience than Australia, though this situation 
is altering through, for example, the KTP process. Representative organisations, and in 
particular environmental NGOs, are no longer restricted to the agenda raising and 
policy implementation phases of the policy cycle, but are now increasingly involved in 
problem solving and policy formation aspects. 
10 Per. comm. Rod Moore, Executive Director West Coast Seafood Processors Association, Portland 
(OR), 31 March 1999. 
I l Per. comm. Laurie Allen, Fishery Biologist, Protected Species Program, National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS), Northeast Region, Gloucester (MA), 5 April 1999. 
- 315 - 
Sali Jayne Bache 
Ideally, policy and the design of management rules and regulations occurs 
via an interactive and cooperative process involving an array of 
stakeholders. Although cooperative processes do not necessarily generate 
rapid results, the results are likely to be more durable and subject to fewer 
ongoing challenges than a top -down management approach where new 
rules are applied without considerable collaboration.' 
Policy Implementation 
Implementation, in particular of international arrangements, but also of domestic 
policies, is the most poorly examined of the three phases of the policy cycle. There is 
no denying that the difficulties associated with the responsibility of imposing the 
social arrangements necessary to either avoid a tragedy situation, or to implement the 
public will to protect marine wildlife, make this an onerous task. 
Co -option has been expanding not only in the policy formation arena, making a role for 
previously excluded NCOs, but is also beginning to emerge in the implementation 
phase of the cycle. This can be seen in international forums, in particular, where 
environmental NGOs are striving to gain legitimate recognition as the courier of the 
public conscience. Environmentalists have for years sought, and variously received, 
observer status and inclusion in official negotiating parties. More recently, however 
some have also begun to purse a role at the implementation phase of the multilateral 
policy process. The most stark example is the IATTC model. This arrangements is still 
formative, and many other forums still prohibit NGOs as even observers. It appears, 
though, that a turn towards increased acceptance of NGOs has begun. The rationale 
herein, to be sure, would be little different from that well represented in the literature 
with regard to co -option in domestic structures." 
Although, as has long been realised by commentators, the U.S. system provides for 
greater judicial participation in the enforcement of laws than does it in Australia, the 
actual impacts that this has had upon policy and its implementation has been less 
thoroughly considered. When a law is not clear it is determined in a system of court 
cases. Though an active courts system such as that demonstrated in the U.S. can assist 
in the implementation in particular of policies, the shaping of policy by litigation is 
often slow and most certainly ad hoc. It is not a preferred way to make policy. It 
places a heavy burden on the Act because those parties that are unsuccessful in the 
courts are then left with only the recourse of changing the law through the legislature. 
12 Metzner (1999) op cit n5. 
13 For a discussion on co- option See Chapter Two, footnote 105 and accompanying text. 
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Extant literature also recognises, however, that bureaucracies hostile to politically 
driven changes may attempt to ignore or reinterpret the policy in their preferred 
manner. And that in this situation, interest groups have a valid role as enforcer of the 
legislative policy. In Australia, the difficulties associated with gaining standing in the 
courts, and prohibitive legal costs, have resulted in a substantially smaller role for the 
courts than occurs in the U.S.. Though Iegal opinions are still sought and used in policy 
decisions in Australia, this lack of access to the judicial system has at times allowed a 
agencies to exert an extremely broad range of controls. 
Commonly overlooked in the literature is the influence of science on policy 
implementation: as in policy formation, the absence of adequate or defensible science 
has been used for decades as a reason for avoiding action even once the issue is on the 
agenda and a policy has been formed. Denial of the accuracy of data, or claims of bias 
in the methodology, is not an infrequently used tactic in attempts to stall the 
implementation of a policy. Moreover, and infrequently mentioned in policy literature, 
this in extreme cases extends beyond attempts to discredit data, to the vilification of 
scientists themselves. Examples can be seen in both the TED dispute in the U.S. and in. 
dugong bycatch policy developments off the Queensland coast in Australia. Regardless 
of the accuracy of claims of bias in data, this is an issue which should have been 
resolved at the policy formation stage of the process. When raised during 
implementation such claims may result in both questioning of the validity of these 
protestations due to their late emergence, or the reopening of an issue believed to have 
been near to closure. 
Perhaps the most under -recognised impediment to policy, and particularly legislative 
implementation, is the lack of availability and structure for funding arrangements. In 
neither the U.S. nor Australia, is there any overall policy on who should pay for 
various aspects of governmental policy once developed. 
Appropriations Committees' control over allocational decisions may give 
them almost as much influence over the implementation of federal 
programs as the legislative committees that authorized them. However the 
power of the purse while substantial does not extend to the outright 
reversal of agency policy.'} 
In both Australia and the U.S., the cost of observer programs has been a recent 
particular point of contention. For example, although many Australian fisheries 
operate on a cost recovery basis, this applies to only some aspects of the fishery, and 
14 ZelImer, S., "Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional 
Crisis" (1997) 2 Harvard Environmental Law Review 457. See also LeBoeuf, J., "Limitations on the 
Use of Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Policy Changes" (1992) 19 Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly 457. 
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many fall in a hazy area of uncertainty. And yet, notwithstanding these difficulties 
and the delay and impediment they have caused to policy implementation, still no 
policy to address these questions has been created, making this a primary example of 
where institutions would benefit by learning from parallel and previous experiences. 
Although not having provided a panacea to international problems of resource 
management and conservation, trade is still being widely touted as a policy solution to 
nations reticent to implement international accords, and by the U.S. as a means of 
policy extension. To be sure, the specifics of some of these arrangements have matured. 
Though trade measures have been in use since the first consideration of the issue of 
marine wildlife bycatch, they have altered significantly. The first generation of 
environmental trade measures were simple prohibitions or product standards. The 
second generation required a judgement about foreign practice or policies. The third 
generation are more market driven incentives rather than direct regulations, for 
example the levy of tax where the production of certain by- products occurs.15 
An emergent trade related policy is that of the use of market as implementer through 
the instigation of eco- labeling or certification schemes. This is a seemingly under - 
utilised policy option in Australia. As an alternative solution, outside of the legislative 
process, this has the potential to offer a viable, alternative method by which to 
facilitate the reduction of marine wildlife bycatch. The greatest merit of the eco- labeling 
and consumer choice is its ability to alter the way in which bycatch is considered: that 
is, not as an impact to be managed, but rather as an environmental cost of fishing that 
needs to be ameliorated by the fishing industry. Internalising bycatch and accepting 
mitigation as a basic part of fishing, and passing the cost along to consumers, is a step 
towards acknowledging that the cost of minimising environmentally deleterious actions 
should be borne by those that benefit from the activity. 
The Future of Bycatch Policy 
Perhaps because of the lack of sufficient science to explain the intricate nature of the 
problem, but also due to the need to accommodate both conservation and economic 
imperatives, the key solutions pursued in bycatch mitigation to date have been 
technological ones. Although this aspect is unlikely to alter, bycatch is nonetheless an 
evolving issue. 
In addition to those cases discussed in detail in Chapters One and Three through Five, 
there are a number of new bycatch issues likely to require detailed consideration in 
15 Charmovitz, S., "Environmentalism Confronts GATT Rules: Recent Developments and New 
Opportunities" (1993) 27 Journal of World Trade 35. 
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both Australia and the U.S.. These include bycatch in illegal, unregulated and 
unobserved (IUU) fisheries: such as the Italian driftnet fishery that is now being 
targeted by U.S. unilateral embargo action, and pirate longlining in the Southern . Ocean. 
The ability of existing regimes, such as CCAMLR, to adapt so as to be able to redress 
these problems will be tested. In this regard, one method that is increasingly gaining 
support is that of multilateral embargo action by member nations of particular fisheries 
regimes, on recalcitrant non -signatories (and with the potential to expand such 
arrangements to non -compliant parties).16 The next stage for many issues that have 
been, by and large, tackled as problems of domestic concern, will be the search for 
solutions to these problems beyond even regional settings, and into the international 
arena. 
Other issues of emerging importance are that of competition between fisheries and 
marine wildlife species, such as is witnessed in terms of seals and sea lions in both the 
U.S. and Australian waters. Related to this, is the issue of the increasing health of 
some species or populations that have recovered and even flourished under extant 
protective mechanisms. Increasingly it is becoming a question of ethics that legislators 
are having to consider, rather than that of biodiversity or species preservation. Indeed 
it was commented that 
there is a certain aspect of reducing the bycatch of charismatic species 
that is a little bit of science and a whole lot of love.17 
Increasing scenarios where, rather than a choice between fish productivity and marine 
mammal protection, a selection between ecosystem conservation and preservationist 
values will be required.' This alteration of previously resource management issues, to 
more species preservation issues will challenge policy makers and interest groups alike, 
with polarised views developing between previous allies. Increasingly, also, less 
charismatic species that have not shared the same level of public attention as marine 
wildlife, will be biologically threatened and requiring protection, at times, at the 
expense of profitable industries. 
16 Anon, Stock Management Measures Taken by the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas ( ICCAT) in Relation to Trade Measures (note by the Secretariat of the ICCAT, to World 
Trade Organisation, Committee on Trade and Environment, 16 July 1998 WT /CTE /W/87); Resolution 
on an Action Plan to Ensure the Effectiveness of the Conservation Program for Atlantic Bluefm Tuna 
(adopted Ninth Special Meeting (Madrid, November -December 1994)); and Resolution Regarding Belize 
and Honduras Pursuant to the 1994 Bluefin Tuna Action Plan Resolution (adopted Tenth Special 
Meeting (San Sabastian, November 1996)). 
17 Per. comm. Victoria Cornish, Fishery Biologist, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), Office 
of Protected Resources, Washington DC, 19 April 1999. 
18 The operation of environmental based NGOs is on occasion hampered by the division between 
conservationists and preservationist. The open airing of these discordant views in policy discussions can 
potentially limit the effectiveness of those striving to safeguard marine mammal populations from 
unnecessary harm. 
-319- 
Sali Jayne Bache 
We are now moving into a new era of technology. Possible policy solutions are 
emerging that have not previously been available due, by and large, to the difficulties 
that had existed in the implementation of such policies. The emergence of technologies 
such as vessel monitoring systems are allowing more selective restrictions, better 
monitoring and harsher penalties for contravention. Indeed, notwithstanding the 
impediments, controversies and mismanagement of the past, the future of bycatch 
policy as it matures to be considered an issue area of concern, looks hopeful. 
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